

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS

*AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

EDITORS

FRANCIS JAMES BROWN

CHARLES HODGES

JOSEPH SLABEY ROUCEK

CO-AUTHORS

Howard Becker
Edwin Borchard
Joseph A. Borowik
Phillips Bradley
Francis James Brown
Marie J. Carroll
Ugo V. d'Amunzio
Robert W. Desmond
John Donaldson
Theodore Draper
R. Ernest Dupuy

C J Friedrich
Pennington Haile
John Eugene Harley
Charles Hodges
Bruce Hopper
Will Irwin
Hans Kohn
K. C. Leebrick
William W. Lockwood, Jr
Charles E. Martin
Warner Moss
DeWitt Clinton Poole

O. W. Riegel
Joseph Slabey Roucek
Frank M. Russell
Henry R. Spencer
Graham Stuart
William Lonsdale Tayler
Walter W. Van Kirk
Arthur P. Whitaker
Benjamin H. Williams
Robert Gale Woolbert
Quincy Wright

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TO
OUR PARENTS
OURSELVES
AND
OUR CHILDREN

*As We Walk The War Road
Seeking Peace*

PREFACE

Public interest in international problems has never been so widespread as at present. One cannot read the daily paper without delving deeply, and often beyond one's knowledge and understanding, into the complex web of international relations. The conditions in the world indicate that the thundering events on both hemispheres will continue to hold the headlines and remain the center of interest.

The public has been bombarded with all kinds of printed material, both informative and of a purely propagandist character. But the growing complexity of public problems and the accelerating rate with which international politics change make it increasingly difficult for the student of foreign affairs to orient himself carefully in the maze of daily international happenings. Not so long ago, the observer of the international scene had at least the advantage of being able to sleep, although somewhat fitfully, over the week ends. Even this advantage is gone today, and the observer, like the British Cabinet, must now expect "surprises" even on Sunday.

The authors of this book are fully convinced that there is a distinct need for a work outlining carefully the fundamentals of international politics, an introduction to the factors which underlie the swiftly moving events on the world stage. Since the mass of available knowledge can be mastered by specialists only, this symposium, each chapter written by an authority in his respective subject, aims to synthesize the available material in world politics for those who are looking for a foundation to this all-embracing and all-important field today. Thus this symposium is designed to bring together in a single volume the points of view representative of the best thought on contemporary world problems. Each chapter aims to bring into sharp focus the main factors involved in each area and their bearing upon related fields.

This book utilizes the new approach to the field of international politics. The post-War years were under the spell of the legalistic approach, owing to the emphasis laid on the newly introduced techniques in world affairs emphasizing the legalistic aspects of world

problems—such as the League of Nations, the World Court, and other institutions. Hence many studies were concerned primarily with this approach to international relations. Today, however, international anarchy has broken the backbone of—although it has not given a *coup de grâce* to—these highly desirable devices, and the institutions of international law, of international order, are violated with impunity and scorn by many aggressive states. Consequently, the major emphasis is on the policy of “Blood and Iron,” on the “Realpolitik,” on the pragmatic aspects of international relations rather than on the legal aspects.

The time is, indeed, propitious for this approach, since the scholarly ranks of America have been increasingly interested in the problem of “irrational” factors in social relations, as evidenced in the vogue of Pareto, Mosca, Lasswell, T. Arnold, and others.

Despite the comprehensive field covered by this book, the editors have sought to give unity and sequence to the organization of the material. Part I is a realistic overview of “World Conflict,” with sufficient historical perspective to interpret present trends. In Part II, “Major Foreign Policies,” and Part III, “Regional Interests,” the authors analyze these conflicts in each of the areas of the world and indicate the interrelation of the problems involved. Part IV summarizes and evaluates the efforts toward “World Organization.” Emphasis is laid in Part V upon the agencies for “Making World Opinion,” with frank recognition of the irrational factors involved. Part VI is a summary and evaluation of the “Roads to World Peace,” the relation of social thought to world peace being presented by a spokesman for each respective group.

The editors and the co-authors of this book, when starting on this project, believed that their task was more than making a collection of individual papers by authorities in various fields. They feel that the weakness of a symposium generally lies in just this resulting lack of integration. Hence they have sought to obviate much of this impression by contributing to each section of related chapters both an introductory statement designed to present a conspectus of the problems treated in the group, and a concluding summary of the group of chapters, here, again, drawing together the results of the lines of thoughts thus developed.

Each contributor was sent a brief statement of the purpose of the

book and a complete outline. As far as possible, chapter outlines and in a few instances manuscripts were exchanged among the contributors. Each contributor was left free, however, to treat his own subject in his own way and to present his own viewpoint frankly and fearlessly. The editors make no apology for the seeming inconsistencies among the viewpoints presented by different contributors. To be wholly consistent in a field so fraught with conflicting points of view would relegate the book to the level of propaganda rather than provide the reader with a broad and sympathetic understanding of current international politics.

The text is supplemented by a uniform and comprehensive system of pictorial material, the work of Professor Charles Hodges. Professor Hodges has developed this material to visualize the world problems discussed in the book. He has made this presentation as his commentary upon the broad problem and not as an exposition of the particular ideas of any of the authors.

The limited and carefully selected bibliographies will be useful to those who are interested in exploring further the specific field of their own interest.

Although prepared primarily as a textbook for the many courses in various phases of international relations, the book should prove of equal interest to the layman concerned with understanding better the rapidly moving events of world history.

It cannot be stressed strongly enough that the underlying aim of both editors and contributors is to work for peace—a fact which must not at all be intermingled with the desire of the authors to be “realistic.” No peace will ever be achieved without realism, and the roads to peace can be discovered only by those who courageously face facts and, without bias or emotion, evaluate present trends. Nothing will be able to repay all who have participated in the preparation of the book more than the much-hoped-for assurance that this undertaking will have helped to promote substantial knowledge of world affairs, and thus further the cause of peace; for, without such knowledge, any effort at real peace will prove once again only tragic futility.

New York City
January 1, 1939

FRANCIS J. BROWN
CHARLES HODGES
JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

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PART I

WORLD CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

The Editors

We are living today in a period of transition. Two world hopes—collective security and the sanctity of unilateral pacts of mutual defense—have become but illusive myths. International relations are characterized by the disruption of both intrastate and interstate relationships, which are being shattered in an ever-accelerated tempo. New kinds of wars, whether declared or undeclared, are indicative of these rapid changes, since war has been, and is, the most effective—as well as the most destructive—method of bringing about changes.

The undeclared conflict continues in its third year in China; the revolution in Spain drags on into its fourth year with munitions and men from several nations, yet there is no war, as defined by international diplomacy! Regardless of definitions of diplomats, war is a stark reality today as it has been throughout the long history of mankind. Preparation for war proceeds at a pace never before equaled during peace. The “danger spots” that shift with each passing month are more than danger zones. They are not causes of war, but symptoms of basic conflicts. No realistic approach to international politics is possible without seeking a frank answer to the age-old question, “Why War?”

From one point of view, all these rapidly moving forces of international politics are expressed in the rising tide of nationalism. The high idealists who put their faith in the extension of nationalism into internationalism have been sorely disappointed as they have witnessed it become more imperial-

istic than international. Nationalism has become at the same time both the expression of and the motivating instrument for the nationalists of every country in their onward struggle for power.

Back of these conflicts are certain social forces. The thesis of the "haves" versus the "have-nots" is currently in vogue as an explanation of the troubles of the world today. Yet the newer studies, analyzing the deeper motives of human behavior, indicate that much of our current rationalizations are the superstructures built on the more hidden mainsprings of our wishful thinking. This all too easy "explanation" can be questioned, as being only another ideology justifying the imperialistic policies of the "pushing" nations of today. The fallacy of the thesis can be demonstrated by such simple questions as: Why does not such a "have-not" nation as Norway strive with the eagerness of Germany to acquire new territory? Or, if Italy, as a "have-not" nation, cannot support its population, why does Mussolini offer prizes for the largest families?

The answer lies in the fact that the basic elements of international relations are "power politics," the efforts at domination. Such efforts are then projected into "rationalized" demands. In this respect, the economic demands are extremely important because such economic activities are the prime methods of attaining power.

The application of "power politics" has no better illustration than that of imperialism. It is as old as the tears of Alexander, weeping for new worlds to conquer; as new as the *Drang nach Osten*—"Push to the East"—of Hitler's Germany. Few nations of modern history, and certainly not our own, have escaped the expansionist policy. Millions have given their lives in the interest of, or the curbing of vaulting ambition for, the extension of boundaries. Nations have eagerly vied with

one another to assume "the white man's burden," and whole continents have been apportioned on the claims of discovery, exploration, or conquest, or as the spoils of war. Imperialism has been a major factor in world conflict.

The final chapter in Part I turns from the analysis of the factors underlying world conflict to a discussion of the instruments of conflict—"Nations at War." Modern warfare is no longer carried on by the armed forces alone. Areas of Shanghai were but crumbled stones and twisted steel weeks before the Japanese entered its gates. An official warning during the Sudeten Deutschland crisis urged all Parisians to leave the city if at all possible; bomb shelters were dug in London parks; and in Prague, even baby buggies were equipped with gas-proof vents.

Not only are there no longer any "non-combatants," but it can be safely said that there is no field of human endeavor which has not been drafted into the current struggle for power. Since war at the present time is more a normal state of affairs than an abnormal one, it is important to note the conclusions of a highly capable student of military strategy that the national fighting ability depends on concerted efforts of the whole nation and that the old distinction between the weapons for defense and those for offense is no longer recognized.

The student of international politics must face the hard and even repellent facts of world conflict if he is intelligently to seek its amelioration or elimination.

CHAPTER I

WHY WAR?

Charles Hodges

War again is here today.

Though these skirmishes which mark another world conflict lack the given stamp of legal formalities by which nations used to be inducted into warfare, the discernible characteristics of a major struggle for power confront us. States are obliterated or mutilated beyond political recognition; new creations appear on the map overnight. Vast armies, from east Asia to the Spanish peninsula, wage undeclared war. Governments issue casualty lists. Allies, likewise technically "at peace," bootleg men and material with ostentatious unneutrality—occasionally interrupted by open forays to be viewed juridically and therefore obviously unofficially as "piracy." Neutrals, i.e., those states bluffed out of participation in the risky game, or too proud to fight this kind of guerrilla warfare, or too afraid to jeopardize already threatened interests, or too engrossed in domestic problems, parade their neutrality.

There should be no mystery about this second world war of assassination, putsch, and undeclared conflict. It must exist, because not only is it the open record of diplomacy; it is within the everyday experiences of all of us. From streamer heads to terse official communiques covering undeclared war fronts, these conflicts are reported with all the orthodox newspaper coverage of orthodox warfare; it is seen, as newsreel "shorts" sandwiched in between the glamorous unreality of Hollywood's double features, in neighborhood motion-picture theaters; it is broadcast day by day over the air in bulletins and "special events" coverage which no dial twiddler can tune out completely in a search for swing music or its momentary successor, while, incidentally, other men than combatants die sudden, violent death in these undeclared war zones—so, too, do women and children, under the understandable confusion of "military objectives" which

naturally arises from the stepped-up tempo of totalitarian war on land, on sea, and in the air.

The clinical evidence has been piling up not for days, not for weeks, not even for months, but now for years. What is the meaning of these truly lethal events?

A MEANS TO AN END

The ominous rumble of these explosions has one message for us: war remains the supreme instrument of national policy in contemporary world politics.

This has one reassuring aspect. Whatever else war may be, it is not an end in itself; it is a means to an end. By this orientation, we shift the spotlight from obscuring effect to illuminating cause—from the instrument to its wielder. The modern state emerges as the creator and the employer of war for calculated political objectives summed up in the phrase “national policy.” Good, bad, or indifferent, these ends pursued by a nation in its international relations dominate the war system; men and arms, military power, implement a state’s policy—nothing more. Hence “power politics.”

This is taken to be synonymous with political realism. We, too, may take it as such to the degree that we accept the dictates of untrammelled nationalism. Every state, in contemporary world politics, must seek abroad these things that will strengthen it at home. Such a compelling direction to national policy exists irrespective of the beneficiaries of the process, also viewed realistically as those who actually control the machinery of the state at home, because the interests served are in any case paramount. However the regime be constituted at home, the projection of its interests into what we call foreign affairs proceeds along the single line—the acquisition of the means that enable a modern state to impose its will, execute its purposes. Thus war is the ultimate extension of power politics. It is marked by the use of force, legally sanctioned or otherwise, in the realization of national objectives.

It may be interposed here by the more squeamish among us that the concept of power politics in international society runs counter to the ideals of world order. This is obviously true. For it, we have the testimony of world disorder in spite of League of Nations covenants, anti-war pacts, and the rest of the internationalism surcharging the

1920's. Like war itself, all these impedimenta of peace can be viewed only as means to an end. We therefore do not run up against a dramatically simple choice between "good" and "evil"—i.e., peace and war. What we do encounter is the much more complicated choosing between the techniques of international co-operation and those of war for the realization of obviously conflicting national purposes.

Even more invidious is the underlying motivation of such statesmanship. The advocates of the peace techniques favor the status quo. The advocates of the war technique, more pleasantly called power politics, favor change. Both the peace and war techniques therefore are means to the same end: national power. Both are concerned with the acquisition and/or preservation of such power on the world map. At no time in international society has the issue been peace or war as alternative ends in themselves, toward one or the other of which states proposed to bend their whole energies.

The upshot is that states in contemporary world politics are reluctant to make the equally contemporary identification of peace with power politics. Obviously, those in the high places of government know this to be the case; but they deem it not to be in the public interest that these peace techniques, heretofore converging upon Geneva, appear simply as another way of aggrandizement or preservation of the fruits of past aggrandizement. The Chamberlains no longer would be able to return from future Munichs with anything politically meaningful in a phrase such as "bringing peace with honor."

Notwithstanding the essential humbug surrounding the practices of peace techniques within the framework of power politics, this lip service to world co-operation should not be dismissed as wholly inconsequential. There remains its ideological residue, democracy. This has manifested itself in world affairs as a bulwarking idealism permeating nations where popular government still strives against the onrush of fascistic power politics. Herein lies the beginning of a significant conflict in international society—the pulling apart of states conforming to diametrically opposed patterns of conduct.

Behind this statement, there is the more disturbing observation that the world of states no longer agrees upon the fundamental characteristics of "peacelike" and "warlike" relations even to the degree it once did. This is the final contribution of embattled

AFTER MUNICH - APPEASEMENT ON THE HOME FRONT

Within four weeks of the Munich deal, shares of the ten leading arms firms increased in value by over one hundred millions of dollars - \$107,075,000


Vickers, \$40,000,000

United Steel, \$10,000,000

Baldwin munitions, \$25,000,000

E t c.

LOMBARD STREET REGISTERS
IN HEAVY INDUSTRY BRITISH
SKEPTICISM OVER THE CZECH
SELL-OUT BRINGING PEACE



A Fact a Picture by Charles Hodges

THE INDUSTRIAL AREAS ARE SHOWN
SHADED; THE BASIC COAL MINING,
BLACK.

ideologies. Each camp is struggling to mold the world more and more iconoclastically to its own particular pattern. Entrenched nationalism emerges supreme. With it, power politics comes into its peculiar own of men, machines, and high-voltage ideas. War, as a sociological fact irrespective of juridic definition, reasserts its primacy as the challenging instrument of national policy.

THE POTENTIALITIES OF CONFLICT

The ingredients of contemporary conflicts, even so oversimplified, need to be spread realistically on the map. These can be likened to layers whose breadth increases in inverse ratio to their connection with what we call politics. The greatest "depth" therefore is to be found in the most elaborate state organizations, notably that of the business states where capitalistic industrialism, led by the financial nose, achieves its final connection between economics and politics.

First, we have the old superficial political clashes. They constitute the clashes literally on the surface of world politics that make the headlines. They are the polarizing points of conflict—not to be taken as unimportant but in themselves only signs of deeper and more significant currents of conflict.

Second, there are the underlying economic rivalries beneath these conventional political antagonisms. This subsoil of economic struggle represents the battles of capitalistic imperialism beneath the surface of conventional diplomacy. Covered by the familiar terrain of politics, these battles engendered by the international competition of business systems explode in the open as economic warfare.

Third, deep down in subterranean depths, the underlying strata of conflicting social ideas represent ideological cataclysms. Thus the clashes marking the undeclared second world war have a graver meaning than the disturbances of 1911 to 1914. They are the manifestations of struggles of embattled social systems underneath our more familiar world politics and their train of economic interests. They wrench international society with unpredictable but revolutionary strains.

Naturally these three planes of struggle, all related to each other, reveal increasing depths of conflict within international society. Insiders in London, Paris, Berlin, and other focal points of diplomacy know that today's statesmanship cuts across these rivalries—from the

surfacelike play of politics in the deceptive traditional manner, through the economic competition, down into the remote layers of ideological antagonism mobilized under the banners of fascism, communism, and democracy. These combine in a kind of three-dimensional struggle to make the collisions of international politics go deeper and deeper into the national life of peoples round the globe.

The Munich milestone in post-War Europe bears witness to this complication of diplomacy and war. France typifies above all the traditional statecraft now strait-jacketed in legalism. Britain, equally agile in using the old diplomacy, nevertheless stands for the supremacy of economic forces; the banker mentality of Lombard Street permeates the government offices of Whitehall. Germany, however, has the whip hand with its brutal punch of fascist ideology—the nazi political paganism given a world drive because regimented thinking “makes it so.”

Hence Hitler's blackmail is calculated soundly. Against the background of diplomatic terrorism, the nazi dictator of Europe can dole out momentary security at a seemingly fabulous price. The decision in European foreign offices is made to turn upon the bogey of bolshevism, which fascism's propaganda more and more identifies with democratic peoples everywhere they repudiate the brown-black creed. This idea of chaos, of course, dragoons lawyer-run France and banker-dominated Britain into choosing the “lesser evil” of unholy fascistic alliance. Thus we have a community of effort, the Big Four, established on ideological grounds. It overrides the inner political and economic contradictions animating Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome—for Hitler's “yes man” on the Mediterranean must not be forgotten.

If the anti-democratic basis of the nazi-dictated combination is strong enough, the overlying diplomatic and business antagonisms of the Hitler-Chamberlain-Daladier-Musolini bund can be resolved temporarily. Such a maneuver does not mean there is peace; the world is simply given another kind of warfare for tomorrow—the crusade technique of fascistic gangsterism. The German-Italian combination has operated in republican Spain with cynical openness of purpose; Japan, actively supported from the fascist west, has attempted to cripple nationalist China; all three, not unreasonably counting upon

support from pro-fascist regimes in France and Britain, have skirmished with "the" enemy, Soviet Russia.

This, and no real peace, has to be in our time. No longer can we speak in the old way of "danger spots" upon the world map. We live in the midst of zones of conflict—even camouflaged war. Our nominal peace is a legal fiction determined by whether or not it is advantageous for belligerents to declare war; even more so, for neutrals to proclaim neutrality!

THREE KINDS OF WARFARE

The realist, reconciling himself to the nominal character of contemporary peace, will follow three kinds of conflict being waged round the globe today.

The first comes from the depths of irreconcilable social conflict—the universal, all-pervading "war of ideas." The second wells up from the economic strata of capitalistic conflict—the equally far-flung commercial battle lines of the "war of goods." The third is just war, the good old mailed fist of nations, with a new political twist given its ancient trilogy of death, desolation, and defeat by fascism.


At first sight, the war of ideas appears as a farfetched concept of hostilities. The propaganda battles of a Goebbels, however, are not airy dialectics. From the Berlin-directed assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss to the strangling of Austrian nationalism, there was warfare. Its upshot was the disappearance of a state from the map of Europe; captives by the thousands, though "concentration camps" become the euphemism for military prisons; and refugees in the hundreds of thousands despoiled of livelihood. The disruption of Czechoslovakia, too, cannot be written off as an act of God. The mutilation of this central European democracy beyond recognition was the direct outcome of a battle launched with the cry of *Blut und Volk* from the nazi dictatorship. It was carried to a successful conclusion by an international propaganda assault; this broke the nerve of two democratic states whose governmental heads surrendered with an abjectness not found in their former foe on November 11, 1918.

This "mental armament," first used to defend a Germany without military defense after the World War, now takes its gangster offensive down the Danube to direct murder in Rumania and across the Atlantic to attempt the destruction of even quasi-democratic regimes


in Latin America. Needless to say, others than the nazi have operated propaganda machines along these lines; but the Reich represents the clearest example of the connection between the ideological battle and international violence because it has produced the most devastating results. The resolving power of alliances between governments with common ideological foundations is tremendous. The fascist bloc, notwithstanding deep political and economic antagonisms, can contain the diplomatic and business rivalries of an Italy and a Germany, not to mention their Japanese camp follower.

The battle line of business, secondly, testifies to the fighting power of capitalistic nationalism. It is the war system carried into the economic world, for continuous conflict characterizes the commercial front. The great business states, however ententes may mitigate bread-and-butter rivalry, are economic foes. They fight trade wars for markets; they fight tariff wars for preferential business opportunity; they fight money wars for financial domination with the dollar, pound, and yen, which are just as much armaments as battleships, planes, and tanks. These economic weapons are employed for the same purpose—to cripple adversaries and impose the victor's will upon the vanquished. Economic self-sufficiency, sought most completely by the fascist states as "autarchy," is nothing more than a declaration of war on the modern world economy. These closed business régimes, deliberately walling themselves off from all economic collaboration, seek to profiteer on international trade. They rear themselves on the political landscape as fortresses of predatory capitalism. From their commercial battlements, the gauge of battle is flung disdainfully at those who have illusions of economic stabilization, observance of treaty obligations, and similar old-fashioned ideas of commercial co-operation along lines of "fair" competition.

When, finally, we reach war itself in the orthodox meaning, it is important only because the combat has become open physical strife in the military sense. It brings into full view the struggle already being waged elsewhere in the ideological and economic spheres. Now we see it, we hear it—possibly fatally smell it or feel it. Such warfare, seemingly the age-old marshaling of soldiers and arms, sums up contemporary predatory power politics in its mobilization of every asset of civilization for destruction. Violence reaches its full world



INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE 1919-1939



1) JAPAN'S SEIZURE OF MANCHURIA, 1931-32

2) JAPAN'S SHANGHAI CAMPAIGN, 1932

3) JAPAN'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN NORTH CHINA, 1934-36

JAPAN'S UNDECLARED WAR ON NATIONALIST CHINA, 1937-39

NICARAGUA: U.S. INTERVENTION IN SANDINO REVOLT WITH FORCE, 1925-33

UNDECLARED WAR BETWEEN PERU & COLOMBIA, 1932

CHACO WAR BOLIVIA & PARAGUAY 1925-35

BOLSHEVIK WAR POLAND 1920

WHITE RUSSIANS vs. BOLSHEVIKS IN A SERIES OF FOREIGN-BACKED INTERVENTIONS 1919-22

ITALO-GREEK CLASH, 1923

SPANISH WAR, 1936-39 REPUBLICAN SPAIN ATTACKED BY FRANCO AND GERMAN & ITALIAN ALLIES

THE RIF WAR, 1919-25 SPAIN, FRANCE GRECO-TURKISH WAR, 1919-21

FRANCE vs. SYRIANS, 1925

PALESTINE WAR BRITAIN-ARABS 1938-39

ITALO-ABYSSINIAN WAR 1935-36

PACIFICATION STILL REQUIRES WAR

ARAB WARFARE IN 1920S, GIVING CONTROL TO IBN SAUD

proportions: airplanes are turned into bombers; chemicals become poison gas; men transform themselves into machines. . . .

THE SHOCK OF WAR

Wishful thinking has marked modern opposition to war as an instrument of national policy. With every increase in the shock of war on international society, there has been a corresponding popular revulsion.

As technology, especially from the middle of the nineteenth century, steadily stepped up the potential hitting power of arms, there appeared offsetting arguments to show how these advances would make war "impossible." Unfortunately, the outcome has been uniformly onesided; the potentialities of destruction have increased without apparently affecting recourse to war. Everyone heard on the eve of the First World War how the costs of modern war made conflict impossible. An earlier generation had been fed on the strengthening bonds of business as bringing nations together in a common commercial destiny defying recourse to war. A later generation is being brought up on the "horror-of-it" theme which plays up the terrors of aviation and chemical warfare—even the strongest shrinking from lethal searing of a metropolitan-trapped population . . . unless, as rumored, a Hitler brought a British prime minister to quaking knees by a secret, aerial super-death threat.

Unfortunately there would appear to be no correlation between the increased ravages of modern warfare and decreased resort to force. Admittedly, the international shock of war has intensified along four lines. First, the militarization of nations has increased tremendously in terms of numbers of combatants and the civilian backing of armies as a behind-the-lines, nation-wide mobilization; hence the quantitative disruption of normal existence has been vastly extended. Second, the zone of conflict has spread so that the theater of warfare ceases to be the immediate vicinity of the belligerents themselves or even continental; it extends from continent to continent in a global conflagration following the incendiary lines of contemporary business and politics. Third, war costs have assumed such staggering proportions that we would hazard the economic impossibility of modern conflict once again did we not know much better from the lesson of the First World War. Fourth,

since warfare always employs the highest destructive power of any civilization, we now move into a mechanized military age; today men pit themselves against machines as the logical extension of the Industrial Revolution into combats of world politics.

Foremost, then, we live in a warridden civilization. This in itself marks the intensification of the shock to society from modern hostilities.

The Ancient and Medieval Epochs, together with the early centuries of the Modern Age, all have important common characteristics—the man power involved in warfare was small; the loss of life, low; the repercussion on society, proportionately less with regard to the intensity of military effort, its actual duration, and social penetration. It is not accidental that the Napoleonic Era marks a change. The mass army appeared simultaneously with the expansion of the Industrial Revolution. Henceforth, down to the World War's supreme strain, the military effort, both in terms of continuous peacetime preparation and in national mobilization from the firing line to industry during actual hostilities, has extended steadily the shock of warfare. A few thousand men were engaged in the Peloponnesian Wars, and European conflicts seldom involved armies exceeding some tens of thousand rank and file until the seventeenth century; but later warfare has steadily advanced the numbers involved so that hundreds of thousands have become the unit of appraisal. Military experts even talk about returning to the much smaller mobile forces to replace the gigantic armies overtaking the command and threatening by their size to block their own execution of movements. Mere bigness would be discarded for the highest utilization of modern techniques of destruction.

In the meantime, military conscription gives us the picture of roundly 6,000,000 men under arms in 1913 in contrast to the 8,750,000 permanently with the colors today. To maintain the mass army, mass conscription has become essential for a near-bankrupt world. This cheap way to maintain today's topheavy military establishments gives a sizable force constantly under arms; behind the standing army, annually replenished by youth at its most impressionable age, there are the organized reserves; and with the spread of totalitarian regimes, the rest of the population becomes disciplined marchers in uniform from a Hitler's crack party formations down to a Musso-

lini's littlest "Wolves." Thus the military machine resembles an umbrella—relatively small, closed; but, opened up, a hugely extended apparatus.

The second factor in the modern shock of war is the extension of the theater of hostilities.

The conflicts of the empires of antiquity took on the character of glorified raids; the swift-moving forays lived off the land, it is true, but even the sieges necessary to reduce and sack the centers of wealth and power from Babylon to Rome localized the ravages of strife. Though the Middle Ages stratified society in military mold, the monopoly of the profession of arms in Western civilization by the aristocratic element again mitigated the play of war; feudal strongholds even more than the growing towns represented military objectives when knighthood was in flower—again localizing the shock of arms. Even the brutal campaigns of Europe's religious wars, ushering in the Modern Age, stripped the countryside for but a season; the increasing zones of operations, however, portended the changes to come in the extent of military activity. The intermittent campaigns of the Seven Years' War, though overseas empire now extended hostilities from Europe proper to the North American forests and the Indian coasts, were "spotty" clashes on a half-outlined world map. Between the Napoleonic war cycle and the First World War, however, nations developed along the lines that make for global warfare as the anticipated form of hostilities. Under modern technology, the physical world has contracted to dimensions suitable for the first-class struggle modern weapons provide—speed and hitting power, from bombers to tanks, automotive transport on super-highways, and capital ships with express liner swiftness. What might be called the social involvement of nations entwines them in a common fate which makes neutrality something to be fought for; business ramifications from trade to credit finance, the electric word from press news to propaganda, ideas of national and international ways of living. This, then, is paralleled by the armaments accompanying these changes; they cover more ground on an intensive scale never before experienced by mankind. With the interlocking of national interests so complete, war, wherever it bursts into the open, threatens all in common conflict.

Now for war costs. Though to be dismissed as a deterrent to

conflict in themselves, the arms burden subjects the dominating capitalistic system to its most dangerous strain. This is an economic drag upon international society whose combined total adds up the direct and indirect costs of the last war plus the mounting current defense expenditures. With no indication that statesmen know what to do about the new conflict growing about us, the balance sheet of the last war can stand repetition. Discarding humanitarian sentimentality over military and civilian casualties, these 1565 days of destruction from 1914 to 1918 cost the world a gross loss of \$374,000,000 every 24 hours of the four-year struggle. They involved a direct outlay of at least \$186,000,000,000 plus about \$400,000,000,000 of indirect losses from private property destroyed on land and sea and a \$45,000,000,000 drop in production with 70,000,000 persons withdrawn from economic life. World economy only recovered its pre-War level in 1925-1926. No international economic collapse in the 1930's would have been likely, with its sweep of fascism now mobilizing for bigger conflict, if international trade had expanded at its pre-War rate. This would have given the world's business a volume two and one half times greater than it actually was as a stabilizer for the critical years of recurrent depression.


Now on top of the economic wastage of the First World War, we are piling up military charges without precedent. Our "armed peace," broken here and there on the globe by open warfare of major dimensions linked ominously in a fascist-militarist chain of cause and effect, makes the estimated arms charges of the post-War period one of the total direct costs of the World War. The fantastic parade of dollars begins, as a basis for comparison, with a world bill of \$460,000,000 in 1868. Forty succeeding years of the truce of armaments brought the annual cost up to \$1,455,000,000 by 1908; on the eve of the crisis, the 1913 total jumped to \$2,531,000,000. After the post-War decade of internationalism failed to limit armaments, the imperial way of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Mikado stepped up the pace with totalitarian high finance, diplomatic blackmail, and bludgeoning militarism. The world totals have run \$3,800,000,000 in 1932, just under \$4,000,000,000 in 1933, over \$5,000,000,000 in 1934, a shade under \$9,000,000,000 in 1935, roundly \$13,000,000,000 in 1936, well over \$15,000,000,000 in 1937, and equally well over \$17,000,000,000 for the year of appeasement.

Yet, paradoxically, these rearmament costs give our world its precarious equilibrium. These expenditures have gone into the resuscitation of strangling business machines. Behind the arms trades lies a nation-wide spread of connected activity; fully 60 per cent of the enterprise of a state such as Britain or Germany is affected by this sinister priming. Social stability also is related directly to modern militarism. Without conscription, the deepening social crisis would turn leftward to revolution much more rapidly than it does with young manhood in the barracks.

The destructiveness of modern war, the final "punch" to contemporary international society, carries a sinister significance.

Nevertheless, from one standpoint, history is reassuring. Every change in arms has increased casualties. In a study of war losses from the twelfth to the first quarter of the twentieth century, it is shown that the chivalry of knighthood faced a loss about $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the army strength. The introduction of gunpowder in the fourteenth century increased the toll to $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. With the rise of modern technology in the seventeenth century, this increased to 15 per cent. The World War climaxed the story, incidentally forecasting that the twentieth century may be the bloodiest in history, with casualties running up to 39 per cent of the armies. It works out for the nine European countries analyzed that the size of the armies increased 52 times in this span of centuries while the casualties increased 748 times.

Apart from the inevitable consequences of scientific achievement such as we possess being turned to military purposes with even augmented power, we have the doctrine and intermittent practice of totalitarian warfare. It cannot be dismissed as the savagery of civilized man in a new and enhanced form although American military realists reject the new terrorism of arms as defeating its own purposes by the counter-fury of defense aroused in the victims. The new destructiveness bursts upon what has been called the "non-combatant" population heretofore supposed to be respected behind the lines. Distinction between "the front" and "the rear" is being blasted out of warfare. Whereas, in the past, the art of war has been to destroy the enemy forces in order to impose one's will upon the defeated state, now it would seem to be to avoid battle and stun the civilian population into suing for peace at any price



THE ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF THE DICTATOR COUNTRIES, WHATEVER ITS ACTUAL STABILITY, IS BASED UPON THE INDUSTRIAL STIMULUS OF UNPRECEDENTED REARMAMENT. WITH THE ARMS RACE EXTENDING TO ALL STATES, THE MANUFACTURE OF WAR MATERIALS TAKES ON CRUCIAL SIGNIFICANCE AS UNDERLYING ANY ECONOMIC UPSWING ROUND THE WORLD. ARMAMENTS CANNOT PROVIDE PERMANENT ECONOMIC RECOVERY, WHICH RESTS, AS ALWAYS, UPON FUNDAMENTAL WORD CONDITIONS OF PEACE, SECURITY, AND RELATIVE POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM.

by a catastrophic unheralded blow at the nation's undefendable vitals. Warfare used to be dominated by the idea of protection—minimize losses through the age-old countering of weapons. Now it appears to be ruled by pace-setting destructiveness in which every means may be expected to minimize losses. This is the triumph of aviation, the achievement of chemistry in which even super-explosives are inseparably connected with daily peacetime life. Were it yet controllable and effective in the military sense, the secret laboratory research directed toward bacteriological warfare would be open armament with the same nonchalance that surrounds "forbidden" poison-gas warfare.

History, too, always carries us back to man power as the decisive military factor. Marshal Smigly-Rydz, commander-in-chief of Poland's powerful military machine, when asked about mechanized warfare and poison gas, told me recently: "Certainly there is an advantage for the country whose army has achieved the greatest technical perfection. But all said and done, it is the man who counts—the man and his soul!" Queried as to the latter, he again emphasized: "Yes, certainly his soul, his patriotism, his will to see the war to a happy end. After all, even the best of machines still needs the man and willingness to sacrifice!"

AND WAR AGAIN TOMORROW

So war remains with us, but the compound of these four characteristics of modern conflict is an unpredictable social shock.

War remains with us. . . . For each embattled nation, the struggle means deep penetration of military effort into every fiber of the national life. Numbers, area, costs, and techniques all combine to jolt every combatant—even neutrals. A shell-shocked international society whose instability is marked by economic collapse, revolutionary upheaval, and reaction nullifies victory. All come to share defeat in a worn-out war generation; while the seeds of new conflict sprout from the lethal sowing of yesterday, the ravaged old order seeks to dike off the forces of change.

Those who decry this pessimism with the shout of "warmongers!" should remember that it takes time to make a good war in even our accelerated way of life. First we have the exhaustion after every armistice—which is the truer characterization of peace in our time.

Then we have a struggle for "normalcy" in political, economic, and social spheres. In the meantime, demobilization of the fighting forces proceeds slowly after the first reaction to peace; victors eventually meet vanquished in rearmament struggles. This sign of military recovery, barring the progressive spread of revolutionary disorder, is the prelude to a new cycle of adventures in power politics. Lines of policy appear on the political map. They entangle in clashes of interests deeper in the economic plane of capitalistic antagonisms. The preliminaries of new conflict are complete when the deep-lying ideological differences between the new contending groups well up to the diplomatic surface and are sprayed as the poison gas of ideas upon the defenseless man in the street. This propagandized psychological instability of masses of mankind called nations brings people to the threshold of war. Personal dictator, party dictatorship, democratic politics, the end is the same.

Seeking the real causes of war everywhere but at home, the reason for war as an instrument of national policy eludes us. Pursuing only effects and closing our eyes to causes too close to us to do anything about them, we only see that the states of the world pursue ends obviously incompatible with peace. All do this because governments are driven to seek abroad the realization of those objectives that are deemed vital to the maintenance of the regime at home—those things in actual practice serving the interests of those who really control the machinery of state. We do not see that nations follow this inevitable road to war because peace is nothing more than a truce between open conflicts; that these conflicts express, in their revelation of the instability of the world of states, the more fundamental lack of social equilibrium within each state.

All this goes on under our nominal peace until such time as the international relations between states jam. This is crisis—produced "naturally" in the course of power politics or "speeded up" by the manipulations of diplomatic intrigue. When the jam cannot be resolved "amicably" by mutual concessions, or preferably by "adjustments" at the expense of third parties, or surrender by one of the opposing states, the logic of force is inescapable. War then effects what organized relations between states no longer can accomplish: readjustment of the international equilibrium made necessary through the breakdown of the organized relations between states.

Under these prevailing conditions, it is unimportant whether we "like" or "dislike" war. The eventual appeal to arms is inevitable in our international social order. It is an inseparable part of the modern state system motivated by the dominating ideas of contemporary civilization. The recourse to war by individual states varies, the frequency of warfare from century to century changes, the relation of war to cultural achievement in itself is debatable. The basic reason for war remains, behind the breakdown of organized relations between states, within each state itself.

CRY PEACE!

So it is not this parade of blood, death, and desolation which is the crux of the problem. It is beneath all the human wear and tear that we uncover the realities of world politics in national politics—concurrently, the mainsprings of war in our time.

Actually, then, wars are not emotional explosions. They represent no compound of rights and wrongs, friendships and hates, such as are alleged to animate presumably mythical men in the street. For the most of us, there is only a detonation which illumines the international scene at the tragic bursting moment. It may well be that such things are beyond the comprehension of men, with war a Mars-like Frankenstein built by mankind into truly gigantic dimensions.

We are told that the last war produced more than two hundred miles of documents, supposing them packed side by side. Reading with a speed of about a minute to a page, it would take a person 5000 years—to A.D. 6939—to run through the documentary mileage of the First World War. Even if he takes the short cut provided by the 152 volumes of the truly monumental *Social and Economic History of the World War*, he still has his *Die Grosse Politik* and the rest of the diplomatic story from 36 capitals to be made comprehensible. Behind this public record are tons of memoirs and secret archives. Intellectual command over the facts proves elusive for even the most earnest seeker after the truth; it is beyond men in the mass, with their mass ideas framed in their mass civilization, to find their own way out through this maze of documentation.

Instead, there is little expectation that the near future will be different from the long past. Hence there is small chance that bleed-

ing humanity will effect a dramatic change of heart in statesmen, or that a mechanistic end of war will come from the horrors of the mechanization of war, or that plain people will rise up in their righteous wrath to destroy "warmakers" and then build anew eternal peace on earth and good will to men. . . . History has little to show for the view that we "progress" toward peace. The annals of Western civilization show repeated ebb and flood in the tide of war. Although some states have a less, and others a more checkered martial history, recourse to war appears to follow no particular pattern in terms of race, form of government, social order, or stage of development after the appearance of warfare and property interests some five thousand years ago. Century by century, war occurs so frequently that for practical purposes we have no more reason to look upon "peace" as any more normal than "war." If we wish to characterize our own generation, the evidence is abundant for the statement that the nineteenth century was the closest approximation of peace in any hundred years of European history. By the same yardstick, the first third of the twentieth century has the sinister distinction of possibly exceeding the bloodiest past of the Western state system.

One particular aspect of contemporary life suggests the hard disillusionment that faces pacifists. This is the transitional character of the twentieth century and beyond. However we may disagree on the future direction of society, there can be little doubt that a chaotic period of truly revolutionary change opened when the First World War closed. That conflict took the lid off the Pandora's Box of mankind—the trouble released really flying round the earth. Those who do not know their classics may be reminded that hope alone remained in the bottom of Zeus's gift to his fellow Greek when the lid was jammed back.

This pulling apart of international society, therefore, provides the greatest danger of war. The division of the world into rival camps assumes maximum violence because the groups represent the greatest mobilization of conflicting social ideas. This has become clear first in Europe, where the state system is splitting to the communist left and the fascist right, with the democratic center losing its dominant role. With this breakup proceeding at the center of international society, disagreement over any universal international ethic grows. This is fatal to peace because, without such universally accepted dicta

of conduct, organized relations between states cannot be maintained. War therefore assumes greater and greater importance as the arbiter of international differences with this breakdown of the traditional state system. Thus armaments are symptomatic of this swing away from the old rules of conduct, in turn found hampering by nations on the make. Yet there are optimists who even welcome rearmament. They do so on the ground that the more nations arm, the less likely they are to use these truly terrible modern weapons; but the underlying social forces now driving nations into new conflict would not appear to be exorcised by any such magic compound of bluff and fear. Such folk should look again at post-Munich events.

Not only are these events to be seen on the map of world politics. They speak, like a cinema equipped with sound, the universal language of impending war. They speak, however, to muddled mentalities. This is because many people are unable to cope intellectually with unfamiliar conditions—to reclassify observed phenomena rather than to force such phenomena into traditional classifications. This static mind is typical of the sterilizing formalism of decadent Western civilization in politics, the professions, the professors. The resulting repugnance to deal with the unknown is a major factor in the breakdown of the known. These judicial mountebanks no longer are able to discriminate between what is happening and what ought to be happening. Strained to the point of intellectual collapse by an overload of events heavy with reality, they play their part in the extension of chaos marked by the butchering of men, women, and children from China to hapless Spain.

This, and no real peace, has to be in our time. If it comes from a new world empire, dominated from a Berlin, nazi legions will fight their way to bloody peace. If it comes from world revolution, Moscow will battle on many a reactionary front and comrades will slaughter many a foe in civil war before the new age dawns.

Without something having the semblance of international conflict such as can be camouflaged under an anti-bolshevik crusade, Europe will return to "civil war" again and again to divide the dwindling assets of capitalistic nationalism round the globe. No longer can we speak of "danger spots" on the world map. We live in the midst of zones of conflict—covert and overt. Our illusory peace

is underlined as to its true significance by the bootleg warfare raging about us.

Prophets of doom have one thing in common. All, fascist to communist, proceed on the theory of greater and greater violence. These ideas build in two directions. The violence spreads over wider areas of disorder; and it is marked by greater depth of social disturbance. These may be the logical consequences of conflict in Western civilization. Optimists who strive for peace down this road of compounding human misery, however, may have only world disintegration at its end in a new dark ages. There is no assurance from history that any accumulation of wars to end war will reach any penultimate Armageddon.

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CHAPTER 2

NATIONALISM

Francis James Brown

Few words in the English language are as difficult of exact definition or as fraught with meaning as the term "nationalism."

In every country of the world, overt acts are daily motivated by its all-embracing appeal to loyalty and to action. "New Rebel Drive Traps Thousands North of Teruel." "London-Paris Axis Is Set for Welding." "Goering Starts Liquidation of Jewish Property." "Senate Approves Billion Dollar Navy Bill for U. S." "Albania Joyous as King Zog Weds." "Ireland Plans Vast Defense Program." These are but a few of the headlines in the morning's paper. The gayety and laughter of a royal wedding, the weeping of a minority group driven from their homes and deprived of property, the wearisome sigh of the taxpayer staggering beneath the ever-increasing burden of rearmament, and the exultant shout and the dying groan of the soldier on the field of battle are blended in the voice of nationalism, its discordant notes drowned in the mounting cry, *La Patrie*.

THE MEANING OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism is a fluid term. In the vicissitudes of history it has had many connotations. The layman, the diplomat, the news reporter, and the social scientist use it with varied meanings.

In its original concept it denoted an ethnic relationship, which soon became primarily linguistic and cultural. With the development of nations and states it gradually assumed a political aspect and by the eighteenth century denoted the struggle of the group for full statehood as in the unification of Italy and the development of the German Empire. The growth of imperialism in the nineteenth century added a still further concept, "based on like-mindedness, it consisted in fostering, and if need be, in imposing like-mindedness."¹ Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism were the resultant of this increas-

ing emphasis upon what Wirth aptly describes as "hegemony nationalism,"² as is also the successful accomplishment of Hitler's *Drang nach Osten*, "Push to the East."

Modern nationalism manifests itself in many ways: in massing armaments, always theoretically wholly for defense; in high tariffs, preferential trade agreements, and economic rivalry; in pageantry, songs, dances, and impassioned orations; in organized youth movements and "patriotic" societies; in decrees and legislation. These overt acts are but the expression of nationalism which is itself an ideology—an attitude of mind, "the rationalistic projection of the eternal human longings for lofty ideals."³

In its present form it denotes dominant ethnocentrism, the aggressive—as well as defensive—pursuit of self-interest by each group, whether a minority within the state insisting upon autonomy or the state itself. Sociologically it is the extension of the "we" or "in-group" feeling which extended from the family to the tribe, then to the nation. Idealists sought to project it in the formation of the League of Nations after the World War, to include the entire family of nations, but the framework of the League was established on a state basis. The past ten years has witnessed the constant intensification of this attitude of national ethnocentrism until now, each day, almost every minute, brings new expression of it. Loyalty to the "in-group" implies hostility to those who by fact or by interpretation belong to the "out-group"; it extends the concept of the "we-group" to those who actually or assertedly belong to the group, as the minorities in each of the countries of central and eastern Europe; and it frequently reasserts the principle of manifest destiny regardless of the means through which it may be achieved.

This emphasis upon nationalistic ethnocentrism and the "we-group" attitude is stressed by Wirth.⁴ He defines a nationality as "a people who, because of the belief in their common descent and their mission in the world, by virtue of their common cultural heritage and historical career aspire to sovereignty over a territory or seek to maintain or enlarge their political or cultural influence in the face of opposition." Nationalism, then, "refers to the movements, attitudes and ideologies which characterize the behavior of nationalities engaged in the struggle to achieve, maintain, or enhance their position in the world." The predominant quality of nationalism is an



EUROPEAN NATIONALISM, WITH THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, TOOK ON ITS FINAL FORM WITH GREAT STATES DOMINATING THE CONTINENT. BENEATH THESE LARGE UNITS, SUPPRESSED NATIONALITIES SEETHINGLY AWAITED THEIR HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO RE-APPEAR ON THE MAP.

irrational egocentric attitude of a contiguous group; and the primary social process involved in its development is conflict with the "out-group."

THE ROOTS OF NATIONALISM

Although no fixed date can be determined, it is possible to state that the eighteenth century brought the beginning of modern nationalism in social thought. But it is important to notice that even today the term "nation" is used in various meanings. In central Europe, that is, east of the Rhine, in the Balkans, and to a lesser degree in the U.S.S.R. the term is still used in its original functional sense, perhaps better denoted by the word "tribe." This organic meaning of nation has its origins in the influence of a German philosopher, Herder, and of his successors, Fichte and Hegel. West of the Rhine and in the United States the term has, predominantly, a political concept, connoting a different social mind from that which rests on a tribal basis. It is in this basic difference that one finds an explanation of the sharply contrasting internal and international policies of the two areas.

Herder, a contemporary of Kant and Goethe, was much influenced by the then famous teaching of Rousseau regarding the non-corruptibility of primitive cultures. He likened the individual to a mineral spring. As the spring gains its chemical properties from the soil through which it flows, so also the individual is imbued with the distinctive language, literature, folkways, and culture of his national group. Thus each nation, influenced by geographic factors, which begin the differentiation, and the slow accretion of its culture, develops a definite "folk character," a national soul. The individual, marked by the characteristics of his own nationality, retains the soul of his people despite conquest, deportation, or voluntary severance of political ties. Herder knew no difference between a tribe and a nation. To him, a nation was, in substance, that tribe which has become conscious of its tribal unity and is aspiring for political independence. It is a natural unit, and the state is the culmination of the family.⁵

Fichte, building on Herder's theories, defined a nation as a unit of people living together, evolving naturally and spiritually, and subjected to a special law of evolution of God. As every individual was

to have a proper place in the state, so each nation was to develop its manifest destiny and to have its place in the sun. German liberty consisted of the realization by each individual of these natural attributes of the nation; Germany's mission was to regain her natural existence; and her destiny was a place of leadership in the world.

Hegel carried forward the principle of nationalism to its logical culmination. For him the state was the highest and most perfect of the agencies of society, an ineffable entity. It was the synthesis of individual and universal will, the earthly embodiment of the Absolute Idea and the object of unrestrained devotion. To Hegel, the German people represented the supreme, never-to-be-surpassed manifestation of the state.

These, and other writers, through their insistence upon the biological and racial element of the nation, had spun the web of a fiction which was destined to play a significant part in the later character of nationalism—the theory of purity of race and of race superiority and mission. First propounded by the Frenchman, Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau it was speedily accepted by reactionary nationalists as a keystone in the mounting structure of nationalism. Although dominating in central and southern Europe, this theory found expression in the United States in such books as Madison Grant's *Passing of a Great Race* and F. L. Stoddard's *The Rising Tide of Color*.⁶

This tribal concept of nationalism had a brief but vivid period of expression under the Jacobins during the French Revolution. Faced by enemies both within and without, the new nationalism was dominated by a fanatical religious fervor. The national flag took on new meaning and became the symbol of the state. National holidays were declared to provide opportunity for the exuberant expression of the zealous loyalty of the people. *La Patrie* became the God whom all were to worship and to whom all owed allegiance, even unto death.

Each owes to *La Patrie* his peculiar gift, but all owe her their blood. Young men fight; married men manufacture and transport arms; women sew and care for the wounded; children make lint of old linen and bandages of discarded dresses; old men are carried to the public square to inflame youth with the glories of the Republic and with hatred for her enemies. Houses are turned into

barracks; public squares into workshops; and cellars into munitions factories.

The response of *La Patrie*, the Great Mother, as phrased by Barès is equally representative:

Citizens, it is I that undertake to protect your personal safety, your peace, your property. What will you give me in return for such constant benefit? If it happens that I am in peril, if unnatural children torment my bosom . . . would'st thou abandon me in these stormy moments for the price of my invariable protection? No! There are times when I would command the sacrifice even of thy life which I have so steadily protected.

Recognizing that such loyalty could be achieved only by a carefully planned program on a national scale, the Jacobins evolved the means to transfer an ideological concept into a militant nationalism. They proposed to establish a universal conscription of all able-bodied men for five years of military service. Civil loyalty became identified with military glory, the *Marseillaise* became a battle hymn, and the graves of soldiers the shrines for devout reverence.

The educational program that was to be established was aimed to develop this same loyalty. The object of instruction was to strengthen the bodies of the children through manual labor and to develop them through gymnastic exercise; to accustom them to hard work; to harden them against every kind of fatigue; and to bend them to the yoke of a salutary discipline. Their memories were to be cultivated, and both boys and girls were to learn by heart "patriotic songs, the story of the most striking events in the history of a free people, and the exploits of their noble heroes."

The Jacobins sought to suppress all language but French and to establish a new journalism under a state bureau. They accepted the premise—closely paralleled in totalitarian states today—that the people must be provided with frequent excitement, presented in the garb of patriotism. National societies were to be organized to provide means for the dissemination and personalization of propaganda. Churches were to be transformed into "Temples of Reason," and the clergy were to be barred from holding any public meetings. Even the calendar was changed to a ten-day week with a national festival day devoted to such idols as "Martyrs of Liberty," "Hatred of Ene-

mies," and "The State Eternal." Finally they sought to develop a national paternalism through regulation of food prices and provision for employment. "What we need is a system of public works on a grand scale over the whole territory of the republic."

Jacobinism was short lived. Few of their proposals were put into actual practice, and its premises were renounced with the formation of the republic. But the ideals and proposed methods of Jacobinism echoed through the century and a half since those terrible days of the Reign of Terror and are reasserted in almost identical form in the most aggressive nationalism of today—German nazism.

The term nation was conceived differently before Herder and is still understood differently in Western countries. Here a nation means a group of people, organized for definite social aims, loyal to the state, its constitution, and the system. A member of the nation is the one who consciously adheres to its principles. It is true that the origin, the race, the tribal allegiance are not without importance, but they are not determining factors. The main point is the will to form a state union. This is best exemplified in the way that the immigrants in the United States are permitted to acquire citizenship, since the determining factor is their desire to become naturalized—to accept allegiance to their adopted country. In Germany, on the other hand, one must be *born* into the state citizenship, and the Jew on account of his reputed "racial" variance, and because of the unwillingness of the dominant tribe so to accept him, not only cannot acquire citizenship but also suffers unbelievable discrimination and brutality even to expulsion from the country. In Herder's philosophy the nation is the inevitable expression of nature; in the Western state the nation is a product of the people seeking to create, by co-operation and free will, a more perfect social organization. ("We, the people of the United States . . .") Whereas for the Herderites the tribe (race) is the main substance of the nation, in the West the nation is a voluntary association of individuals without regard to country of origin (except in the case of Orientals).⁷

TRENDS OF MODERN NATIONALISM

The last fifty years has witnessed the inevitable conflict of these earlier developments of nationalism. Like roots they are woven into an inextricable mesh. They have reached into every nation. They are

influenced by many factors, all of them largely irrational in nature, although quite understandable as social forces.'

The humanitarian nationalism of Herder is still espoused by idealists and tacitly used as a camouflage by diplomats. The theory of self-determination as conceived by Herder found its last factual expression in President Wilson's Fourteen Points and in his *Address to the Congress on the Addresses of the German Chancellor*, February 11, 1918, "National aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent—self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." It was, at least in theory, one of the guiding principles at the council table of the Versailles Treaty.⁹ Its humanitarianism lies interred with the dry bones of the League of Nations, but it has been revived on a new basis: the inalienable right of the state to claim as its own all who are of the same language and culture or race.

This new nationalism marches behind banners of a harsh patriotism—a nationalism of Machiavelli, of Fichte, and of the Jacobins. "The highest duty of a German youth is to die for his Fatherland." In the Soviet Union, five million young Comsumoles, sixteen to twenty-five years of age, accept the solemn pledge, "I shall study military technique; I shall be supremely devoted to the great Socialist Fatherland; and I shall be ready at any time to give all of my strength, and, if necessary, life itself." The greatest peacetime rearmament burden of all ages is mounting in every nation as every state seeks in frantic haste to build up its defenses. The famous, and presumably impregnable, Maginot line stretching miles across the former No Man's Land on the northern border of France is barely finished until a new line is begun in the Pyrenees and another across the desert sands of her colonial empire in Tunisia. England and the United States vote billion-dollar naval bills. Munition plants operate at speed-up pace twenty-four hours a day. Italy and the Soviet Union mass their air squadrons in tremendous displays of power.

This nationalism of the twentieth century tends increasingly to be one in which its followers march for personalities—for Stalin, for Hitler, for Mussolini, for Chiang Kai-shek, and for the Emperor Hirohito. Individuals have again become gods, the state has been

personified. These gods enforce obeisance and obedience, and demand the willingness if not the fact of human sacrifice.

Modern nationalism increasingly seeks to identify itself with a specific ideology of state. It lifts itself above the political loyalty to the state of Fichte. The defense is still that of *La Patrie*, but it is more than *La Patrie*, it is a great ideal, communism, nazism, fascism, democracy. From a conflict between political states, many would stay their hands; a conflict between ideologies, enshrouded in a mystic symbolism, fires the smoldering embers and enlists the zeal for martyrdom.

In the United States, this transference from state to ideology has already been clearly shown in the changing pleas of Peace Day orators. Even so recently as three years ago they reiterated the frequently repeated denunciations of bankers, munition makers, and propagandists, the "Merchants of Death" of World War days, vividly described the gruesomeness of war, and advocated disarmament and neutrality. The words of these same orators at a recent "Strike for Peace" rally still echo in my ears. "Drive the Nazis out of Austria," "Force the Japs out of China," "Help the Loyalists Save Democracy in Spain." "Fight for Peace!" Even Senator Nye, who stumped America in 1935 in the interest of neutrality legislation and dramatically recounted the findings of the Senate investigation, has recently, with equal ardor, supported a modification of the neutrality bill that the United States may lend aid and support to the nations "defending democracy."

Each ideology has elicited a missionary zeal for its propagation—a zeal which supplements but does not supplant loyalty to state. As in 1917, in the United States, we are passionately urged, not now to "Make the World Safe for Democracy," but to "Defend Democracy against the Aggressor"—not Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, or Japan as political states, but against nazism, fascism, and communism as ideologies. In almost every country of the world the same change has occurred. The Japanese are told that their invading armies are "emissaries of good will to save the Chinese from communism."¹⁰ The huge triangle of Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo is heralded as an essential step in the formation of a united front against the advance of communism. France holds its tottering government together with the constant threat of fascism at both doors. Mussolini



EUROPEAN NATIONALISM CAME TO A HEAD IN THE WORLD WAR, HERALDED BY THE FIRST AND SECOND BALKAN WARS RESHAPING THE SOUTH-EAST. PAN-GERMANISM MET PAN-SLAVISM IN A HEAD-ON COLLISION WHEREIN RACIAL HEGEMONY BECAME ONE OF THE MAJOR PRECIPITATING FACTORS IN THE WORLD STRUGGLE.



WITH HITLERISM IN GERMANY, THE INTERNATIONALISM OF THE 1920S COLLAPSED. THE NEW CHALLENGE OF RACIAL DOCTRINE AND THE RESTATEMENT OF PAN-GERMANISM LAUNCHED EUROPE ON ITS MOST CHAUVINISTIC PERIOD OF NATIONALISM.

publicly derides democracy and extends the enlightenment of fascism into Ethiopia. On May 14, 1938, he served notice on the world's democracies that in case of war "totalitarian states will immediately form a bloc and march together to the end."

Finally, this new nationalism is negativistic. It as ruthlessly destroys its opponents as it demands loyalty of its proponents. One of the first acts of the national socialists in Italy after the March on Rome was to bomb or burn opposing newspaper offices and the headquarters of antagonistic organizations of whatever character. On the day of the Austrian coup and the succession of Sudetenland, thousands of leading citizens became political refugees. Even in democratic countries, by their proponents referred to as the "last outposts of liberalism," there is growing suspicion of opposition. Only today, an impassioned radio speaker cried, "There must be no 'ism' but patriotism in America and no 'ocracy' but democracy."

These are the trends of modern nationalism—the gnarled and treacherous plant that has grown from its tangled roots. What factors have influenced its growth?

Real or fancied insecurity is a significant force in the development of nationalistic feeling. With the dismemberment and disarmament of the Hapsburg and Prussian Empires, and the establishment of collective security, nationalism was less intense, for world security seemed assured for the time being. As economic insecurity increased, the principle of national self-interest was reasserted, fanned by new leaders who preached the gospel of the restoration of ancient glory and the scrapping of international agreements. Some have assumed that this sense of security has a factual basis. They point out that the United States, comparatively safe between its ocean moats, and Switzerland, until recently secure behind her mountain barricades, have not developed as intense a nationalism as the countries of central Europe under constant threat of border revision or France almost surrounded by fascist states. If geography were the sole or even the primary factor, then forts would line the Canadian border, England would fear France as much as Germany, and Belgium and Holland would be feverishly rearming against each other. Insecurity, now a fact, is initiated through the cultivation of fear.

The inescapable conclusion is that conflict is the most important element in the promotion of nationalism. Conflict is a social process

which is at the very foundation of all our social forms, a form of "cultural Darwinism."¹¹

There is always danger of oversimplification. The cultural heritage of the nation, the homogeneity of the population within the state, the forcefulness of leadership, the extent and character of the education of the people, and the degree of centralized control of government are some of the additional factors in the rising force of nationalism.

To seek to determine whether nationalism is the cause or the resultant of such factors would be but idle verbiage. The significant fact is that nationalism is an irrational ideology which accepts and exaggerates the principle of the "we-group" and is predominantly concerned with naked self-interest, hidden behind the skillfully planned smoke screen of rationalizations.

NATIONALISM AND EDUCATION

The school is an artificial agency created by the group for the preservation of its own ideology. The public school, from its first inception in ancient Greece to the magnificent structures erected through federal aid, is the instrument of the state. The difference between the past and present and between modern states in the utilization of the school for nationalistic propaganda is wholly one of degree.

With the rise of nationalism, the school became a ready tool for the cultivation of the attitude of obedience and loyalty to the state, as was described above during the period of the Jacobins. The "General Order of the Minister of Education" issued by Frederick William III of Prussia left no doubt as to the purpose of education under a strongly centralized government.

The primary schools have only to work to the end that the common people: may learn to read, write, reckon, and sing; may love their rulers and their fatherland, be informed, according to the needs of their social position, of the institutions and laws of their country, be contented with their social status, and live peaceful and happy in their lot; and to sum up all very briefly, may know how to serve and wish to serve God, the King, the fatherland, and themselves with strong, skillful bodies, awakened intelligence and good conscience. The principles enunciated will not raise the common people out of the sphere designated for them by God and human society.¹²

Giving lip service to the principle of the development of a scientific attitude and of individual judgment, the school has been a major force in the indoctrination of the status quo. Today in many countries of the world it no longer seeks even to claim the right of judgment for its pupils but openly asserts that "The school must be the major instrument in the hands of the state. Give me one generation of school children and the state will resist all opposition from within and attacks from without."¹³ The curriculum has become nationalized, its teachers are trained in national schools and are imbued with the ideology of the state, and the activities are predominantly militaristic. In Hungary in every schoolroom is a picture of Christ, typifying the country, bleeding and bruised, crucified on a cross. Under it is the caption *Nem! Nem! Soha!* In the mind of every child rises the picture of the glorious days of the old Empire and in their hearts the determination that their country will not remain crucified—"No! No! Never!" In the schoolrooms in Italy the school children will henceforth say grace before their midday meal, which is taken in the school, according to this formula: "Il Duce, I thank you for what you give me to make me grow healthy and strong. Oh Lord God, protect Il Duce so that he may be long preserved to Fascist Italy."¹⁴ In each classroom hang the pictures of the King and of Il Duce; in Germany, that of Der Führer; and in China, that of Dr. Sun Yat Sen.

Beginning with the insistence upon a common language, the first lessons which the child falteringly reads tell of the greatness of his country. From 50 to 80 per cent of all instruction during the intervening years is primarily or wholly the literature, history, and government of the nation. By implication or by direct statement the other nations are belittled and even described as "our natural enemy." By incessant repetition, the glory of the state is embedded deep in the impressionable mind of the growing child. The commencement orator culminates the process of indoctrination through an impassioned plea for loyalty to, and service and sacrifice for, the state.

Even in the countries in which educators still assert that the school is a free agent it is decreasingly free. Swept forward—or backward—in the all-embracing march of nationalism, legislation is enacted requiring teachers to take an oath of allegiance. In one large city in the United States teachers, before they can receive their monthly pay

checks, are required to sign a statement that they have not discussed communism in their classes. The danger does not lie in the possible mention of communism but in the utilization of government to restrict freedom of teaching. Commemorative holidays are set aside and the schools are bombarded with "appropriate" programs sent by state departments and by patriotic societies. In one community, the patriotic groups utilized their own children as "scouts" to report any "subversive teachings," the group reserving the right to define the term.

There is grave danger that democracies, fearing the principle upon which they are founded, will follow the example of fascist states and reduce education to the level of nationalistic propaganda.¹⁵

OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONALISM

The utilization of the church as an agency for the development of nationalism is more difficult to trace than that of the school. Here the pattern varies widely from time to time and between countries as will be shown in detail in a later chapter. During the World War the great majority of ministers on both sides of the conflict became modern Pope Urbans enlisting volunteers in the greatest "crusade in all history." During the interim of peace, ministers have renounced war and church councils have officially declared against it.¹⁶ One can only wonder if this very reversal of position may not be all the more conclusive evidence that the church is but a puppet and under the complete dominance of the state. Some hope for a degree of independence is shown in the contrast of the capitulation of the church in Italy, and its almost complete abolition in the Soviet Union, with its courageous opposition in Germany. Few can dispute the fact that increasingly the state is being lifted to the level of the Godhead as an object of devotion, and even the very symbolism of religion has been transferred to the state. Holidays are as important as holy days and in some countries have supplanted them. The infallibility of the church has been accepted as an attribute of the state.

Youth organizations form a ready tool in the hands of the nationalists. Little lads of four proudly square their tiny shoulders and assume a military bearing as they step forward to take their places in the *Enfante Fascist*; young men of twenty-one, hardened and disciplined soldiers through eighteen years of advancement through


the youth organizations, become full-fledged fascists. Youth movements vary from the highly organized and rigidly controlled programs in the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy, through the predominantly athletic organizations such as the Sokols of Czecho-Slovakia, to the many and widely divergent youth organizations in England and the United States. The major difference in the youth groups of the various countries is not in terms of the enthusiasm of youth but rather in the lack or existence of a universally accepted goal and a leader who can appeal to their imagination and crystallize their zeal into united action.

The control of the press, already referred to, the attempt to re-establish the doctrine of race purity, the linking of the present to the glorious past in an unbroken chain, the enforcement of a common language, and the emphasis upon a common culture will be abundantly illustrated in the succeeding chapters. In July, 1935, the *American Magazine of Art* quoted Hitler as saying, "We call upon our artists to wield the noblest weapon in defense of the German people: German art."

With each passing year, the instruments of education and enlightenment have become increasingly the tools through which nationalism is developed. Whether such controls are exerted subtly through patriotic societies or overtly through ministers of propaganda makes comparatively little difference. The net result is the same—a heightened ethnocentrism: suspicion of and antagonism toward those of another nationality group and an impassioned sense of loyalty toward one's own group.

NATIONALISM AND THE MINORITIES PROBLEM

No single problem is so acute as that of minorities. Within every state there can be found diversity of blood, language, and culture. In some instances these differences are ethnic, that is, on the basis of race or "blood." In spite of the growing body of scientific data refuting the theory of race purity,¹⁷ it is tacitly assumed by many and actively promulgated by the ardent nationalists in every state. Differences of culture often reach back across the centuries and are perpetuated through song and saga, dress, folk dances, feast days and fast days, and in the woof and web of folkways and mores. Language is an important factor of differentiation.



THE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF MINORITIES, WHICH HAD PROMISED SO MUCH, COLLAPSED IN THE 1930S. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW SUPER-NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENT VIRTUALLY HAS DESTROYED ANY HOPE OF ALLEVIATING THE PLIGHT OF THESE "LEFT-OVER" PEOPLES BY INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION.

The term minorities is basically sociological. It has been defined by the author as "the individuals and groups which differ, or are assumed to differ from their dominant social groups, and have developed, in varying degree, an attitude of mind which gives them a feeling of greater security within their own group than in their relation to the dominant group."¹⁵

This attitude of insecurity of the minority group is frequently reflected in intensified ethnocentrism; and, in the majority group, by fear and suspicion with resulting dominance or even oppression.

There are three possible alternatives in the treatment of minority groups. At one extreme is the annihilation, forcible deportation, or imprisonment and persecution resulting in the "voluntary exile" of all individuals in, or assumed to be of, the minority group. The vivid accounts of the persecution of the Jews illustrates this method of handling the minority problem. A milder form of the same general type is the subjugation, exploitation, and discrimination against minority groups. This was the method through which imperialistic states gained control of "backward peoples" and made them, although superior in number, a minority group as defined above. This last form is still all too common in the world today as evidenced by our own discrimination against the Negro and Oriental and, to a lesser degree, against many other national or cultural groups in the United States.

A second alternative, and the most commonly accepted at least in theory, is seeking to assimilate all the groups through universalizing the culture of the dominant group. Thus, in Yugoslavia, the dominant group is attempting to force a single pattern upon Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Dalmatians, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. This is the prevailing trend of nationalism today. A school principal recently stated over the radio, "Only one language shall be used in our schools and that is English. There shall be but one culture and that shall be American." In nations in which minority groups themselves seek to amalgamate with the dominant group and in which the differences between the two groups are primarily cultural and not racial, assimilation is possible over a period of several generations. If either of these two conditions are lacking no amount of brewing in the "melting pot" will produce assimilation. It cannot be enforced from the top. History is replete with illustrations of the failure of man-

datory conformity. Armenians retained their culture through nearly a thousand years of persecution. Bohemia remained Czech through the 500 years of shifting governmental allegiance, and Poland retained its cultural autonomy though divided, like Gaul, into three parts for more than a century. The peasant cottage much more than the homes of the upper classes is the stronghold of minority cultures, frequently buttressed by the church and the market place. The theory of assimilation will not, at least in our generation, be translated into reality.

The third possible way out is cultural pluralism: providing opportunity for the cultural autonomy of each group. The Soviet Union has regimented thought in terms of the communist ideology but has retained cultural pluralism, and, as far as possible, has granted even political autonomy to minority groups within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There is a distinct movement for the revival and perpetuation of the culture of the social and national minorities in the United States. It is the only practicable solution to the problem, but it can be achieved only to the degree that both minority and dominant groups will accept the principle of compromise and mutual understanding.

The wave of nationalism has tended to override humanitarianism. Comparatively few countries have granted cultural autonomy to their minority groups. As the threat of invasion grows more imminent and the war psychosis grips the world, intolerance of minority groups is more overtly expressed. Perpetual moods of hatred, bitterness, and indignation against real or fancied wrongs become dangerous forces, ready to explode whenever a favorable opportunity arises. That legalistic guarantees of the League cannot run counter to deep-seated attitudes is abundantly evidenced by the varying status of minority groups in America and in the different European states. The direction in which the solution lies is very clear, the path and its achievement is difficult; at present, the world is journeying in the opposite direction.

THE UNFORESEEN ASPECT OF MINORITIES PROBLEM

When the makers of the peace treaties at the close of the World War included in them special sections dealing with the protection of the minorities, it was felt, and quite justly, that the orderly and more

humane organization of the world was being built. But the peacemakers certainly could not foresee that within fifteen years of the signing of these treaties the whole problem would assume just the opposite character of that on which it had been built. In simple terms, the major problem today is not only how to protect minorities, but also how to protect the majorities against their own minorities.

The indications of this serious problem were very apparent soon. It was already clearly stated in the resolution of the Third Assembly of the League of Nations, which reads as follows:

While the Assembly recognizes the primary right of the minorities to be protected by the League from oppression, it also emphasizes the duty incumbent upon persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities to co-operate as loyal fellow citizens with the nations to which they now belong.¹⁹

That these words fell upon deaf ears is obvious from such subsequent international problems as the terroristic activities of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization or the seditious drive of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. From another point of view, this problem is also connected intimately with the way that nations characterized by aggressive nationalism can utilize the problem of their own minorities for the justification of their warlike designs and for all kinds of interventions in the internal affairs of other nations, as irrefutably evidenced in the absorption of Austria and in the September, 1938, ultimatums of Hitler for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the movement for a "united Ukraine."

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

The definition of nationalism will determine the answer to the query, "Can nationalism and internationalism exist together?" If nationalism implies the conscious recognition of the place of the individual state in the family of nations and of its responsibilities to the larger group, then the answer to the query is in the affirmative. This is the conception held by Herder and echoes, at least, in the idealism of Wilson's Fourteen Points. As will be shown by several succeeding writers in this symposium, this is not a realistic conception of the term.

With each passing year nationalism has increasingly implied dominant ethnocentrism of the political state. The disarmament conference broke down under the demand for larger quotas by individual states for their own individual protection and nations stagger beneath the burden of feverish rearmament. The United States refused to join the League and the Court of International Justice, and Japan, Italy, and Germany walked out of the League Assembly because they placed national welfare above the well-being of the world. The Economic Conference crumbled even in the face of world depression because of the frantic scramble for world markets by each nation, and preferential trade agreements have supplanted any possible movement toward free trade. The twofold character of modern nationalism—intense loyalty to one's own nation either by choice or compulsion and antagonism toward other nations—has created a world in which every nation's hand is raised against its neighbor. In such an atmosphere nationalism is the bitter protagonist of internationalism.

This need not be true. The economic interdependence of the modern world would seem to demonstrate that the welfare of each nation is dependent upon the welfare of all. Why should nations devote one third of their total income to rearmament when a sincere pact of peace could make possible the sinking of every battleship, the demobilization of every standing army, and the conversion of every bomber into a common carrier for the rapid distribution of commerce among the nations of the world? At present this is an idle dream. In the frantic grasping for national well-being, not only is the basis of internationalism being swept away, but the welfare, even the very existence, of the nation is being jeopardized. Emotion has outrun reason. One wonders what cataclysm will be necessary to reverse this present trend and place nationalism in its proper perspective in relation to the greater good of each. It can be achieved only through an internationalism based upon mutual trust.

NATIONALISM AND WORLD PEACE .

The last chapter of Hayes' *Essays on Nationalism* is entitled, "Nationalism: Curse or Blessing." The author answers his own query by differentiating two common uses of the term. He states that nationalism as a process is an historical fact upon which no judgment can be passed; nationalism as a belief he condemns as "a curse and

nothing but a curse." Unfortunately the latter, while irrational, is as much an historical fact as the former. An ideology, although existing only in the mind, is, for the individual, as much a reality as marching men or the rattle of machine-gun fire. The following chapters will bear vivid testimony to the truth of this statement. It has this basic difference: as an attitude of mind it is possible to change. The unified organization of all the agencies of education could change the entire character of nationalism within a single generation.

It is therefore more important to ask by what means the "curse" can be changed into a "blessing." Certainly there is no panacea. There is only the hope that, as men have discovered law and order to be necessary within the state for the best interest of each individual, so some basis of law and order must be found in the larger groups or nations to assure the security and welfare of every nation. Perhaps the only starting point in the modern world lies in the inculcation in the individual of a vital concern for his fellow man, and an earnest desire to pay the price of peace: live and let live.

To ignore or even to renounce nationalism in the world today is to fail to face reality; to seek to discredit it is to run counter to all existing trends. Yet the very preservation of all that the world values can be achieved by the molding of public opinion to the point where the individual and the nation, which is after all but a collective term for a group of individuals, will be willing to let reason control emotions; to think less of saving face and more of saving mankind; to transplant self-interest by world well-being and to act rationally whatever may be the apparent crisis.

NOTES

1. ALBERT GUERARD, "Herder's Spiritual Heritage," *Annals*, July, 1934 Vol. 174, p. 5.

2. LOUIS WIRTH, "Types of Nationalism," *American Journal of Sociology* May, 1936, Vol. XLI, No. 6, pp. 723-737.

3. J. S. ROUCEK and CHARLES HODGES, "Ideology as the Implement of Purposive Thinking in Social Sciences," *Social Science*, January, 1936, Vol. XI pp. 25-34.

4. LOUIS WIRTH, *op. cit.*, p. 723.

5. JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte*, Bibliographies Institut, 290.

6. See CHARLES E. MERRIAM and HARRY E. BARNES, *A History of Political*

Theories in Recent Times, New York, 1924; chapter by FRANK H. HANKINS, "Race as a Factor in Political Theory." Also FRANK H. HANKINS, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*, New York, Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1926.

7. There are numerous works dealing with the history and various aspects of nationalism. See particularly: C. J. H. HAYES, *Essays on Nationalism*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, New York, R. R. Smith, 1931; BERNARD JOSEPH, *Nationality, Its Nature and Problems*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929; HERMANN GRAF VON KEYSERLING, *Europe*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1928; L. S. WOOLF, *After the Deluge*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931.

8. Since the ethnocentrism of the "we-group," as expressed in nationalism, is indissolubly interconnected with the geographical factors and those of the time, the theory of internationalism, as viewed from the standpoint of sociology, can hardly be developed on empiric bases. In other words, how can the "we" attitude of an African tribe be similar to the Swedish nation? Are there any constant elements which would bridge all these numberless ethnocentric tendencies, which could be used for permanent international co-operation and peace?

9. See JAMES T. SHOTWELL, *At the Paris Peace Conference*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937.

10. Quoted from a printed sheet enclosed in a letter from a Japanese school girl in the exchange of letters arranged by one of the peace organizations.

11. Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer, Steinmetz, Marx, and others.

12. Quoted from EDWARD H. REISNER, *Nationalism and Education since 1789*, p. 144, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922. The book is replete with similar illustrations.

13. See JONATHAN SCOTT, *The Menace of Nationalism Is Education*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1936; CARLTON HAYES, *France: A Nation of Patriots*, New York, Columbia University Press; and the series of volumes, *Studies in the Making of Citizens*, edited by CHARLES E. MERRIAM, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

14. "Order of Secretary General of Fascist Italy," as reported in the *New York Times*, February 20, 1938.

15. See BESSIE PIERCE, *Public Opinion and the Teaching of History in the United States*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1926; and *Civic Attitudes in American School Textbooks*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930.

16. For the attitude of the church during the World War, see R. H. ABRAMS, *Preachers Present Arms*, New York, Round Table Press, Inc., 1933; for its attitude in times of peace, see WALTER VAN KIRK, *Religion Renounces War*, Willet Clark and Company, 1934.

17. For a popular summary of such studies, see JACQUES BARSUM, *A Study in Modern Superstition*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937.

18. F. J. BROWN, "The Meaning of Minorities," in F. J. BROWN and J. S. ROUCEK, *Our Racial and National Minorities*, p. 6, New York, Prentice-Hall,

Inc., 1937. Most of the numerous studies dealing with the problem of European minorities approach this question from the legalistic viewpoint. This has been due to the fact that the minorities system under the League of Nations attempted to deal with the problem of central and east European minorities from the viewpoint of the international and constitutional law. See: J. S. ROUCEK, *The Working of the Minorities System under the League of Nations*, Prague, Orbis, 1928. Strange to say, there are hardly any works dealing with the problem of minorities from the sociological standpoint. See: F. J. BROWN, "Sociological Background of Minority Concepts," *The Baltic and Scandinavian Countries*, January, 1938, Vol. IV, pp. 82-85; J. S. ROUCEK, "Neglected Aspects of the Problem of Minorities in Europe," *World Unity*, November, 1932, Vol. XI, pp. 77-82.

19. League of Nations, *Records of the Third Assembly (Plenary Meetings)*, Vol. I, p. 186.

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CHAPTER 3

POWER POLITICS

John Donaldson

WORLD ECONOMICS AND WORLD POLITICS

In the complex composite of contemporary world affairs, the economic factor is a basic one. Many of the most fundamental international processes and policies are economic in character or have economic ends, and other international objectives are often attained through economic means. It is no mere coincidence that the World Powers are pretty largely the Economic Powers, and these in turn, since the Industrial Revolution, are mainly the Industrial Powers.

ECONOMIC CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION

So greatly do some of these nations at times struggle for control of resources and for commercial and financial supremacy that world politics are sometimes said, with some degree of logic, to be power politics, with such economic activities as the prime methods of attaining such power. It is even asserted occasionally that modern wars are basically economic in their causes and objectives. These views are extreme and quite open to debate. But they suggest the purpose of the present chapter, which is to consider briefly some aspects of the interplay of world economics and world politics. Many phases of international economic relation, such as pure theories of international trade and exchange, and manifold techniques of tariffs, money, and the like, must here be ignored. Attention will center largely on the primary questions of resources and population, and on such problems as economic imperialism and, somewhat, those national controls of commerce and finance which affect the general position of the World Powers. In short, the subject here is "Power Economy."

But if such a discussion tends to suggest only a huge struggle for

national existence and expansion, it must be recalled, *always*, that through mutualities of like interests and the compensatory character of unlike interests, there are also inherent in the international economic processes fundamental elements of common gain and concord. Beneath the dramatic episodes there always flows a quiet volume of peaceful and profitable international business, and economic relations may conduce as much to co-operation as to conflict. Indeed, if it be one of the tasks of peace promoters to utilize these inherent ingredients of economic co-operation, it is also true that such forces constantly tend to work toward their own end, regardless or even in spite of conscious efforts of governments and other organizations. On the other hand, one may also recall the proposition that in the present state of civilization power is an essential and, if properly directed, a beneficial feature of world politics; a League of Nations, it is thus argued, can preserve world peace and order only to the extent that it can, as through sanctions, exercise economic power. Such a thesis may be highly controversial, but it is suggestive of realistic consideration.

RESOURCES: NATIONAL "HAVING" AND "NOT HAVING"

The relative economic position of the nations of the world cannot be understood except in terms of their geography and demography—their environment and their people. It may seem unnecessary to remind ourselves that the nations vary greatly in location, size, topography, soil, and climate, as well as in the number and type of their inhabitants. But it is not always realized how important these differences in natural endowment are, both in their indirect influence upon the nature of international trade and trade policy and in their direct creation of major problems in contemporary world politics.

Some countries are landlocked and some border the sea. If it be true that there is scarcely such a thing as a really manmade harbor, then some nations are much more fortunately endowed for world shipping than others. Russia, a country of great size and natural resources, may have been somewhat impeded at first in her modern development as an industrial and commercial power by having few good harbor outlets in the west; a czar spoke of having to look out through a small window; control of the Turkish Straits apparently influenced certain wars. Some countries, such as England, with

THE GROWTH OF THE TRADE OF THE WORLD SHOWING THE GREATER COMMERCIAL EXPANSION OF THE NON-EUROPEAN REGIONS SINCE 1913

Soviet Russia's 'Five-Year Plan' has developed since 1926 into a formidable commercial pressure upon European & American business

Japan in the East has become an industrial competitor of Europe & the U.S. since 1913

The U.S. is the only great industrial land in the West to expand on a vast scale since the pre-war period

- less than 100
- 100 to 155
- 155 to 175
- 175 to 205
- 205 to 250
- 250 and over
- Data not comparable




CONTINUED BY CHARLES HODGES

Comparative Growth Of The
Total Trade: 1926 in
Comparison With 1913
(1913 Trade Equals 100)

THIS GROWTH OF
INDUSTRIAL RIVALS
OUTSIDE EUROPE --
THE U.S., JAPAN AND THE
NON-CAPITALISTIC SOVIET
UNION -- PUTS THE OLD
WORLD ON THE ECONOMIC
DEFENSIVE IN THE BATTLE
FOR WORLD MARKETS

Adapted from Data Prepared By The Economic
Section Of The League Of Nations



vigorous inhabitants but small area and resources, have "thrust their people out to the sea," where they have developed great merchant as well as fighting fleets. The United States has many natural harbors. Topography is important. The oceans cover nearly a fourth of the earth's surface, and in the remaining portion much land is too high and rugged for very successful economic development. It is estimated that 87 per cent of Africa is over 600 feet high, that 38 per cent of Asia is more than 3000 feet above sea level; in Europe, with its many low plains and fertile river valleys suitable for economic development, have emerged a number of the modern powers.

Differences in climate and soil and area of arable land are obvious, and the difficulties of controlling them artificially are great. Climate not only greatly conditions the types of foodstuffs and organic raw materials for manufacture which a nation can grow at home or in its colonies, but it also sometimes influences factors governing manufacture. Although perhaps controversial, a theory strongly entrenched in economic geography and climatology holds that certain climates, such as the tropical, will not permit extensive development of manufacture because of effects upon the people, and suggests that some countries will therefore always lack the industrialization which in the present period inevitably accompanies rise to a position as a world power. Contrasts in mineral inheritance are still sharper. A nation possesses a mineral resource or it does not.

To catalogue here the essential foodstuffs and strategic raw materials which the leading nations do or do not produce, and which some of them may hope to gain in the areas of present-day conquest, would take too much space. Only a few illustrations may be presented. Coal and iron ore, the steel and textile industries, early became prime factors in the Industrial Revolution. Britain, which took the lead in modern industrialization, had both iron and coal, and also wool, but she has long since become dependent upon imports of iron and cotton and, partly, wool; and the iron and cotton do not come mainly from her colonies. She also imports scores of other essential materials, some of them from outside the empire. France has a surplus of iron but (even with her colonies) an insufficiency of coal and fibers, as well as dozens of other important supplies. Even the United States, with probably a closer approach to economic self-sufficiency than any other nation, must import a number of essen-

tial raw stuffs, such as rubber, tin, and manganese. Petroleum, increasingly important for modern industries, armies, and navies, is unevenly distributed throughout the world, and has been the subject of much private and some public international exploitation, as will be noted later in this chapter.

Germany is completely, or almost completely, dependent upon other areas for (among other things) cotton, rubber, aluminum, manganese, nickel, tungsten, antimony, mercury, and tin. Some of the supplies for which she is largely or partly dependent are wheat, wool, iron, petroleum, copper, lead, sulphur, and phosphates. When she absorbed Austria she obtained some iron and steel and textile industries, but so far as sufficiency of raw materials is concerned she did not appreciably improve her situation, and in some respects may have made it worse. If she took over all of Czecho-Slovakia it might "help" (?) her a trifle more in this respect, and if she swept through to the Black Sea she would gain control of important raw material resources, but she would still be very far indeed from self-sufficiency.

Italy is at least equally dependent. She must obtain externally all, or nearly all, her needs in petroleum, iron, coal (she has considerably developed her own water power—her "white coal"), cotton, wool, rubber, copper, and many other minerals, and large or considerable portions of her lead, potash, hides and skins, and meat. In her "battle of the grain" she has surprisingly succeeded in making herself practically self-sufficient in wheat, but only through extreme measures, and doubtless precariously. Her new East Africa possession, Ethiopia, grows some cotton, grain, tobacco, and coffee, and conflicting estimates suggest that she may ultimately get important amounts of meat and hides there, and just possibly some unknown quantities of petroleum, iron, copper, lead, lignite, and precious metals. The great difficulties of developing the area and the uncertainties regarding its resources suggest a good deal of guessing. In any event this acquisition still leaves her tremendously dependent upon others for supplies.

Japan, "the Great Britain of the East," wholly or partly lacks cotton, wool, petroleum, coking coal, lead, copper, and other important materials, and on the mainland she is interested in additional supplies of coal and iron, soybeans (especially in Manchuria), the antimony and tungsten that are known to exist there, and the many other

materials which may be present in larger or smaller quantities. The actual resources of the greater China are the subject of widely varying estimates. But complete self-sufficiency for Japan, even with all China added unto her, is highly remote.

Examples of the great physical contrasts in the relative economic position of the nations could be multiplied; these contrasts also involve the problem of colonial control. It is not to be supposed that any one geographic factor alone accounts for a nation's economic strength or type of economic development; in each case a great variety of such factors create a given situation. Neither must it be claimed that these conditions remain always the same; gradually controls of the environment have been established, and this to an increasing extent since the Industrial Revolution; and as applied science progresses new products and new processes are substituted for old ones. But until the present time the environment continues in large measure to mold the economic destiny of nations, and consequently their relationships and policies, thus giving rise to the frequent discussions of present-day world politics in terms of the "haves" and the "have-nots."

Ignoring ethical considerations, it must be obvious that the idea of economic self-sufficiency is in large part a great illusion, for as things now stand the possession of all the present colonies in the world would not render any one nation independent of other nations for essential materials. Further, it may well be argued that nations undergoing great economic development of the modern type need not possess essential raw materials nor produce their foodstuffs within their own borders or in areas they control; under proper commercial policies they could purchase from others whatever supplies they needed. But for realistic purposes in contemporary world politics these points do not solve the problem, and the next world war may be partly if mistakenly motivated by "having or not having."

POPULATION: THE QUESTION OF "WORLD STANDING ROOM"

If economico-geographic factors have the strongest and most direct and obvious bearing upon international-economic and economic-political relations, economico-demographic factors are also fundamentally important. Racial questions are largely beyond the scope of this chapter, but the economic aspects of the population problem

cannot be ignored. That different races vary in the type of economic activity to which they are best adapted would probably be generally admitted. More controversial is the proposition that the people of different nations inherently vary in their economic efficiency; this is difficult to verify or measure statistically.

The relation of the size of a nation's population to its resources¹ and its production is somewhat more tangible. Statistics of population, including numbers per square mile, may readily be compared with figures on production and even on estimated amount of certain resources such as the minerals. Density figures show great differences but do not point to too simple a conclusion. Ever since Malthus presented his theory that population tends to increase more rapidly than the means of subsistence, the population question has been discussed at length. Some of the conclusions which have been drawn from this assumption have been gloomy: war is among the principal natural checks on population growth; the level of living, at least in the crowded countries, always tends to be kept at a minimum; aggressive modern nations engage in conquest to relieve population pressure. Some of these ideas are debatable.

In any event, if it is assumed that a high density is a disadvantage, it must be observed that most of the industrial powers have a fairly or very high density—witness France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan. A reasonably large and compact labor supply is in fact an essential feature of industrialization, and of course may partly cause and partly result from it. Thus a governmental policy which encourages increase in an already dense population (with bonuses for large families and the like), and at the same time tries to stimulate an inadequate domestic production of foodstuffs, and also sends out armies to conquer new territory with the purpose in part of providing land for population overflow, may not be quite so complete an anomaly as it seems. Though it must remain both uneconomic and anomalous, it becomes a phenomenon of contemporary world affairs. Nevertheless the plea of need for outlet for population pressure, used by more than one aggressive nation in recent and present-day conquest, is overworked, to say the least. Thus the number of Japanese who have settled in those parts of China conquered by Japan, from best available evidence, is far less than would have been expected from the argument, and apparently

far too few to reduce very materially the population of Japan. The same observation, if not premature, may be made with even greater force in the case of Italy and Ethiopia. Nor is there any proof, in such cases, that if a heavy exodus from the home area did occur it would not be offset by a continued growth of population in the mother country.

In fact, among the various types of population movement it is generally conceded that in recent times those which occur spontaneously, and even individually, to a country where the climatic and cultural conditions are not too different from those in the country of egress, but where economic opportunity is greater, are the most successful; this is immigration (or emigration) in the stricter sense of the term. The huge flow of people into the United States until the World War checked it and post-War legislation restricted it (both greatly and selectively) provides the largest modern example of immigration and immigration policy. Other countries also have immigration policies, positive or negative, which sometimes contribute to friendly or unfriendly international relations. The "White Australia Policy" restricts, selectively. Some of the South American countries, sparsely populated, still (though apparently decreasingly) encourage inflow, with the result that Germans, Italians, Japanese, and others settle there, sometimes in groups. Italy and Japan occasionally assist such groups of their nationals in moving and make arrangements with Latin American governments for their settlement and allotment of land, but the total effect upon the home population apparently is not great. However, if present-day leading nations have little luck in pushing portions of their population into controlled areas of Asia and Africa or welcoming countries of Latin America, this does not complete the story.

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

Modern economic imperialism, some of the fundamental aspects of which have been noted above, might be said to center on the exploitation of politically or economically controlled areas, with or without settlement. The purposes are not single. If the people of the "mother land" (ironic term?) do not move to the colony, they may obtain at least some essential materials from it without interference from other nations, they may develop or hope to develop colonial

markets for their manufactured products, and they sometimes find in the colonies opportunities for the activities of their capital and enterprise. If to the vast system of political imperialism, under which nearly half the globe's land area consists of dominions, colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories, there be added spheres of influence and interest, and a whole host of economic and politico-economic devices for such exploitation even in technically independent countries, the economic domination of a few world powers can be more fully realized. The colonies (in the broad generic sense of dominions, crown colonies, and all other non-homeland areas which are politically owned or controlled portions of empires) are of course very unevenly distributed. At one extreme stands the tremendous British Empire upon which "the sun never sets"; at the other the United States with a very small collection of colonies and Germany, who was stripped of all her colonies after the World War but is generally supposed to have the purpose of rebuilding an external empire.

Colonies (in the same broad sense) also vary greatly in economic type. A familiar classification is: (1) non-tropical, settlement, self-governing (the British Dominions); (2) tropical, non-settlement, non-self-governing. The first type has geographic and demographic conditions more or less similar to those in the mother country. Consequently, the products of these colonies and in fact their general sort of economic development tend to be like the mother's. They have been chiefly useful in providing markets and in supplementing the homeland supplies of certain familiar staples such as grains and meats and some minerals. But as their development (including the industrial) continues they tend to become competitive with, rather than complementary to, the mother economy, and with tariff autonomy (and increasing degree of political autonomy to the point of becoming members of a "commonwealth") they have created new problems in empire economic policy—as reflected in the Ottawa Agreements. The second colonial type, though usually with smaller per capita purchasing power, also provides markets for the products of the industrial powers, and in turn exports a great variety of exotic products some of which have become essential raw materials for the powers. Moreover, and this is sometimes lost sight of by observers who think in terms of trade alone, colonies have afforded

large opportunities for capital investment and for operation of enterprise in fields of production ranging from plantation agriculture to mining and utilities. Colonial trade policies will be discussed later, but access for capital and enterprise must never be overlooked.

A good deal of controversy, in parliaments and books, has centered on the question: Do colonies really pay? Some facts cited above throw doubt on the proposition, and some recent careful statistical analyses offer rather convincing negative answers. But not all the elements (such as the profits of enterprise) may be measurable; and empire ambitions, even if unwise, are vital matters in world politics. Undoubtedly some of the present-day empires are vastly more successful than others. It is somehow difficult to think of Britain as an economic and political power without the British Empire. The United States has an empire within its own borders, and so, potentially, has Russia.

RAW MATERIAL CONTROLS

The economic aspects of imperialism include also the various processes by which economic penetration of a so-called backward area has both preceded and accompanied political control. But not unrelated to these are the further manifold cases where private enterprise from the leading nations, sometimes with government encouragement or support, but without carrying the flag, has penetrated various less-developed areas, to build and operate transportation systems and factories and, especially, to operate mines. In fact the line between public and private exploitation cannot be sharply drawn. A mere list of the mineral cases would require a volume. Coal, iron, such ferroalloys as manganese, copper, lead, zinc, and many minor non-ferrous metals have been the subject of foreign ownership. The companies acquire concessions, or buy properties, sometimes in a sphere of interest, as in China, sometimes in an independent country, as in Latin America. Often the mineral products are of strategic importance as raw materials for the industries of the Powers from which the companies chiefly come, and some of the materials are strategic from the point of view of war. Not to mention purely financial loans, certain portions of Africa, Asia, and America just before the World War were honeycombed with capital from Great Britain, Germany, France, and a few other industrialized

countries; and, although the details of the picture have changed from time to time, and the War and the post-War peace settlement took from Germany all her foreign investments, the general situation remains roughly the same.

Probably the commodity which has provided the most dramatic cases is petroleum, where a few great companies, chiefly British and American, directly or through subsidiaries, have acquired ownership of oil resources in almost every area where they were known to exist, and have themselves engaged in rivalries which have involved almost every device in the category of raw-material controls as well as of politico-economic imperialism. The story includes private operations, government concessions, stock ownership by the British Government, open or closed-door policies in colonies, control of mandates, and when the contest would become too keen, business and governmental agreements for division of rights in some areas among British, American, and French interests. The recent increase of economic nationalism, as in Latin America, and the fact that some countries, such as Persia and Mexico, have resented such exploitation and have taken drastic measures to restrict or eliminate it are of some significance, but in many other areas the rivalry among the business interests of the World Powers for petroleum control continues; nor is it likely to be lessened by the increased dependence of army transport and navies, as well as industries, upon fuel oil, gasoline, and other petroleum products.

Mention may be made of a different use of the term "raw material controls" to refer to those cases (which have included such commodities as jute, sisal, rubber, sulphur, potash, nitrates, camphor, sugar, tin) where governments have endeavored monopolistically to manipulate a world market. Although higher price is the principal objective here, such schemes often accentuate another country's realization of its supply dependency, as in the case of the United States and her need of rubber and tin. Occasionally overlapping such phenomena is a further series of developments which also fall within the field of what may be termed international industrial (as contrasted with mere trade) relations: namely, international cartels and world trusts. These various forms of world combination of producers have stirred some resentment because of their monopolistic practices. But as the producers are usually, though


not always, manufacturers in the leading industrial countries, the net result probably has been to solidify more than to antagonize the interests of the industrial powers. Big business is sometimes bigger than areas within political boundary lines. In still other instances, governments, singly or in groups, have fostered or directly participated in such international production and marketing controls.

COMMERCIAL POLICIES

If we now turn to international trade proper, we must pass over many aspects of it as having no very direct bearing upon world politics. Regardless of the various theories explaining its nature (one of the familiar ones of which leads to the conclusion that there should be free trade) and to a surprising extent despite the many national restrictions placed upon it, great streams of commerce flow back and forth among nations, with presumable profit to producers and consumers, exporters and importers. At the same time the commercial policies of the nations are of much significance; and, if they probably do not cause war or ensure peace, they can conduce to some discord or concord. They are sometimes formulated with international political motives in mind, just as commercial objectives may also influence political plans.

Until just recently tariffs, in the form of export and especially import duties, composed the basic structure of commercial policy, and these are still highly important. Ignoring the well-known arguments over their economic effects, their relation to the present problem may be briefly suggested. On the surface it might be supposed that the purpose of the tariff is always purely economic—to raise revenue or to protect such a growth of domestic industries as will, presumably, promote national prosperity. Sometimes this has been the case. However, and especially in the light of modern economic history, it is apparent that many leading nations have employed protectionism with both general industrial strength and strategic industries, among other things, in mind. This would apply to several Continental countries, and perhaps especially to Germany; and England, having adopted free trade before the middle of the nineteenth century, has recently returned to protection. Moreover, in many instances the tariff has been one of the devices for endeavoring to attain a degree of self-sufficiency. Further, colonial

THE WORLD-WIDE WEB OF ECONOMIC COLLAPSE



TWO THIRDS OF THE WORLD'S TRADE LOST
TO THE NATIONS BETWEEN 1929 AND 1933

Fact-Picture by Charles Hodges
Data Adapted from The
Austrian Institute for Business Research

tariff policies have often been particularly designed (as in empire preference) to ensure the colonial market for the mother country products.

Turning to tariff relations, the leading nations have a great array of bargaining devices, and have long engaged in exchange of tariff favors or penalties, by means of maximum and minimum schedules and the like, and through the conclusion of reciprocity treaties. General commercial treaties, when containing the unconditional most-favored-nation clause, have endeavored to level off, to "generalize," these particular favors; but the effort has often been defeated by means of exceptions, trick tariff classifications, and a great variety of other devices. Throughout these international tariff relationships, retaliation and counter-retaliation have occasionally caused a "tariff war," but these have usually been of no tragic political consequence, often being settled by a reversion to "positive" tariff bargaining. In a great emergency, of course, as during the World War, nations have extended almost without limit the control of their foreign commerce, as well as of their foreign shipping and finance. Indeed, an examination of such controls reveals the remarkable extent to which modern war has become, among other things, an economic conflict. In military language one finds the term "economic strangulation."

THE NEW TRADE AND EXCHANGE CONTROLS AND AGREEMENTS

But since the World War, and most especially since the world financial crisis of 1931, even peacetime policy among many major (and minor) nations has come to be dominated by what amounts to a new system of international trade and exchange controls and agreements, which are far more direct and extreme than ordinary tariffs and commercial treaties. These often seem closely related to the whole recent movement toward increased economic (and political and cultural) nationalism which has been so dramatically evident in the internal and external policies of many nations. To ordinary tariff duties, counter-vailing duties, contingent duties, rebates and drawbacks, surtaxes (as for currency depreciation), anti-dumping duties, retaliatory duties, and many other older devices, the new policies add, unilaterally, mixing regulations, global and country division quotas, prohibitions of trade except under permits and

licenses, exchange controls, new governmental trading monopolies for given products, state purchases and sales for special purposes, and full state trading, which finds its most complete form in the U.S.S.R., where the government does the importing and exporting and such things as ordinary tariffs and unconditional most-favored-nation clauses become essentially meaningless. Indeed, in many types, these new controls by their very nature evade or defy application of the unconditional principle. Exchange control is a particularly sharp and delicate instrument, whereby a government can (in the extreme case) permit or prevent, in whole or in part, any inflow or outflow of any commodities, to or from any country, and it can similarly control completely capital flows and all the other transactions which compose the balance of international payments.

Out of these new controls there have almost inevitably evolved a great variety of new commercial and financial agreements: barter, quota, encouragement of purchase, purchase aid, guaranteed purchase, import bounty, clearing, exchange allocation, tourist exchange, nationality exchange, compensation, trade ratio, liquidation, and general payments agreements. The nations, having set up the extreme new barriers to international economic intercourse, naturally found methods of cutting holes in them, by arranging deals with others which they considered expedient in each particular case. This new system has been properly deplored as reducing international trade and diverting it into "unnatural" channels, although it may be remarked that it originated less in willful malice than in desperate conditions, in some instances approaching national bankruptcy, and that a surprisingly large volume of commerce continues despite it. It is also noteworthy that some observers see a solution of the problem less in abolition of the system than in molding it along constructive lines and in attacking its fundamental causes (see the writings of Sir Arthur Salter). Meanwhile, however, the new controls are employed by some nations with almost spectacular results; thus Germany, one of the extreme cases, has recast large portions of her trade (and other transactions), particularly in the direction of the Balkans and Latin America, and trade and exchange control becomes a potent instrument in the orientations and ambitions of general world politics.

GOVERNMENTS AND MERCHANT MARINES

The carrying of international trade is also important, and merchant marine policies are not unrelated to economic and naval strength. As is well known, most of the World Powers have more or less successful merchant marines, which is not entirely accidental or incidental. True, some of the economically lesser countries, such as those of Scandinavia, which have turned to seafaring, have proportionately large merchant fleets, whereas some of the larger countries, such as the United States, have proportionately smaller ones. But the World Powers strive, through government ownership and operation and a variety of subsidies and other direct and indirect aids to merchant shipping, to assist and promote the building and operating of ships. Some analyses of given cases have indicated that such assistance is often much less effective than anticipated and less effective than "natural" efficiency. But this ordinarily leads to less economic argument than other external economic activities, since considerations of potential naval warfare tend to override other considerations. Even if costly, the merchant marine is usually maintained as far as possible, for it becomes both a "life line to the colonies" and, as an auxiliary, the "second line of naval defense." Merchant marine success and control of trade, in recent times and at this moment, bear somewhat more heavily upon the problems of world politics than is usually realized.


INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POSITION

Financial strength relates vitally to the position of the world powers. Not only does trade financing serve commerce, and become especially significant in a widespread system of foreign branch banks such as that of Britain, but a nation's monetary position and its foreign investments often become matters of prime concern in its foreign policy—even though much international finance may be looked upon as "ordinary business."

As observed above in connection with colonies and extensions of enterprise, some of the leading nations, especially since the late nineteenth century, have honeycombed portions of the Americas, Asia, and Africa with their capital. Some of the chief pre-War creditors were Britain, France, Germany, and in lesser degree

WORLD 1929         

WORLD 1934         



Japan—as well as Belgium and the Netherlands. In the major British case there was less evidence of direct political compulsion, but France, apparently officially, guided much of her foreign funds into politically friendly Russia, whereas Germany deliberately thrust portions of German capital “to the East” (e.g., Berlin to Baghdad Railway) with ultimate military objectives presumably in mind—perhaps with the hope of bifurcating the British Empire.

Public or private loans to governments and businesses in weaker countries, especially if not repaid, sometimes become the basis of general economic and economico-political control; in Turkey this came to be called, resentfully, strangulation. The World War strained the financial strength of most of the nations. The peace settlement stripped Germany of all her foreign investments, public and private, and saddled her with an enormous reparations commitment. After the war the United States emerged as a huge creditor even if the war loans be counted out, but recently this American position has declined very substantially, with regard to both straight foreign loans (portfolio investments) and direct investments in enterprise abroad. Meanwhile, despite the boom of the 1920's, many nations remained in difficult financial circumstances, and Germany, temporarily relieved from her heavy burdens by fresh funds from the United States and by a series of moratoria, at least could no longer stand the strain of what she considered impossible obligations. This was a principal, though not sole, factor in the world financial crisis of 1931, which first broke in Vienna, spread to Germany, and soon involved almost every nation, large and small. It might not be an exaggeration to say that the world has not yet recovered from that crisis—certainly not from its underlying causes and the resentments they engendered. And these difficulties and reactions doubtless help to account, fundamentally, for some of the hypernationalism and war-breeding urges, at least in Europe, at the present moment.

Meanwhile the external investments of Britain (especially if ones in “overseas” dominions and colonies be included, as is customary), of the United States, and of some other countries, are by no means unimportant. Also, there is now an increase of reported instances of loans for political purposes, even when it might appear that the lender can ill afford it economically. The government of a European

power, for example, grants funds to a smaller country which it wishes to win away from other alliances and into its own orbit. Sometimes it is provided that the principal of the loan must be spent for purchases of munitions in the lending country.

Moreover, even the monetary system has become an object of concern of leading governments in their consideration of national advantage, perhaps not without considerable logic—since a country's monetary relations comprise an extremely delicate and sensitive relationship to economic conditions throughout the world. The general financial difficulties mentioned above, their great accentuation during and after the world financial crisis of 1931, and the emergence of new problems such as the "flight of capital" and (partly the same thing) the rapid shifting of short-term, as contrasted with long-term, balances from one financial center to another, have underlain such phenomena as exchange controls, noted above, and alleged competitive currency depreciation. Before the World War the international gold standard had come largely to prevail, and under it foreign exchange became fixed, with necessary adjustments occurring within national price-cost structures. After the war various efforts were made to re-establish this standard generally, but they finally failed, and with Britain's abandonment in 1931, one by one many other countries followed her, including the United States.

Whether currency depreciation stimulates a country's goods exports, at the expense of non-depreciating neighbors, is a nice economic question beyond the scope of the present discussion; theoretical considerations and statistics do not necessarily bear out the assumption. But most leading countries have come to a policy of flexible rather than fixed exchanges in order to attain a certain independence in their international monetary relations. Even the recent tripartite monetary arrangement made by Britain, France, and the United States, and joined in indirectly and directly by many other countries, while providing a system of stabilization, preserves the new flexibility in national position. In these and other connections nations increasingly analyze their respective balances of international payments; and to the centuries-old regulation of imports and exports of merchandise they have added control of flows of gold and capital for their respective internal and external necessities or advantages, real or imaginary.

THE OUTLOOK

It is easy to emphasize, perhaps to overemphasize, the extent to which the World Powers employ both economic means and economic ends to further their ambitions and to strengthen themselves for war. The struggle for resources, the haves and the have-nots, standing room only, outlets for population pressure, economic imperialism and world power, control of raw materials, trade follows the flag, the flag follows trade, tariff wars, the merchant marine as the second line of naval defense, loans are golden bullets, currency warfare—such popular aphorisms dramatize by exaggerating. Similarly it is easy enough, granting the premises, to adopt some pure economic theory in which strictly economic processes are assumed to be natural while governmental measures are looked upon as inherently unnatural and therefore become artificial interferences with an otherwise more or less perfect international economic equilibrium.

But in any realistic view it is idle to deny the interaction of world economics and governmental affairs, or indeed the practical significance of the terms power politics and power economy. If, therefore, the goal be world peace (assuming that such an ideal is attainable in the foreseeable future), the solution of non-economic problems such as the governmental, racial, even the psychological ones, and the solution of international economic problems must go hand in hand. Dim dreams of a peaceful world policy and a prosperously balanced world economy blend, and call for enlightened adjustments worked out in the interludes between wars.

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CHAPTER 4

IMPERIALISM

Charles E. Martin

WHAT IS IMPERIALISM?

It cannot be denied that imperialism is one of the moving forces of world politics today. It is somewhat beyond pure nationalism, but is something less than internationalism. Lying between these extremes of political thought and action, it is difficult to define, and almost impossible to understand. Some describe it as the major tendency of the immediate past and present. It is rather a manifestation of present tendencies than a dominant tendency itself. The champion of imperialism regards it as one of the world's great ordering processes. The opponent of this manifestation looks upon it as unnecessary, and as an inevitable outgrowth of its leading source—nationalism.

Empire is nothing new, either in concept or in practice. The wish to rule over other peoples, to increase the national income from the land and labor of others, to conquer and enslave, and to add to the state's territorial domain is as old as organized society. Empires are based on power and have grown out of an expanded nationalism, with war as its instrumentality.

Ancient empires made some contribution to the age of their existence. The Roman Empire gave a common citizenship, an improved legal system, a regime of peace and order, and a certain prosperity to the peoples of the Mediterranean area. However, war was its mode of action; and the independence, equality, and liberty of the Greek world yielded to a rigid legal system, and the arts of the Greeks were lost under the regimentation of Roman conquest. Other empires had their day and passed away. The empire of Napoleon illustrated the combination of an extreme political nationalism, and the ambitions of the greatest military figure in the world. His empire meant the subjection of neighboring peoples and the reduction of the states of

Europe into one imperial system under the control of a single military despot.

Modern empire has much in common with ancient empire. It uses the same tools. It has, in large measure, the same objectives. Its means of using the tools, however, are more humane, and a certain solicitude for the welfare of the peoples affected is professed, and often practiced. The British imperial system, made up of diversities in respect of regions, peoples and races, languages, and even forms of government, is, in many respects, the antithesis of the Roman system. In demanding, in British fashion, the desired return from its colonial investment, the demands of the native peoples and the good of those who are governed are taken into account.

Imperialism of the modern type can be found in the policies and practices of all the leading powers today. Great Britain has led the way. Considerations of sea power, raw materials, markets, cargoes, investments, and proconsular interests have dictated the greatest example of imperialism in the modern world. The stresses and strains of world politics, due to demands of highly nationalistic powers seeking to become imperialistic, have made terrible inroads on the integrity and stability of the British Empire. But the breakup of this great political system is many years in the future. France, dominant on the Continent for several years following the World War, and preoccupied mainly with national considerations, has yet found time and interest for African and Far Eastern penetrations as important political and economic appendages to her domestic policy. The recent yielding of Continental primacy to other powers has not diminished her determination to safeguard her colonial life line. From the first, Mussolini has made imperialism one of the cornerstones of fascist doctrine. The glory that was Rome, expressed in colonial conquests and the mastery of subject peoples, should be restored to Italy today. Extension into the Mediterranean and the acquisition of colonies did not long remain a mere promise. Ethiopia has become an Italian colony, and Great Britain, through the very fact of negotiations with Mussolini, has conceded a division of power in that great inland sea. Italian claims to Tunisia, Corsica and Nice are still further evidence of her imperialist policy. Japan regards herself as holding in the East an analogous position to Great Britain in the West. As an archipelago,

she must rest her greatness on sea power. She must order the more backward peoples of her region and reduce to political stability those who, while culturally and intellectually her equal, are prone to political and military disorder. And unlike Great Britain, she must carve out for herself a great continental sphere of control, in Manchuria and north China. Imperial Germany sought to conquer the world's trade, to equal Great Britain's navy and merchant marine, and to acquire what was left of the world's available territory. Republican Germany's enforced renunciation of the program and of the fruits of empire was but a respite in the logical resurgence of German nationalism under nazi control and a natural resumption of imperialism, either in the form of consolidating her Continental position, such as the annexation of Austria, or in the form of the recovery of her lost colonial possessions. The Soviet Union professes opposition to imperialism as a process of enslavement, and in theory makes common cause with the peoples subjected to its sway. Having more territory and resources than she can perhaps hold, and conceding an autonomy of nationalities and regimes which is subject to simple national control, her position on this question appears more rhetorical than real. The United States, while encouraging the development of free institutions in regions and among peoples subject to her jurisdiction, has not been detached from the spirit and practice of empire. An admixture of motives justified American continuation of a business into which accident led her, but this has not lessened the imperialistic nature of the problem.

Imperialism is a phenomenon in the life of every great nation-state today, whether democratic or totalitarian. It is, as suggested above, a manifestation of a major tendency rather than a major tendency itself. It has been an important, but not the leading or the most influential, force in the life of the state, ancient and modern. It has not been the main cause of international war. Imperialistic elements in war are frequently the more spectacular, but not generally the more controlling ones. The root of international conflict is nationalism. For nationalism is creator, and imperialism is creature; nationalism is root, imperialism, fruit; nationalism is tendency, imperialism is manifestation. We should not seek to make imperialism more or less than it really is.

THE MOTIVES OF EMPIRE

Back of the spirit of empire, and generally embedded in the nationalism of the state, are the motives which have dictated the course of empire, and which have rationalized it. To appraise motive, individual or collective, private or political, is dangerous. However, to discuss and explain imperialism without reference to the factors which have inspired it is to neglect the heart of the subject.

One motive for the building of empires is the conviction on the part of a country that it has a world mission to discharge, whether it leads to the subjugation of neighboring peoples, or to the control of backward areas. The implication of success in war is that the rule of the victor will be good for the vanquished, although subsequent experience, to the shame of the world, has been the antithesis of this assumption. This idea is essential, it seems, to the principle of empire. The "Hellenization" of the world was an aim of the Greeks. The Romans sought to impress the world with a system of uniform laws, and with a common political allegiance based on conquest rather than on political participation. Louis XIV, even though seeking the selfish territorial aims of France, regarded it as a mission for Europe and the civilized world. Napoleon looked upon his system of administration and law as good for the peoples who did not want or seek it. Every great imperial system has been indoctrinated with its obligation to external political and military sway. And each has assumed that the virtue in its rule is intrinsic. The acid test of the allegiance of the peoples ruled is rejected without any consideration whatsoever.

The condition of men and of nations to think too highly of themselves, and to suspect their neighbors too much, has both its good and bad points. It reveals a sense of power and achievement, and a determination to take good care of one's self and one's own. Violent manifestations of these tendencies are unnatural, and arouse in others an enlarged sense of importance as well as a belligerent solicitude for one's own welfare and rights. The national mind, disordered by these unnatural considerations, becomes politically insane, and conflict begins. Temporary victory justifies the course of action taken by the aggressor state, and doctrinal rationalization begins on the part of the state's theoretical apologists. Will subsequent political

experience establish the soundness of the course of action and the accuracy of the doctrine?

Economic considerations also lead to imperialism. It may take any one of three forms, from the economic viewpoint. For one thing, land, and resources and materials derived from it, which are sorely needed by the world, will somehow find its way into the hands of the country which is able to exploit it. Such important elements in feeding, clothing, sheltering, and transporting the peoples of the world will not long remain unused by nations not disposed to make use of it. An outlet will be found for them. Under the conditions of modern business, Western civilization compels the release of needed materials not voluntarily yielded, or released under conditions which it deems unfavorable. The terms of exploitation should be fairer to the native peoples whose resources are tapped. The technological genius of reducing such materials to economic use should not be less than the social genius of doing it on terms of reciprocity, justice, and mutual advantage. Nations insist upon unlocking resources which are held in defiance of world need. Some states today, such as Turkey, Mexico, and China before the Japanese invasion, have declared their intention to be free from the usual modes of economic control enjoyed by the concessionaire. The state is determined either to develop its own resources, or to stipulate the conditions of foreign exploitation. The record of the exploiting state and individual is far from a clean one. It is only fair to add, however, that the nature of the demands of the exploited government frequently has contributed to these abuses.

Markets in the outward regions of the world is the second form of economic imperialism. They have been the basis of the prosperity of many communities in colonizing and manufacturing countries. The native demand for foreign goods has been steady, increasing, and profitable. This is an advantage which, if lost, entails much economic dislocation. It satisfies a deep-seated curiosity on the part of the native which soon ripens into buying habits. It provides a stream of business for shipping and manufacturing interests. When the invasion by Japan of British colonial markets with cheaply manufactured goods began, certain British factories which had supplied these markets with goods for upwards of a century were forced to close down. The British Government felt itself forced to retaliate

in the form of import quotas, for fear of total demoralization of its vast trade destined to a formerly dependable colonial market.

A third form of imperialism, investment of funds in colonial enterprises, has been a common and paying practice on the part of many colonizing powers. Money will go where there is opportunity for a profit, and will remain where a profit is paid. Capital will flee situations which make war on its operations, and which make profits difficult or impossible. It will go to the ends of the earth, if it is profitable to do so, and any outlying region or provinces promising profit will experience the good and evil of the system. The guarantee of profit, at home and abroad, is settled conditions. Such conditions may be ensured through complete domination by the governing power, as in the case of Japan in Korea, or through local control by a foreign-influenced ruler, such as Porfirio Diaz in Mexico. In the first case, there is no hope until the rule of the colonizer is ended, or until its purpose has become more humane. In the second case, new regimes have considerably increased for the native peoples the benefits flowing from the exploitation of their resources.

Other factors producing imperialism include religion, overpopulation, and military interest. The mandate to carry religion to the other peoples of the world has played its part in the development of empire, in some of its aspects at least. Although Christianity has stood for the peaceful conquest of peoples of all nationalities, it has occasionally taken literally the injunction, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." The Pauline conception of Christianity's mission was active and militant. The Christian soldier should push his way into the enemy's country, taking his religion with him, and converting his heathen adversary to it. Christ envisaged the "good fight" of the Christian as a peaceful one. Organized Christianity has taken the command literally, occasionally fighting in its own right, and again entering into arrangements with governments. Religions battled during the Crusades, and faiths made war on each other during the Protestant Reformation. In the settlement of new territory, the religious urge has been present. The Spanish soldier and missionary were integral parts of the Spanish penetration of the Americas.

In the modern world religion is seldom forced on the people or the individual. The right to crusade for converts, however, is insisted

upon by modern church organizations. This is especially true of the institutions of Christianity. The missionary, in addition to his work of conversion, has made profound contributions to the life of the people he seeks to serve. The techniques and mechanisms of Western civilization have frequently come from his influence. He has often been a factor for peace between the country of his origin and the country of his labors. However, foreign religious activity is resented by some states themselves, and is also resented by certain governments seeking political and economic control. The missionary frequently attaches himself to the political causes and fortunes of the people he serves. In demanding the protection of his own government against the abuses of the people ministered to, he is sometimes caught between his political allegiance to his own government and his religious allegiance to his spiritual wards. Moreover, in championing the national interests of the state where he resides, he often locks horns with the government having imperialistic designs against it.

The tendency of some governments to make war on the institutions of religion as a matter of national policy has raised more serious problems than those growing out of the religious manifestations of imperialism. The attitude of the Government of Mexico and of the Loyalist Government of Spain toward the property and the privileges of the Catholic Church and the policies of the Soviet Union and of nazi Germany toward the various forms of religion and of religious activities are examples of this. Such opposition along nationalistic lines may do much to curtail the activities of religion in the external field.

A common motive for expansion on the part of the national state is overpopulation. It is admittedly one of the reasons for the economic malady of Europe. Overcrowded nations have approved the migration of their excess population to countries where their peoples can retain their national traditions, their language, and, in a measure, their original allegiance. The nations which in the past have been the haven of the European and Oriental underprivileged peoples, such as the United States and certain Latin American states, have restricted immigration. Other nations such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, have closed their doors to persons of certain nationalities and races, for definite social and

SPACE: THE BATTLE-CRY OF EMPIRE

WORLD POPULATION - TODAY AND TOMORROW

HITLER'S PROPHET, ROSENBERG:
Germany must "procure sufficient
territory for its future 150
million inhabitants."

EACH FIGURE REPRESENTS
100 MILLION INHABITANTS

SOVIET RUSSIA
Food Supplies
Raw Materials
Key Position

JAPANESE IMPERIALISM
Dominate East Asia,
China and Siberia.
Colonial Control Over
Malaya, Philippines,
and Pacific Islands.

PEOPLE LIVING UNDER
MODERN CONDITIONS

PEOPLE LIVING UNDER
PRIMITIVE CONDITIONS


FUTURE POPULATION

A FACT OF PICTURE

TWO CONTINENTAL "SOFT" SPOTS
Latin America and Africa

MUSSOLINI: "We are
hungry for land be-
cause we are prolific
and intend to remain
so."

Created by
CHARLES HODGES



economic reasons, and in part from prejudice. Exclusion in some cases and restricted immigration in others have been the nationalistic answer of some countries to the imperialistic aims of certain overcrowded countries.

Closing the door on the part of the country which has held out the possibility of economic and social opportunity has made the problem of population all the more acute for certain countries, notably Japan, Germany, and Italy. Japan claims an excess of births over deaths of approximately a million persons per year. Some Japanese urge that the answer to this population problem is emigration to more profitable and less occupied regions of the world. Other Japanese contend that emigration is no answer, considering the fact that many places of desirable settlement are now closed, and that the Japanese will not live in certain regions which are definitely open to their settlement. This group argues in favor of industrialization, mass production, and mass employment, which means either the liberal import of cheaply produced goods by consuming countries, or the acquisition of new markets through imperialistic means. The latter markets are the only ones Japan feels she can count on, hence, the conquest of China. Whichever view one takes of the proper relief of Japan's overcrowded condition, imperialism is an inevitable means to that end.

Italy has a large and increasing population, without great resources and with little territory. Her domestic economy must be buttressed by economic activity abroad, either in the free interchange of raw materials and trade or in political imperialism with an economic basis. Her Ethiopian exploits offer little in the way of the profitable emigration of her peoples. It appears to be essentially an experience in bloodletting and prestige, a long overdue manifestation of the dictator's promises.

Germany, as the protector of her minorities in near-by foreign countries, seeks to bring them within the ambit of her influence or control, either by political absorption, as in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, or through political commitments she hopes to gain in other states containing German minorities. However, the annexed territories now become the patrimony of the whole German peoples, and the political controls secured in the neighboring states

can become the means of important economic concessions, both as regards tariffs, raw materials, and markets.

A minor motive for imperialism is the interest of the official classes who thrive on it. The army, the navy, and the colonial officials all favor an aggressive policy of imperialism. It means extended activity for all these branches, such as larger budgets, greater personnel, more influential careers, and greater political influence at home. It also complicates diplomacy, and means an enlarged diplomatic service. The colonial official, however, is the greatest advocate of imperialism. He is a proconsul of a sort, and has a certain amount of Caesarism in his veins. He assumes and receives an importance in governing a subject population which would never accrue to him at home. He has the consciousness of superiority which a bureaucratic experience inevitably imparts. Profiting by the system, he seeks to perpetuate it.

As a final consideration, there is the military motive of imperialism. Large military and naval establishments are required for imperialism on any extended scale. The seas must be controlled; means of communication must be kept clear; and order must be maintained in the subject region. Naval bases and supply stations are required by maritime powers. New territory must sometimes be seized in order to protect existing colonies. Important waterways must be under the control of the colonizing and trading state. With airways girdling the globe today, remote islands in the South Seas, formerly worthless, have become necessary stepping stones in the maintenance of world communication and transportation systems. These are measures of defense as well as commerce, and are the military expression of imperialism.

Mobility in troop and ship movements is a popular reason for definite military and naval locations, and for greater military strength. Great Britain justifies her points of concentration of army and navy forces in the remote parts of the world on the ground that great distances require important centers from which her forces may move to the affected or disturbed area. Japan demands more and faster ships on the ground that great distances and growing responsibilities require more and different naval armament than that allowed by the limitations of the Washington Naval Treaty. But military considerations are not the uppermost ones in imperialism. The basic urge is really the economic one.

IMPERIALISM IN GREAT BRITAIN

In Great Britain, imperialism is a fact, not an issue. The methods and procedure of imperialism may occasionally be in dispute, but not the policy itself. For the business of an empire is imperialism. And the business of an empire, as practiced by Great Britain, involves great diversities of forms of government, race, and geography. The United Kingdom itself is a unitary state. However, every form of government is tolerated within the confines of the empire, and the pattern of the United Kingdom is not always followed. Whether unitary or federal, kingdom or republic, aristocracy or democracy, one or the other exists somewhere under the British flag. Generally, in autonomous regions, the parliamentary system exists. In certain cases presidential elements seem to be present, but no authoritarian ones. An empire of approximately 500,000,000 people has less than 100,000,000 in European Britain and in the European settled self-governing dominions; the others are in Africa, India, Burma, the Far East, and the South Seas. Geographically, the British Empire spans the world, with possessions on all continents and archipelagoes.

These diversities mold the political organization which is found within the empire. May this peculiar political organization be maintained in the present condition of world affairs? World economy and world order must inevitably modify some of the organizations and plans of empire. These diversities have been bound together politically, even though the tie may be a loose one. With the absolute independence of the dominions, and the growing autonomy of other units of the British Empire, the question of devitalization or eventual dismemberment is raised, as the dominant partner—the United Kingdom—withdraws its control, either by agreement or compulsion.

The constitutional organization of the British Empire cannot be reduced to any uniformity. However, practical administration has resulted in certain divisions which are instructive in describing the constituent elements of the empire. First is the United Kingdom, which is the dominant partner, and the source of constitutional and political authority. Then come the self-governing dominions, partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the Irish Republic, formerly the Irish Free State. Next are the Crown colonies,

such as Jamaica. The dependencies come next, of which India is the most conspicuous example. Then follow protectorates, spheres of influence and of interest, mandated territories, coaling stations, trading centers, and fortresses. Such are the extent and diversity of political organization within the British Empire.

The mechanics of imperial administration, although important, need detain us only for a moment. The agencies of imperialism in Great Britain are wisely regarded as instrumentalities rather than ends in themselves. They must achieve the imperialistic motive and purpose, or yield either to change or abolishment. The protectorates yield certain external or internal sovereignty, or both, by conventional arrangements or because of *de facto* situations. Relations with the protectorates are accordingly carried on through the Foreign Office. The colonial secretary, a member of the cabinet and the parliament, must from time to time be prepared to explain and defend the government's colonial policy. Apart from this political responsibility, the Colonial Office has the largest colonial administration problems in the world. This office recruits and assigns the colonial bureaucracy. It must train and send the right men to their posts of empire, or it fails. India is directed by a special office, conducted by the secretary of state for India and the council for India.

How may the relations between the dominant partner and the member units be defined? They cannot be defined in express terms. However, administrative practice has resulted in certain common elements in relations. The sovereignty of the king in parliament is the most important common factor. When general legislation is required, or where loyal legislatures are incompetent, the dominant partner may and does act for the good of the empire. The king may, in theory, through his governor-general, withhold his consent to colonial legislation or may expressly veto it. This power is now a formality in the case of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and is rarely exercised in other semi-autonomous units of the empire. In some instances, an appeal lies from the highest colonial courts to the judicial committee of the Privy Council. The appointment of the governors of the colonies and dependencies rests with the Crown. Except in the case of the self-governing dominions, the dominant partner conducts the foreign relations of the empire. These practices cannot be said to make up the constitutional law of the empire. They

have been set aside in some instances, and are being challenged in others.

The evolution of the self-governing dominions, culminating in the organization of the British Commonwealth of Nations under the agreements of the Imperial Conference of 1926, is a development which originated in imperialism, but which has ripened into a condition of independence, sovereignty, and international status. By the agreement they became "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Having become international persons, and members of the family of nations, they are no longer illustrations of the principles and practices of imperialism, in the sense in which the term is used in this discussion.

Unrest in India, and demand for further native participation in the government, led the British Government to promise an extension of the representative principle among the classes of India. Moreover, India made common cause with the empire during the World War, making a noteworthy contribution in the non-combatant services of the allied powers. After the World War, the *Montague-Chelmsford Report on Indian Constitutional Reform* was released, the main features of which were incorporated into the Government of India Act of 1919. A number of reforms were introduced into provinces, where a dual form of government, called "diarchy," was to be set up. Few reforms were introduced in the central government of India. The British Government was committed to further reforms, after further study, and only by "successive stages." After a period of ten years, Sir John Simon visited India, with the purpose of determining whether further reforms might be introduced, on the basis of the ten-year record. By the Government of India Act of 1935, a new constitution is set up on the basis of an All-India Federation. This remains to be done. By the same act, the provinces were granted virtual autonomy. Uprisings and non-co-operation movements delayed the introduction of some reforms, and prevented the realization of some which were under trial. The inflammable condition of India, together with the present crisis in the Far East and the world, makes it necessary, in the opinion of the British Government, to

delay the complete development from dependency to dominion until there is greater stability in India, and more settled conditions internationally in the Far East. Japanese economic negotiations with India present a genuine threat to both the political and economic interests of Britain in India, and further concessions to Indian nationalism must await a more propitious time.

British occupation of Egypt dates from 1882, but the relation between the two countries remained undefined until 1914, when Egypt was declared to be under the protection of Great Britain. This status was confirmed by the Treaty of Versailles. After considerable trouble and difficult negotiation, the independence of Egypt was proclaimed in 1922, with the former khedive as king of Egypt. The accession of King Farouk I to the throne has accentuated the nationalism of the country and has reduced, but not eliminated, British influence and interest. The treaty of 1936 between Great Britain and Egypt provided, in the main, as follows: (1) the formation of a military alliance between the two countries; (2) Egyptian membership in the League of Nations; (3) the exchange of ambassadors; (4) removal of British troops from Egypt to a zone at the Suez Canal; and (5) promised British aid in ending the capitulations. In May, 1937, Egypt was admitted to the League of Nations, and in October, 1937, the capitulatory regime in Egypt was brought to an end.

The establishment of the Irish Free State as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and its transformation into the Republic of Ireland under a president, in keeping with the provisions of the new constitution, are developments from imperialism rather than a situation of imperialism, and consideration of them is accordingly omitted.

Mandated territories of Class A, B, and C, formerly belonging to Germany, were assigned to British administration and control. Although the administration of these regions has been under British national authority, title to them is legally vested in the League of Nations, and Great Britain is held to an international responsibility for them. Only as they lose their status of mandates and become incorporated within the colonial domains of national states will they again become examples of imperialism.

Basic changes are being made in the structure of the British

Empire from without as well as from within. The Japanese invasion of north China and the setting up by Japan of a puppet state in Manchuria have greatly modified the economic interests of the British in China. Defense of these interests amounting to war with Japan would mean not alone their loss, but the loss of Hong Kong and the elimination of Great Britain as a factor in eastern Asia. The conquest of Ethiopia by Italy resulted both in the defeat of economic sanctions, imposed in the main by Britain, and in weakening British interests in Africa, as well as her control of access to the Red Sea. Italian activities in Spain, and her Mediterranean maneuvers, have compelled the recognition of Italian interests in the Mediterranean and a virtual surrender of naval and strategic monopoly in that great sea. Usually taking a vital interest in Continental affairs, the United Kingdom has refused to commit itself to attacks against German aggression except in the border states of France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Britain's imperial interests in the Mediterranean and in the Far East prevent her from joining in any engagements against Germany in central or southern Europe.

IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Countries following a policy of frank and open imperialism often assert that the United States has maintained a policy of imperialism with respect to the Latin American states, veiled under a veneer of an international relationship. The Monroe Doctrine as a protection against foreign aggression, especially European, is generally conceded as a desirable thing for the American Hemisphere. The states of South America, especially the larger ones, have found little in the Doctrine to contract their activities, or to modify their course of action, despite much criticism of the United States, both official and unofficial, literary and political. Certain special situations have existed in the countries of the Caribbean and in Mexico which seemed to require the interest of the United States in a more concrete form than the expression of mere sentimental interest. Some cases have required positive aid; others, the exercise of temporary control. Are these measures evidences of imperialism, either in spirit or in fact? The actual situation will form a basis for more accurate appraisal. A few examples will suffice.

The Resolution of Intervention, resulting in war with Spain over

THE WORLD'S RURAL POPULATION

MOST OF HUMANITY STILL LIVES ON THE LAND
FEEDING THE CITY DWELLERS AND THEIR MACHINES WITH THE
FOODSTUFFS AND RAW MATERIALS WHICH KEEP
WESTERN CIVILIZATION ALIVE

Western Europe & the U.S.
are 'urbanized' peoples
who live off the rural
millions of the earth

OCEAN

ATLANTIC OCEAN

PACIFIC

From 20 to 40 per cent
From 40 to 55 per cent
From 55 to 70 per cent
From 70 to 85 per cent

'Backward Peoples'
85 per cent and over
No data or desert

The Latin American peon
is feeling the pressure
of machine civilization
behind plantation and
mining development today

African man-power now
is settling down under
European exploitation
in plantation and other
business development

900 million Asiatics
live on a 'hoor' economy

Cuba, declared that the Cuban people are and should be free and independent; that Spain should withdraw from the island; that the military forces of the United States should be used to give effect to the resolution; and that the United States, after establishing the government and independence of the island, would withdraw. After military conquest and civil administration, Cuba became independent, with its relations with the United States defined by the terms of the treaty of 1903. The treaty committed Cuba to certain important acts of omission and commission in the interest of her territorial integrity and political independence. The United States was given the right to exercise certain measures of control over her external and internal affairs, including the right to intervene to prevent invasions from without and to put down insurrections from within. Occasional interventions have taken place to restore order, followed by withdrawal. Some claim that this has been imperialism, and that the economic and political life of the island are dominated, respectively, from New York and Washington. It is sometimes called a "veiled control" and a "subtle imperialism." Others take the view that the original intervention was in the nature of the abatement of an international nuisance at our door, and that subsequent interventions have been merely to aid in maintaining the independence and stability of Cuba, and to safeguard the interests of the Cuban people, as provided under the treaty.

American economic interest in Cuba is admitted on all sides. That this interest has conditioned our political relations is also clear. It is not imperialism, however, in the sense of the European and Far Eastern use of the term. By a treaty of May 29, 1934, the treaty of 1903 providing for the intervention of the United States was expressly abrogated, in respect of the limitations upon Cuban sovereignty. What the United States might do in Cuba on a *de facto* basis is not clear, should she regard her interests as endangered. However, she has abandoned the conventional right which formed the basis of her relations with most of the countries which have been temporarily under her protection.

Conditions in Santo Domingo in 1905 and Haiti in 1915 required the intervention of the United States to restore order and credit, and to prevent the intervention of European states in behalf of their creditors. Dominican intervention was regularized by the treaty of

1907 with Santo Domingo, and intervention in Haiti by the treaty of 1915. The main purpose of these interventions was the supervision of the collection of customs for the island republics and their application, in part, on the foreign obligations of these governments, in order that European creditor governments might not have just cause to intervene, which they claim the right to do under international law. These countries could have been left to their fates, which would have meant European occupation. Or the United States could have resisted the European demands, which would have meant war. Or a measure of control could have been assumed which would perpetuate the independence of the debtor states, satisfy the creditor states, and preserve the Monroe Doctrine. With the objects of the financial supervision accomplished, and with order and stability restored, American forces have been withdrawn, and the treaties of limited intervention have been appreciably modified.

The relations of the United States with Panama and her treatment of Colombia certainly have imperialistic implications. President Theodore Roosevelt admitted this to be a departure from the principles of non-intervention and of *de facto* recognition, but justified it as a legitimate exception, based on treaty rights, on national interests and safety, and on the collective interests of civilization. The treaty of 1903 between the United States and Panama made the latter country virtually a protectorate of the United States. After the relinquishment of the Platt Amendment by the United States, Panama agitated the renunciation by the United States of certain of her measures of control over the Canal Zone as well as the republic. The Foreign Relations Committee majority drafted such a treaty. The opposition to it was so great that it was never submitted to the full committee. The United States will doubtless insist that the Panama Canal and her relations with Panama stand on a different ground from other Latin American situations, and that she will not tolerate any less control than is now exercised over this important international waterway.

Of outstanding importance in the relations of the United States to the countries of the Western Hemisphere are two new policies, one commercial and the other political, which are now applied to the countries south of the Rio Grande. The new commercial policy was a result of a general convention of the Montevideo Conference of

1933-1934, providing for the lifting of trade barriers through the negotiation of bilateral treaties. This has been followed by several reciprocal trade agreements between the United States and these countries, thus establishing a new international commercial policy. The new political commitment was the protocol of non-intervention, negotiated at the Buenos Aires Conference in 1937-1938. Under it, "no state has a right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." They pledged themselves against the intervention of any in the internal affairs of the other, and for whatever reason. Under this protocol, the United States is understood by the Latin American countries to have abandoned the Monroe Doctrine on a unilateral basis, as it affects these countries.

As concrete evidence of new and liberal policies, the United States is encouraging the establishment of peace machinery on a collective basis for the preservation of continental tranquillity. Truly the policy of the United States, in pursuance of the "good neighbor" relationship with Latin America for the last several years, has not been imperialistic. The Pan-American Conference at Lima in December, 1938 resulted in still further emphasizing political, economic and military co-operation on a non-imperialist basis.

IMPERIALISM IN THE FAR EAST

European imperialism in the Pacific and the Far East has been a deliberate policy. For one thing the European countries acquired tribute-paying possessions in this quarter of the globe. Second, they have been imperialistic in their relations with China. The first tendency has been well illustrated in the conduct of Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan. The United States, in her possession of Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, and Samoa, has also pretended to power and influence in the Pacific.

Conflicting imperial interests found their most rigid application in China. Favoritism toward certain foreign nations resulted in special privileges in the form of foreign customs control, consular jurisdiction, and trade concessions. The demands of the powers extended eventually to spheres of interest in the form of virtually perpetual leases. Limited in profession to commercial exploitation, they soon threatened the dismemberment of China. John Hay, for the United States, urged the policy of the "Open Door," which included China's

territorial and administrative entity. At the Washington Conference of 1922, imperialism in China received a definite check. Japan and Great Britain agreed to relinquish certain territorial claims based on leaseholds. Under the Nine-Power Treaty, the signatories agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. A conference was to be held, looking to the surrender of foreign customs control. Finally, a commission of extraterritoriality was to consider the gradual abolition of foreign consular jurisdiction.

The leasehold renunciations were faithfully carried out. Customs control has been relinquished by means of bilateral engagements by the powers with China. Abolition of consular jurisdiction was refused, pending further developments. China abolished the practice of unilateral declaration, but it has remained on a *de facto* basis without interruption.

Application of the Nine-Power Treaty began to break down with the affirmation by Japan of increasing political and economic rights in Manchuria. A set of conditions and circumstances had been set in motion which could not be settled by the terms of a treaty providing merely a covenant of self-renunciation on the part of nations. Lack of space prevents the chronicle of events leading up to the conflict between the two countries of the Far East. The claims of Japan are excellent illustrations of simon-pure imperialism, in its stark reality. For one thing, Japan rested her interest on sixteen treaty rights, providing for the lease of territory, the operation of the South Manchurian Railway and the maintenance of railway guards, for certain mining and lumber rights, the right to issue and circulate notes, and the right of free residence. On the economic side, Japan claimed to be the heir of Russia. Much money had been invested and many improvements had been made. Her interests were also strategic, since Manchuria was next to Korea, and also to Russia. To protect herself and Korea, she must keep other nations out of Manchuria. As regards the peace of Asia, she held herself responsible for it, and as much interested in the adjacent coast country as England was in Holland or Belgium, and for the same reason. She also regarded herself as having a mandate from civilization to maintain order in this region, much as the United States assumed a similar responsibility in the New World. Politically, she sought to keep the peace and maintain

her position without war. To do so, she must have a stake in Manchurian politics and diplomacy, as they affected Japan's interests. China was not in a position to protect her own interests, much less the interests of others. And China, she said, benefited by the order maintained there by Japan.

China's defense was typically that of the weaker state at the mercy of empire. The twenty-one demands on which Japan based her treaty claims were secured by force, and should be abandoned. Japanese economic control had held back possible Chinese development of the same resources. Certain *de facto* practices, in addition to written treaty provisions, had enlarged the scope of Japanese administration. The political interference of Japan had prevented political unification of the three provinces making up Manchuria and the achievement of the aims of the revolution there. Japanese soldiers and officials abused their privileges. And, finally, China politically sought to adjust these treaties in her own interest, just as Japan politically desired to maintain her rights.

The military activities of Japan in Manchuria in 1931 led to the celebrated Lytton Report of the League of Nations. This commission found Japan guilty of using measures in Manchuria not those of legitimate self-defense. It also found her guilty of setting up a political regime called "Manchoukou," without the participation and support of the people of Manchuria. It also found China to be suffering from communism, and unable at the time to reduce her own house to order, both of which situations were of great importance to Japan. The commission advised a compromise of interests which would allow Japanese economic penetration but would prevent her political control. Considerable Manchurian autonomy was to be allowed, but political connection with China was to be continued. Conferences between China and Japan, followed by treaties of commerce, non-aggression, and peace, were to take place. Japan refused to accept the recommendations of the report, and withdrew from the League of Nations, continuing in effect her arrangements in Manchuria. The United States and the members of the League of Nations agreed to withhold recognition of any regimes coming into power in violation of pacts of peace.

Unfortunately, the imperialism of Japan did not stop with Manchuria. She continued to maintain that China was disorganized and

weak; that Japan, being so close to China, must in her own interest prevent this condition, or neutralize its effect; that China, through boycotts, propaganda, and abuse, had discriminated against Japan; that China had held Japan up to the scorn of the world; and that Japan must protect herself against the scourge of Chinese communism. Accordingly, she demanded that China should not strike at Japan through Europe and America; that China should recognize Manchoukou, and there should be close economic relations between north China and Manchoukou; and that China and Japan should co-operate in a plan to check communism in China.

China refused these conditions and called her own claims to the attention of the world. Illegitimate measures of Japanese commercial expansion in China were declared to be: the maintenance of military guards in north China, really performing the functions of soldiers; the introduction of foreign currencies into China; the support of the illegal east Hopei autonomous government; and the aid to smugglers of Japanese goods into China, depriving her of her customs' receipts. Japanese impediments to Chinese reconstruction included the political events from Manchoukou to Jehol and Hopei, leading up to the war; the determination not to allow any other country to aid China in her process of reconstruction; and Japan's determination to resist any government capable of unifying China.

China refused to agree to the demands of Japan, and Japan refused to abate the practices complained of by China. The occasion for the conflict was not difficult to find, and the undeclared war is the result. The progress of the war has emphasized all the more the imperialistic purpose of Japan. In November, 1938, she abrogated the Nine-Power Pact in reply to the warning of the United States. China remains determined to maintain her political independence, and such of her territory as she may. On the results of this war depends much of the future of imperialism, especially in the Pacific and the Far East.

The Philippines, now a commonwealth and soon to be a republic, is, as the British Dominions, an example of an escape from imperialism, and is not a legitimate example of the practice of today.

IMPERIALISM IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA


One of the most interesting examples of a country as a pawn in the game of empire is the conquest of Ethiopia by Italy. It was a case of

naked conquest of a small state. Italy's claims illustrate, as in the case of Japan, what the demanding state of power and might seeks, and how it justifies its course of action. There had been, said Italy, upwards of fifty years of legitimate Italian penetration, based on the needs of both peoples. Ethiopia, far from co-operating with Italy, had refused co-operation, and had violated covenants as well as massacred Italian troops. This, she said, was merely a step in the Europeanization of Africa in which all nations had shared, with this as Italy's part. Certain abuses in the country needed abatement, which only a European power could effect. Italy needed an outlet for her excess population, and raw materials for her industries. Colonization was a definite part of Italian polity. The admission of Ethiopia to the League of Nations had been a mistake, as her sovereignty was only a sham. The peace of Europe was not involved, for it was only a colonial expansion program vital to Italy, but unimportant to the world. It was no case to test the peace machinery of the world, and not a case for the application of the sanctions of the Covenant of the League. "Localization of the conflict" became the key to Italy's policy as regards Ethiopia.

The case for Ethiopia was that of the survival of the small state against the imperialistic aggressor. Ethiopia, save Liberia, was the one remaining native independent state of Africa. Should it pass to Italy, with it would go any hope of independent native rule, and Africa would become merely the colonial playground of Europe. Italy's penetration, contended the Ethiopians, had been far from peaceful and commercial. The objective from the beginning had been political subjugation. Resistance alone had prevented Italy's designs from taking effect. The test of state preservation should be a pragmatic one, it was urged. A state which had survived so long was entitled to continue its political existence. Moreover, Ethiopia had as much reason for a guaranteed existence as some states created by the peace conference. Ethiopia had joined the League of Nations in good faith, and its significance seemed to be understood by all nations except Italy. Weak in military power and resources, but equal before the law, she stood before the world, about to be sacrificed to the inordinate ambitions of a powerful state. This should be a case for the employment of League sanctions. If Italy could defy the League, she could do much more. The powers, by allowing it, would only post-

ONE COMMODITY COUNTRIES

THE PROSPERITY OF THESE PEOPLES DEPENDS PRIMARILY UPON THE WORLD MARKET FOR ONE PRODUCT WHICH COMPRISES THE BULK OF THE NATION'S EXPORTS



pone a more terrible reckoning. "To localize the conflict" would be an approval of Italy's course, and would leave Ethiopia to a terrible fate.

Such was the case for Italy's extended imperialism; such was the case for the life of the small state. The appearance of the representatives of the two countries before the League Assembly; Italy's defiance of the League; the tardy application of sanctions and their ultimate failure and withdrawal are subjects for discussion under the League of Nations and collective security rather than under imperialism. The Manchoukou and Ethiopian cases, however, emphasize a new and more terrible consequence of imperialism. Formerly, it affected only the economic and other interests of the dominant state, and interfered profoundly with the life and property of the native peoples concerned. Today, imperialism is more frequently the result of an act of aggression, a violation of covenants of peace, and a defiance of the universal institutions of peace. As such it endangers the peace of all peoples and nations, and affects adversely the interests of the civilized world.

THE FUTURE OF IMPERIALISM

Imperialism is a manifestation of a tendency rather than a tendency in itself. It has brought a degree of order in parts of an otherwise orderless world. Where stability has not been maintained by international agreement or organization, order resulting from imperialism has been a boon to mankind. With some states quite satisfied with their territorial domains and with some empires relaxing their political strangle hold on the peoples governed, imperialism is being modified in some particulars, and is yielding altogether in others. The imperialism of today derives from the "Have-not" state, dissatisfied with the status quo, and demanding additional territory, even at the threat of war. It is a more subtle and complex type of imperialism, and is all the more dangerous for this reason. The future of imperialism once depended on the reasonable satisfaction of national demands of prestige, economics, and territory. Today, its future depends on the preservation of the institutions of peace, the application of pacts of peace and of covenants of non-aggression, and the collective security of civilization. It is tied up with the prevention of aggression and the punishment of the aggressor. Only an organized

world, based on international law grounds, can hope to drive it from the earth.

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CHAPTER 5

NATIONS AT WAR

*R. Ernest Dupuy*¹

The armed forces of a sovereign state stand in relationship to that state as an integral instrument of its sovereignty. This would appear to be true regardless of the type of government. Inability to control its own forces is self-confessed indication of instability of government. Where, then, we find the armed forces exercising control of internal or external affairs of a supposedly sovereign state, we may draw one of two conclusions. There exists either military dictatorship of some sort; or anarchy. In other words, a condition abnormal to the recognized conventions of international law appears; that the government *de facto* or *de jure* may be a dictatorship per se would not seem to alter this proposition.

Conversely, we may present another proposition: That state which neglects development of its armed forces to such an extent as to endanger those internal and external relationships controlling its continuance as an entity betrays its people.

If we subscribe, then, to the general proposition that a nation's armed forces are an instrumentality of its sovereignty, we are forced to recognize that in each sovereign state the structure of its armed forces—its army, navy, and air force—is based upon the internal and external policies of that nation. These may be defined as objectives internal to the preservation of the integrity and stability of the state, and external to imposition to the utmost limits of the will of the state upon other states, whenever the instrumentalities of international diplomacy shall have failed. Whether this imposition of the national will be in aggression or in defense depends upon the policy over which the armed forces themselves, being instrumentalities, may have only advisory control. This struggle for imposition of national will we term "war."

THEORIES OF WAR

Conduct of war is controlled more or less by a somewhat loosely linked accumulation of customs, observances, and agreements. They reach from the dim past to the present moment; they are subscribed to in whole or in part by civilized nations; and they represent—up to the present time—one definite objective itself which emerges as a result of war's ravages upon the individual, both combatant and non-combatant. This accumulation of usages we call the laws of war. The principles of the laws of war rest broadly upon the dictates of humanity; their enforcement, like the enforcement of the entire gamut of international law of which they are part, rests in last resort upon international public opinion. That this apparently frail reed has in fact some importance may be gathered from the increasing growth and importance of propaganda—the devil's advocate. This fact will be discussed at length in Part V, "Making World Opinion."

Up to 1914, the structure of national armed forces was in accordance with the theory of the "nation in arms." That is, the national man power of military age, mobilized by one means or another, ranging from voluntary enlistment to national conscription, was regimented into great masses—individuals being drawn from their normal peacetime pursuits with but little regard for those pursuits. Since that time, however, and indeed as a direct result of the tremendous strains at once produced by modern war upon national resources to supply and maintain the war machine, it has been found necessary to adopt another theory. This more practical plan is the theory of the "nation at war." It is based upon an equally regimented and rigidly directed production, geared specifically for one wartime purpose—the supply of the armed forces in the field. The United States embodied this theory in her own Draft Act of 1917, which excused certain individuals from military service in recognition of the necessity for speeding up production rather than hampering it by withdrawal of workers. This lesson we had learned from the experiences of the nations already at war; they learned it at greater expense—paying for the knowledge in currency of flesh and blood. As result, then, of the World War, this theory has become fact; each of the great nations is as much interested in this thing, termed


industrial mobilization, as it is interested in the organization, mobilization, and equipment of its armed forces.

The "nation at war" is as equally dependent upon the worker as on the soldier. The worker slacker at home, or the *saboteur*, is as much guilty of war treason as is the uniformed man in the field who fails in his duty; both merit identical punishment. War today, as a result, thunders at the door of every citizen. Furthermore, with technical improvement of weapons, this is no figure of speech; it is grim reality. This thought merits some elaboration.

We have said that war has as its basic purpose the imposition of the national will upon the adversary. Let us not quibble. In any physical struggle the winner is he who makes the other fellow stop fighting. The loser may be knocked out, or he may merely throw up the sponge. Who cares? He is licked. He has no desire to fight further. Why? Because—and this should be weighed carefully—he has been struck in a vital place, the stroke paralyzing his strength. This may have been an indirect result of continual pummeling; it may have been a solar-plexus blow; or it may have been a combination of both. The grand strategy of the art of war, then, is to eliminate the armed forces of the enemy, laying bare to our thrust that enemy's vital centers—paralyzing his strength. So long as land warfare remained two-dimensional the sudden solar-plexus blow was as infrequent as it was in a fist fight. The continued pummeling was the rule. This is, of course, a tremendous simplification. There is no place here for elaboration of the principles governing the art of war as any other art is governed—principles in themselves immutable, although changing in application with every new development in science.

The air arm has brought war into three dimensions. Its capabilities of range and evasion result in a penetrative power which, following the principle of surprise, might, under certain conditions, simplify the problem of the solar-plexus blow. For the air arm—and the air arm only—has the inherent power to strike directly at the enemy's vital centers without preliminary of eliminating his ground forces. Again we must simplify. Discussion of anti-aircraft means and tactics, the inevitable result through the ages of man's inventive ability to oppose any new engine of destruction by a counter-engine, has no place here other than to recognize their existence. We are interested

AIR POWER - KEY TO WORLD EMPIRE AFTER 1938



in this inherent power of penetration possessed by the air arm, for it has brought about another theory of war threatening the breakdown of the laws of war because it puts the non-combatant squarely in the line of fire. It substitutes for Grotius's doctrine of military necessity the reasonings of Machiavelli. This is termed the theory of totalitarian war.

The leading exponent of totalitarian war was the late General Douhet of the Royal Italian Air Force, and his theory may be summed up as: "Defend on the surface, that you may mass all possible strength for attack in the air. The air force only can attack under the conditions of modern war; and only by attack can victory be won." He foresaw attainment of command of the air, by a great armada, with immediate and continuous attacks on hostile vital centers until the enemy's will to win was broken. The fallacy of his theory, that there is in general no such thing as command of the air, does not concern us here. We must still think in terms of the inherent power of the arm, for Douhet and his followers have brought to our attention the fact that this theory of war affects everybody. A bomb has power neither of recognition nor of discrimination.

Douhet asks of one of his critics whether, in the interests of victory, the latter would hesitate to "employ the least chivalrous, the most perfidious, the most diabolic of weapons, turning them at their maximum power upon non-combatants, the aged, the women and the children?" He answers his own question with—"Certainly not. First the victory of one's own country, then humanity." He adds: "Do we really desire to be civilized? Then abolish war. If this be impossible, it is beside the question to confine humanity, civilization, and all other beautiful ideals in the closed fields of more or less pleasant methods of killing, devastating and destroying."

We see today on the war-torn surface of the earth the effects of this theory, already subscribed to in part at least. However, we must not jump to conclusions. In Ethiopia the answer would seem to have been in the affirmative. In China, also. Of operations in Spain the best verdict is Scotch; not proved. It is for the future to decide whether totalitarian war, directly involving combatant and non-combatant alike, is a fact. Abhorrent as this is from an American viewpoint, it must be considered, if only from the standpoint of expectancy. That this country or Great Britain would subscribe to

such tactical and strategic doctrine is unthinkable. That France would subscribe *ab initio* is improbable. The fact remains that the theory is here and that the only basic European or Asian argument against it is one of expediency. With the radius of action of the air arm increasing day by day, vital centers of each European country, with the exception of Russia, are mutually bare, while in the Far East the distance between Siberia and the Japanese archipelago shrinks practically to the danger point. Once bombing is initiated, reprisal is in order. Who can say where safety from the air will be found tomorrow?

All of this brings us to the cynical conclusion that man's own inventive genius and his own education have brought forth from the womb of our much-vaunted civilization after centuries of labor pains the means to topple that civilization from its lofty pedestal constructed of what General Douhet has termed "beautiful ideals."

WORLD ARMIES AND NAVIES

So much for the theory of war. Let us turn to consideration of the composition of the armies and navies of the world. This composition must follow the basic principles laid down above—that is, support of the policies of the nations respectively concerned. As a result, we may evolve the theorem that in each nation its military forces are implemented and schooled first with reference to power, and second with specific reference to the national problem; that is, national strategy.

On land the growth of national strategy is simple to follow. It depends first upon the terrain of the homeland and of its neighbors. For example, the Alpine troops of France, of Italy, of little Switzerland, the porcupine of Europe, are implemented and trained in conformance with objectives utterly foreign to the cavalry of Poland and western Russia, destined to maneuver upon fairly flat country. They are all of them part and parcel of respective national tactical and strategic doctrine. Whether considered from external or internal stand, the paths of conquest—resultants of obstacles and advantages of physical geography—play a dominant part in shaping the armies of the world.

Another serious factor in the construction of a national armed force is cost. The coat must be cut with regard to the cloth. The

most elaborate planning must come to earth with realization that just so much and no more cash and credit are available. Furthermore, with the tremendous strides of scientific and technical implements the weapon most modern today may be superannuated tomorrow. Hence it is with the utmost reluctance that the normal nation inaugurates a tremendous sudden increase in armament. A progressive planning, with the turnover in depreciation, as in any plant, an item of consideration, is preferred. By this means the national military power expressed in engines of war has three parts: the first line, consisting of the latest in weapons; the second line, those which are becoming obsolescent; and the third line—in reserve—the national ability to construct replacements and improvements; again, our old friend, industrial mobilization.

Thought is also given to the testing of innovations. Here the sane national mind, guided not only by inventive genius, but also by the more pertinent consideration of military effectiveness, must test and try, remembering that in the entire history of mankind no one weapon has as yet *revolutionized* war in a day. Although the boast has been made for many it is so far a boast unrealized.

Returning to the norm of preparedness, two examples of costly mistakes may well be cited. When England in 1906 brought out the first *Dreadnaught*, the vessel was hailed as revolutionary. She was! She could outfight, outrun, outlast any other vessel of the line of her day. But not until the British Admiralty and public had crowed for a while did they realize that, in producing this single example of revolutionary type, they had thrown into the discard all their previous advantage of preponderant battleship strength. For Germany and other nations began building similar dreadnaughts, each better than individual British pre-dreadnaught type vessels, reducing England from leader to competitor. It would have been wiser either simply to maintain her previous position of superiority of existing type ships, or to construct at one and the same time a number of dreadnaughts.

The other example, result of the Versailles Treaty, is more pertinent to present world conditions. As we know, this treaty wiped out German armament. So, while other nations retained as a result of the World War great parks of artillery and other material, Germany was forced, willy-nilly, to rebuild. This she has done. The new

SEA POWER - KEY TO WORLD

EMPIRE 192 TO 1938

Soviet Russia maintains undisclosed submarine strength in Pacific against Japan based upon Vladivostok.

Japan controls Pacific approaches to far East as one of the Big Three naval powers.

The U.S. is destined to become the greatest of the "sub" fleet based on islands.

Britain still commands the approaches to the Indian Ocean with Singapore base

Australia, with its sparse population, highly vulnerable.

AMERICA, BRITAIN, JAPAN
GERMANY, ITALY

INDICATES MAJOR EMPHASIS ON "SUBS"

Big Three, with two oceans confronting it, in any naval race.

Outside the A-B-C powers, no Latin American navies of even secondary importance.

Britain's lost control of the Mediterranean restores Cape of Good Hope route, 1830-36.

Possible German-Soviet clash on Baltic and round Norway in Arctic operations.

Anglo-German rivalry in North Sea

Soviet Russia

France

Mediterranean Br., Fr., Italy

Panama Canal

German artillery, it is said, is, gun for gun, superior to World War types. Or, if not, it should be—and that is cause enough for worry for those nations which have jealously retained their stocks. They had to retain them; no government could stand under popular pressure resulting from costs of entire rearmament; no parliament then could be talked into throwing into the discard all the existing superiority. But, gun for gun, that superiority is gone today. In the United States we may well thank the unceasing experimentation of our Ordnance Department in constructing pilot models of new weapons and improvements in old, which, were the switches of industrial mobilization to be flung shut, would result in the production of superior equipment. That is, if time be granted.

Time and space—the old bugaboos of logistics—stand jeering at human endeavor. It is for this reason that, while the foundries of Europe are roaring full tilt, only an aggressor nation, a nation which has a definite national policy for obtaining by conquest if necessary what she deems she needs, can afford to throw all resources into the latest developments. It is for this reason that the “have” nations, rearming to the best of their abilities, trying to balance their military affairs, do so with the menace of “war at a given date”—the day secretly predetermined by some certain “have-not” nation for the fulfillment of her strength, and falling upon them unprepared. The smaller nations, of course, although they too have the fear, can do only whatever is possible within the limits of their smaller resources to put their respective houses in order, hoping to make the cost of conquering them so great that their larger neighbors will—like the lightning stroke—take the path of least resistance.

An army, reduced to simplest form, consists of warriors and a leader. Through the ages, with technical and scientific advances producing new weapons, we come to the army of today, consisting in the main of infantry—foot troops—assisted by artillery and cavalry and the air and a host of lesser auxiliaries, and supplied by its own maintenance troops. Mechanization, which term covers men and material actually fighting from motor vehicles, and motorization, which includes transportation in motor vehicles of men and material who dismount from their transport to fight, have widened the ranges of movement of armies and have increased the mileage

bounds to the vicinity of battle. These new factors do not guarantee additional speed to the tide of battle itself.

On the sea, navies consist of battleships—vessels which can remain afloat and fight under any condition—assisted by auxiliaries such as cruisers, airplane carriers, destroyers, and submarines, together with supply vessels.

In the air, and it makes no difference if one considers the air arm as a separate entity or as an auxiliary to land and sea forces, there are two broad classifications of fighting ships: bombers and combat planes. To them must be added craft for observation—the long distance eyes of the leaders—and necessary supply and transport ships.

FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARIZATION

The ingredients noted above are compounded in each national armed force in accordance with the individual prescription dictated in the main by financial resources, by man power, by geographical considerations, and by national objectives. But that is not all, for there is another pertinent factor in shaping national policy and, as corollary, national strategy. This is the question of raw materials. However, in discussing nations at war, we must differentiate between the raw materials, ordinarily necessary for national life, and the raw materials vital for military use. To confuse these entirely different questions, or to lump them as one, is an error. It took four years, we must remember, for lack of vital military raw materials to force both the Southern Confederacy and the German Empire to their knees. In each case the nation thus throttled went through the utmost privation at home, exercised the most astounding improvisations, in order to keep the fighting forces going. The subject of raw materials was considered in Chapter 3, and the allied subjects of sanctions and neutrality will be discussed in Part IV. Both are vital to an understanding of why nations fight. Suffice it here to mention the fact, for it brings us face to face with another facet of the war machine—sea power.

Sea power, says Mahan, is made up of three factors: navy, merchant marine, and bases. What nations need a navy? First, all nations with a littoral; second, all nations not entirely land-bound, needing raw materials to exist; third, all nations with overseas holdings. From this viewpoint we can run the gamut from the smallest seashore

country with a tin-pot gunboat up to the British Empire. But there is more to the case than this bald statement. National policy, plus the old question of cutting one's coat to fit the cloth, intervenes. So we might well come to the comparison of two great exponents of colonial possessions—little Portugal and Great Britain—the former with an entirely negligible navy, the latter predominant in sea power. It is interesting and it may clarify the argument.

Portugal's colonies, on the one hand, lie to a great extent in climate unsuitable for European colonization, and their commercial value in general is incommensurate with their extent. Furthermore, the mother country is not dependent upon them for supply. Brazil, her one blue chip in the game of international strip poker of the early nineteenth century, was lost to her when lack of sea power prevented the mother country from maintaining her hold by force of arms. For Portugal, then, sea power is today not essential. She could be stripped of all her possessions and still exist. This is fortunate, for Portugal is too poor to maintain a large navy.

England, on the other hand, depends upon her thriving dominions and her colonies and her foreign trade for the necessities of life. She must maintain open sea lanes to live, hence Britain's navy, her merchant marine, her bases. Since Portugal's colonies lie along the main British sea lanes, it is important for Britain, who has sufficient bases for her own normal use, that Portuguese colonies do not pass into the hands of powers who could make use of them to obstruct her own life lines; and, incidentally, England is the principal customer of Portugal.

Between these two extremes may be bracketed all the arguments pro and con, and all the various factors entering into, the individual equations of each national necessity for sea power in the world. To reduce this question to a theorem, let us state this proposition: Sea power is the weapon by which a nation preserves its own littoral from invasion, ensures its overseas supply (both of these are defensive or parrying measures), and strikes (offensive measure) at its adversary in war. Turning again to the analogy of the boxer, the striking force of sea power is effective only in proportion to the distance (cruising radius) of the fist (the battle fleet) from the body (the base), whereas the arterial and digestive systems are combined in the merchant marine.

MILITARY POWER - ARMIES STILL DOMINATE CONTINENTS

Soviet Russia's military problem is the threat of simultaneous attack on its two frontiers by Germany and Japan.

OVER-RATED
Japan's military machine shows weakness in China - poor discipline and inferior mechanization.

Sea and air power are the first lines of U.S. defense - also the basis of Pan American security.

Britain's small professional army largely in empire duty overseas.

OVER-RATED
Germany once again the chief military power of Europe but shows weak spots in machine.

France has formidable army, with extensive colonial forces.

Italy Army inferior to sea and air forces

Fascist powers are taking lead in the rearmament of South American countries, especially in air.

WITHOUT SUPPORTING SEA AND AIR POWER, MILITARY CANNOT CONSTITUTE AN OVERSEAS THREAT

EUROPE REPRESENTS THE GREATEST CONCENTRATION OF MILITARY POWER IN THE WORLD.

COUNTRIES WITHOUT
CONSCRIPTION
CHIEF MILITARY POWERS

A FACT & PICTURE

Prepared by
CHARLES HODGES

Air power has many of the characteristics of sea power. The combatant air arm needs bases; it needs supply. Its limitations are those of a fleet—radius of action from a base to the target and return. It is three-dimensional, just as is sea power, which includes submarines, and has the same power of evasion. Finally, neither fleet—sea nor air—can hold ground. Both necessitate the supplement of a ground army to obtain this effect.

Thus far the vital ingredient of the war machine—the base upon which the prescription is made up—has been touched upon but incidentally. This ingredient is man power, individual and collective. It should be self-evident that in each nation there is a maximum limit to man power—population strength. All that has been said before as to the component parts of the war machine are of course dependent, in each nation, upon this collective maximum limit, which may only be exceeded if outside man power is hired or drafted. The pros and cons of such procedure—enrollment of mercenaries—lie spread upon the pages of history; there is here neither time nor space for discussion of the mercenary, whether his use be necessitated by lack of national man power or, more frequently perhaps, by lack of national individual will to bear arms. Let us rest upon the statement that no matter how far we may have progressed into the machine age, man is still necessary to work the machine, and we have in each nation just so many men and no more. Conversely, of course, there is no minimum natural limit.

Since man is our basic factor, we must examine next the relationship of the individual to the state. Though this is very fully discussed in other parts of this book, we must have a point of departure; there is no more lucid nor concise compendium of this relationship than is contained in a United States Supreme Court decision rendered a few years ago by Mr. Justice Butler:

Government, Federal and state, each, in its own sphere, owes a duty to the people within its jurisdiction to preserve itself in adequate strength to maintain peace and order and to assure the just enforcement of law. And every citizen owes the reciprocal duty, according to his capacity, to support and defend government against all enemies.²

Given the potential man power, secured to the nation by voluntary enlistment, by conscription, or by other means, the next con-

sideration is training, which, with discipline and courage, weld the individuals into groups of competent soldiers; these groups, further strengthened by competent leadership, become armies of the land, the sea, and the air. Competent military leadership is itself a product of natural ability plus training, hence the necessity for military schools at which are produced the majority of leaders.

CONDUCT OF WAR

This brings us face to face with consideration of the conduct of war. To say that war is a science is inexact, for a science is predicated upon exactitudes, whereas war is the reverse. Rather, war is an art. It does, like all arts, possess a theory and principles. "Otherwise," as Foch says, "it would not be an art." The theory of war—elimination of the hostile will to win—we have already touched upon. The principles bear consideration, for upon them, and above all upon their application in the light of forces and weapons available, rests the fate of nations at war. These principles are laid down in military textbooks, are studied in the staff colleges of the world. They differ but slightly in the printed word, here and abroad. Simplified, they boil down in essence to three axioms: concentration, offensive action, and security. Concentration and security can be accepted as self-evident military truths without much argument; offensive action needs some study before being accepted as axiomatic, particularly in view of a popular fallacy now prevalent—the glittering generalization that defense is superior to offense.

This fallacy has been brought about in part through the tremendous developments in fire power of modern weapons, particularly of automatic or semi-automatic arms; that is, machine guns and automatic rifles. It is quite true that, given plenty of ammunition and some cover, determined men with machine guns can hardly be driven from a position by frontal attack. But to stretch this truth by rationalization into a doctrine of defensive superiority in war does not follow. As well attempt to reason that because a rock stands firm against a river current the stream will not flow around it, or, if in sufficient volume, over it.

Another reason for rationalistic acceptance of the defense fallacy is the wish of peacefully inclined humanity to remove the possibility of a national administration forcing a people into a war of aggres-

sion. This ties in basic thought to the specter of the "man on horseback" always dreaded in democracies. It falls logically in step with the theorem pronounced at the beginning of this chapter—that where the armed forces of a nation exercise control of national policies, military dictatorship or anarchy exist.

But the soldier, upon whom in last resort rests the preservation of the nation, must be prepared to present to the national administration, and through it to the people, a plan covering all eventualities. This is just as true in a democracy as it is in any other form of government. This plan must also recognize that it takes only one party to start a fight. A bully may force the most peacefully inclined individual to defend himself. So the problem reduces itself to the basic question: Does national defense start at home or abroad?

Before going further it must be realized that the pros and cons of a policy of non-resistance have no place here. We are considering war, not peace. So though the temptation is strong to bring in such examples as China to bolster arguments for national defense, let it rest there.

Physical geography is a factor in demarking the line of national defense. To a land-locked nation, or on contiguous terrestrial frontiers, the problem is first of all the defense of the frontier. It is seemingly passive both strategically and tactically. It is the initial crouch of the boxer, wary of a hostile blow. The aggressor must physically cross the frontier to strike, and the defense takes place on the homeland of the victim, with all the horrors that war will impose. But just as the boxer dodges and blocks in order that he in turn may strike, so must the military defense plan consider the counter-attack, to drive out the invader directly, or by invasion of the hostile territory to cause withdrawal of the original menace. Counter-attack, let us remember, is an offensive move. Even in boxing, the man who continually covers up and makes no offensive move gains no decisions. But here we must bear in mind that war is not a game. It is a serious struggle. It is the most serious step that mankind can take. It is the last resort for at least one of the parties concerned. Therefore half measures will not suffice, in defense.

Where a nation is blessed with a sea frontier, and particularly is this true of a really maritime nation having a navy as part of its armed forces, the problem has a different aspect. The navy takes the

burden of first-line defense, seeking to keep the hostile fleet from its shores either by a decision on the high seas or by its very potential threat, if superior in strength. This, for instance, was the role of the British Grand Fleet in the World War—a role successfully accomplished. Such action is offensive action, or threat of offensive action; certainly not a passive role.

Now the air arm has brought a refinement to this basic problem of demarking defense lines. The air arm knows only the boundaries imposed by its own capabilities and limitations in the air. It has shrunk distance; it has brought home the terrors of war. When we consider that mass bombing operations are conservatively possible today at ranges of 500 miles, that carrier-based aviation can operate freely at sea at conservative ranges of 350 miles, and that lesser air raids may leap much greater distances, one in truth sees the blessings of a maritime frontier, where exercise of sea power can mitigate to great extent the hostile ravages upon the homeland *by offensive action or the threat of offensive action*.

Parenthetically, let it be explained that the above noted ranges or radiuses of action of the air arm mean the non-stop flight distances which an airplane can make carrying pay loads of bombs to its target and sufficient gas to ensure return to the base. These distances are obtained by halving the maximum distance which the plane can travel with fuel and load, with the further subtraction of fuel expenditure necessary for maneuvering. At present airplane constructors are engaged in solving the problem of building planes with maximum ranges of 5000 miles, carrying a 25-passenger load; and certain types of long-range flying boats and bombers, as we know, today can attain maximum distances of more than 2000 miles. Hence, we may draw the conclusion that America must tomorrow face what today is Europe's problem.

In the air, then, for nations within mutual bombing ranges, the problem of defense includes retaliation, a sort of "you bomb me and I'll bomb you" threat. Defensive? Certainly, from the strategical viewpoint of the peaceably inclined participant, but, nevertheless, a counter-attack and of itself an offensive tactical move. The maritime nation wishing to keep the hostile air arm from its homeland, must keep that arm out of striking distance. But whence does this hostile air arm take its departure? Either from carriers or from land bases

seized by exercise of sea power. Carriers themselves are vulnerable to naval attack; they must be protected by fighting ships; but carriers are vessels capable of keeping the seas in any weather and with wide cruising radius. They must be guarded by vessels with similar seagoing qualities. They are then protected by battleships, and as a result can be attacked only by battleships accompanied by carriers—that is, by exercise of sea power supplemented by air power, used offensively. A navy composed of vessels which cannot fight in all weathers and at great cruising ranges—that is, a navy without battleships—has no real national defensive value. Hence one may conclude that on the high seas, as on land, offensive capabilities are essential for defense.

CONCLUSIONS

All of which should bring the conclusion that offensive action—the search for a decision, the positive move—is an axiom of war. So we return to very brief consideration of the other axiomatic principles upon which the soldier wages war, and by which, of necessity, the nation at war is governed. Concentration, which is the grouping of power, welds the hammer of offensive action. Freedom of movement to swing the hammer is attained through security, which includes in effect the screening of our movements and the disclosure of the enemy's intentions and strength.

Were this all there is to the waging of war, Napoleons would be a dime a dozen, and, incidentally, war might be a more frequent phenomenon. Alas! War is waged by men; men free to employ all their individual ingenuity to trick, to fake, to embellish. It is not a science; it is an art with complete freedom of medium. Just as great masters are few in comparison to the students in other arts, so in war are great commanders few and far between. Hence the professional soldier upon whom the nation at war depends to wield its cutting edge should undergo training, should study the past in the light of the present, realizing that in war there are no set formulas, no ground rules, no so-called "normal" methods of attack or defense. Principles there are, the application of which depends upon wisdom, while results are added to the frescoed walls of history. Nor is it the enemy alone who hampers the leader. In war whatever portion of the nation comes under the hostile threat feels justly aggrieved,

demands defense regardless of the future good of the whole, exerts political pressure to attain its wishes, even though temporary surcease for the threatened part means greater eventual danger to the aggregate. This is human. That it is correct follows no more than does the patient's wistful plea to the surgeon for momentary alleviation of pain ensure correct medical curative procedure.

It would seem, in conclusion, that the following opinion may be reached with regard to war: It is waged by national instrumentalities which, in abnormal situations such as revolution or military dictatorship, may themselves be cancerous growths upon the body politic, but which normally are legitimate expressions of sovereign will. In either case, it can be brought about by one party regardless of the desire of the other party. Furthermore, man's own ingenuity in weaponmaking has brought warmaking power to a stage where, to be effective, the entire nation must be absorbed in concerted effort. Hence classification of weapons or means as defensive or offensive is mere quibbling, quite aside from the stark necessity of national self-preservation which should be the guide, and which, although it may be affected in the upward bracket by national policy, has a definite irreducible minimum of safety for each nation concerned. Chauvinistic tampering with this safety limit on the ground of superior national fighting ability or on any other academic ground is the surest way to court disaster. Two and two make four in guns and ships and men, and none of these is interchangeable, any more than one can add one cent and one orange and produce either two cents or two oranges. Reducing the matter to a final theorem, whosoever desires to exist today must be prepared to defend that existence by the law of claw and fang.

NOTES

1. This chapter is the opinion of a soldier student of world affairs, and does not necessarily express War Department policy
2. *Hamilton vs. Regents of the University of California, et al.*, United States Supreme Court, December 3, 1934 (*United States Reports*, Volume 293, page 262).

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- See also texts of Command and General Staff School, United States Army

SUMMARY

The Editors

The main conflicts in the world today—whether in Spain, in the Danubian Basin, or in China—have their source in the clash between the expansionist and pushing drive of certain big powers, and the resistance of the threatened states, large and small, against the pressure. The “pushing” nations have developed their arguments mainly on the basis of their economic needs—the lack of certain raw materials, the need for the emigration of the excess population, the necessity of controlling foreign markets—hoping to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency, although such an ideal is one of the great illusions of our contemporary thinking. The same illusionary mistake is made when arguments are advanced for the acquisition of colonial possessions, which may or may not pay economically. But, obviously, the psychological satisfaction is even more important than the economic cost.

In order to achieve these illusory goals, all the countries of the world are pursuing certain economic policies to further their ambitions and strengthen themselves for (or in case of) war.

Although the economic element is basic in international relations, no world peace can be achieved without dealing with other, non-economic problems—the governmental, ideological, racial, psychological, and others. In this respect, the world is faced today by a definite type of collective behavior, known as “nationalism,” a powerful phenomenon of our modern age which penetrates and has its ramifications in

every sphere of human life. It is a complex phenomenon, which cannot be understood by oversimplification. Basically, however, it is nothing else than the extension of the well-known sociological principle, the "we-group" attitude. In this approach the sociologist understands by "culture" all the ways of behaving of a group, a "complex whole," which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, tools, and modes of communications—whether "good" or "bad." But every culture, and especially that of the modern state, is characterized by ethnocentrism, an attitude of mind which looks at all other cultures, and particularly the cultures with which the group competes and struggles, as inferior, degenerate, lower, and worthless. Hence nationalism of today is a form of cultural behavior which involves suspicion, ignorance, distrust, and contempt for other "out-group" cultures.

The manifestation of such an ethnocentric attitude involves the whole series of nationalistic behaviors, which are manifested on the one hand in the nationalistic practices at home and, on the other, in aggressiveness in the international sphere. As modern nationalism tends to identify itself with a specific ideology of state, all agencies within the state are increasingly used for the promotion of such nationalistic designs. This same influence may, as in central Europe today, extend to minority groups in other states especially when, from the standpoint of nationalistic ideology, the "national brethren" are "protected" by powerful states on the basis of the right of "racial self-determination." One of the most important of these agencies of government is the school. It is a powerful instrument for the promotion of nationalism, and education has become, to an alarming degree, subservient to the modern state.

The tendency of powerful states to extend their domination to their neighbors and to more distant parts of the world is

manifested in another aspect of nationalism—imperialism, which can be found in the policies and practices of all the leading states today. Back of the imperialism of every state are selfish motives, of course, but always propounded in the form of “ethnocentrism,” that is, that either the “culture” of the imperial power is “superior,” or that the country has a “world mission” to discharge. Imperialism is extremely dangerous, as is any form of aggressive nationalism, and “only an organized world, based on functioning international law, can hope to drive it from the earth.”

The world of today is faced more and more with the application of the famed dictum of von Clausewitz that “war is politics continued by other (that is, forcible) means.” This type of art forces the growing measures against world insecurity and the counter-measures for national self-preservation, and has abolished the attempt made by the League of Nations to establish a classification between defensive and offensive warfare.

It would seem, on the surface, that it is impossible to deal rationally with the unloosed forces of conflict and destruction. It is true that conflict, as a form of social process, can never be abolished. It might not be even advisable to abolish it since conflict promotes changes and results always in some form of adjustment, possibly even the promotion of more desirable goals.

What, then, are the possibilities of bringing about world peace? The most feasible answer lies not in the abolition of conflicts but in the acceptance of the more civilized methods of dealing with international problems. We must learn that conflicts can be solved and settled without the accompaniment of organized murder and destruction. Education must instruct in the fundamentals of international politics, explain the fundamental forces, and deal courageously with the “ethnocen-

tric" aspects of our national and international problems. Intrigue, vaulting ambition, and "saving face" have been camouflaged by international diplomacy. They must be recognized in their true character and dealt with as such. Based upon a thorough understanding of contemporary trends and policies of international movements, the task of those working for world order and peace is to teach that the international order, like the organized community, the United States, can have many differences, conflicts, and even struggles, but that the whole process can be brought under the only rational principle of government—the good of all is the good of each.

PART II

MAJOR FOREIGN POLICIES

INTRODUCTION

The process of international relations can be compared, very crudely, to the Sunday traffic on American highways and byways. There are all kinds and varieties of drivers—states, in our case—on the road. Some are going after their destination with determination and without much regard to others. Others are cautious drivers, going seemingly nowhere in particular, and only anxious not to be hurt or hit by others. From time to time there are hit-and-run drivers who leave behind them wrecks and casualties—and often for no particular reason except that their “inferiority” or “superiority” complexes got the better of them.

There is, however, one important distinction between world politics and our Sunday traffic. For Sunday traffic there is a supreme authority, represented by traffic signals and the policeman, which determines the conditions and rules of driving. But international relations of today operate along lines which are more chaotic than anything else, and the rules of the game—international law and agreements—are openly violated and ignored, despite the lip service that is given to them. For that reason our “international traffic” resembles Sunday driving in which each driver makes his own rules and where the iron fist, ruthlessness, and the taking of chances have the upper hand.

It is true that even such traffic has to recognize certain fundamental facts. World location is something which has to be reckoned with by every country. But even more important than that is the effect of size. A heavy, large-sized truck gets the right of way on any highway. If the ordinary, smaller-

sized car dares to dispute the point, the advantage of size is immediately evident. The "Great Powers" represent the "trucks," and their pushes and pulls, their approval and objections, their particular type of "driving" along the international highway, their hitting power and their ambitions are very powerful factors in international affairs which must be considered by the smaller neighbors.

As the Sunday traffic, even against its own wishes and despite accidents, runs along definite highways, built according to definite geographical and other considerations, so do the foreign policies of major powers conform to certain definite principles, determined and conditioned by geography, the economic structure of the state, population density, the ethnic homogeneity of the people, the form of government, the complexes and the likes and dislikes of foreign ministers—all interacting in varying degrees and resulting in the complex phenomenon known as "foreign policy."

In Part I, major areas of world conflict were charted, with major emphasis upon the ideological factors of international relations. The brief references to national states were illustrative rather than expository.

Part II turns from this general analysis to a specific study of major foreign policies—the foreign policies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. (Part III will do the same for regional interests and minor powers.)

Each chapter earnestly seeks to do two things: to describe the relatively unchanging and basically unchangeable factors determining the foreign policies of the respective governments in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Moscow, Tokyo, and Washington; and to appraise critically the elements of international policy that are in process of change, including the forces that have produced these changes.

The latter purpose is by all means the more difficult. The accelerated pace with which the international scene is shifted and the many factors of uncertainty for which only time will provide the answers have made prediction impossible.

There are other variables which are but winds of chance or the changing whims of dictators or diplomats. These have been excluded or suggested only as potential alternatives. Such predictions can be made only by prophets, for they "lie in the laps of the gods."

The major emphasis has consequently been given to basic policies and fundamental trends in the firm conviction that a knowledge of these more dominant elements of the foreign policies of each state will provide a basis for understanding recent trends, present developments, and future events.

CHAPTER 6

BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE

Warner Moss

British foreign policy is mysterious—beyond the comprehension of Continentals. The German documents on the origins of the World War reveal that Germany failed utterly to understand British policy. The conduct of France since the World War has indicated time and again, that the French do not understand British policy.

Whatever perplexes us is in bad repute. Throughout the world Britain's reputation is as bad as that of the Pope in Belfast. All the world wonders at Britain's calm acceptance of defeat in Asia, Africa, Spain, the Mediterranean, and central Europe. It cannot be denied that Britain appears on the European stage as a much-bullied old woman bewildered by the taunts of upstarts. But perhaps we err in our judgment. British prestige has reached the depths before, only to emerge more brilliant than ever. As Kemal Atatürk recently reminded the world, "Britain may lose battles, but never wars."

BASIC BRITISH POLICIES

The Geographical Basis. Geography explains the mystery of British policy, for British geography is unique and no foreign office with different problems of geography can hope to understand it. Except for Japan, whose experience is too short and experimental to be in point here, Britain is the only example of an *island* empire. The insular position is beyond the comprehension of *continental* nations. ✓ Economics explains the mystery—for Britain is the only empire based primarily upon world-wide maritime trade with its infinite variety of interests. ✓ Politics explains the mystery—for Britain's empire is the only one which has developed hand in hand with the spread of democratic institutions and the spirit of nationality.

One of the most brilliant explanations of this mysterious British policy comes to us from the pen of Sir Eyre Crowe in the form of

a Foreign Office memorandum (January 1, 1907) dealing principally with Anglo-German relations.

Domination of the seas is the first item in Sir Eyre's list of British policies:

The general character of England's foreign policy is determined by the immutable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe as an island State with vast overseas colonies and dependencies, whose existence and survival as an independent community are inseparably bound up with the possession of preponderant sea power.

Naval power is the sole basis for Britain's assurance that she can feed herself in wartime and that she can preserve access to raw materials and to her markets.

Domination of Trade. A second policy follows from domination of the seas, says Sir Eyre:

. . . a maritime State is, in the literal sense of the word, the neighbor of every country accessible by sea. It would, therefore, be but natural that the power of a State supreme at sea should inspire universal jealousy and fear, and be ever exposed to the danger of being overthrown by a general combination of the world. Against such a combination no single nation could in the long run stand, least of all a small island kingdom not possessed of the military strength of a people trained to arms, and dependent for its food supply on oversea commerce. The danger can in practice be averted—and history shows that it has been so averted—on condition that the national policy of the insular and naval State is so directed as to harmonize with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind, and more particularly that it is closely identified with the primary and vital interests of a majority, or as many as possible, of the other nations. . . . It follows that England, more than any other non-insular Power, has a direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the independence of nations, and therefore must be the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others, and the natural protector of the weaker communities.

In other words, Britain has deliberately surrendered political dominion in exchange for the trade domination of the world, but with

the distinct provision that no other nation shall be allowed to exercise such a political dominion to Britain's disadvantage.

General Freedom of Commerce. The third item of policy follows logically from the second:

Second only to the ideal of independence, nations have always cherished the right of free intercourse and trade in the world's markets and in proportion as England champions the principle of the largest measure of general freedom of commerce, she undoubtedly strengthens her hold on the interested friendship of other nations, at least to the extent of making them less apprehensive of naval supremacy in the hands of a free trade England than they would in the face of a predominant protectionist Power.

In this statement Sir Eyre did more to justify British free trade in the eyes of foreign nations than in the eyes of the British people. It is therefore to be added that Britain's economic life is so intimately associated with trade throughout the world that every step away from free trade and "open door" policies narrows the British opportunities for making a living and a profit. Sir Eyre also failed to state that priority in the industrial revolution gave Britain an advantage which other nations must seek to overcome through the protection of their own markets.

The Balance of Power. The fourth policy is the balance of power:

History shows that the danger threatening the independence of this or that nation has generally arisen, at least in part, out of the momentary predominance of a neighboring State at once militarily powerful, economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread its influence, the danger being directly proportionate to the degree of its power and efficiency, and to the spontaneity or "inevitableness" of its ambitions. The only check on the abuse of political predominance derived from such a position has always consisted in the opposition of an equally formidable rival, or of combination of several countries forming leagues of defence. The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power, and it has become almost an historical truism to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single State or group at a given time.



The balance of power explains the British opposition to Napoleon and later to Germany. After the World War, Britain had a distrust of the power of France but the rise of Greater Germany has once again shifted British support to France. On the whole, the French position in the Mediterranean, especially in the light of Mussolini's agitation for territorial gains, and the proximity of France to Britain make necessary a close and peaceful relationship between the two countries and, other things being equal, Britain must prefer a French alliance to any other.

Germany and Great Britain. Germany still errs in believing it possible to woo Britain away from France. At the same time British relations with Germany must be kept as cordial as possible, partly to offset French ambitions but also to preserve to Britain her central European market. To quote Sir Eyre Crowe again:

So long as England remains faithful to the general principle of the preservation of the balance of power, her interests would not be served by Germany being reduced to the rank of a weak Power, as this might easily lead to a Franco-Russian predominance equally, if not more, formidable to the British Empire. There are no existing German rights, territorial or other, which this country could wish to see diminished. Therefore, so long as Germany's action does not overstep the line of legitimate protection of existing rights she can count upon the sympathy and good-will, and even the support, of England.

Further, it would be neither just nor politic to ignore the claims to a healthy expansion which a vigorous and growing country like Germany has a natural right to assert in a field of legitimate endeavor.

Much depends, of course, upon Sir Eyre's definition of the field of "legitimate endeavor." Of this he says,

A wise German statesman would recognize the limits within which any world-policy that is not to provoke a hostile combination of all the nations in arms must confine itself. He would realize that the edifice of Pan-Germanism, with its outlying bastions in the Netherlands, in the Scandinavian countries, in Switzerland, in the German provinces of Austria and on the Adriatic, could never be built up on any other foundation than the wreckage of the liberties of Europe.

Belgian Neutrality. Closely associated with the balance-of-power doctrine is one last rule of British diplomacy—no powerful nation can be permitted to gain control of Belgium and the Netherlands because their shores may be used as a base for military and naval operations against Britain. It was this rule, more than any other, which caused Britain to give up all thought of neutrality in 1914 when Germany invaded Belgium.

A NEW DIPLOMATIC ORIENTATION

These policies described by Sir Eyre Crowe are the traditional British policies. Every one of them stands challenged today. Britain has been forced to share the dominion of the seas with the United States and Japan. Germany, Italy, and Japan have robbed weaker powers of their independence. Greater Germany has directly challenged the balance of power though she appears considerate of Britain's interest in the Low Countries. The open door and freedom of trade have practically disappeared.

It becomes imperative, then, to examine the factors which are driving Britain to a new diplomatic orientation.

Changing Economic Factors. The first major factor to change the basis of British foreign policy is economic. Priority in the industrial revolution, the possession of resources of coal and iron, and a favorable geographic position gave sufficient advantage in world trade to raise the British level of living far above that which prevailed upon the Continent. This was accomplished by the sale abroad of Britain's resources and products, trade and manufacturing based upon the raw materials of other countries, and by the supply of shipping and other services to all the world. Britain, however, became almost completely dependent upon her empire and foreign trade. The situation has changed. Britain has maintained her position in shipping and many of the other services, but other countries have now met Britain in the industrial race and have protected their markets by tariffs. British coal now faces the competition of oil and water power. British steel and textiles face expanded competition. During the World War, while Britain was engaged in Europe, the Chinese market fell largely into the hands of the Indians, the Japanese, and the Americans. It will be noted that the great British loss was in coal, steel, and textiles which supplied the better part of

the visible exports. British imports have continued at a high level. The purchasing power of the masses of the people has been maintained by tax-supported unemployment benefits and social services paid for out of savings and the income from shipping, foreign investments, and such services as insurance.

British savings were once invested abroad and stimulated trade for British products, but these investments have now shrunk and so has British power. The shrinkage is due to a number of factors. High taxation for social services has taken much of this money. Savings are being invested in Britain itself to re-equip steel and textile plants and to establish new industries at home to meet the demand for consumers' goods. The government has discouraged foreign lending to aid its refinancing and to protect sterling exchange. The same autarchic policies which have reduced world trade have reduced opportunities for lending abroad.

The establishment of the National Government in 1931 marked a revolution in British economic life. British bankers, whose influence over policy has been so great, seemed to have become industrial minded when they financed the new home industries and took over the declining industries in steel and textiles. The last free-trade fortress has been successfully stormed, and we must add Britain to the countries surrounded by tariff walls. The old foundations are surely trembling.

Once British bankers could influence world policies through their lending power but, today, that power is shared with New York and autarchic legislation has limited the politics of international finance. Through a forced reduction of the level of living Russia has been able to industrialize, Germany has been able to rearm, Japan has been able to wage war in China, and Italy has conquered an Ethiopian empire. In each case the task was considered financially impossible. British financial circles should wonder whether the victor in Spain and China will really need to turn to the London money market for aid in reconstruction.

Changing Imperial Relations. A revised political organization of the empire is the second fundamental change affecting British policy. The empire was, in the past, the basis of Britain's claim to the position of a great power. Britain's policy was once an imperial policy—the policy of one fifth the land area of the globe, the policy of

one fourth the population of the world.) Moreover, we should not confine our consideration of the empire to the territory under the British flag. There were the protectorates and countries intimately bound to Britain by treaty and also a number of areas, such as the Netherlands East Indies, which could not be maintained under their existing sovereignty but for the defense provided by the British navy. There were other countries, such as the Argentine, intimately connected with Britain by trade. Add the decisive factor of sea power, and the empire appeared unchallengeable in war.

Since the World War this situation has changed. Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand have ceased to be borders of the seas controlled by Englishmen. They have become continental nations with an industrial development and policies of their own. Southern Ireland has made good its claim to a separate national existence. Imperial co-operation is more an ideal than a fact—and in the minds of many a dubious ideal. The role of the dominions in a future war is uncertain. The dominions are represented abroad by separate diplomatic agents and are not bound by British treaty commitments without their consent. (Much of the Empire has ceased to be British in policy if not in name.)

British America has come to identify itself almost completely with the foreign policies of the United States. (It has become an axiom of the British Commonwealth of Nations that good relations and cordial co-operation with the United States must be maintained.) Because of pressure from Canada and the United States, Britain abandoned the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had been so useful during the World War. But the divisions within the empire were revealed when this action was taken over the protests of Australia and New Zealand. The dominions at the antipodes feel extremely dependent upon the British navy, and yet they have frequently separated from the mother country on matters of Asiatic policy. Except for the protection of the British navy South Africa has no interest in common with any other dominion. Ireland, the recent rebel, knows that her fate is inevitably linked to that of Britain by the circumstances of geography. Yet, as the price of her support to Britain, Ireland will demand that the same British pressure which was used to accomplish and preserve the separation of northern Ireland shall be used in the interests of Irish unity. Britain knows

that a few thousand Irish extremists may be able to immobilize many times their number of British soldiers, may conspire with the enemy, and may destroy crops and supplies.

Naval and Military Changes. The third major change influencing British foreign policy is naval and military. As Baron von Clausewitz demonstrated, war is a continuation of diplomacy, and diplomacy is a continuation of war. This continuity of the two is quite apparent today in Asia, Spain, and central Europe. Italy underscored her challenges to Britain by the sinking of British vessels in the Mediterranean. Germany reminded Britain of the need for German friendship by demonstrating the effectiveness of her bombing at Guernica.

(In the military and naval game Britain has lost much. The surrender of naval supremacy has freed Japan in Asia, has freed Italy in the Mediterranean, and has made Britain reluctant to pursue any policy in opposition to the United States. The development of the airplane has, in part, removed the Channel barrier against European aggression, has reduced the usefulness of Gibraltar and Malta, and has lessened the possibilities of a war of attrition in which British naval power can weigh heavily in favor of British arms. Britain won the last war by blockade, but the submarine, the airplane, and the speed boat armed with torpedoes have all increased the difficulty of successful blockades.

On the other hand, the acceptance of American naval parity won Britain a friend; the Singapore Base has compensated, even if only slightly, for the weakened naval position; antiaircraft protection has kept pace with airplane development, and the Channel, despite the panicky fear of London in September, 1938, still remains a barrier to real invasion and occupation; the new French, Belgian, and German forts increase the likelihood of a war of attrition; mechanization and motorization are ideally suited to Britain's policy of supporting an ally by her industries and the sending abroad of a small expeditionary force; and finally Britain's path is open to the very resources her possible opponents need desperately—if her navy is not really challenged.

The Growing International Anarchy. The new political setting is the fourth and last of the factors compelling a new British diplomacy.

During the nineteenth century the Continent was busy putting its house in order, and the unorganized and undeveloped non-European world lay open to British exploitation. The foundation of the British system was a sea power as pervasive as the sea itself. Behind every British move and every British assertion of a principle of international law there was the veiled power of blockade made effective by the control of the North Sea, Gibraltar, Egypt and Aden. But, as Sir Eyre Crowe recognized, that power of blockade made a potential enemy of every nation which became dependent upon world trade. And, as the industrial revolution followed its course, the British system was challenged with increasing frequency. Britain found it necessary to make concessions to America, France, and Russia in order to keep the peace. Germany recklessly threw down the gauntlet in a direct challenge to British sea power—and was defeated. But Britain was victor in name only, for she was economically crippled and her allies took the principal spoils. To France went the hegemony of the Continent. To the dominions went the principal but not very valuable German colonies. To the unscathed Americans and Japanese went the preponderance of naval power and the markets of the East.

Britain did the best she could under the circumstances. The League served to put some restraints upon the methods by which French power was exercised though hardly upon the power itself. The Washington Conference of 1922, served to hold the Americans and the Japanese in bounds, at least temporarily. But treaties cannot restrain power. Japan blandly tore up the Washington agreements. France defied the principles of the League through her central European diplomacy and through using the League to block revision of the Treaty of Versailles.

THE HETEROGENEITY OF PUBLIC OPINION

Britain, herself, appears to be the only part of the empire with the possibilities of a well-defined and realistic policy, and yet in Britain there have been dissensions. In 1914 Britain was faced with labor unrest and with a mutiny in Ireland, but by and large her people felt that they understood the issues of foreign policy. Crisis after crisis had helped mold public opinion so that the nation was more or less united at the outbreak of the war. But today the British

public is distrustful of its newspapers and of its government which came into power on domestic issues. The public feels that it has not been kept fully informed and that policy is the result of backstairs politics, palace revolutions, and pressure from financial interests. Taken together, several polls of public opinion are highly significant. In March, 1938, a poll by the Institute of Public Opinion showed that 73 per cent of the British public thought that Mr. Eden was right in resigning, 62 per cent approved his reasons for resigning, and 56 per cent definitely opposed Chamberlain's proposed policy. Such support as Chamberlain had was based upon the British dread of war. Similar polls showed marked public uncertainty on other issues of policy. Forty-six per cent of the people were undecided as to whether Ireland should be united, 25 per cent had no opinion as to whether the dominions would support Britain in a war, 28 per cent were doubtful or non-committal about Britain's membership in the League, 30 per cent were indifferent to a trade agreement with the United States, and 27 per cent were doubtful or non-committal about the abolition or reduction of armaments by international agreement.

In a democracy such a state of public opinion virtually leaves the determination of policy to interested minority groups and, with a conservative government in power, that means the bankers of the city, the federation of British industries, and the powerful conservative families. But these minorities, frightened by bogeys of "bolshivism," do not have the complete confidence of the people—their power is due primarily to the bankruptcy of the Liberal and Labor Parties and to the hopeless state of opinion in the country. The National Government came into power in 1931 through backstairs management and financial pressure, and it went to the people asking for "a doctor's mandate"—that is, the power to do whatsoever they might think best without consulting the patient. The National Government and its conservative successors have transformed British foreign and domestic policy more radically than any Labor Government ever attempted to transform it—indeed the changes have been more radical than any since the repeal of the Corn Laws. Once in power the conservatives have managed public opinion with consummate skill, so that even the Munich agreement has been "stomached" by a dismayed and frightened public. It was a public which rushed for gas masks without reflecting that all the scattered

warfare of the past few years produced not a single instance of a civilian population gassed from the air.

LACK OF UNITY

Lack of unity in policy is matched by lack of unity in the conduct of the British empire. Acts are performed in the name of the king, but different advisers act for the different dominions. Consultation might avoid conflicts and contradictions, but consultation does not always take place and it often becomes a mere fiction. No part of the empire faced with a serious crisis is likely to consult or take gratuitous advice. It will probably merely inform its fellow members of the commonwealth. Britain, in particular, is unlikely to base her policy upon consultation. The resignation of Eden, which signaled a momentous change in policy, illustrates the situation. Australia complained that she had not been consulted, but Britain felt there was no need for consultation. In the face of events known to all the world, Mr. Chamberlain announced:

The United Kingdom Government still adheres to the policy enunciated and discussed at the Imperial Conference of 1937. There is no change in the attitude of the United Kingdom towards the League of Nations and collective security.

The change was explained as a change in "methods" only.

It is doubtful whether a British foreign secretary can be made truly responsible to the British Parliament. It is even more doubtful if he can be made responsible to all the Commonwealth Parliaments at once. He cannot serve two masters—much less six. Out of simple necessity Britain will continually confront the dominions with *faits accomplis*. British Empire foreign policy will therefore be made in London so far as it is made at all. The dominions may accept it or face the world alone. The lonely course will always be filled with peril, and Britain will never make co-operation so expensive as to force the alternative.

It is argued by some that the outbreak of war will prevent any dominion from remaining neutral. This is a wholly academic view, however. In the first place, it is doubtful if formal declarations of war will ever be used again so that belligerency and neutrality will be less easily distinguished in the future. In the second place, it is

a possibility that the next war will be quickly decided and the dominions will hardly have an opportunity to participate. But, finally, as long as Britain rules the seas, or even the seas important to her, no dominion's neutrality is likely to be challenged in any but a strictly legal sense.


During war the dominions may be useful to Britain without sending troops to a European battlefield. An important school of military opinion holds that the number of men actually engaged upon the battlefields in the next war will be smaller than in the past. In that case the transportation and feeding of dominion and colonial troops would probably be a nuisance. The various parts of the empire can, however, perform very important functions, such as looking after their own defense, patrolling their neighboring waters, supplying food and raw materials on credit, and perhaps by carrying on purely local wars on their own account. All these things can be done in the local interest without actually embroiling the dominions in Europe. Britain would then be left free to fight her own war in Europe without carrying the burdens of imperial defense.

LONDON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Actually the League system was Britain's undoing. So far as the League had significance in terms of power politics it was an Anglo-French agency and its influence was confined to those areas where Britain and France had effective power. To the French the League was merely an auxiliary to the system of security alliances, a sort of revised form of the Anglo-French Entente to be used when convenient. But to the British the League was a very serious affair, for its exercise of power depended upon sanctions and the sanctions depended upon the British navy and the British power of blockade. A Britain which was weakened economically, politically, and strategically had presumed to make a public threat of blockade to guarantee a status quo in which she had little interest—the Versailles settlement with its central European progeny of impossible states. She had placed herself in the very position which Sir Eyre Crowe had dreaded. She had become the enemy of every nation bent upon expansion. The threat of sanctions instinctively turned against Britain every nation dependent upon the outer world for food and raw materials. Sanctions were a repudiation of free trade and drove

THE BRITISH EMPIRE - SEA POWER

Held together
by the symbol
of the crown



nations to autarchy. Britain's only friends today are France, who duped her, several small states in central Europe, and a United States wary of sailing unknown seas in so leaky a vessel as the British Empire. Today Britain is faced by Germany, Italy, and Japan threatening her at once in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific. The task is beyond the power of Britain. She failed to oppose Japan in Manchuria in 1932, German rearmament in 1933, the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1935, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the intervention in Spain in 1936, the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, and the expansion of Greater Germany in 1938. Britain may be right in asserting that it is not her task alone to defend the Versailles settlement and the League—but if she is right it is a confession that her old power is gone. She stands challenged in every interest and every policy.

✓WHAT ALTERNATIVES?

In the light of these fundamental changes in Britain's position, what paths are open to British policy?

A British bid for world power is out of the question. The resulting war would be world-wide with very nearly every nation, including the United States, ranged against Britain. Britain would fail utterly.

The alternative is a retreat. It is a rule of war and politics that victory goes only to the army of the offensive, the army which keeps the initiative in its own hands. A forced retreat sacrifices the initiative to the enemy. Britain's problem is therefore to choose in advance a point to which an orderly retreat may be made and from which the offensive may be resumed. There is a second rule of war and politics that the successful general must concentrate a superior force at the decisive point. The Labor Party has failed to arouse public opinion to support of a positive policy. It is obvious that Britain must withdraw her military forces from China. It is obvious that the American Empire can be left to the protection of the United States. But, beyond that point, British public opinion is hardly prepared to select the line of retreat and the point of concentration. The conservative leaders do seem to know what they want. Said Mr. Chamberlain,

China cannot be developed into a real market without the influx of a great deal of capital and the fact that so much capital is being

destroyed during the war means that even more will have to be introduced after the war is over. It is quite certain that it cannot be supplied by Japan. Therefore, when anyone appears to contemplate a future in which Japan has a monopoly of the Chinese trade and we shall be excluded from it, I think it is flying in the face of facts. It is quite certain that when the war is over and the reconstruction of China begins she cannot be reconstructed without some help from this country.

The British bankers and industrialists apparently believe that a war-weary Japan, Italy, and Spain will need reconstruction and an expanding Germany will need funds. All these countries will be under the heavy expense of maintaining dictatorships and will be forced to produce results quickly enough to satisfy their people. Thus British leaders believe the dictators will be forced to borrow from Britain for their capital equipment. British money will thus support the dictatorships and, though Britain may not govern the world, she will own it—on paper. It was thus that France once sought to finance Russia, but tory Britain does not seem to have learned the lesson.

The Munich Agreement (or something like it) now appears to have been inevitable once Eden was replaced by Halifax. Britain is forced to regard the German problem from two angles. In the first place it must be recognized that, whatever the justice of national aspirations, the peace settlement at the end of the World War produced monstrosities in central Europe. Had these new national states been woven into a general European system, such as was idealized in the League, their unsuitable composition and boundaries would not have hindered survival. But such states were in no wise suited to enter a military conspiracy for the suppression of the leading industrial power of central Europe, a power with burning resentments and a military tradition. If central Europe is viewed in this light the only possible policy was that of appeasement leading to a reorganization satisfactory to Germany. In the second place it must be recognized that central Europe must be economically united—and if Britain regrets that this must come about through German expansion it must be remembered that Britain and France once had an opportunity to draw the boundaries of central Europe much to

their own liking. What Britain cannot help she will be wise to encourage and guide.

Because of the changed strategic situation in the Mediterranean Britain must either control Italy or withdraw all concentrations from that sea, even if the move means the loss of prestige, trade, Egypt, Palestine, and the oil pipe line supplying the British navy. Military necessity would also seem to demand the surrender of many British post-War commitments in the Near East, especially Palestine. However, the conservative leaders appear to feel that Italy can be adequately controlled by British financial power and, since finance is of relatively less importance in the Arab world, there must continue to be a use of force at the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

These policies of political appeasement and financial control may preserve the peace temporarily and preserve some portion of British trade, especially British exports of machinery. But it clearly means the loss of military allies, and the expected trade will not be permanent, lucrative, or especially large. These policies can constitute nothing more than a line of retreat.

From this line of retreat Britain must move on to the establishment of international institutions in co-operation with other nations. She must also seek a reduction of trade barriers. Control of the seas has been surrendered and can never be regained. The balance of power on the continent of Europe cannot be maintained any longer. Britain must now find security and prosperity in co-operation with others, for she cannot have it alone. To quote Sir Eyre Crowe again on the enmity of nations:

The danger can in practise only be averted . . . on condition that the national policy of the insular and naval State is so directed as to harmonize with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind, and more particularly that it is closely identified with the primary and vital interests of a majority, or as many as possible, of other nations.

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CHAPTER 7

THE STRUGGLE OF FRANCE FOR HEGEMONY AND SECURITY

Graham H. Stuart

France has been called a "nation of patriots," an appellation both apt and justified. The one certain means of producing evidence of French patriotism is to threaten *La Patrie* with aggression from outside. Internal dissensions disappear, parties coalesce, and *l'union sacrée* is born, endowed from birth with the power of unlimited resistance. The unprotected Rhine frontier has been the spur to this disposition, and the German invasions of 1870 and 1914 have whipped up the need for security. France cannot contract—her present frontiers bound a homogeneous French people. France must be preserved intact in order to remain France. The once glorious watchwords "liberty, equality, and fraternity" have been reduced to prosaic but grim "security." Today *vive la France* would be more accurately translated "let France live" than "long live France."

EFFORTS TO GAIN SECURITY

It was this obsession for security that dictated French policy at the Peace Conference. Clemenceau was not merely a vindictive old man imposing impossibly harsh terms upon a vanquished foe—he was also a realistic leader of France who had seen his country's territory ravaged twice in his lifetime and who intended to prevent a repetition if it were in his power. Hence his determined insistence upon the whole Rhine frontier, a policy which both Foch and Poincaré supported. In fact, a secret treaty with Russia in 1917 had provided for an autonomous Rhineland state, occupied by French troops until Germany should fulfill to the letter the terms of the settlement of peace.

Failing to obtain the Rhine frontier, Clemenceau demanded and obtained other guarantees which were the nearest possible equiva-

lent. The Rhineland, including the bridgeheads, was to be occupied by allied troops for fifteen years as a pledge for the execution of the terms of the treaty. The Rhineland to a distance of fifty kilometers eastward was to be completely demilitarized—even the temporary entrance of German troops was forbidden. Germany's navy was substantially reduced; her army was restricted to a Reichswehr of 100,000, whose term of enlistment ran for twenty-five years; compulsory military service and the general staff were abolished; and the manufacture of arms, munitions, and war equipment was forbidden.

But these were negative guarantees, and France was determined to have certain positive pledges as well. Clemenceau had little faith in the protective value of the League of Nations. He wanted a treaty of guaranteed security, according to the terms of which Great Britain and the United States would come to the immediate aid of France in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany. Lloyd George and Wilson agreed to accept such a treaty. They carried out their pledges, but, unfortunately for France, the United States Senate, a body zealous of its prerogatives, sabotaged the entire Wilsonian peace settlement. France was compelled to seek elsewhere for security.

FRANCE'S ALLIES

Logically, France must turn for support to those nations whose future existence depended either upon an impotent Germany or upon unified action for defense against an aggressive Germany once more restored to influence and power. France first approached her good neighbor and ally, Belgium, and a military alliance of a defensive character was signed September 7, 1920. Another natural ally was Poland, whose empire had been established partly at the expense of Germany, and whose corridor separating east Prussia from the rest of Germany was a territorial arrangement which would never be acceptable to Germany once she should be in a position to alter the situation. France had been a partisan of Poland at the Peace Conference and had later aided the newly organized state against the bolsheviks. Poland, fully appreciating these services and the potential value of French assistance in the future, was receptive to the proposed alliance. By the Franco-Polish Treaty of

February 19, 1921, the two powers agreed to take concerted measures to defend their territories and legitimate interests in case of unprovoked attack upon either.

Since Great Britain was unwilling, after the refusal of the United States, to accept the obligations of the tripartite treaty of guarantee agreed to by Lloyd George and Wilson, France naturally expected some sort of substitute. Lloyd George appreciated the reasonableness of the French attitude and, at Cannes in January, 1923, Briand obtained his acceptance of a treaty of alliance according to which Great Britain would support France on land, sea, and in the air, in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany. However, Briand's successor, Poincaré, wanted more specific guarantees implemented by a military convention and his intransigence completely alienated British support for the time being.

Another nation whose future would be seriously threatened by a powerful Germany was Czechoslovakia. If the *Anschluss*, or joining of Germany and Austria, were accomplished, Czechoslovakia would be almost encircled by Germans. A minority of some three and a half million Sudeten Germans within her borders enhanced the danger of the newly established Czecho-Slovak Republic. Foreign Minister Beneš was keenly alive to the situation, and, during a visit to Paris with President Masaryk in the autumn of 1923, the question of an alliance arose. Such an arrangement was manifestly so advantageous to both sides that an agreement was quickly reached. According to its terms, the two powers agreed to consult one another on questions of foreign policy threatening the security of either. They agreed further to make common cause in case of aggression, or if a restoration were attempted in Germany or Hungary, or if Germany should try to effect an *Anschluss* with Austria.


Having signed the Treaty of January 25, 1924, with Czechoslovakia—the key member of the Little Entente—the next logical step for France was to conclude similar treaties with Czechoslovakia's allies. Rumania had always been friendly toward France because of the cultural relations between the two countries so that the treaty of friendship, signed by France on June 10, 1926, was well received in both countries.

Not only did this treaty provide for consultation in case of a threat to the security of either France or Rumania and joint action

H O S T A G E T O
D I C T A T O R S

HITLER'S OWN WARNING

“A SECOND WAR IS COMING.... IT IS NECESSARY, ABOVE ALL, TO ISOLATE FRANCE THAT THIS SECOND WAR WILL NOT BE A WAR OF GERMANY AGAINST THE ENTIRE WORLD, BUT A DEFENSE OF GERMANY AGAINST FRANCE WHICH DISTURBS WORLD PEACE.”



against the aggressor, but also the two states agreed to work out a concerted policy if an attempt was made to modify the European political status quo. A similar treaty with Yugoslavia, signed November 11, 1927, made France a full-fledged associate of the Little Entente.

Bismarck was supposed to have feared coalitions, and the Kaiser's nightmare was the encirclement of Germany. French foreign policy in the years immediately following the World War gave Germany cause for concern on both grounds. The French policy of making bilateral treaties with potential enemies of Germany not only gave her hegemony in Europe but also at the same time provided a *cordon sanitaire* which guaranteed her security by the maintenance of the political status quo.

SAFEGUARDS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

At the same time that France was carrying out her policy of alliances with individual states, she was not overlooking additional safeguards of international organization and co-operation. Although she had little faith in the League of Nations as an absolute protection, France appreciated its possibilities as a valuable re-enforcement. As a permanent member of the Council, with a large number of her nationals in the secretariat and with the support of the succession states, France dictated League policy. French authority became so pronounced that Great Britain almost broke with her on several occasions, and neutral opinion could appreciate the accusation of the vanquished powers that, in practice, the League of Nations was a League of Victors.

The greatest weakness of the League from the French point of view was its lack of effective sanctions. The automatic boycott was a potential threat to the aggressor state and the possibility of using force was also provided for in the covenant. Nevertheless, the French favored an international police force organized and equipped to make the dictates of the League immediately and fully effective. Without this, some sort of co-operative use of force of a specific character was an essential need; otherwise, any substantial reduction of armament was impossible.

The Third Assembly of the League, which met in September, 1922, realized the vital relationship between disarmament and se-

curity and authorized its commission to prepare a draft treaty which would make disarmament contingent upon mutual security. This recommendation resulted in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which provided that, if a state was attacked, the other signatory powers would come to its assistance immediately. The Council of the League was authorized to name the aggressor in case of war, and must do so within four days of being faced with the question. The Fourth Assembly adopted this treaty unanimously. But when it was submitted to the Powers for acceptance, a general criticism of the plan followed. The principal objections to the treaty arose from its failure to define aggression or to provide specifically for the peaceful settlement of disputes as an alternative to war.

Premier Herriot was particularly determined to work out a plan for joint security that would meet with general acceptance, and his ideas were strongly supported across the Channel by Ramsay MacDonald. A threefold basis of agreement was now proposed—arbitration, security, and disarmament—and the results were embodied in the so-called Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, commonly referred to as the Geneva Protocol. By the terms of this treaty, a war of aggression was deemed an international crime and the guilty state was defined as one which resorted to war in violation of its obligations to submit disputes to the machinery of peaceful settlement or, after submitting its case, refused to accept the award. Legal disputes were to go before the World Court and additional machinery was provided to settle non-justifiable disputes.

The Geneva Protocol was unanimously adopted by the League Assembly in October, 1924, and France and her allies, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, signed it promptly. Great Britain, however, had gone conservative in the last election and the Baldwin government was unwilling to accept further international commitments. For the time being, France once again saw her policy of security through international action jeopardized, if not destroyed.

MULTILATERAL PACTS

Locarno Pact. The next step on the path of security for France, strangely enough, was taken by Germany. On February 9, 1925, the German ambassador in Paris sent a memorandum to M. Herriot

suggesting a pact of mutual guarantees for those countries interested in the status quo of western Europe. France sounded out her allies and, after considerable diplomatic jockeying, the famous agreements of Locarno were consummated. The most important of these agreements was the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee signed by Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, which guaranteed the existing frontiers between France and Germany and Belgium and Germany. Aggressive warfare in this region was prohibited and, if it occurred, all the signatory powers agreed to come to the immediate assistance of the injured party. The other agreements were similar treaties between France and Czechoslovakia and France and Poland. Four arbitration treaties were also signed at Locarno to facilitate the peaceful settlement of possible disputes among the signatory powers.

Although M. Briand is said to have described the Locarno Pacts as a fragment from the broken mirror which was the 1924 Geneva Protocol, nevertheless Locarno was the first real guarantee of security which France could accept implicitly. The Alsace-Lorraine frontier could now be regarded as permanent, since Germany had signed the protocol voluntarily. Although the Locarno Pacts were strictly regional, their limited jurisdiction increased the likelihood of success. Another encouraging feature was that the Locarno agreements were concluded entirely within the framework of the League of Nations, and Germany was admitted as an equal partner to their enforcement. When M. Briand welcomed Herr Stresemann as a member of the League of Nations in the historic assembly meeting of September, 1926, the spirit of Locarno was undoubtedly a sentient reality and permanent peace seemed at last to have been achieved.

Kellogg-Briand Pact. One more international engagement looking towards permanent peace cannot be overlooked, although its importance has been on many occasions cynically derided. In April, 1927, the tenth anniversary of America's entry into the World War, Foreign Minister Briand suggested that France and the United States sign a pact forever outlawing war between the two countries. At first the suggestion was rather coldly received, but Secretary Kellogg could not ignore the favorable popular attitude aroused by Nicholas Murray Butler's spirited press campaign. Secretary Kellogg insisted, however, upon a multilateral instead of a bilateral

pact, to which M. Briand finally agreed. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris, was signed August 27, 1928, by fifteen nations in Paris and, within the year, some fifty nations had acceded to its provisions. The contracting parties condemn war and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations. They also agree to settle all disputes by pacific means. No machinery to carry out its provisions was set up nor were any sanctions provided to enforce its obligations. Nevertheless, France had finally drawn the United States from its shell of isolation and, in so doing, had obtained worldwide denunciation of aggressive warfare.

MILITARY SAFEGUARDS

In her long search for security, France never forgot Napoleon's realistic expression that God is on the side of the largest battalions. Many Frenchmen believed that Germany had begun the World War at a time when France had permitted her defenses to become seriously weakened. However, immediately after the war, with the Central Powers defeated and disarmed, the problem of French military and naval armament was not pressing. In fact, there was a strong sentiment throughout the world for a substantial reduction of armament and France heartily subscribed to the idea. But reduction of armament in France could be considered only in so far as it was compatible with national security. Because Germany has a larger population and higher birth rate (a French deputy not long ago noted that in twenty years Germany would have twice as many conscripts as France), France must maintain a powerful standing army, a large and modern air force, and a navy commensurate with her needs as a nation facing two seas with the world's second largest colonial empire.

Nevertheless, armaments are expensive and deputies who must face their constituents for re-election are never eager to increase taxes. Appropriations for armaments on land, sea, and in the air were cut. The three-year military service which existed at the outbreak of the World War was gradually reduced until, in 1928, it was down to one year. The French navy at the close of the war for the most part consisted of obsolete ships and, although the shore personnel remained large, very little money was available for an adequate fleet. As a result, when France came to the Washington Conference in

November, 1921, she was practically on a parity with Italy and would have to do considerable building to reach the 175,000 tons in first-class battleships which were allotted to her by the conference. This condition was such a severe blow to French pride that measures were immediately taken to remedy the situation and, by the Naval Law of 1925, France provided for a program of building which would bring her navy up to treaty strength by 1931 and, at the same time, provide more adequate numbers of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Even the French air fleet, the largest in the world at the close of the World War, diminished in numbers and deteriorated in quality to an extent that shamed the memory of Guynemer and Nungesser.

It was not, however, until after Locarno that France became actively interested in supporting the League program for a substantial reduction of armament. In fact, the Third Assembly in September, 1922, had definitely gone on record declaring that the principles of disarmament and security were inseparable. The League's Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference had its first meeting on May 18, 1926, and commenced working on the agenda. When the first draft conventions were submitted by the British and French at the third session on March 21, 1927, wide differences of opinion were in evidence, particularly as regards international supervision. The French wanted a very elaborate system of international control, while the British preferred to rely upon the good faith of the signatory powers. The attempt of the two powers to reach a secret compromise in 1928 was frustrated by the publication of its terms in Hearst's *New York American*, and all further plans for world disarmament remained in abeyance until after the London Naval Conference of 1930.

France, still smarting under the provisions of the 1922 Washington Treaty which reduced her to a parity with Italy, was at first disposed to refuse to attend the London Naval Conference just as she had the Geneva Conference of 1927. Nevertheless, M. Briand, as a co-author of the Pact of Paris, could hardly afford to refuse an invitation to a conference looking towards disarmament when proposed by his distinguished collaborator. Nevertheless, France made it clear in advance that she believed that naval disarmament could not be settled separately from land and air disarmament and that

the League of Nations Conference was the logical place to achieve results. Furthermore, parity with Italy would not be accepted except in the Mediterranean. She maintained this attitude throughout the conference and signed only those sections of the treaty which extended the Washington agreements. The conference concluded with the relations between France and Italy even more strained than at the beginning.

In the meantime, the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference had been plodding along with indifferent success, but in December, 1930, it finally produced a Draft Convention for the Limitation of Armament for the consideration of the Powers. The League Council thereupon issued an invitation to the nations of the world to attend the first general disarmament conference to be held in February, 1932, in Geneva. France, still insistent that security must precede disarmament, opposed the American proposal for the abolition of weapons peculiarly adapted for offense, and M. Tardieu urged the establishment of an international police force with strong air auxiliaries to be placed under the jurisdiction of the League to make its sanctions effective. This plan found little favor except in the eyes of the allies of France and, faced with the threatened withdrawal of Germany, Herriot in November, 1932, offered a new formula implementing the Pact of Paris, providing for consultation, and extending the Locarno agreements to ensure immediate aid to any European state which might be the victim of aggression. He, too, wished the Powers to place at the disposition of the League a small contingent of troops equipped with powerful implements of war.

Although this plan received a more favorable reception, Germany objected to the solidification of the status quo and, finally angered at the Allies' failure to achieve some degree of limitation, gave notice on October 14, 1933, of her withdrawal both from the conference and from the League of Nations. Although the conference again convened in 1934, the success of Hitler's policy of rearmament in Germany precluded any chance of success. On June 11, 1934, the conference adjourned for the last time with the world's annual expenditures for armament far greater than in the years just preceding the World War.

THE PROBLEM OF REPARATIONS

Among the indirect methods employed by France to strengthen her position in reference to Germany was the imposition of a fantastically high bill for reparations. Either Germany would be bled white in making the required payments or the Allies could maintain or extend indefinitely the occupation of the Rhineland. The chief difficulty was to determine just how much should be assessed. A bill of \$55,500,000,000 proposed by the Allies on January 29, 1921, startled even their own experts. However, a reparations commission had been set up to fix both the amount and method of payment before May 1, 1921, and its bill assessed against Germany was \$33,000,000,000 plus the Belgian war debt and plus payments made for the armies of occupation. It was agreed that France should receive 52 per cent of this amount, since restoring the 13,000 square miles of her devastated territory was estimated to cost about \$20,000,000,000.

France, fearing lest Germany would fail to carry out her financial obligations, had seen to it that severe penalties should be provided in case of default. Since Germany could not borrow abroad, had little export trade, had been unable to stem the flight of capital, and, it must be conceded, lacked the will to pay, default was inevitable. Great Britain favored at least a temporary moratorium, but Poincaré demanded productive guarantees. Inasmuch as France controlled the Reparation Commission, Germany was declared in default and, January 11, 1923, French and Belgian troops entered the Ruhr. Germany countered with a policy of passive resistance. The results were disastrous to Germany and unsatisfactory to France. The German mark reached a level of 5,000,000 to the dollar before its complete devaluation, and the French army of occupation cost more than three fourths of the amount obtained.

Germany finally agreed to resume payments, but wished to have her capacity to pay taken into consideration. The Dawes Commission provided a compromise solution, but France refused to consider diminishing the reparation commission's bill. But even France ultimately realized that Germany could never pay \$33,000,000,000. When the European financial situation demanded a final and reasonable settlement of the reparations problem, the Young Com-

mission not only materially cut the reparations bill but recognized the vital relationship between reparations and war debts.

The Young Plan became effective in 1930, but the world depression had already cast its shadow ahead and, although France opposed the Hoover suggestion of a year's moratorium for the reparations and war debts, no other solution was offered. As the economic conditions became steadily worse, another reparations conference convened at Lausanne in 1932. France was now compelled to see reparations scaled down again—this time to \$750,000,000 and with a possibility that even this sum would never be paid. Her only chance for compensation lay in the possibility that the United States would make a corresponding reduction in the war debts.

France had been the last of the allied powers to settle her war debts with the United States and the Mellon-Berenger agreement of April 29, 1926, had given France far more favorable terms than the British had received. Furthermore, before the Lausanne Conference practically wiped out German reparations, Laval claimed to have obtained from President Hoover in their conversations in October, 1931, a definite promise to join the question of debts with reparations in future efforts at settlement. When the United States, after the Lausanne Agreement, refused to consider a downward revision of debts, France decided to default on her payments and her policy was soon followed by all the rest of the European creditors except Finland.


THE WEAKENING OF FRENCH HEGEMONY

The great depression which began in Europe in 1931 with the failure of the Credit Anstalt in Vienna not only wiped out reparations but also brought about a weakening of French political power and a gradual disintegration of French security. Her ally, Great Britain, was forced to abandon the gold standard, and the new National Government was less friendly to Continental commitments than its liberal predecessor. The German Republic became steadily more nationalistic and threatening as Brüning gave way to von Papen and von Papen was succeeded by von Schleicher. The relations with Italy were rendered increasingly unfriendly owing to the pretensions of Mussolini to regard the Mediterranean as *Mare Nostrum* and to plan its defense accordingly.

With the advent of Hitler as chancellor of the Third Reich in January, 1933, the French could foresee a complete débâcle of their political hegemony unless drastic counter-measures were taken. The League's power was seriously weakened by the resignation of Japan and the prospective withdrawal of Germany. The Four Power Treaty of Understanding and Co-operation, fashioned by Mussolini and MacDonald in Rome during the hot days of July, 1933, was founded upon fears rather than hopes and, by signing it, France alienated Poland and the Little Entente without any corresponding advantage to herself. It never had a chance of success, and its failure pushed Italy closer towards Germany and the revisionist group.

Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in October, 1933, and in January of the following year proceeded to undermine the French bulwark of defensive alliances by signing a ten-year pact of non-aggression with Poland. Pilsudski was weary of playing tail to the French kite and was glad to gain a ten-year breathing spell for the corridor and at the same time get even with France for signing the Four Power Treaty. France could not afford to see her security swept away without a vigorous effort to stem the flood. In February, 1934, a National Union Cabinet, with Doumergue as premier and Barthou as foreign minister, began a vigorous counter-movement. The first step was the proposal of an eastern Locarno pact which would tie up the Soviet Union, the Baltic states, Poland, and Germany in a non-aggressive agreement. Russia was willing, but Germany was not, and Poland could not afford to antagonize Germany. France next sponsored a movement to bring the Soviet Union into the League of Nations as a counter-weight to the loss of Japan and Germany and also as an addition to the status quo of nations who were desirous of peace. The bolsheviks, aroused by the nazi success in Germany, accepted the invitation and the Soviet Union was elected a member of the League of Nations in the September, 1934, meeting.

Barthou's assassination in October, 1934, was a serious blow to France and his successor, Laval, was a most unfortunate choice. The murder of Chancellor Dollfuss of Austria by nazis directed by Germany changed Mussolini's friendship towards Hitler into hostility and fear and, in order to prevent the union of Germany and Austria, Il Duce was willing to forget his antagonism to France.



FRANCE WAS DETERMINED IN POST-WAR POLITICS TO "FREEZE" EUROPE IN THE VERSAILLES PATTERN.

Barthou had been willing to join Italy in a policy of rapprochement, but Laval was so eager to curry favor with Mussolini that he sacrificed vital bases of French security. In a short week end in Rome early in January, 1935, Laval made concessions to Italy which resulted in the destruction of Ethiopia as a sovereign state, the alienation of British support, and the *coup de grâce* to the League of Nations as an agency of collective security. In order to preserve Austrian independence, which was of greater importance to Italy than to France, Laval made territorial cessions in Africa and gave Italy a share in the ownership and management of the railway connecting Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, with Djibouti, thus permitting unlimited shipments of arms and what was equivalent to a free hand in the subjugation of the Negus.

Germany was not slow to take advantage of the blue funk in which France was laboring. On March 16, 1935, Chancellor Hitler proclaimed the restoration of military conscription in direct violation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. France protested vigorously to Germany, demanding an extraordinary session of the League to consider this violation of the Covenant. Sir John Simon, the British foreign minister, although registering a mild protest, was clearly unwilling to support any drastic action. Great Britain, it is true, joined with France and Italy in a denunciation of German armament as a threat to European peace at the Stresa Conference in April, 1935; yet two months later she signed a separate agreement with Germany, recognizing the latter's right to naval rearmament up to 35 per cent of total tonnage of the British Commonwealth.

This act recognizing an illegal violation of Versailles was bitterly denounced in the French press as a typical trick of *perfidie Albion*. When Great Britain began to get restive regarding the Ethiopian venture and decided to oppose Italian aggression and support the League's efforts to obtain a just settlement, France was in a dilemma. Either she must support the British and the League, her traditional policy towards collective security, and alienate Italy, her new-found ally, or sacrifice the League and its principles and lose the friendship and support of Great Britain. Even a foreign minister who could spell his name backwards or forwards found it difficult to straddle this situation. When Sir Samuel Hoare made vigorous defense of

League principles at the September meeting, and this was followed by the dispatch of the British fleet to the Mediterranean, Laval was in a quandary. He dared not sabotage the League openly and, when Italy was declared to be the aggressor and sanctions were imposed, France had to follow along, though reluctantly. Laval was able to patch up the situation by sacrificing Ethiopia and getting the British Government's acceptance. The infamous Hoare-Laval Agreement, which gave the Italian international highwayman a large part of his prospective booty with the sanctimonious approval of Great Britain and France, deserved the reception it got. Sir Samuel Hoare was forced out of the British Cabinet immediately, and Laval barely lasted out the year.

Another achievement of the Laval administration of Quai d'Orsay, the Franco-Soviet Pact signed May 2, 1935, was to have results which had not been foreseen by its makers. The foundations for this agreement had been carefully constructed by Barthou, who never ceased to fear and suspect Germany. The proposal was originally joined with the idea of an eastern Locarno pact, but when Germany refused to accept any such commitments, France continued negotiations looking towards a bilateral agreement. As finally signed, the Franco-Soviet Treaty provided that France and the Soviet Union should come to each other's assistance in case of unprovoked aggression if the League machinery failed to provide the necessary protection. Although it was stated that the provisions of the pact recognized all existing treaty obligations, Germany denounced the agreement as violating the Locarno Pact and as aimed solely at her. Laval, himself, was somewhat dubious as to the value of the soviet treaty to France and he postponed its ratification as long as he remained in power.

Germany did not limit herself to words. On March 7, 1936, nine days after the Franco-Soviet Pact was ratified by the French Chamber, Hitler ordered nazi troops to enter the Rhineland and, at the same time, he declared the Locarno Treaties abrogated and no longer binding upon Germany. In their place he suggested the conclusion of a twenty-five-year non-aggression pact by Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands—to be guaranteed, like Locarno, by Great Britain and Italy. Demilitarization was suggested on both sides of the frontiers. For the moment, France felt that her whole

carefully constructed edifice of security had tumbled about her ears. Mobilization was discussed, but, with Italy latently hostile, Great Britain still resentful, France would have to march alone. Instead, France appealed in vain to the League, whose influence and power she had so recently undermined.

The Franco-Soviet Pact and the resultant remilitarization of the Rhineland undoubtedly had some effect on the French elections of 1936. For the first time in the history of the Third Republic a socialist premier, in the person of Léon Blum, was accepted by a French Chamber controlled by the Front Populaire—a coalition of parties of the left. The new government was pledged to reverse the policy of Laval, but the destruction was too complete. Italy had flouted the League and destroyed its influence; Germany had violated Locarno and her troops were in the Rhineland. Collective security was but a memory. The soviet pact was an asset, and a rapprochement with Great Britain was still possible. In fact, Italy practically forced the issue by her manifest predilections towards Germany.

The Spanish Civil War, which broke out in July, 1936, was the first test of the new French Government's foreign policy. From the beginning, Soviet Russia supported the loyalist government while Italy and Germany made manifest their attitude by the dispatch of munitions and personnel to the rebels. When Great Britain decided to follow a strictly non-intervention policy, France, in spite of the government's strong loyalist sympathies, did likewise. An effort was made to include Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union in a non-intervention agreement, but, after long negotiations and violent recriminations, non-intervention remained a dead letter except for France and Great Britain.

QUAI D'ORSAY AND EUROPE TODAY

One recompense to the Quai d'Orsay for modeling her foreign policy after that of Downing Street was the public announcement by Anthony Eden on November 20, 1936, that Great Britain would afford military support to both France and Belgium in case of unprovoked attack. Then, as a gesture of peace, Great Britain and France in January of 1937 made overtures to Germany to co-operate in a general European settlement. Chancellor Hitler replied there

could never be agreement between Germany and Soviet Russia. The British answer was an announcement to spend £1,500,000 on rearmament during the next five years, while the French Senate and Chamber overwhelmingly approved the flotation of a national defense loan. In reply, Germany and Italy began negotiations which would bring as much of the Balkan area as possible within range of the Rome-Berlin axis. When the Chamberlain government tried to pour oil on the Rome-Berlin axis by sacrificing Foreign Minister Eden to Mussolini's exigencies as a preliminary to an Anglo-Italian Accord, France found herself powerless to object. The culmination of Anglo-French impotence seemed to have been reached on March 13, 1938, when Chancellor Hitler marched his nazi troops into Austria and consummated the *Anschluss*, while neither democracy dared do more than protest verbally. The only compensation visible was that with the nazi banner on the Brenner Pass, Mussolini had paid dearly for his support of Hitler.

According to the French, *l'appétit vient en mangeant*, and Hitler's appetite was voracious and still unsated. The three and one half million Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia offered a tempting morsel, and Hitler decided to swallow it. Again France had to wait on British intentions, and when Premier Chamberlain flew to der Führer's mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden and received Hitler's terms, France was forced to accept the dismemberment of her ally Czechoslovakia as the price of peace. The deal was finally consummated at Munich on September 29, 1938, when Mr. Chamberlain, M. Daladier, and Signor Mussolini agreed to the occupation by Germany of all preponderantly German territory in Czechoslovakia by October 10. The immediate result for France was the loss of both the Little Entente and the Soviet as dependable allies against Germany. A new *Drang nach Osten* was threatening and France was impotent to prevent it.

At the present time, collective security no longer exists and France is the principal victim. The dictatorships have bluffed their way into control of Europe, and the end is not yet as evidenced by Italian demands in the Mediterranean in December, 1938. France today is paying for past mistakes and is prepared to protect only herself. The Daladier government has realistically made a military alliance with Great Britain, and Great Britain has completed a deal with

Germany and Italy. The pre-War balance-of-power diplomacy is again in vogue. But, behind her Maginot Line, the French will still fight for *La Patrie*, and even dictators respect the courage and patriotism of the *poilus*.

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CHAPTER 8

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

C. J. Friedrich

(German foreign policy since the World War has revolved around one central goal: to redress the balance of power in Europe, as established by the Treaty of Versailles.) In this urge toward throwing off the fetters of a treaty believed to be iniquitous and imposed by force, German action in the international sphere bears a certain resemblance to French policies after 1871. But the Treaty of Frankfurt was very different from the Treaty of Versailles. It was written in the same spirit of *vae victis*, but it was old fashioned, in that it was limited to the taking of territory and cash. After these transfers had been effected, France was left—her eyes fixed upon the “hazy blue sky-line of the Vosges Mountain,” beyond which lay Alsace-Lorraine. Thereafter, she heeded well the admonition of Gambetta, “always to think of it, never to speak of it.” (The Treaty of Versailles, on the other hand, is a modern document, replete with the complexities of industrial and financial affairs, with mandates and international controls, plebiscites, and all the rest. Hence no such advice as Gambetta’s could meet the situation. “Always to speak of it, sometimes to shout about it,” might have been congruent advice to Germany. Though never thus advised, she acted accordingly. It was an obvious lesson.)

German democracy, newly emerged from the collapse of the imperial structure, faced its first great decision when confronted by that treaty: to sign or not to sign, that was the question. The issue found its leaders unprepared for the gravity of the situation. Intoxicated in November, 1918, by the suave popular phrases of Woodrow Wilson, the leaders of German democracy were slow in comprehending the contrast between theory and practice. Unmistakable signs of a vindictive treaty were not taken sufficiently seri-

ously to induce the leaders of public opinion to make preparations for the certain consequences of a possible rejection. Had not the terms of the armistice been summarily dictated and delivered in the form of an ultimatum? Had not the Germans been left completely in the dark concerning the terms of the treaty?

To be sure, the German Government assumed, in the spring of 1919, that the negotiations in Paris were preliminary. A good many of the experts working on the treaty in Paris had likewise supposed that what they were preparing were maximum demands which were to serve as the basis for a peace conference. But in fact these terms were imposed by unilateral dictate. Much worse than the Treaty of Vienna, the most undemocratic treaty was made by the victorious democracies. When the German delegation appeared in Versailles, they were treated like criminals led before the judge to hear their verdict. In protest against Clemenceau's vindictive speech, the head of the delegation, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, democratic scion of an ancient noble family, said: "The hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have perished since November 11 by reason of the blockade were killed with cold deliberation. Think of that when you speak of guilt and punishment." But what was the German Government to do?

GERMANY AND THE VERSAILLES TREATY

Some immediate efforts were made to modify the treaty. They were of no avail. The German democracy found itself confronted with an ultimatum either to sign the iniquitous treaty or to suffer a resumption of the blockade and further occupation. There were a good many men, like Count Brockdorff and Herr Scheidemann who were ready to choose the latter alternative. If necessary, they were prepared to throw their lot in with the masters at Moscow. But Germany was a democracy, it was argued, so the majority must decide. The majority, after long debates in the Constitutional Assembly, decided for peace, even at this price. It was a majority of the recently elected representatives, but they had not been chosen to decide this question. One wonders what would have happened, if the Assembly had dissolved itself, calling new elections on the issue of the treaty. Perhaps the German people would have rejected the

dictate of Versailles. If they had accepted it, the democratic leaders would at least have had an alibi.

Under the treaty terms, Germany lost one eighth of her territory in Europe as well as all her colonies, containing about one tenth of her population. In the west, Alsace-Lorraine went to France; in the east Posen and west Prussia were given to Poland, and in the north, Memel and Danzig were placed under allied control. All these provinces were transferred without consulting the people concerned, whereas Wilson had solemnly proclaimed to the world that "peoples were not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty." What was perhaps worse, German Austria was forbidden to join Germany, no matter what the desires of her people. This kind of international servitude was later called "independence." In other provinces, such as the Saar valley, east Prussia, Slesvig, upper Silesia, and Eupen-Malmedy, plebiscites were called for, but, when no majorities were secured for the separation from Germany, the territories were divided up. These provinces contained a large portion of Germany's industrial raw materials; by their loss she was economically crippled. To complete the work of destruction, Germany's merchant fleet was taken by the Allies, her concessions and foreign capital resources confiscated, her own navigable rivers placed under international control.

Thus maimed, Germany was to pay unspecified, but certainly huge, reparations; and it was finally insisted that Germany must acknowledge the sole responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Such was the treaty ending the war that was to end all wars! |

For this treaty the common people in the allied countries were as much to blame as the politicians. The feeling of vindictiveness was aroused by the tension and sufferings of the war. Much abuse has been heaped upon Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson. Undoubtedly, they failed democracy in this decisive hour. They did not rise above the popular clamor sufficiently to pitch their better judgment against general prejudices and excitement. Back home in England, France, and America, the people demanded a revengeful settlement. In the light of what has happened such sentiments seem incredible. It is the tragedy of such righteous conceit that it blinds to the realities of its human kind.

REPARATIONS

However deeply the German people and its leaders were mortified by the moral and territorial provisions of the treaty, the phase of the peace settlement which required their immediate attention was (the tributary payments imposed under the hypocritical disguise of reparations.) Though sane and wise people in all countries bitterly condemned the reckless manner in which the idea of reparation for damage was distorted into the most fantastic demands for war indemnities, there was no stopping the jingoists who howled for "squeezing the orange till the pips squeak."¹ Nor was such opposition confined to scholars. It has been said that "Lloyd George and Curzon were from the beginning aware of the danger and stupidity of excessive reparation and that they endeavoured to effect a more reasonable settlement." Their efforts were slow in bearing fruit, however, and the delay proved fatal.

From 1920 until 1932 German foreign policy was dominated by the problem of how to throw off the reparation burden. It was a struggle from which Germany eventually emerged without having to make any further payments at all. She had paid, just the same. The ruined fortune of her middle class remains as the lasting monument to the huge sums which were transferred in the years immediately after the war. No agreement exists between experts as to the total sums thus transferred. (This transfer was effected first, as a consequence of the "policy of fulfillment," second, under the Dawes Plan, and third, under the Young Plan.) The policy of fulfillment, hotly attacked by German nationalists throughout the period, was initiated in May, 1921, when a newly constituted cabinet under Chancellor Wirth decided to accept the ultimatum of the Allies concerning a schedule of payments which seemed extortionate, in order to prove by an effort at fulfillment that these payments exceeded Germany's capacity to pay. By the end of 1922, this conclusion had been amply proved. Continuous negotiations had been carried on with a view to reducing the payments to a more practicable level. The German currency had been continually declining. Rathenau had been murdered by incensed nationalist youths. The negotiations failed, as did the reparation payments. Against the opposition of Great Britain, Poincaré decided to seize "productive

guarantees"; the French marched into the Ruhr. Popular indignation flared up in Germany. Spontaneously, but encouraged by the government, the working men in the Ruhr valley decided not to co-operate and staged a "passive resistance." The government sought to aid them by paying their wages through issuing more paper money. The mark plunged into the bottomless well of nothingness.

It is customary to look upon Germany's policy of passive resistance as a complete failure. Such a judgment is built on the assumption current at the time, both in Germany and abroad, that it was the purpose of passive resistance to drive the French out of the Ruhr. Such hopes were no doubt entertained. They were disappointed and the French not driven out. But another and more permanent objective was achieved: (American and British public attitudes were rendered more favorable to Germany) Unfortunately, such feelings were slow in altering policy. To be sure, Lord Curzon took a vigorous initiative, but before it could mature, passive resistance collapsed. Gustav Stresemann was the man of courage and invincible optimism who stepped forward in that critical moment. From September, 1923, until his death about six years later, he shaped German foreign policy. It was the period of pacification. ✓ With the aid of Great Britain, the French policy of splitting off the Rhineland was thwarted. At the instance of Britain and the United States, an international commission of independent experts, the Dawes Commission, was allowed to settle the reparations issue, on the basis of "Germany's capacity to pay." Having provided for the restoration of German territorial integrity and a large international loan to start her recovery, the Dawes Plan provided for a moratorium of two years, after which time payments were to be resumed on a rising scale. The Dawes Plan did not fix a total of payments. Contrary to expectations, it did not prove a permanent settlement, but for the time being it closed the issue. German foreign policy could, during the breathing spell, turn to other matters.

LOCARNO

A very popular and important issue was how to free the Rhineland from its occupation. During the fall of 1924, Stresemann had been watching apprehensively the revived amity between England and France. He feared that it might lead to the permanent installa-

tion of international controls in the occupied territory. Any positive, lasting settlement of this issue seemed to turn upon allaying the French fears concerning their security. Germany, since the Ruhr invasion, feared French aggression as much as the French feared Germany. The time seemed ripe for a mutual pact of non-aggression. Stresemann proposed such a pact in February, 1925, encouraged by Lord D'Abernon, a far-sighted English diplomat who was then ambassador at Berlin. He suggested several alternatives, among them a guarantee of the existing boundaries between Germany, Belgium, and France, combined with arbitration treaties, and backed by Great Britain and Italy. After protracted negotiations such a pact was concluded at Locarno in October, 1925. Three difficulties had to be overcome. The French, bound by treaties to Poland and Czechoslovakia, sought to extend the pact to cover the eastern boundaries, but, because of British as well as German opposition, only arbitration treaties were concluded in the east. The Russians, fearful lest Germany be drawn into a Western combine to destroy the Soviets, tried to persuade Germany not to enter. Germany concluded a treaty of amity with Moscow, the Treaty of Berlin. One aspect of the Russian objection was centered upon Germany's participation in League sanctions, for the English made the pact conditional upon Germany's entry into the League of Nations. Germany, pleading her disarmament, wished to be relieved of her obligations under Article 16 of the League covenant. An informal engagement by France and Britain was finally accepted by Germany as a substitute for a formal condition attached to the covenant.

The Locarno Pact was hotly contested in Germany, because it renounced Alsace-Lorraine. Stresemann argued that it merely renounced the reconquest of the province by force of arms, which was out of the question, anyway. Abandoning such a paper "right" for the evacuation of the Rhineland and genuine pacification seemed good policy to Stresemann. But the evacuation did not follow so automatically as had been hoped. It required further protracted negotiations. How slowly pacification gained headway was brought home to Germany by the disagreeable developments prior to her admission to the League, which could only be effected in September, 1926. Nevertheless, it is evident now that Stresemann's achievements were considerable. He had regained for Germany not only a cer-

tain measure of freedom, but he had laid the foundation for a real peace; indeed some writers have gone so far as to claim that the few years after Locarno were the only years of peace Europe has enjoyed since 1914.

Less tangible, but nevertheless very real, was the diplomatic gain of initiative; Germany, instead of being a passive object of international diplomacy, had re-entered the family of nations. If she was not as yet a full equal, she had means at her disposal now with which to become one. Hers were no longer merely the defenses of the downtrodden: subterfuge, lamentation, passive resistance. In the process, Stresemann and some of his associates had grown to an international stature. The remarkable development of the German foreign minister's views is fully revealed in his collected papers, *Gustav Stresemann, Ein Vermächtnis*. In the summer of 1925, speaking to a German student meeting, he developed the new faith:

International cooperation for national reconstruction. . . . If you try to find a general formula for Germany's foreign policy, you must discover it in the international agreements in which we are and must be involved. . . . The task before us is to devote all our strength to the maintenance of peace in Europe. . . . The road ahead of us is clear; we must strengthen our own national life by the advancement of peaceful understanding.

Clearly, his was not a policy of yielding to external pressure, but of adopting international co-operation as a positive method and goal, though clearly tied to national reconstruction.

FOREIGN LOANS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

Certainly the psychological relief following upon the conclusion of Locarno and Germany's entry into the League expressed itself in widespread prosperity. A good measure of that prosperity seemed more solid at the time than it appears in retrospect. The extent to which the boom was financed by American loans to Germany and other European countries remains a matter for speculation. There can be little doubt, however, that these capital injections played a great role. Ultimately, these loans contributed toward the building up of a large marginal industry in central Europe. The overproduction which followed brought on the depression, but, at the time, only

a few keen economists saw the writing on the wall. Most financiers gave little thought to the question of how interest and amortization of these billions could be got from Germany without lowering tariff walls and taking in goods.

The planless anarchy of our international economic relations created a temporary illusion of a working order. The illusion was not to last very long. An international effort, under the League, to bring about wholesale revision of the tariffs ended in failure. A conference for naval disarmament likewise came to naught. Meanwhile, the time was coming when reparation payments were to be resumed in earnest, under the Dawes Plan. Voices were being heard suggesting that, after all, America was paying Germany's reparations, at least as far as getting them into French pockets was concerned.

In Britain, the end of European dissensions was not bringing the hoped-for economic relief. In fact, all indications pointed to the conclusion that Britain was facing what amounted to permanent unemployment of at least two million workers. The dislocation and impoverishment due to the World War had permanently destroyed markets which could not be recovered. More and more people in England commenced to toy with the idea of international trade restrictions. To complicate matters further, the idea of imperial-preference tariffs injected itself, not only as an economic, but as an imperial safeguard as well. Amid all these cross-currents of impending difficulties, the world depression got under way. It struck first in Germany, then spread to the far corners of the earth. By the summer of 1931, confidence was at the vanishing point. The Austrian and German bank crisis, as well as the collapse of the pound revealed that the structure of international finance was coming down. With it went much that had provided the underpinnings for international co-operation.

DISARMAMENT AND REARMAMENT

In the meantime, German foreign policy had developed another major theme: disarmament, or rather equality of armament. Even in the Locarno days that issue had made its appearance. When Germany was not admitted to the League in the spring of 1925, quite a few people, even the American State Department, suspected that

it might be caused by Europe's unwillingness to face Germany's demand for disarmament. Though untrue, this notion shows how clearly Germany's membership in the League implied some such step. When the Allied powers disarmed Germany, so the argument ran, they did it with the avowed purpose of making general disarmament possible. Hence, the other powers were obliged, now that Germany had joined the League, to proceed with this plan. To Briand's plea that this might be a moral obligation, but not a legal one, Stresemann had indignantly rejoined that moral questions were more important among nations than legal rights.

At first, German foreign policy inclined to utilize this claim for warding off further pressure from France and England toward Germany's completing her disarmament—a little later to hasten the evacuation of German territory. This accomplished, the Germans began to press for arms equality in earnest. They still retained the idea that general disarmament would be the most acceptable road to such equality. Occasional misapprehensions were voiced abroad, however, that the German policy was aiming at rearmament; indeed some French circles claimed that rearmament was already under way. (The German Government insisted upon their tenet of general disarmament until the summer of 1932 and only then began to suggest a measure of rearmament.)

At long last the general disarmament conference had assembled. Why it did is in many ways a puzzle. No more inopportune time could have been chosen. No sooner had Hitler stepped into power than German policy openly shifted to rearmament. While the threat of a Franco-Polish preventive war darkened the horizon, quieting speeches by Hitler and his aides were veiling the shift in policy. In the fall of 1933, Hitler staged a dramatic exit from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. All plans for disarmament died away. Der Führer celebrated the event as a great victory, and the German people attested to it in a plebiscite. But was it really Germany's victory?

THE NAZIS DEVELOP A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

It is never easy to answer the question as to what particular policy is in the national interest. It is impossible without a general idea of national policy. From the viewpoint of the foreign policy of the re-

public, (Germany's abandonment of her policy of pressing for a general disarmament was undoubtedly a major disaster. The foreign policy of German democracy had been built up gradually in response to the problems the Versailles Treaty imposed upon Germany. It anxiously sought to avoid the mistakes of pre-War German foreign policy: separation from Russia, alienation from England, lack of understanding for the "internationalism" of the great powers of the West. Rapallo, Locarno, the League—these were stones toward the new edifice of German foreign policy.)

The coming of the nazis changed all that. Instead of a guarded belief in international co-operation, the nazis openly professed a faith in force. This is a questionable notion at any time; for a weak power it may prove suicidal. However, the nazis thought that Germany was, or ought to be, a strong power. (To make her stronger, German rearmament must be undertaken at once. Hitler's entire foreign policy has revolved around this goal.) It might almost be said that the rest has been window dressing. If you approve of rearmament you will on the whole look upon Hitler's foreign policy with a measure of favor. It will appear as a necessary consequence. Many Germans do see the present policy in that light. Rearmament was, of course, by no means wholly a foreign policy issue. It was closely related to efforts at overcoming the depression and unemployment: "spending their way out!" (But rearmament, whatever its motives, dominated foreign policy; indeed it does so to this day. There are many other aims, but they are subordinate to rearmament.)

It has often been argued that Hitler's ideas as expounded in *Mein Kampf* offer the clue. In an ideological sense that is probably true, but foreign policy allows little room for ideology. As Schiller has so aptly phrased it: "How easily do ideas dwell together while matters stubbornly collide in space." Foreign policy, more than any other part of politics, is the "art of the possible." Many of the ideas which are expounded in *Mein Kampf* conflict with each other, when realization is attempted. Recently, a skillful commentator of nazi foreign policy, S. H. Roberts, depicted it as torn between three alternative conceptions: the opportunist, the Eastern, and the Western. The Eastern conception emphasizes expansion; the Western, collaboration. The same author has commented that Hitler "sees, in foreign

HITLER OVER EUROPE

TWO PURPOSES

DESTRUCTION TREATY OF VERSAILLES

REALIZATION MEIN KAMPF

440 Articles

781 Pages

Withdraws from Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations Oct. 16, 1933.

Initiates rearmament in the open May 30, 1934.

Regains Saar Territory under treaty plebiscite Jan. 13, 1935.

Rhineland re-militarized so Locarno Pact denounced March 8, 1936.

Renunciation of international waterways clauses on five German rivers Nov. 16, 1936.

Rearmament May 30, 1934.

Establishes conscription March 17, 1935.

Establishes general staff Oct. 16, 1935.

HITLER'S NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY PROGRAM

"ALL WHO ARE GERMAN BLOOD, WHETHER NOW UNDER DANISH, POLISH, CZECHOSLOVAKIAN, ITALIAN OR FRENCH RULE, SHALL BE UNITED IN ONE GERMAN EMPIRE. WE SHALL NOT GIVE UP A SINGLE GERMAN IN SUDETIC GERMANY, IN ALSACE-LORRAINE, IN POLAND, IN AUSTRIA, THAT COLONY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF OLD AUSTRIA. FRONTIERS ARE MADE BY MEN AND ALTERED BY MEN."

War Guilt Clause denounced and 3 billion marks of reparations bonds repudiated upon Jan. 30, 1937.

Hitler's "surprises" begin with leaving the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations; they end with renouncing the War Guilt Clause and repudiation of three billion marks of bonds for reparations.

1920: Hitler proclaims 25 theses of National Socialist Party in first mass meeting in Munich.

1923: "Beer Hall Putsch" with Gen. Ludendorff fails in Bavaria.

1924: Hitler imprisoned, writes *Mein Kampf*, published 1925-1926.

"... AS A RESULT OF SHREW PRO-PAGANDA A PEOPLE MAY BE BROUGHT TO THINK HEAVEN HELL, AND A LIFE OF MISERY PARADISE."

Moscow Crisis 1939


"WHEN WE SPEAK OF NEW LANDS IN EUROPE TODAY, WE ONLY THINK IN THE FIRST INSTANCE OF RUSSIA AND HER BORDER STATES"

Czechoslovakia dismembered and Sudeten German annexed by Reich September 30, 1938

Austria seized March 12, 1938, after Hitler's July, 1934 plot murdering Dollfuss failed.

"I HAVE ALREADY POINTED TO ENGLAND AND ITALY AS THE ONLY TWO STATES IN EUROPE WHICH IT IS WORTHWHILE TO STRIVE FOR AN ALLIANCE"

"THE MORTAL ENEMY OF OUR PEOPLE IS FRANCE. NO STATEMENT, NO AGREEMENT APPEARS TO US AS IMPOSSIBLE IF WE RETAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF FINALLY BEATING OUR MOST HATED ENEMY"



A FACT PICTURE BY CHARLES WOODS

HITLERISM IS THE COMPOUND OF THE TWO SIDES OF GERMAN NATIONALISM— THAT OF RESTORING GERMANY'S HONOR BY THE REPUDIATION OF THE VERSAILLES "LIE" AND ITS PENALTIES; AND THAT OF REASSERTING GERMAN HEGEMONY IN EUROPE IN A NEW BID FOR "A PLACE IN THE SUN."

affairs, only a vast reserve of opportunities to secure successes for his glorified stump-oratory at home."

Turning from words to deeds for the ascertaining of the new conception we find that Hitler has abandoned the main ideas of the former German policy.¹ First, he has allowed a wide breach to develop between Russia and Germany, though one should not forget that he has renewed the Berlin treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. His attacks against bolshevism helped (before Munich) to recreate the Franco-Russian alliance of pre-War days, even while a militarily stronger France and Russia faced a weaker Germany.² Hitler has, secondly, through his lawless breaking of treaties and his ruthless persecution of minorities, aroused the common man in Britain to such an extent that the government has at times found it difficult even to maintain ordinary friendly relations.³ Third, der Führer abandoned the League and all forms of international co-operation, repeatedly denounced them, and thereby rendered much more difficult some of the urgent German problems discussed later in this chapter.

These negatives are offset by the idea of a fascist bloc of powers prepared to fight "Jew-Marxism" and bolshevism. After many initial difficulties these ideas crystallized into the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany, Japan, and Italy. That Germany should squander her limited energies in such a pursuit testifies to the lack of realism in the conception, but there is always rearmament to fall back upon as an excuse for all other action.

APPLICATION OF THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY

The so-called thunderbolts of Hitler's crude diplomacy have largely been striking down treaty provisions relating to Germany's disarmament. First came the departure from the conference. Then followed a thinly disguised rearmament in materials and equipment, particularly airplanes. In March, 1935, Hitler reintroduced universal conscription. A year later this was followed by the reoccupation of the Rhineland and seizure of the rivers which until then had been under international control.

There can be no doubt of the great popularity of the latter two measures, and even conscription was widely hailed throughout Germany. The common assumption is that they were essential steps toward freeing Germany from the bondage of the Versailles Treaty.

It shows how completely the spirit behind disarmament has been abandoned. Furthermore rearmament was to give Germany back her equality amongst nations and the power to intimidate those who were unwilling to fight. Since that time, both France and Britain have taken up the challenge; the latter particularly has launched a staggering military and naval program. Germany, seeking equality, has reaped a temporary gain but she has unleashed a world rearmament program that in a few years will give her less rather than greater equality. Any advantage of temporary parity must be utilized immediately.

Foreign policy may have been decisive, but domestic pressure has, undoubtedly had its share in pushing Hitler into rearmament. In the first place there was the army, itself. For a long time it had been looking forward to the day when the small army which the Versailles Treaty had allowed Germany might become the nucleus of a larger and more adequate force. To be sure, von Seeckt and others had worked out the strategy of the small professional army. They had even publicized their ideas in order to help disarmament along, but there remained enough doubt to make rearmament seem desirable, particularly in *material*. Consequently, the army pressed for active support.

There was also the problem of unemployment. Hitler had set himself the task of winning the "battle against unemployment" as quickly as possible. Universal conscription removed more than 500,000 young men from the labor market. Even more important was the fact that the large orders for munitions and arms provided a powerful stimulus to German industry. Borrowing on a large scale, the Hitler Government certainly primed the pump of the German economy in the most efficacious manner; the only question is whether the water which has been running out of the faucet has ever been anything else than the water poured into the pump by the government. Recklessly indifferent to the mounting government debt, the German Government has been depressing the general standard of living relentlessly to finance armaments. To those who complained the nazis answered that the necessary sacrifices must be borne.

Behind the screen of the Ethiopian campaign of Mussolini, Hitler was able to push his program. Indeed, the dissensions between Britain and France in the spring of 1936 gave Hitler his chance for re-

occupying the Rhineland. It was a bold step, or seemed so at the time. Reports have it that both army and foreign office were bitterly opposed to the move. They argued that it was impossible to fight the French. We are told that the reoccupying troops had orders to withdraw, if the French should march; but the French did not march. They felt that they could not do so without the British, and the British did not see any purpose in fighting over that issue. It has been alleged that Hitler had been tipped off as to the probable decision of the Cabinet by an Englishman belonging to the reactionary, pro-fascist group in the Conservative Party. Still, Hitler took a great risk and won. After the success of his coup, the restraining influence of army and foreign office declined. Hitler's prestige rose. It was argued that the reoccupation freed his hands in the East, because now the French could no longer effectively support Czechoslovakia in case of German attack.)

On the whole it would appear in retrospect that the Hitler Government gained some concrete advantages. Against these must be reckoned that nazi policy confirmed all the suspicions which were entertained against Germany abroad. Far from rupturing the French alliances, it convinced France and her partners of their increased importance and hence it tightened the ring around Germany. Still unilateral abrogation had brought victories without war.

THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS

As previously stated, Hitler's conception of foreign policy is built upon the idea of a bloc of fascist powers, the powers of "order," which are prepared to fight "Jew-Marxism" and bolshevism. The prospects for such a development seemed decidedly bleak at first. All that had been possible during the first three years was an agreement with Poland, a country in which anti-Russian policies have always been quite popular. It is well known that the Poles had been pressing France for a combined preventive war against the nazis. When France turned a deaf ear, Poland made her peace with Hitler. Just what the basis of the agreement was is a matter for conjecture. Events would suggest that Hitler secured a free hand for the National Socialists in Danzig in return for a free hand to Poland in the Corridor and upper Silesia. In other words, the German minorities in Poland were sacrificed on the altar of party advantage in Danzig. Since that

time, the Polonization of the Corridor has proceeded apace. Danzig has come under nazi domination, but Poland has maintained an uncertain position toward France.

The lure of armament loans as well as apprehensions concerning the ultimate aims⁸ of German policy have been responsible for these Polish maneuvers. However, apart from this agreement with a minor dictatorship, Germany not only remained isolated, but also found herself confronted by a united front of Italy, France, and England, when the Austrian nazis attempted a *coup d'état* with the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss of Austria. This Stresa Front broke down, however, as a consequence of Mussolini's Ethiopian adventure. The bitter antagonism which developed between Italy and Britain gave Hitler his chance to push an alliance. He did not join Italy in Ethiopia; rather, he remained as neutral as he could without getting embroiled with England. At the crucial moment when sanctions were to be imposed he reoccupied the Rhineland, thereby diverting attention. When General Franco, with Italian support, started his rebellion in Spain, Hitler made common cause with the fascists, on the premise of fighting "world communism." Since that time, German propaganda has carefully nursed the slogan of the Berlin-Rome axis. Just how much there is to it, no one knows. Stephen Roberts judges it "very nebulous," yet, this specter dominates international affairs at present. However little basic agreement there may be between the two dictators, the concept of the axis has the visual suggestiveness which is ideal from the propagandist's standpoint.


Hitler has reached beyond Europe in his efforts to bring about his fascist combine. At the party rally in 1936 he insisted that all countries must enter either the bolshevist or the fascist camp. It may be presumed that this oratory is really counter-propaganda—an effort to stem the tide of Moscow's popular front slogan which was to unite communism and democracy in the common defense against fascism. At any rate, this note struck a sympathetic chord in Japan's military oligarchy, deeply frightened as it was of the further spread of communism amongst the exploited laboring masses of the island empire. It also offered a chance to hold the Soviet Union in check while Japan might attack China. As a result, the Anti-Comintern Pact came into existence, first aligning Germany and Japan and later enlarged by Italy. This pact foreshadows a conflict between rival

coalitions divided by doctrinal differences as in the days of the religious wars.

PAN-GERMANISM

[Besides treaty abrogation and a fascist world alliance, Hitler's conception of German foreign policy embraces what has been called Pan-Germanism.] It is the idea that ultimately the German Reich ought to include all people of German race; that is, presumably, of German speech. It so happens that owing to German *wanderlust* and a deep-seated colonizing drive which dates back to the Middle Ages, many millions of Germans live scattered throughout central and eastern Europe. There are also the Germans of the Italian Tyrol, of Alsace and Lorraine, the German Swiss, the Germans in Africa mostly concentrated in the territories of the former German colonies, and the Germans in North and South America. There being no prospect of bringing the Swiss and Italian Germans under the rule of der Führer within the near future, German propaganda has avoided arousing them beyond general sympathy for the Reich. Hitler has broadened the area of his concern for the scattered German minorities, as agitation has begun for the area of the Polish Germans, for Memel, and for a "united Ukraine" which would be subject to German penetration. Beginning with three groups, the Austrians (who are Germans from a "racial" or-linguistic standpoint), the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, and the former German colonists in Africa, one may well ask, "Where will he stop, or be stopped?"

Hitler cannot escape the charge that his violent policy of persecuting the minorities in Germany has redounded to the disadvantage of German minorities throughout Europe. The powerful international organization which these minorities had developed in co-operation with other racial minorities as the "European Minorities Congress" has gone to pieces. Everywhere German minorities have fallen upon evil days, to say the least. Mention has already been made of the sad fate of the Germans in the Polish Corridor. Worse has been the situations of the German-Austrian minority in the Italian Tyrols. It is a universal calamity which has resulted from Germany's disavowal of international co-operation. For where scattered minorities are involved the only hope lies in developing international controls



THE THIRD REICH, ENDING ALLIED DOMINATION, RUTHLESSLY SEEKS TO DOMINATE HER NEIGHBORS.


and guarantees. The minorities' treaties concluded at the end of the war were a beginning, though by no means a successful one. Hitler, after denouncing the League, has adopted a policy of territorial expansion. Though Austria and the Sudeten Germans have been taken over without war, such conquests always raise the specter of a catastrophe. Even if temporarily successful, they do not solve the basic problem of minorities.

Yet a great many Germans, for a while at least, will consider the invasion and absorption of Austria a great victory. They will look upon the dismemberment and virtual conquest of Czechoslovakia as an even more marvelous token of Hitler's genius in foreign affairs. Regarding both issues, German national sentiment had been aroused ever since the war. There was a good deal of sentiment behind the *Anschluss* movement prior to Hitler's coming into power. While these sentiments received a temporary setback following the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss in 1934, they soon were revived. Though one need not take the plebiscite figures too seriously, *Anschluss* probably would have received the support of a popular majority at any time, if the restrictions of Versailles had been removed. In retrospect many have wished that the treaty provisions might have been changed; a concession to Dr. Brüning in 1931 would have been statesmanlike. They were not.

The problem of the German-speaking population of Czechoslovakia was similar in that here, too, a popular majority for union with Germany probably has existed right along. But inasmuch as these people formed an integral part of a democratic republic containing a majority of non-German people, it seemed beyond the realm of practical politics to seek more than a position of equality and cultural autonomy. However, the *Nationalsozialist* movement amongst the Sudeten Germans made such a solution increasingly impractical. After the absorption of Austria, the Sudeten leaders began openly to announce their intention to secede. Such a step, it should be remembered, meant the virtual dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the protectorate of Hitler over the entire area. Such a solution had been an avowed Nazi aim since 1933.

✓ With the thinly disguised contrivance of the British conservatives, the German policy took an even more threatening line. A series of dramatic crises, skillfully staged by the Hitler government, brought

GERMANY'S STRATEGIC HIGHWAYS — DOUBLE-TRACKED FOR PEACE OR WAR



within a few months the desired result of the conquest of Austria. The virtual surrender of Britain and France leaves Hitler and Germany as the dominant power in Europe. There is nothing in sight which would now seem strong enough to stop the imperial *Drang nach Osten*, unless it be the Soviet Union. The *Anschluss* has been accomplished by show of force.

No matter how ardent a believer in peace one may be it will remain an undeniable fact that arms and dictatorship accomplished what co-operation and democracy could not bring about. The implications are the more portentous, as the technique employed against Austria and Czechoslovakia is applicable against a number of other countries, with minor variations. First, a nazi movement is built up when the government of the threatened country attempts to protect itself. Incidents pile up; an agreement is forced; the agreement is not kept, except by the government. The nazis in Berlin declare they cannot be responsible for "Marxist provocateurs." Eventually, disorders are provoked on a large scale and the German troops are called in by some kind of puppet government set up by the insurgent nazi elements. Yet, all the time, the outmoded doctrine of sovereignty and non-intervention is invoked by Germany, as well as by England, France, and other countries, to excuse whatever is happening as of strictly international concern. This is roughly what happened prior to the events which united Austria with Germany and led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

As to colonies, Hitler's policy has not been successful to date. It is difficult to picture just how he expects to use violence in that connection. Any insurrectionary movement on the part of German colonists in South Africa, for example, would surely find it difficult to maintain itself merely with German support. Despite this fact, Hitler recently announced that Germany will not cease to demand them.

Considering what Stresemann and Bruening were able to accomplish with their methods, there is good reason to believe that some German colonies would have been returned by this time, or an equivalent found through the mandates system of the League. This is said on the assumption that these statesmen would have wanted to seek the return of these colonies. Actually, support for these colonial claims has been quite weak in Germany, and even Hitler has been less

enthusiastic about them than is sometimes assumed. Indeed he has been suspected of working up the colonial demands for bargaining purposes; certainly the views of *Mein Kampf* are anti-colonial. Be that as it may, the return of some of the colonies would afford him an opportunity for celebrating another of his great victories over the dictates of Versailles. It would wash off the "colonial-guilt-lie," a phrase in the Versailles treaty which most sensible people had completely forgotten until the nazis revived the idea. Guilt or no guilt, the greatest favor which the colonial powers could do Hitler is to give him a half a colony at a time. For each such concession could be utilized for another celebration.

CONCLUSION

From the premises of this study, the recent German foreign policy promises to develop into a catastrophe in spite of the apparent triumphs of recent months. It is daily increasing the prospects of a war in which Germany will be the loser. The German people will have to pay for the sins of its "leader." Unhappily this time they will not be able to excuse themselves by saying that the leader was not of their own choice. In addition to such gloomy prospects, one must admit that the present German Government has sacrificed Germany's real interest, which the German Republic had pursued with slow plodding step, to a frantic search for prestige victories. It has unilaterally denounced objectionable suspects of the Versailles Treaty which could have been altered by negotiation and has thereby brought on profound hostility toward Germany throughout the world, expressing itself in lowered trade and general suspicion and hatred. It has strained the resources of Germany to the breaking point to seek a rearmament which, in the face of the much larger resources of England, France, and Russia, resembles a race between a lame man and an athlete. That such a policy does not serve the vital needs of Germany should be evident to all.

The role of the man of violence is an unlovely one at best; it is foolish when the resources are so limited that the bullying and braggadocio turns into empty bluff or into calamitous defeat. Anyone considering the present German policy cannot help weeping at the way in which the future of Germany, Europe, and the world is being recklessly jeopardized by incompetence, thirst for glory, and

an undisciplined disregard of all the vital facts. It would not stand the test of critical scrutiny by an opposition able to address itself to the German people for one single week. Such is the balance sheet at the end of 1938.

NOTES

1. For an early challenge see John Maynard Keynes' statesmanlike volume *The Economic Consequence of the Peace*, a full-dress Cassandra cry in the wilderness.

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CHAPTER 9

EXPANDING ITALY

Henry R. Spencer

As life cannot be static, a living Italy, newly risen from the dead, must expand.

Growth by accretion has been her constant tradition ever since the beginning of modern Italy in that miraculous *Risorgimento* (1648-1861), whereby Italian dead bones were conjured back to life and became a living body. In the middle third of the nineteenth century Mazzini preached the word, Garibaldi wielded the sharp sword, and Cavour contrived the political and diplomatic process of *redemption*. The vigorous impulse having been given by Piedmont, *Italia Irredenta* was redeemed, bit by bit in successive stages (1859, 1866, 1870, 1919) until substantial completeness had been achieved, so far as the peninsula and continent and islands were concerned. There remain as still unredeemed fragments only Corsica, Nice, and Savoia in French hands, the British island stronghold of Malta, and Dalmatia, where the traces of Venice's ancient empire have been almost completely submerged under the rising Yugoslav tide.

Conditioned by this historic process and continuing it, what has the age of Mussolini to offer, or rather to demand?

A totalitarian and authoritarian organization of the state may give expansion more vigor than would a parliamentary one, but it is subject to certain special dangers. There is, for example, the precariousness of a regime which top-heavily pivots everything on the continuing activity and ability and statesmanship of one poor mortal, supported in terrifying degree by non-legal force and popular hysteria. There is another quality which seems for a time to give dictatorship an advantage in international competition for expansion opportunity, but in the long run may constitute a dangerous temptation, namely, the gambling propensity. The dictator may stake his very shirt on a throw of the dice, on the supposition that the winner

would not be so ungentlemanly as actually to demand said shirt. In other words, the gambler-despot presents to a peace-loving neighborhood his blackmailing demands for privileges, the refusal of which, he threatens, will entail the horrors of war. The responsible neighbor statesmen cannot ignore, at this point, Mussolini's reckless avowal: "We are a warlike nation and are likely to become increasingly warlike, for that is what we want to be. As I am not afraid of words I add that we are a militaristic nation."

He may speak for himself, but this assertion regarding the Italian people's attitude is patently, flagrantly false to history. It is obvious, however, that such threats cramp the playing style of opponents, who are seriously aware of responsibilities for peace and international law and order.

Apart from the possibly ephemeral phase of the so-called "dictatorship," there are two key words for explaining and characterizing the foreign policy of Italy and giving it expansionist character. Both of them have a large and long-run application, with or without the special qualities of a Mussolini. They are *vulnerability* and *egoism*.

The state, as a social body priceless for social purposes, must assert and defend itself or it will perish, by the competition of other similar bodies or by the breaking of itself into its constituent parts, each vulnerable and egoistic. Each of these qualities is a feature of every sovereign state that exists. But for certain historical and geographic reasons there is a special application to the Italian case.

A synthetic and common-sense solution of the problems which these two words suggest may be found in the League of Nations, with its ideals of collective security and the safe and full but moderated realization of national values through international co-operation. This ideal was prophetically apprehended by Italy's great moral hero Mazzini, just a century ago, and the realistic implementing of the idea was wholeheartedly initiated by the statesmanlike policy of Sforza as Italian Foreign Minister in 1920-1921. But after D'Annunzio's fantastic, mutineering adventure in Fiume had upset the nation's mental balance, *Sacro Egoismo* was developed with emotional inflation beyond all rational consideration of due limits. *L'Italia farà da sè* ("Italy will carry on by herself") came to have a new meaning, or rather a revival of the old Machiavellian meaning, which was to

give point to Mussolini's receiving Bologna's academic degree only after his presenting a thesis on the Renaissance Florentine's statecraft.

Italian membership in the League was continued by Mussolini as a matter of form, but he never made any constructive contribution to its spirit. In the unlucky Corfu episode (Mussolini's seizure of a Greek Island, September, 1923) the League's jurisdiction was systematically flouted, though as a matter of fact it was League procedures which, indirectly applied, extricated Italy from too embarrassing a clash with the influences then dominant in Europe. In the totalitarian fascist period, Mussolini made no secret of his scorn for the procedures and spirit of the League. It may be remarked in extenuation that absolutely nothing had been achieved under the Covenant Article 19, which had seemed to promise revision of the injustices of the Paris treaties, under which Italy smarted as if she had been a defeated power. As she self-pitily said: We won the war (victory at Vittorio Veneto, October, 1918) and then our poltroon statesmen at Paris lost us the peace; they even helped build the League as an insurance institution for guaranteeing Britain's and France's ill-gotten imperialist gains; we had been promised respectable shares of the loot, instead we were thrown mere considerable scraps of desert in Jubaland and the Sahara.


When the cup of Italian vexation had been filled to overflowing by Geneva's well-nigh unanimous condemnation of the Ethiopian enterprise, and the consequent penal sanctions, the wonder was that Mussolini did not formally withdraw at once. This fateful step was postponed until late in 1937, perhaps as a sign of Mussolini's consuming ambition to play a large European role—not as outsider, like Asiatic Japan, nor as pariahs, like Germany and Russia—and his realization that Geneva was still the favorite rendezvous of the Great Powers, with whom he desired to associate. Through minor spokesmen like Salandra and Scialoja, and later through his foreign ministers Grandi and Ciano, he might perfunctorily attend to Italy's affairs in the place of common co-operation and negotiation. But, while he symbolically associated his own name with Locarno (which meant Briand and Austen Chamberlain as well as Stresemann), and more cordially with Stresa (a policy of his own devising); he never paid Geneva the homage of his own personal attendance. The whole tenor of his policy has been the consistent denial of Geneva's central

principle, namely, the interdependence of nations, the curbing of excessive egoism by mutual recognition of the rights and dignity of other states, the building of the structure of each state's safety not upon the narrow base of its own resources but upon broadly co-operative collective action of all for each, of each for all.

GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS

In spite of the possibility opened up by the Geneva ideal to the peninsula itself, the factor of geographical situation long kept Italian policy strictly on the defensive. It suggested to prudent statesmen a defense complex, against which the present Italian administration makes strident, blatant revolt. The peninsula occupies a central position in the Mediterranean, an inviting position for peaceful commerce, as entrepôt between the capital-lenders of northwest Europe and the multifarious regions of the Balkan-Levantine area, which was once the seat of world-ruling empires, Persian, Greek, Latin, Slav, and Turk, but in modern times has become the needy, backward prey of rival west European imperialisms.

But Italy's convenient accessibility to every corner of the Mediterranean trading world would signify her vulnerability in a war situation to an agonizing degree in modern conditions of distance-annihilating invention. The peninsula does not average much more than a hundred miles in breadth. Certain vital portions of her railroad system are compelled by her mountainous configuration to run very close to the water. Hence, to escape the guns of a hostile fleet, Italy has always realized that she must be on friendly terms with whatever power commands on the sea. Furthermore, on the Adriatic to her east, the distribution of harbors and island shelters is highly unfavorable. Italy until the war had practically no Adriatic harbors (ancient Ravenna and Rimini having long since silted up), but across the narrow sea Dalmatia has plenty of harbors, and an archipelago of mountainous islands and peninsulas provides an ideal sheltered base for naval operations against Italy. What had once been the seat of Venetian empire was now in potentially hostile hands, Austrian before the war, Yugoslav afterwards. No wonder that the Italian ambition was to turn the Adriatic into an Italian lake, at least partially guarded at its southeastern outlet by a frankly Italian domination of Albania. No wonder that the peacemakers of



NOT THE ECONOMICS OF COLONIES BUT THE STRATEGY OF IMPERIALISM MAKES THE NAZIS DEMAND THE RESTITUTION OF THEIR FORMER DEPENDENCIES IN AFRICA AS THE ONLY SETTLEMENT.

Paris were anything but blessed in Italy when they denied her Dalmatia and even the port city of Fiume. The Fiume town council, not trusting a fifty-fifty population's referendum, had prematurely voted for entrance into Italy, in defiance of the Paris statesmen, and, after a tortuous series of compromising experiments and negotiations, the Italophiles finally got their way, though at the price of the complete economic stagnation of the port whose business has mostly gone to the little Yugoslav suburb of Sussak.

The mountain boundary toward former Austria, on the other hand, was adjusted in Italy's favor, at the expense of the principle of "self-determination of peoples." For half a century Italy had suffered from an Alpine boundary that had been unfairly drawn (1866) far down the southern slope, so that in the war of 1915-1918 she had to fight against the cruel Alps for many months before she could ever find and meet her Austrian enemy on topographically even terms. It was quite understandable, therefore, that she insisted and the Paris peacemakers agreed on the new boundary's being drawn at the Brenner watershed, with topographic fairness to both states, even though this and similar map drawing in Istria involved the placing of some half million German-speaking Tyrolese and Slav-speaking Slovenes under Italian sovereignty, instead of the Austrian and Yugoslav state membership which they would have preferred. This sacrifice of ethnic justice to strategic necessity is said to have caused many a subsequent pang to Woodrow Wilson, but it seems to have been historically unavoidable, and might well have continued fairly acceptable to all concerned, but for the rise of hypernationalistic fascism (1922).

EFFORTS TO EXPAND

Having now an Italy that resulted from a process of aggregation, we turn to observe more specifically the process whereby that Italy made an earnest effort to expand, following the example of other older nations in earlier centuries. During the last half century the swarming off of Italians into the outside world has taken place on a huge scale, but not in such a form as to produce an Italian empire. To escape grinding poverty at home, hundreds of thousands have left the peninsula and islands, but they have not had opportunity to plant new Italys. They have left Italy to become citizens of foreign

republics, already ethnically formed, beyond the seas, north Italians to a variety of points in Latin America, south Italians and Sicilians to the United States of North America.¹ What was Italy's loss has been undoubtedly the enormous gain, not only of Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, but also of New York, southern New England, and scattered regions farther west. Some had likewise migrated to France and Switzerland, where Italian skill in road building and in vine culture has been appreciated; but they have of course been lost to Italy.

There has been little of that which we associate with the phase "colonial expansion," that is to say, the founding of Italian colonies, expanding Italian culture, outside home Italy but under the Italian flag. In the empire-building period of the last third of the nineteenth century Italy participated, but in a very modest way indeed. For the eligible sites had all been pre-empted by others; and, furthermore, an almost incredibly low standard of economic life meant that it was not fruitful capital that the migrants could take with them to plant beyond the seas but only their empty hands; their migration was one of proletarian want rather than of bourgeois or even peasant enterprise.

In 1869 Eritrea was acquired, as a tiny toehold on the Red Sea, and in 1892 a portion of Somaliland, some 140,000 square miles, on the East African coast, abutting on the Indian Ocean. But these two were hardly more than administrative schemes. The enterprises were exceedingly costly, and by reason of the inhospitable nature of the environment and the backwardness of the native population, Italian people could not be persuaded to migrate thither. Consequently there has been almost no investment of capital and little importation or exportation of goods.

Much the same must be said regarding the territories of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, on the North African coast, between Egypt and Tunisia, just across the Mediterranean from the peninsula and the islands. These areas were acquired by conquest in 1911-1912, as Italy's promised share in the Ottoman Empire, breaking up at the death of the Sick Man of Europe. The territories are vast, but are mostly sandy desert, with no prospect of ever nurturing an Italian, or any other, population, or European industry, agriculture, or trade. Military power from the homeland has been intermittently

applied, finally with apparent success, not to compose the quarrels of the Arab chieftains and Mohammedan sects, but to take advantage of their endless and mysterious quarrels, to crush them in detail and reduce them to sullen submission.

Rhodes and the tiny Dodekanese (Twelve) Islands off the southwest coast of Asia Minor were seized by Italy as an incident of her war of 1911-1912 with Turkey.² Their population is largely Greek; they cannot offer any hope of development as a market for Italian goods or as the source of useful raw materials for Italian industry. They were expected to afford an entry to a hinterland on the Anatolian peninsula that was promised Italy during the Great War. But Kemal Atatürk unexpectedly wrought a miraculous revival of the Turkish national life in that whole peninsula, leaving no room for other nations, and the Italian imperial hope has faded away, as regards that whole area. The islands may once have been—when in Greek hands—a trading center for the eastern Mediterranean, but that is only a reminiscence of the distant past. They cannot serve strategically as a substantial check to Britain in Egypt and Cyprus, or to France in Syria. As an item of Italian empire they are hardly more than a picturesque ornament.

During the years 1935 and 1936 the European world resounded with the din of another expansion, the conquest of the empire of Ethiopia. This is no place to tell that familiar and sorry tale, of widely advertised, long-matured economic and strategic plans, of deals with France and Britain, including the division of Ethiopia into "spheres of interest," of threats of League of Nations "sanctions," which annoyed and enraged but did not greatly hamper Italy's action, and certainly did not effectually prevent her achievement of the conquest she had deliberately planned. The upshot of the whole episode is the annexation of all Ethiopia, as a portion (together with Eritrea and Somaliland) of "Italian East Africa," which is supposed to have an area of over 600,000 square miles and a population of seven or eight millions. Government has been set up, of the now familiar Italian type, hierarchical and military, without a trace of responsible self-government or even of real representative institutions. Much attention has had to be bestowed—and probably will have to be for a long time to come—on the ugly task of repressing bloody disorder by bloody ruthlessness. But it is also planned

that road building and investment of Italian capital (if Italy can find lenders) shall bring these hardly accessible highlands into fruitful contact with European civilization. There has been much hopeful talk of oil, cotton, and other products which may in time be developed and render this new, distant province a place of Italian settlement, "room" as well as "glory" for an Italian population that is crowded at home, and which tends to become still more crowded as the result of the government's deliberate fostering of a "natality" policy; possibly here will also be found (after the French manner) a recruiting ground for African armies of Italy for use in Europe.

But it should be borne in mind that the chief Italian interest in Ethiopia has been not so much economic as spiritual, the saving of face. According to fascist accounting practice, of baffling budgetary secrecy and the juggling of statistics, we have no adequate means of judging the real financial balance; but among neutral observers the opinion is widespread that the expense of the Ethiopian campaign was enormous, disproportionate, and incapable of any sort of justification, that the promise of economic return is vague and highly remote, that the business as a whole is not likely ever to be a paying enterprise. Nevertheless, the dictator can cash in the result at whatever figures it suits him to imagine, and the Italian people is perforce required, and by government propaganda actually seems to have been persuaded, to accept the result as satisfactory.

Especially important is this subjective aspect as regards the world's opinion of the Ethiopian enterprise, and as regards Italian public opinion (so far as expressed) regarding that world opinion. The Italian theory is that Il Duce's righteous defense of the sacred nation's honor was subjected to unwarranted suspicions and imputations. The League of Nations, it is held, in the applying of sanctions, was hypocritically pretending to standards of virtue and humanitarian justice which had never been applied to the colonial and imperial activities of its own members, particularly Britain and France. Such unfair treatment Il Duce righteously resented and defied—and with success. In Garibaldian and D'Annunzian fashion—with picturesqueness and *éclat*—the diplomats have been confronted with accomplished facts, and they have been compelled to record and accept them. Italy is no longer occupying a lowly seat at the world

table, asking for favors; she is now one of the Great Powers, at or near the head.

ITALY AND GREAT BRITAIN

Italian policy regarding Britain had, until 1935, one continuing principle: vulnerability of the peninsula as regards the great sea power compelled deference. Then, too, British liberal policy in the middle of the nineteenth century unquestionably had been highly, though rather patronizingly, serviceable to the disunited fragments of an Italy that was struggling to become free and united. Three-quarters of a century later, also, Mussolini might well assume realistically a middleman's role as broker, between the city of London, with its capital to invest, and the Balkan and Levantine areas, with their obvious need of exploitation under Western (Italian?) enterprise.

This traditional friendliness of relations suffered severe shocks, and equally amazing recoveries, as British policy vacillated in 1935-1938 with regard to Mussolini's plan for the conquest of Ethiopia. The Peace Ballot in Britain signified an impressive popular enthusiasm for the League ideal of collective security; Sir Samuel Hoare was sacrificed; Anthony Eden was exalted. But within a few months the Tory government was again found ready to make terms with Italy at Ethiopia's expense; Eden went out. The Italian air force may have constituted so severe a threat to the British Mediterranean fleet at Alexandria that Britain dared not risk an actual clash of arms, airplane and submarine against battleship and cruiser, until her rearmament program should have been achieved. The Hitler threat may have seemed to Downing Street the greater danger to peace, requiring drastic and immediate settling of all other quarrels at any sacrifice of principle. One is reminded of how, a generation ago, the Tirpitz German fleet turned three anciently traditional rivals, even enemies, into the friends composing the Russo-French-British entente.

Of equally great significance is the fundamental similarity of view of the two governments most concerned, on the real bases of imperialist statesmanship. A Baldwin-Chamberlain policy at Downing Street can readily understand and sympathize with a Mussolini. It says in effect: "We British know, from our experience with India and South Africa, what difficulties you Italians are facing as you

attempt to deal with North African natives; we gentlemen understand and respect each other; you do not interfere with the upper (Abyssinian) waters of Egypt's Nile, we leave unhindered your transport of troops and materials through our Suez Canal." In other words, an isolationist Britain, postponing to the distant future any realization of the League ideal, shares imperialism with fascist Italy, makes no trouble for her and finds none in her.

ITALY AND FRANCE

With France, Italy finds no irrepressible conflict, for republican France is in ideological conflict within herself, a popular front of democrats and socialists against an empire of business and colonial possessions. Laval can make terms with Mussolini as naturally as can Hoare, on the basis of mutual consideration. One may well question Mussolini's recent remark: "Our victory in Abyssinia ought to be welcome to England and France, for it will turn Italy into a satisfied Power." The imperialist appetite grows by what it feeds on, and there are still Italian longings for Tunisia, just across the straits, containing more Italians than Frenchmen; for an Italian share in the mandates of the ex-Turkish territories of the Levant, where Britain and France alike have found more griefs than satisfactions; and for a vaguely imagined future expansion into the vast but inhospitable (and exceedingly expensive) opportunities of North Africa. What bargains were made at Munich for the division of future expansion will never be known, but the new Italian demands promulgated in December, 1938, would indicate that the table has turned, that France is no longer to be feared but can be dealt with on even terms, or even bluffed into a capitulation—though, of course, "with honor."

ITALY AND GERMANY


Much is said in these days regarding the "Rome-Berlin Axis." This is a strange new phrase, unfamiliar in international relations. An axis is not an instrument, nor is it a human relation. It is a line between two points, a line about which something is in revolution (*absit omen!*). An axis is not an alliance, it is not even an entente. Yet in this case there may be something of both co-operation and sympathy. Basically different though fascist Italy and nazi Germany

may be, there is much in common. They are both totalitarian in their internal organization, proud of their departure from democratic ideals, of their freedom from constitutional checks and balances. Both are disdainful of liberty, civil and political, and ready to devote their peoples' entire energies to nationalist purposes, conceived by inspired leaders who are free from parliamentary control and capable of speedy executive action without necessity of persuading or outvoting critics or opponents.

Yet the observer may query whether this axis means genuine sympathy and reliable co-operation. They do not share a body of principles to be spread as gospel to a needy world. Mussolini long held and said that fascism was not an article of export. In Berlin in 1937 he said, "The Europe of tomorrow will be fascist by the logical consequence of events but not by our propaganda." When he sees imitations of his regime it is mostly by torn, dissatisfied, distraught nations that are passionately seeking unity at the sacrifice of all other ideal values; he must be more embarrassed than gratified. Two fascistically organized and inspired nations have in common nothing but their passionate devotion each to its own interest, to the exclusion of co-operation with other states, even with those that are fascistically organized. It is a fairly safe guess that Germans have for Italians as human beings no higher regard than they had in Bismarck's day, or in Metternich's; worse yet, in these days when one sacrosanct, omniscient, omnipotent leader is the sole spokesman of a "monolithic" nation, it is highly significant, as it is probable, that Mussolini as international statesman has a scorn for Hitler's personal capacity that at least evens up the old score.

In the current affairs of diplomacy, Germany and Italy may be helpful to each other, Germany refusing to join in the League sanctions against Italy and Italy facilitating the nazifying of Austria, Sudetenland and other central European areas. But these are mere occasional plays in the game. There is no reason to predict that gratitude from state to state will prove to be anything more than "a lively expectation of favors to come." And when their national needs clash, their respective nationalisms will imperiously assert themselves. Of two states which are pledged against the general principle of co-operativeness in the family of nations, one cannot be expected to co-operate, even with the other, at its own expense. Polarity of

EUROPE - AS IMPERIAL ITALY WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT



A Fact & Picture by Charles Hodges

ITALY, FRUSTRATED AT THE PEACE
CONFERENCE, RENEWS THE DRIVE FOR
EMPIRE IN ANOTHER PARTNERSHIP
WITH GERMANY.

opposition is as likely to develop as helpfulness on that Rome-Berlin axis, all depending on their individual interests as individually conceived. This sharp opposition was seen in Mussolini's mobilizing on the Brenner frontier on the occasion (1934) of Dollfuss's murder. The opportunistic policy of the master dictators was shown by the delay of each to leap to the support of the other in their respective aggressions in September and December, 1938. This antagonism may be expected to reappear as plans develop, on the one side or the other, for exploiting trade or alliance opportunities in the Danube Valley and the Balkan Peninsula, an area which each is ambitious to dominate, and where those ambitions, if carried far, might remind history readers of the rivalry a generation ago between the Hapsburg and Romanoff dynasties. Successors to the role of rivals for that region's domination might well take warning from the fate of those dynasties.

ITALY AND SPAIN

Regarding Italy's relation to the Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War the elements for judgment are still in high degree obscure and doubtful. In the early days of his tenancy of power Mussolini showed his realistic sense by (1) cold-shouldering the dictatorial Spanish regime of Primo de Rivera, notwithstanding its palpable imitation of his own procedures; (2) cultivating good relations with the Soviet Union when there seemed high prospects (1924) that markets might be developed to Italian advantage. This was a situation he felt he could handle without fear, although communism was still the actively prosecuted crusade of Lenin with his world revolution and although Mussolini's fascism (after his own amazing conversion from socialism to nationalism) had presented itself to Italian bourgeois opinion as the acceptable antidote to cosmopolitan communism. But it is notorious that Stalin's policy, during the last ten years, has been not cosmopolitan but national, the building in Russia of a regime that is sometimes called "state capitalism."

In internal structure there is much kinship between the Stalinist and the Mussolinian system. Mussolini may join Hitler in denouncing "bolshevism" as their favorite enemy, but at least Mussolini knows that this denunciation is a mere theatrical property, convenient as stage thunder for producing a dramatic effect, but utterly

devoid of meaning for a realistic statesman. In Mussolini's view the Soviet Union is to be dealt with as a mere name for Russia, another nationalist dictatorship, with which he can come to terms as necessity and convenience may dictate. It has been ingeniously suggested that unhappy Spain is being used by both Russia and Italy as a proving ground for the testing of military material and procedures. It is extremely unlikely that Mussolini thinks (and who else can have an Italian thought?) of Spain as an area of future Italian expansion. In any case a serious setback has been suffered there by whoever may have conceived Italian hopes in Spain. The main truth has yet to appear.

IMPERIUM ROMANUM

One final danger factor is suggested by the words *Imperium Romanum*. The Latin phrase is of a piece with the emphasis on the excavation of archeological remains of the Augustan Era, the reiterated use of the lictor symbolism, the so-called "Roman" salute, and even the recent effort to call the Berlin-imported goosestep a *Passo romano*. Every propaganda device is used for making Italians of today think themselves to be Romans. If Romans, then imperial Romans, with a consequent suggestion of world rule. We do not say that Mussolini is insanely dreaming of an Alexandrian or Caesarian role as world ruler. But, for effect on the people's imagination that very suggestion is to be exploited for all it is worth. A modest, thrifty, laborious, private-spirited people, accustomed to minding its own business, is to be transformed by all the arts of propaganda, including, especially, press and school and youth organization, to offer itself in unquestioning obedience to a despot, in such plans of expansions as he in his wisdom may conceive and mature and execute.

Wonders have unquestionably been performed in Mussolini's effort toward national unification, in the eradication of regionalist loyalties and mutual hates, in the development of a corporate spirit that comprehends conflicting categories, employer and employee, northerner and southerner, wise and simple in one public will; which is not the public's will or any combination of the wills of parts of the public, but the will of Mussolini, imposed and passionately accepted. The fact that a patriotism, embraced as a religious faith, is irrational, in

the realm of the emotions, renders it incalculable, unpredictable, but dangerously potent. And this faith is devoted to an Italy which is not static and self-contained but expanding.

National imperialism is not limited by economic considerations. A people may be persuaded that it is sordid to count costs when the nation's honor is at stake. And it is Il Duce who interprets infallibly that honor and its requirements. An enormously expensive campaign to conquer Ethiopia may hold out slight hopes of economic advantage in a long period to come; but it was declared that the nation's honor required revenge for the humiliating Italian defeat suffered at Adua in 1896. After forty years the nation's honor was declared to have been cleansed by the Italian triumphal entry into Addis Ababa, the conquest of a new colony. There might have been enormous disparity of resources on both occasions, such as to deny humiliation on the part of the heroes who died in their tracks in 1896; and by the same token to arouse admiration and pity for the poor primitive warriors who offered their feeble bodies to be devoured by the mechanized columns of 1936. But that is the nature of a totalitarian state: it leaves the determination of what is honor, of how defeat can be canceled by revenge, and how a nation's expansive energies can be justifiably expended, to the conscience and statecraft of one poor human Duce.

NOTES

1. See F. J. BROWN and J. S. ROUCEK, *Our Racial and National Minorities*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1937; LEONARD COVELLO, "Italian Americans," pp. 357-387, and bibliography, pp. 818-820; M. R. DAVIE, *World Immigration*, pp. 113-115, 194-196, and *passim*. New York, Macmillan, 1936.

2. MARGARET BOVERI, *Mediterranean Cross-Currents*, translation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1938, is a brilliant study of the Mediterranean World, ranging from the ancients to Mussolini.

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CHAPTER 10

POTENTIALS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Bruce Hopper

The present historical moment is of commanding importance for the future course of the Russian revolution. The Munich Agreement was a "black-out" defeat—a timeshed between two epochs in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. The statesmen of the four Western powers not only blackballed Russia from the club; they dynamited the soviet diplomatic defenses to the west. Such a Homeric repudiation of a friendly, great power invokes equally Homeric retaliation. The temper and scope of that retaliation cannot be determined; it might well be the *leit motif* of a new burst of revolutionary energy. Certainly the bolsheviks have small cause to place future confidence in the treaty pledges of Western powers, whether for consultation or for military support in a crisis. Munich drew the sponge over the record.

Mere citation of detailed objectives in past soviet policy offers but little guidance. The task of the student now is to select from rather fugitive materials the elements likely to contribute to the potentials of future policy. The situation in political and military strategy is too liquid to permit a definitive statement. And even a broad presentation must of necessity be limited to questions for which there are, as yet, no precise answers: e.g., why the Russians were excluded from Munich; what resultant changes affect Russia; and what shifts in policy are possible for the bolsheviks.

FAILURE OF "INDIVISIBLE PEACE"

A generalized view of the soviet reverse might be somewhat as follows: During the last decade the Soviet Government fostered a desire for "peaceful coexistence and friendly collaboration" with capitalist states. In 1934, Russia entered the League of Nations with a program of "indivisible peace" within the system of collective

security, buttressed by a comprehensive series of soviet non-aggression pacts. Soviet Russia became, in fact, the most determined apostle of collective peace, with Litvinov crying in the wilderness of Geneva, whence officials of the other great powers had fled.

Exclusion of Russia. Why, then, was this stalwart champion of the status quo excluded from the Munich feast, from the "peace in our time"? The answer is veiled in the general obscurity of pre-Munich diplomacy. It may be that the bolsheviks pursued collective security too eagerly for the comfort of statesmen who intended to liquidate that system. It is possible that such statesmen feared that the bolshevik devotion to the Geneva principle camouflaged a willingness in Moscow to force a showdown in the west, a war from which Russia would emerge as the undamaged, dominant power. The bolsheviks are notoriously blunt. They invariably embarrass other delegates with wavering or delicate objectives to pursue in international parley. The conspicuous role played by Litvinov at Geneva was that of ripping the mask of pretense from disarmament, sanctions, and other half-way measures. It may be that he ripped too vigorously and too long.

Even if that were a valid reason for the exclusion of Russian delegates from Munich, the question remains as to why the Soviet Government was not even consulted during the sultry weeks before the storm. The treaties involved, including the covenant, pledged consultation of Russia before such a momentous decision. The Soviet Government gave frequent, unrequested assurances of its fidelity to its military obligations to France and Czechoslovakia. Total mobilization of the soviet air force would have intensified the difficulties of the Czech Government which was accused by Hitler of introducing bolshevism into the heart of Europe. The Czechs had reasons not to discount Russian military support. But the British and French Governments chose to regard effective aid from Russia as highly problematical, and, in any case, too slow to save Czechoslovakia. (On November 14, 1938, Chamberlain told the House of Commons that Lord Winterton's public statement alleging Russian failure to offer specific military assistance to Czechoslovakia was "unfortunate," and that Britain desired the "most friendly relations with Russia." Lord Winterton, who as a cabinet minister sat beside Chamberlain, refused to answer questions or to enlarge upon his reported apology to

the Soviet ambassador.) This all-important question awaits the verdict of time and revelations: In the fifty-ninth minute of September 28, 1938, did Chamberlain and Daladier face a situation of overwhelming desperation and a genuine threat of general war? Or, on the contrary, did they face the climactic move in five years of bluff, and thus needlessly sacrifice a gallant democratic ally in what amounts to a continuing process of blackmail? If we knew the answer, we could write the formula for future soviet foreign policy. The historical fact is: there was a long and ominous period of crisis buildup before September 28. During that time Soviet Russia, the military ally of France and Czechoslovakia and the colleague of Britain in the League, was ignored.

Introduction of Russia into Western Europe. According to Moscow pronouncements the bolsheviks changed their attitude toward the League in 1934 because the peaceful nations were inside that organization, and the warlike nations, Japan and nazi Germany, were outside. But the original impetus which brought Soviet Russia into western European politics was the French alarm over Hitler's program for revision of treaties. The French Government sought from Britain a stronger guarantee of the Rhine frontier than that written into the Locarno Treaty. The British Government refused, just as it refused a guarantee to France after the rejection by the United States Senate of the Triple Guarantee Treaty of 1919. In so doing, Britain followed tradition. But the result was historic. As an alternative, to stiffen the legal fences, France launched a gigantic scheme for a security system in eastern Europe. France was willing to guarantee Germany, Poland, the U.S.S.R., and the Baltic states against unprovoked attack from each other. Germany and Poland, however, rejected that plan of Barthou. The German Government of 1934 was no more ready than the one of 1925 to freeze the Reich's eastern frontier. When the diplomatic smoke cleared away, the eastern security system was found to be extremely attenuated. The only achievements were Russia's entrance into the League (1934), and the soviet treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia (1935). What resulted was not security but increasing insecurity. France offered to refer the soviet treaty to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion as to its consistency with the letter and spirit of Locarno and the League system. But

1. THE MARCH REVOLUTION, 1917, Anti-Czarist, democratic
2. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, 1917, Bolshevik-led, social upheaval

Enemy States

Potential Enemies, if
then key British move 1924.
climaxed with U. S. 1933.

Nazi Pressur

Spheres of Democracy

LITVINOFF'S BALTIC NON-
AGGRESSION PACTS, 1932-33.

RAPALLO ACCORD, April, 1922, first collaboration of the two "out-law" states - Germany and the Soviet Union.

Macdonald Govt., Feb 1924, recognizes USSR, BRITAIN starting general relations with two dozen states.


FRENCH ALLIANCE, 1935, mutually desired to meet Hitler menace, is followed by CZECH PACT.

after fascist Italy and Nazi Germany backs the Franco revolt in Spain, the USSR aids the legal Republican regime, 1936.

Soviets began technical collaboration with the LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1922; Litvinoff starts political collaboration with disarmament, 1927, and USSR member-state, 1934.

ANTI-COMMUNIST BLOC, 1937
formed by Hitler Germany
with Italy and Japan.

COLLAPSE OF SOVIET-WESTERN ALLIANCES with the Anglo-French abandonment of the Czechoslovakian Republic, 1938.

A FACT  PICTURE
BY
CHARLES HODGES

CHARLES HODGES

WHITES vs. REDS: The Wars of Intervention, Baltic, Ukraine, Archangel, Siberia, 1918-1922

2. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, 1917,

Separate PEACE with Germany,
Brest-Litovsk, March 3, 1918.
Lening: THE ARMY VOTED WITH
179 LEGB.

Lenin's "NEP", the new economic policy, 1921, makes it possible for foreign business to enter into deals with modified red economy.

LENIN DIES. 1924, with STALIN'S policy of national, socialist consolidation defeating TROTSKY who drives for immediate world revolution on all red fronts.

Inauguration of FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN, 1928, turns the USSR westward with emphasis on commercial cooperation.

NON-AGGRESSION PACTS begin with Soviet neighbors - Germany, 1926, Turkey, etc.

Hitler refused all legal interpretations and pronounced the Locarno Treaty abrogated. His assumed justification (*rebus sic stantibus*) was that the circumstances of 1925, when Locarno was signed, were so altered by the introduction of Soviet Russia into western Europe that the Locarno conditions no longer maintained. On March 7, 1936, German troops marched into the Rhineland, in direct violation of Articles 42-43 of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Rhine Pact of Locarno. (The French were to learn later that the German officers had orders to march back if the French army counter-marched to the bridgeheads.) That propitious moment for the democracies to make an unequivocal stand against nazi expansion was allowed to pass. It has never returned. From March 7, 1936, to January 1, 1939, the path of the victors of the last war was retreat into weakness. The French quest for a legal security system in the east thus brought Soviet Russia into the political caldron of the west, and provided the provocation Hitler desired in order to explode the treaty structure of Europe as a prelude to Germany's eastward expansion.

The Integration School of Thought. While the French sought soviet support to the languishing Geneva security there developed in England a counter-ideology which may be called the Integration School of Thought, later to be sentimentalized as Appeasement. Early in 1933 an influential group of sincere peace planners in London began to advocate the integration of Continental Europe. The reasoning was somewhat as follows:

Collective security, resting on the aggregate strength of the small states, has failed to create a true peace system. The parcelling of the map perpetuates the major defects of the 1919 settlements. Peace, herefore, must be sought through removal of these barriers in a general process of integration. Because of certain ugly aspects of nazi ideology it is unfortunate that the integrating force might be Germany. But if Germany possesses the energy and will to integrate Europe, then let Germany have the role. For the Western democracies to oppose the natural expansion of Germany would be to fight for a system which had proved unworkable. Therefore, let Britain strictly limit all commitments on the Continent. The nazi thrust must be diverted to the east, where a conflict with Russia might exhaust both bolshevism and national socialism. If, in addition, Germany demands colonies, such claims might be met through

arrangements with small states, e.g., Belgium or Portugal. Collective security would probably be sacrificed. And Germany would acquire hegemony in central and southeastern Europe. That development is inevitable in any case. Germany would thereby become a satiated state, eventually to be weakened by internal explosion, or by a war with Russia. Thus, at the inescapable cost of permitting Germany to change the constitution of eastern Europe, peace would ensue.

No responsible student would seriously ascribe such stark realism to the British Government. Britain's Inner Cabinet of Four did not consult other cabinet members, and thereby broke the tradition of cabinet collective responsibility. But that it entered into a plot to engineer the events of September according to a prearranged schedule is an incredible canard. Britain's rulers have not shown capacity for such subtlety. Rather are they to be charged with being blandly unaware of the shift in power determinant from the water to the air, from the battleship to the air-bomber. Their complacency had much to do with Britain's unpreparedness. It must also be remembered that Britain consistently avoided assumption of military obligations in eastern Europe. The Conservative Government was apprehensive, from the beginning, of the indirect commitment implied in France's obligations to Russia. The fact remains that Prime Minister Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler has had the effect of putting into operation something like the scheme for integration of Europe, in which there obviously can be no place for Soviet Russia. Only time will show whether the traditional long-range British wisdom was equal to the diplomacy of air-bomber politics in 1938; whether the adage still holds true that Britain loses every battle except the last one.

Decline of Soviet Influence. Another factor, of a more general character, was the decline of soviet influence in the democracies. In 1934 many liberal intellectuals regarded the soviet system with tolerant interest, if not definite sympathy. The trials of the "old" bolsheviks were viewed with suspicion; their execution, and the decapitation of the Red Army incited a deep revulsion. However necessary the ruthless purge may have been considered in Russia, it impressed the West as barbarism.

Also, within the democracies, the property issue sharpened. The excesses of the Front Populaire in France caused general alarm. Both the socialists and the bourgeois capitalists seemed to put their specific

class interests above the interests, the honor, and the dignity of France. The Leftist political groups in both France and Britain urged resistance to nazi aggression in the same breath that they voted down the means to that end by increased armaments. Disgust with such tactics swung large sections of opinion over into the Right, or conservative, camp. And the natural hostility of the Roman Catholic Church to the militant atheism of the bolsheviks proved more effective, politically, than its opposition to the nazi persecution of the church.

This internal cleavage demonstrated the weakness of democracies in the crisis. The vast majority of the citizens of Britain and France are intensely loyal to democracy per se, but are torn in twain by their fears of bolshevism and nazi-fascism. The bolshevik threat is remote; the nazi threat was immediate. It was perhaps for this reason that absence of Soviet Russia from Munich was largely ignored by the press and the public. "Indivisible peace" slipped quietly into the historical limbo.

Europe's Changed Front. Viewing post-Munich Europe, the bolsheviks see the wreckage of their three pillars of security to the west:

First, Czechoslovakia, officially rechristened Czecho-Slovakia since the Munich partition, though reduced in size and power, is being transformed from a soviet ally into a "loyal" nazi vessel; from a Slavic spearhead toward Germany into a German spearhead toward Ukraine. As phrased by one Czech leader: "We did our best to fight on the side of the angels; now we must hunt with the wolves."

Second, France, about to repudiate the soviet alliance, is shifting from reliance on allies in eastern Europe to dependence on a nazi guarantee of the Rhine frontier. The Munich Agreement broke the Front Populaire, which supported the soviet treaty. But the social issue has sharpened. Since 1936, nazi leaders have predicted civil war in France.

Third, the collapse of collective security changes the function of the small states. The Allied map architecture in 1919 was directed to the creation of a buffer zone between Germany and Russia, consisting of fourteen small and medium-sized sovereign unities. Of these only Czechoslovakia inherited a substantial economic foundation; the others were, and remain, economically backward. Instead of being

an economic and military buffer zone, eastern Europe became a power vacuum. Small states, in general, depend on international law and recognition of the rights of self-determination for their existence. Consequently they proved consistent supporters of the Geneva system. The paradox of 1938 was that Soviet Russia, excluded from the 1919 peace conference which established the territorial set-up, was the one forthright defender of that settlement. Munich set in motion a tendency in Europe away from the small state pattern, necessary for collective security, to a great power pattern which may develop military empires. International law, to which the bolsheviks themselves attached only transitional significance, is in retreat before a new regulatory principle called "dynamism." Treaties now lapse without being abrogated; they suddenly cease to apply. A new era begins when mere threat of "Blitzkrieg" attains a war objective, when wars can be won without firing a shot. Collective security, self-determination, international law and treaties, and similar paraphernalia of Western thought, must be heavily discounted by the bolsheviks in the future.

Fourth, instead of three pillars of security to the west, the bolsheviks now see arising the *Mittleuropa* of the old German dream, extending from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Balkans and the Black Sea. The periphery states may retain a measure of cultural autonomy, but the economic and foreign policy will be controlled from Berlin. The barter arrangements of Doctors Schacht and Funk have prepared the way for economic exploitation by Germany of the vast Danube area. The partition of Czechoslovakia not only removed the single air threat to Germany's war industries, which Goering had transplanted from western to central Germany, but also provided the nazis with a corridor railway for sealed trains through Moravia to the Danube. These shifts in military strategy are highly important to Russia. The enlarged food and raw materials area also permits Germany to defy a naval blockade, which deprives Britain of a powerful weapon. In the general reverse, the strong powers which became Russia's friends in 1934 have become the weak powers in 1938. And hegemony passes to the state which has singled out Russia as its objective enemy.

Effect on Soviet Foreign Policy. Four years of adventuring in

western European politics, in support of collective security and the *status quo*, have thus produced a situation approximating the very "capitalist encirclement" which the bolsheviks sought to prevent, which they dreaded as a menace, and which they used to justify to their own people the exhausting tempo of industrialization. Soviet membership in the League failed to make the world safe for socialism; rather did it stimulate the nazi-fascist reaction.

Such tremendous changes in Europe dictate a reorientation of soviet foreign policy. Russia has a long record of sudden reversals in direction. On coming to the throne in 1762, Peter III deserted Russia's Austrian and French allies of the Seven Years' War, and actually furnished troops to Frederick the Great. After the rebuff at the Congress of Berlin, 1878, Russia turned east. The bolsheviks have also known precipitate shifts, such as Lenin's New Economic Policy, 1921; the program of "peaceful coexistence" with capitalist states, 1927; and Russia's entry into the League of Nations in 1934, after fourteen years of bolshevik denunciation of that body.

In the pending reaction to Britain and France, Russia may become quiescent for a time. Stalin may assume the role of a Philip of Macedon, brooding in the northern citadel, awaiting the moment when, in fulfillment of Lenin's prophecy, the capitalist states of western Europe shall have strangled each other after the manner of the jealous Greek states of yore.

On the other hand, the reaction may be positive and retaliatory. The bolsheviks may strike what bargain they can with an aggressive Germany in order to concentrate their energies on the development of their power interests in Asia. In 1922, Britain and France practically threw the Germans into the arms of the Russians at the Genoa Conference, thus the Rapallo Treaty. In 1935, they pushed Italy into the Rome-Berlin axis. If, in 1938, they have recklessly forced the bolsheviks into an economic and military rapprochement with nazi Germany there will result a power combine extending from the North Sea to the Pacific which will allow to the two democracies but small voice in European affairs.

In any case, the Russian revolution enters another transitional stage in foreign policy. And Soviet Russia again becomes the great imponderable of international politics, isolated, baffling, and remote.

QUESTIONS OF FUTURE POLICY

The above cursory statement does not presume to measure the full impact of the Munich Agreement on the affairs of the Russian revolution, but to suggest causes for a change in temper in Moscow. From another point of view, there is a certain historical retribution in the desertion of the Czechs and Russians by the two western democracies. In pursuance of their program of "peace without annexation or indemnities," the bolsheviks in 1917 prepared the way for the collapse of the eastern front. Russia deserted the Allied cause. And the bolsheviks were forced to sign the disastrous Treaty of Brest Litovsk with Germany, March 3, 1918. As a consequence, the Allies feared that Germany might seize the military stores accumulated in Murmansk and Archangel, tap the food supplies of Siberia, and thus be able to defy the naval blockade in the North Sea. This strategical justification for Allied intervention on Russian soil quickly developed into anti-bolshevism in the form of material support to the White Russian armies. During the Paris peace conference the attitude of the Allies was phrased by the resolution to allow the bolsheviks to "stew in their own juice," behind the *cordon sanitaire*. Two decades later, the positive policy of the *cordon sanitaire* was replaced by a negative policy of resigning to the bolsheviks the dubious honor of resisting nazi aggression alone, as best they may. To the Russian mind, these two policies of Britain and France are identical in spirit and implication. Fear of a return to the *cordon sanitaire* again may dominate bolshevik thought.

Also, from the beginning of the revolution, the bolsheviks were given to making broad predictions which have proved to be miscalculations of historical importance. One such prediction was that the world would be divided into two camps, socialism and capitalism; in the fullness of time, imperialism would collapse, and then capitalism, leaving socialism in command of the field. Since 1933 there have been not two, but three camps. The capitalist camp subdivided into democracy and nazi-fascism, with the latter advancing in power at the expense of both liberal democracy and socialism. Another prediction was that "capitalist encirclement" would eventually force the socialist camp to defend the revolution with arms. The encirclement has come; it is not capitalist, but rather encircle-

ment by a rival form of state planning, the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo combine which is united by the ideological common denominator of anti-communism.

While historical precedents have little place in post-Munich Europe, considerations such as these may direct the student's attention to those areas of soviet foreign policy in which changes are possible or likely.

The Unavoidable Quest for Peace. The bolshevik promotion of international peace is founded on their need for security while building socialism. As the revolution is still on the defensive, it is extremely unlikely that Soviet Russia will abandon this major objective.

Peculiarities of geography are an important factor. Whereas great revolutions in the past have tended to overflow into Napoleonic conquests, the bolsheviks inherited a continent of their own to conquer. To the west they are confronted by peoples of more advanced industrialism who have not proved susceptible to the Russian dogmas of social change and militant atheism. To the east lies soviet Asia, the largest and richest unexploited land expanse of the earth. Beyond the border are non-aggressive peoples in various stages of backwardness, to whom Russian revolution means economic betterment and modernization. The Asiatic frontier is peculiar in that for long stretches it is a mere line on the map dividing kindred tribes. Even Tsarist Russia, astride the Eurasian continent, aspired to the mission of learning in the West in order to teach in the East. The general objective of soviet foreign policy, as dictated by the logic of geography, is, therefore, to hold the West at bay while perfecting socialism in Russia, then to apply the new science and technique to the building of an entirely new civilization in Eurasia, self-sufficient and powerful. To realize this potential Asiatic industrialism the bolsheviks must pursue a peace policy of defense to the west while orienting the country's main interests to the east.

Bolshevik Defenses. Since security for socialism remains fixed as the major objective, special interest attaches to the bolshevik defenses against a threat of actively hostile encirclement. Two sets of questions, in this regard, are here suggested: What is the feasibility of military defense, and how may such other measures of defense as economic development, propaganda, and diplomacy be made most effective?

Military defense of the Soviet Union is entrusted to a standing army

of 1,300,000, an embryo navy which is well equipped with submarines, and a first-class air force. The number of soldiers returned to civilian work under the system of universal service, and the general militarization of life, ensure an enormous man power trained for the field. Some estimates run as high as 20,000,000. Under the command of Marshal Tukhachevsky the Red Army was being remodeled into a national army, mechanized, and capable of offensive operations. But Tukhachevsky and seven other generals of the high command were executed in June, 1937. It is not clear to the critics outside whether the charges of treason actually involved conspiracy to overthrow Stalin by a Bonapartist coup with the connivance of the German General Staff, or whether the generals opposed too vigorously the reintroduction of the political commissar system into the army. In any case, the growing autonomy of the Red Army did threaten the communist party's leadership. These factors of disunity and the sweeping purge in all ranks give some weight to the appraisal of foreign critics that the Russian fighting force is really a political army in which military efficiency is sacrificed to loyalty. The educational level of officers is rated lower than formerly. Such an army may not, at present, be prepared for large-scale operations abroad. It is presumed, however, that given the factor of distance, Russia remains impregnable on her own soil. How that defense may be affected by the development of long-range air bombing is yet to be determined.

The first line of economic defense is the Foreign Trade Monopoly, created in 1918, and designed to insulate the planning system and the managed currency from the fluctuations of foreign markets and international exchange. Behind that wall the bolsheviks have built an industrial base for military defense. Russia has ceased to be an agricultural appanage of the West. The diplomatic status of trade delegates of a state in business has been a troublesome issue in international law. Nevertheless the foreign trade monopoly has been recognized in treaties with foreign states, permitting the Soviet Government the advantage of being the only buyer and seller of soviet supplies. Inside the country the bolsheviks are able to mobilize their entire economic strength, developing heavy industry at the cost of sacrificing the production of consumers' goods. The soviet system continues to be geared to foreign trade. But in the event of a blockade,

Russia could more closely approximate a condition of self-sufficiency than any other nation with the notable exception of the United States.

The most feared bolshevik weapon is propaganda. This has been used in times past to appeal to the class consciousness of workers behind the lines of Russia's potential enemies. The Communist International, formed in 1919 of national communist sections, carries on propaganda for world revolution with varying degrees of intensity. It was effective during the early years, when communist groups actually seized power for brief periods in Hungary and Germany. The last major offensive was in China from 1924 to 1927, ending with the expulsion of the Russian military and political advisers. Following the party's rejection in 1927 of Trotsky's thesis of "permanent revolution," the propagation of world revolution was held in abeyance. The Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935 voted to compromise with democracies, and passed the celebrated resolution to co-operate everywhere with all political groups opposed to fascism and war. The resulting "united front" had some political success in France and Spain, but also stiffened the nazi-fascist reaction. The bolshevik prediction that the world would be transformed from vertical state divisions into the broad horizontal lines of international class cleavage seems as remote as ever. Nevertheless, a new offensive for revolution in given areas, as part of the bolshevik defense, would be a logical sequel to the reverse at Munich.

Finally, the bolsheviks have used diplomacy as part of their defense system. During the period of military communism, when war between the socialist and capitalist camps was envisaged, the treaty relations of Soviet Russia were confined to the limitrophe states (formerly part of the Tsarist Empire) and friendly neighbors on the Asiatic border. The quarantine was broken by the Russian need for foreign capital, and the desire of both camps for trade, leading to trade agreements and bilateral non-aggression pacts. But the question of the role Soviet Russia should play in world affairs produced a violent schism within the party. Trotsky's position was that industrialization was impossible without exploitation of the peasants (agriculture to feed industry) and security was impossible without the promotion of revolutions elsewhere. Stalin's program was to take the peasants into partnership, and to build "socialism in one country first." The issue was decided, for the time, by the expulsion of Trotsky

from the party in 1927. The corollary of Stalin's policy was "peaceful coexistence and friendly collaboration with capitalist states," which became the keynote of the involvement of Soviet Russia in western Europe via entrance into the League, 1934, and the defensive alliances with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935. The many striking triumphs of soviet diplomacy have been due to the caliber of soviet emissaries abroad, especially Litvinov who captured the only laurels at the London Economic Conference in 1933, and assumed a dominant role in such readjustments as the Montreux Convention of 1936. During the crisis preceding Munich, Litvinov was the one statesman of a major power to give wholehearted support to collective security. His startling speech before the Assembly of the League, September 21, 1938, closed with this paragraph:

The Soviet Government takes pride in the fact that it has not acceded to such a policy (e.g., the proposed mutilation of Czechoslovakia) and has invariably pursued the principles set forth by the League of Nations, which were approved by almost every nation of the world; *nor has it any intention of abandoning them* in the future, being convinced that in the present conditions it is impossible otherwise to safeguard a genuine peace and a genuine international justice. It calls upon other governments likewise to return to this policy. —

Questions of Internal Strength. There was a steady increase in the internal power of bolshevism from 1921 to 1934. This may be indicated by the achievement of revolutionary objectives in terms of predominant problems at different periods.

1917-1921. The conquest of Russia and the civil war determined the conditions of the isolation. Russia was weak, an outcast.

1921-1928. The rehabilitation of economic life dictated the bolshevik search for a *modus vivendi* with capitalism. Foreign relations were made possible by the new economic policy, and a general softening of the regime. Russia entered the family of nations.

1928-1934. The economic reconstruction of the country through a prospected series of five-year plans made necessary the policy of "peaceful coexistence" with capitalist sources of equipment. Soviet Russia attained a status equal to that of other great powers and became a counter-weight in the European balance of power.

1934-1938. Political reconstruction was begun by Stalin to root out the evils of the bureaucracy which had crystallized in the soviet system. The term itself covers a multitude of changes, from the new constitution, 1936, to the ruthless purging of the government apparatus, the army and navy, and the diplomatic service. The great economic projects supervised by the G.P.U. (State Political Administration, now merged with the Commissariat of Internal Affairs) indicate an increase in forced labor. The trials of the "old" bolsheviks betrayed intensified fears of treason. The almost balmy atmosphere of 1934 changed to one of widespread suspicion and dread of the terror. It seemed as though bolshevism reached the stage of "socialism victorious" only to turn inward in a process of self-devouring. Foreigners were forced to leave Russia in large numbers, and visas became difficult to obtain. Foreign relations entered a phase of vaguely defined distrust on all sides.

Such terror conditions, however necessary to the revolutionary goals, make the measurement of Russia's internal strength impossible. Certain indexes of production (e.g., steel, 16,000,000 tons) continue to mount. But planning in general has developed major defects. In 1938 the goods famine reappeared, and even the food supply was inadequate because of faulty distribution. By raising prices in order to pay for armaments the state becomes a reluctant profiteer. But the question of strength concerns the loyalty of soviet citizens as well as economic output. It is no longer true to say that the purge reaches only the bureaucrats; all layers of the population have felt the lash of investigation. The causes of the purge are ascribed in Moscow to the incompetence of the bureaucracy, to the overrapid tempo of industrialization for which technical cadres could not be trained fast enough, to the wrecking activities of Russians in the pay of foreign states, and to incipient opposition to Stalin's dictatorship. Any, or all, of these suggested causes would not solve the mystery. The question remains open whether the regime is strengthened or weakened as a result.

One historical aspect is highly significant. As a result of the heavy casualties among adults during the World War, the Civil War, the famine and epidemics, and the many forms of liquidation since the revolution began, Soviet Russia enters its third decade as an extremely

youthful regime. Only a fragment of the 1937 census was published, but from the few figures given one estimates that two thirds of the total population (170,000,000) belong to the post-revolution generation. That means more than one hundred million living persons were born since 1917, or were in primary schools at the time, and are therefore without personal memories of a pre-bolshevik existence. In sacrificing talent and experience, Stalin has shifted his reliance for support to youth. Youth continues to be amenable, loyal, and unpredictable. Given five more years of peace, Soviet Russia should be even stronger than she was claimed to be at the peak of 1934.

Possible Changes in Russia's Defense to the West. The condition of mercurial disequilibrium introduced into Europe by the Munich Agreement imposes upon the bolsheviks the task of mending their western fences. For the first time since the Polish incursion to Kiev in 1920 the threat of invasion enters practical politics. The Russian military preparations include the creation of a No Man's Land, 100 miles wide, along the border. But in the diplomatic defense, bolshevik intentions are not yet revealed. Three possible changes may here be suggested: (1) An arrangement with Germany; (2) Reconstruction of the Eastern barrier to Germany; (3) Definite withdrawal from the European scene. Consideration of these must of necessity be speculative.

An Arrangement with Germany. The antagonism between bolshevik and national socialist ideologies has given rise to a prevalent assumption that Russia and Germany are natural enemies. The reverse is true. From the time of Frederick the Great to Bismarck the political and economic relations between the two countries were friendly. Bismarck's policy of keeping the "wire open to St. Petersburg" was thrown overboard by Kaiser Wilhelm when he came to the throne in 1890. The immediate result was the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1893, the nucleus of the Triple Entente which brought about the downfall of the Kaiser in 1918.

After the World War and the annulment of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany and Russia were drawn together by a common cause as the outcasts of Europe. They cemented this return to the old friendship by the Treaty of Rapallo, 1922. An unpublished, secret protocol to that treaty is considered to have been the basis for the subsequent military co-operation. German staff officers trained the


Red Army, and German technicians acted as consultants in the new soviet war industries. Much of Germany's leftover war equipment was shipped to Russia. The trade treaty of 1925 assured Germany of the bulk of soviet foreign trade and concessions. For more than a decade, German spokesmen insisted that Germany must be considered as the clearing house of Russia's relations with the West. At that time, the bolsheviks considered the League a "bandit" organization, and tried to prevent Germany from joining it. They also tried to prevent Germany's signature of the Locarno Treaty. To compensate for making peace with the League powers, Germany concluded the Treaty of Friendship with Russia, April 24, 1926. According to the terms of this document Germany and Russia are pledged to maintain neutrality if either one is attacked by a third party, and not to join any economic coalition or boycott directed against one or the other. This treaty was renewed by the Nazi Government March 5, 1933, without a fixed date of expiration. Legally, it is still in force.

As the Kaiser broke the old bond with Russia in 1890, so Hitler broke the Rapallo bond in 1933. The Soviet Government attempted, for a time, to keep the economic ties, but subsequently refused the nazi offers of credit. Hitler needed the bogeyman of communism first to gain political power within Germany and later as a European menace necessary to force through revision of the Versailles Treaty. The frequent pronouncements from Berlin left no doubt that the nazis intended in due course to expand to the raw materials and food areas of Ukraine. As noted above, Barthou's plan for a security system in eastern Europe led only to Russia's membership in the League, and the treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. The first Franco-Russian Alliance led to the World War; the second led to the Munich Agreement which has the effect of removing Russian influence from western Europe.

With such scrambling of partners it may not be unrealistic to inquire if Russia's solution of the present dilemma may not be an attempt to revive the Rapallo policy. Certain factors lend logic to such speculations.

Economically the two countries complement each other. As a supply of food and raw materials Russia is unrivaled. Germany is likewise unrivaled in surplus, trained man power, in technicians, scientists, and other specialists needed by Russia. There is a tradition

THE ANTI-COMMUNIST BLOC'S THREAT WAR ON TWO FRONTS AGAINST THE USSR



BRITAIN'S DILEMMA: WITH WHICH OF THE RIVAL LIQUIDATORS OF EMPIRE
SHOULD IMPERIAL BRITAIN ATTEMPT TO COME TO TERMS -- NAZIS OR REDS?

SOVIET STATESMEN FEAR A COMBINE AGAINST THE U.S.S.R., BACKED BY TORY BRITAIN, WHICH WOULD ATTACK ON ALL FRONTS. OTHERS ARE APPREHENSIVE OVER THE ALLEGED POSSIBILITY OF A DEAL BETWEEN THE NAZIS AND THE BOLSHIEVICS JEOPARDIZING THE BORDER STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE.

of profitable partnership between the two peoples not unlike that of Britain and America in the nineteenth century when the capital and brains of the mother country developed American frontiers. Before 1914, Germans supervised Russian industries, landed estates, and many commercial enterprises. The industrialists and business leaders of Germany have consistently demanded a return to, the close economic relations. They may, one day, be heard.

The military collaboration during the Rapallo period also was very intimate. Germany was disarmed in fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty and sought to build a military base in the hinterland, in Russia. The officers of the Red Army were schooled in German military technique. One interpretation of the deterioration of relations in 1937-1938 is that the leaders of both the Reichswehr and the Red Army desired resumption of their formerly close relations, in opposition to the policies of their respective governments. But in each instance the political branch triumphed. Eight Russian generals were court-martialed and shot, June, 1937. The German high command was replaced, February, 1938. Although the connection between these events may be tenuous, it is suggested that the hostility between the nazis and the bolsheviks does not extend to their armies.

Also from the point of view of Russian strategy, an arrangement with Germany, guaranteeing Russia's western frontier for a *quid pro quo*, would relieve the strain of preparation on two fronts and permit soviet concentration on development of the East.

These factors favor a return to the Rapallo policy. Unfavorable factors are also apparent. Ideologically the two regimes are opposed. They differ fundamentally on the race question. Socialization of property is complete in Russia, and only partial in Germany. Soviet Russia is non-expansionist. But, in both, state power is supreme. Both deny the rights of the individual inherent in democracy. Each one could turn off its hostile propaganda against the other if a new direction so demanded. The radio war between them has, at times, the character of fanfare. In a word, the ideological gulf could be bridged without much jar to either system, for the sake of *real politik*.

A more serious obstacle is the intent of Hitler in regard to his ultimate objective in the East. The key to his strategy appears to be the Ruthenian base within the "vassal" state of Czecho-Slovakia. Hit-

ler prevented the partition of Ruthenia by Poland and Hungary, and thus has a claim on its future. Ruthenia is a backdoor entrance to the Carpathian region to which Poland has transferred important war industries. Despite the German-Polish agreement of 1934 to respect the Corridor for ten years, Poland's position has become extremely precarious. The propaganda campaign has already begun and the Poles have reason to fear they will be the next victims. Ruthenia also is the springboard from which to launch a project of an independent Ukrainian state in fulfillment of the annulled Treaty of Brest Litovsk. The separatist sentiment in Soviet Ukraina has been nourished by constant propaganda from Ukrainian organizations in exile. A reshuffling of boundaries, to incorporate Soviet Ukraina with Ruthenia and southeastern Poland would unite the 44,000,000 Ukrainian people. The self-determination principle would again recoil on the mapmakers of 1919. An Ukrainian state, under such conditions, would be subservient to Berlin. That contingency would imply, of course, a nazi intention to maintain the independence of a Poland reduced in size as Czechoslovakia was reduced and a determination to make war on Soviet Russia. The opposite contingency is the possible enforcement of the Reichswehr's policy of alliance with Soviet Russia which, in time, could have as a result the partitioning of Poland in the process of remaking military empires. Poland continues to be the key to German-Russian relations. These potentials are no longer speculative. Minority groups are openly declaring their intentions and military strategists in Europe are discussing its eventualities. Since the shock of Munich even the most extreme possibilities must be given consideration.

Reconstruction of the Eastern Barrier to Germany. A second method would be an attempt to re-establish an eastern barrier to German expansion. The loss of Czechoslovakia removed the only defensible, military terrain. But a barrier of resistance in the small states would require the support of Italy. That in turn would mean paying Italy a price for weakening the Rome-Berlin axis (Savoy, Nice, Tunisia, shares in the Suez Canal), a price only Britain and France can pay. But even if Britain and France were able to appease Italy, it cannot be presumed that Britain would be any less reluctant than in the past to co-operate with Soviet Russia. When the nazi exploitation of eastern Europe begins in earnest it is likely that

Poland, Hungary, and Rumania will seek support from both Russia and the democracies. But short of restoring collective security it is difficult to envisage the rebuilding of the barrier.

Complete Withdrawal from Europe. A third method open to the bolsheviks is complete withdrawal from European affairs, shifting their defense from diplomacy to intense propaganda for revolutions in European states. But self-imposed isolation is unlikely. Britain and France have carried the appeasement policy forward to their no-war pacts with Germany. In time, that policy might lead to British and French acquiescent membership in an enlarged Rome-Berlin-Tokyo combine. To the bolsheviks such an outcome of Munich would revive the nightmare of intervention by the Western powers. If for no other purpose soviet statesmen must continue diplomatic activity in western Europe to prevent, as far as possible, a situation in which further appeasements shall be at Russia's expense. Litvinov is therefore to be taken seriously in announcing Russia's intention of clinging to collective security and the platform at Geneva.

CONCLUSION

The reverse to soviet diplomacy at Munich does not alter the fixed objective of soviet foreign policy—peace and security while building socialism. Nevertheless, changes in the strategy of bolshevik defenses are to be expected in consequence. The internal trend of the soviet system is summed up in the phrase: "back to Marxist principles." In foreign relations, soviet policy will be dictated by changes in the constellation of the powers. The questions raised include the following: Will the bolsheviks revert to intensive propaganda for revolution abroad? Will they come to terms with an aggressive Germany? Will they attempt to rebuild the buffer zone of resistance between Russia and Germany? Will they be forced to withdraw from Europe? No precise answers to these questions can be given. What seems most probable is that the bolsheviks will await the unfolding of the appeasement policy, meanwhile maintaining their foothold in Geneva.

While repairing its defenses to the west, Soviet Russia will accelerate her eastward orientation. From the point of view of the social revolution, European Russia is the matrix area, and Asiatic Russia the field of expansion into which the developed energy can flow. The

industrial citadel of the Soviet Union is destined to be east of the Urals, on the site of the richest raw materials, where vital centers are being constructed far from enemy air bombers. The Russians have three main lines for the delivery of power to the Pacific: through the northern Sea Route; along the trunk line of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is the metal-fuel axis of the continent; and through the friendly states on the southern border, including the client areas of the nomadlands of old China. The bolsheviks are building in Asia something which never existed before, a true Hyperborean civilization, in which the conquest of nature on a gigantic scale staggers the imagination. New objectives appear, such as aid to the Chinese revolution, now accessible via the motor roads from the Turk-Sib Railway to Szechuen. Even though Japan may contest the soviet mission of tutelage over backward Asiatic peoples, the future of the Russian revolution lies in the development of the continent of Asia.

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CHAPTER II

JAPAN'S PACIFIC POWER

William W. Lockwood, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

A half century ago it would have required no keen gift of prophecy to foretell that the "invasion" of the Far East by the Western world would have momentous consequences for all concerned. Clearly foreshadowed also was the likelihood that those consequences would sooner or later involve sharp international conflict, and that the conflict would center around imperialist efforts to dominate China. Few observers foresaw, however, that when the climax came it would be Japan, now a world power of first rank, who would make the desperate bid for continental hegemony. Few would have believed that when the Chinese people at last roused themselves to determined resistance it would be their island neighbors of the Orient, and not the Western peoples, who directly threatened their survival as an independent nation.

Yet this was the road taken by Far Eastern events in the 1930's. The explanation is rooted in the circumstances attending the emergence of Japan as a great industrial and military power. Any solution of the problem of peace in the Far East today is conditional upon relieving the pressures and strains which have made Japan an increasingly disruptive factor in the political and economic equilibrium of the Pacific area.

The prospect that this end would be peacefully accomplished faded rapidly after 1931, when the Japanese army struck in Manchuria. With the fresh outbreak of hostilities in north China in 1937, it reached the vanishing point. For by this time the Chinese people were thoroughly aroused over the progressive loss of territories which had taken place in the preceding six years. A rising spirit of nationalism was rapidly forging a united front where there had recently

been bitter civil strife and defeatism. In Japan, moreover, the momentum of advance could not be halted, once the armies were again in motion. For the military rulers of Japan, in fact, there could be no turning back. Whether confident of the final outcome or not, they dared not face the consequences of such action for Japan's economic and strategic program in China or for the stability of her political and social structure at home. As a result the spreading conflict soon took on the characteristics of a life-and-death struggle—the first great war of the Far East in modern times.

SINO-JAPANESE HOSTILITIES

The Background in China. The explosion long in preparation in the Far East was delayed until the year 1937 only because the Chinese were slow acquiring the will and the means to defend their national independence. The aggression of Japan in China is no new phenomenon, but it is only recently that it met with the stiffened resistance which was bound to lead to war if the Japanese militarists refused to heed the warning. At a later point we shall have occasion to analyze the basic forces which have impelled modern Japan along the path of military conquest. Their true significance will be more apparent, however, if we first examine the broad setting in which these forces have operated and the position in which Japan finds herself today. •

Under the old Manchu Dynasty, China was helpless to resist the foreign encroachments which reduced her step by step to the status of a semi-colonial country. Her political and economic order was decadent, and all the signs pointed to another of those dynastic upheavals and readjustments which had characterized the long cycle of Chinese history. This time, however, new influences from the West had undermined not only the authority of the Manchu rulers but the whole social system. The revolution of 1911 was followed by fifteen years of political and economic anarchy, in which regional warlords, semi-feudal relics of the *ancien régime*, contended for power behind a façade of republican government.

Meanwhile the foreign powers either rested on their previously acquired special privileges, or, as in the case of Japan from 1915 to 1919, sought to extend them. The Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922 represented a collective effort to assure the

Open Door and the integrity of China for the future, but little headway could be made at that time with proposals to do away with the whole existing system of foreign concessions and settlements, extra-territoriality, tariff controls, and so forth. A new equilibrium was established in the Pacific, however, and with the growth of liberal influence in Japan it was hoped that the unsettled basic issues might be peacefully adjusted.

The rising tide of Chinese nationalism in the post-War decade seemed to signalize the beginning of a new day. Under the leadership of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and with the participation of the Chinese Communist Party and the aid of skilled Russian advisers, the nationalist movement swept up from Canton to the Yangtse Valley in 1926-1927, rallying popular support under the famous slogans of nationalism, democracy, and improvement of the peoples' livelihood. The foreign powers were thrown on the defensive and subsequently entered upon negotiations looking to the gradual revision of the "unequal treaties." Even in Japan the challenge was met with what seems in retrospect to have been moderation.

At the crest of the nationalist movement, in April, 1927, however, the Kuomintang split between the right-wing forces under Chiang Kai-shek and the left-wing forces, among whom the communists were most militant. There followed almost a decade of savage civil war. The newly established Nanking government, representing the landlord-militarist class and the newer commercial elements of the treaty-port areas, sought repeatedly to exterminate the communists who now entrenched themselves in south-central China. Successive campaigns failed to achieve this end, largely because of the peasant support enjoyed by the Red Armies. In 1934, however, increasing military and economic pressure on the Chinese soviet areas precipitated the famous 600-mile trek of the communist forces to north-west China. Here they re-established themselves in a position later to have great strategic significance in the hostilities with Japan. Meanwhile civil war, flood and famine, banditry, and world depression wrecked havoc on the Chinese countryside, spreading economic distress which the reconstruction program of the National Government did little to alleviate.

This was the setting in which Japan launched her campaign in Manchuria and later in north China. The increasing truculence of

nationalist China respecting foreign privilege had created alarm in Japanese military and business circles, and the descent of world depression created an internal social situation in Japan in which the army could again take matters into its own hands. Manchuria was seized in 1931-1932 and reorganized as the new state of Manchoukuo, under complete Japanese domination. Ensuing years brought the steady extension of Japanese diplomatic intrigue, military pressure, and occupation of Jehol, Chahar, Hopei, and adjacent provinces of north China.

From 1931-1936 the National Government under Chiang Kai-shek dealt with the problem of Japanese aggression chiefly through diplomatic negotiations and appeals for aid to the foreign powers. Meanwhile it sought to strengthen itself through administrative and financial reform and the military unification of the country. It was reluctant, however, to oppose military force to Japanese encroachment. Yielding to Japanese demands, it even rigidly repressed anti-Japanese agitation among the people.

This policy of acquiescence was officially justified on the grounds that war might yet be avoided and that, in any case, China was not to fight. The aim was first to unify the country under the National Government. Critics of the policy charged, however, that China's potential power to resist was being steadily undermined by Japanese aggression and that the ruling group at Nanking was absorbed in stamping out internal social revolt even at the price of Japanese domination in China. In any event, military action against communism was largely unsuccessful because the economic burdens which it imposed on the peasantry merely spread the area of social unrest. Meanwhile, public opinion became increasingly impatient with the dilatory tactics of the government in the face of continuing Japanese encroachment.

This period of civil war and confusion reached a climax with the Sian incident of December, 1936. The detention of General Chiang by the young officers of the (Chinese) northeastern army and his subsequent release brought dramatically to light the strength of the demand both in the army and among the public that the National Government and the communists join forces in frontal opposition to further Japanese encroachment. Not until the Sian incident, moreover, was General Chiang convinced that the communists were

sincere in their offer to subordinate revolutionary agrarian change to the establishment of a national united front against Japan. Increasingly, with the persistence of Japanese pressure in north China, such a policy came to be championed by diverse elements from all walks of Chinese life. Anti-Japanese sentiment, the creation of long years of humiliation, shifted from smoldering resentment to a demand for action. The National Government, as a result, was forced in the direction of uncompromising resistance to further Japanese demands. Japan's military leaders, however, greatly underestimated this change in China's national temper. Thus, when the crisis came in the summer of 1937, China soon became the battleground of vast, contending armies.

The Course of Hostilities. It was only with the lapse of some months of hostilities that the magnitude of the task which Japan had undertaken became fully apparent. In the earlier seizure of Manchuria and in the undermining of Chinese authority in near-by provinces the Japanese army had met with no effective military resistance. Similarly, after the Lukouchiao incident in July, 1937, the Japanese forces pouring into north China were easily able to dislodge the Chinese armies from the Peiping-Tientsin area and to drive far down the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow railways, the two trunk lines which link that area with the Yangtse Valley. At Shanghai, however, and later at Hsuechow they encountered stubborn opposition. Although massed Chinese resistance was gradually cleared from the lower Yangtse Valley following the fall of Nan-king in December, 1937, and although the campaign moved slowly up the Yangtse River toward Hankow in the summer of 1938, the Japanese advance was now bitterly contested at every foot and it was apparent that the problem still facing Japan was of prodigious proportions.

This problem was political and economic, as well as military in the strict sense. After fifteen months of fighting the Japanese campaign had spread over the greater part of China north of the Yangtse. The occupied areas claimed as under the control of Japanese armies included many of the chief commercial and industrial centers of China, a large part of China's mineral resources, and as much as a quarter of China's population. Chinese resistance was thrown back mainly on the interior provinces of western and southern China.

Here the Chinese armies continued only with difficulty to procure foreign munitions through the port of Hongkong and across China's land frontiers. Yet the popular will to resist appeared stronger than ever. The National Government under Chiang Kai-shek was moving steadily to a more compromising position as defeatist elements were eliminated, and as left-wing groups, always leaders in the united-front movement, strengthened their influence. In the occupied areas the Japanese were experiencing the greatest difficulty in finding any responsible and influential Chinese to head up puppet regimes. Most important of all, the Chinese guerilla campaign behind the Japanese lines expanded in organization and scope, harassing the far-flung Japanese armies with growing effectiveness.

In 1938 this latter type of resistance was becoming the thorniest problem for the Japanese army in the field. After a year of hostilities, and with a million men under arms on the continent, the effective control of the Japanese forces even in north China extended hardly five miles from the railway garrisons. Elsewhere throughout this immense territory there was at first chaos, and then the rapid organization of local Chinese regimes which delivered incessant and concerted attacks upon isolated Japanese units and supply bases. Led by the Eighth Route Army, formerly the Chinese Red Army and now a co-operating unit of the central government forces, this movement behind the Japanese lines embodied the strategy and tactics so successfully employed by the Chinese communists in resisting the Nanking armies from 1929 to 1934. Its essential elements were economic and social reform for the impoverished peasantry, political propaganda to stir up patriotic fervor, and the technique of mobile guerilla warfare. In itself a most formidable obstacle to any Japanese effort at pacification and consolidation, it threatened to be the nemesis of the Japanese army as long as the central government armies continued to engage the Japanese forces on the war fronts.

War Economy in Japan. The final outcome in this struggle, however, was not being determined solely by events in China. If China's will to resist was one element in the equation, another was the ability of Japan to endure the strain imposed by a prolonged war. Unlike China, Japan has for a half century made rapid strides in modern industry and finance. Moreover, although her natural ad-

vantages in world competition have been in textiles and other light industries, her statesmen for decades have fostered the development of iron and steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, machinery, and other industries essential for war purposes.

From 1931 to 1937 this industrialization proceeded at an accelerated pace, stimulated on the one hand by the external depreciation of the yen and on the other by more direct encouragements at home. The latter took the form of armament expenditures and the fostering of industrial development in Manchuria—both on a huge scale. By 1937, accordingly, Japan had progressed far towards self-sufficiency in munitions and metallurgical industries as well as in the production of foodstuffs. Moreover, the financial strain imposed by successive government deficits had been partially compensated, so far as the national economy was concerned, by a marked expansion of industrial production. It was minimized further by the steady tightening of state control over finance and industry.

The economic burden of pre-War days, however, was small compared to that presented by the outbreak of large-scale hostilities in 1937. Chinese hopes of victory, in fact, were pinned largely on the belief that the Japanese economy would eventually crack under the strain. Government expenditures budgeted for the year 1938-1939 exceeded half Japan's national income, and this inflationary spending brought rising prices and a deterioration in the quality of goods. But it was in the realm of foreign trade that the pinch was most severe. Japan's poverty in natural resources necessitates imports of most of her key raw materials, including especially oil, cotton, iron, steel, wool, rubber, nickel, and other non-ferrous metals. In addition, she is still unable fully to satisfy at home her demands for machinery and equipment. The first year of hostilities witnessed the exhaustion of most of her gold and credit resources and an alarming slump in exports. Drastic restrictions upon the consumption of imports paralleled the rapid spread of state control through all phases of financial, industrial, and commercial activity as the government fashioned the strait jacket of war economy. There was little reason to suppose that Japan could not fight a long war; but it was apparent also that the sacrifice in the people's standard of living would be enormous and the problems of post-war readjustment of a most critical character.

Totalitarianism in economic life was merely one aspect of intensi-

fied military dictatorship. Indeed, the reaction away from representative government outran even the retreat from *laissez faire*. Prior to 1931 the Japanese state, while it continued to retain strong elements of the old feudal regime, was nevertheless evolving in the direction of responsible parliamentary rule. During the post-War decade the Diet, representing chiefly the business classes, asserted itself with growing success against the military and bureaucratic cliques around the emperor. With the adoption of universal manhood suffrage in 1935, the proletariat also became increasingly articulate. The Manchurian incident, however, led to the overthrow of the liberal cabinet of Premier Wakatsuki, leader of the majority party in the lower house of the Diet. It was succeeded by cabinets from which political party representatives were increasingly excluded and which followed somewhat erratically the path leading to totalitarianism under military-fascist auspices. The concomitants were aggressive nationalism in external affairs and increasing political and economic regimentation at home.

Latent popular opposition to this trend appeared at times during these years. It was on the increase prior to the military uprising in Tokyo on February 26, 1936, an attempted coup in which a number of Japan's statesmen again fell victims to army extremists. Again in the spring of 1937 it was one factor in inducing certain elements in the army to force the issue in China. Substantial sections of the business community were increasingly apprehensive over the mounting national debt and the reckless course of foreign policy. Even more alarming was the spread of state control under the plea of a national emergency. The prolonged distress of millions of peasants and the decline of real wages in industry also made it clear that Japanese militarism was only aggravating the economic plight of the masses.

The keys to power under the emperor, however, were in the hands of Japan's military leaders and of those bureaucrats, industrialists, and landowners closely allied with them. The flow of orders to the munitions and metallurgical industries created new and powerful vested interests in the continuation of military expansion. Moreover, Japan's deep-seated tradition of state loyalty, especially in time of crisis, was a potent ally of the status quo at home. Operating through a system of pervasive state control, including the regimentation of

public opinion, it made possible a unity of national effort and the acceptance of great economic sacrifices. A year of hostilities foreshadowed grinding burdens for the people as a whole; but it also revealed how successfully the leaders of Japan could command the disciplined support of the nation in time of national emergency.

Japan versus the West. It was inevitable that Japan's bid for supremacy in China should place a severe strain upon her relations with the other foreign Powers. Until recent years, in fact, Japan's major antagonists on the Continent were the western Powers. In 1895, when this Oriental upstart emerged victorious from a war with China, it was Germany, Russia, and France who forced her to disgorge her most precious spoils—the Liaotung Peninsula of south Manchuria. A decade later Japan obtained this foothold in Manchuria and later Korea, not by warring on China but on Russia. Still later at the Washington Conference, it was primarily the foreign Powers who induced Japan to consent to the return of Shantung, seized from German hands during the World War, and to sign the Nine-Power Treaty pledging respect for the Open Door and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. Only in the past fifteen years has Chinese nationalism taken its place as the foremost obstacle to Japanese supremacy in east Asia. Even then the opposition of the Powers to further Japanese encroachments has been a factor which no Japanese statesman could afford to ignore.

That opposition, however, has by no means been unified and effective. The reasons are apparent. In 1931 and in ensuing years a great economic depression gripped the Western nations. It paved the way further for a mounting political crisis in Europe centering around the resurgence of Germany under Adolf Hitler. Moreover, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a potent factor in the post-War Far East raised the specter of communism in that area. This was more frightening to conservative elements of Britain, the United States, and France than even the aggression of Japan. Finally, since 1931 as in previous years, America's intensified isolationism *vis-à-vis* Europe crippled any efforts to secure co-operative action with England and France in the Far East, and, in any case, the American people were absorbed in the internal economic and social problems of their New Deal.

Taking advantage of these circumstances, Japan proceeded un-

deterred by threats and warnings. When the League of Nations and the United States finally concurred in condemning Japan as an aggressor in February, 1933, she deserted the Geneva body. Opposition to Western efforts to extend technical and financial aid in Chinese reconstruction was asserted semi-officially in a Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" a year later. Subsequently the continued refusal of the Powers (except Germany and Italy) to recognize Manchoukuo, the Japanese puppet state, failed to prevent the consolidation of Japan's position in that area or the progressive exclusion of foreign economic interests. Again, naval limitation in the Pacific under the Washington and London treaties was terminated in 1936 when Japan insisted on naval parity with the United States and Great Britain in place of the former ratio of inferiority to which her admirals had always objected. Thus, even before the outbreak of hostilities in China in 1937, Japan had moved into a position of increasing diplomatic isolation. Nor was this counteracted adequately in 1936-1937 by her entrance into an "anti-communist" pact with Germany and Italy. That alignment signified chiefly the nuisance value which each of these rebels against the status quo had for the others.

As the war proceeded in 1937-1938, Japan's diplomatic position became increasingly strained. Relations with the Soviet Union, in fact, neared the breaking point at one time and war was freely predicted. The Japanese conquest of Manchuria had been the signal for feverish defense preparations in the soviet Far East. In the Soviet Union, and among many observers elsewhere, it was believed that Japanese aggression in north China was merely the prelude to an onslaught against soviet territory. For years, too, the threat of communism in China was played up in Japan as a prime justification for Japanese intervention—an argument which was advanced with increasing shrillness as soviet munitions and technicians came to the aid of the Chinese armies in 1938. Thus the fifty-year-old hostility between Japan and Russia continued, although in altered form, as in recent years the soviet regime has been strictly on the defensive and increasingly well equipped to resist invasion.

The new freedom of Japan to disregard the interests of Great Britain and the United States in the Far East reflected a shift, temporarily at least, in the balance of power in this area. Not only was

Western opposition divided and distracted, as noted above, but in addition Japan had now come of age as an industrial and military power. Screening the coast of Asia from Siberia to the Equator, the islands of Japan were strategically almost impregnable to sea attack. Despite a naval building program launched in 1934, the United States navy was far too weak to challenge Japan's naval supremacy in the western Pacific, thousands of miles from its home bases. And for Britain, the easternmost point of effective sea power was the great naval base at Singapore, which was now rushed to completion.

Especially in the matter of foreign rights and interests in north China, Japan clearly held the whip hand after her armies overrun the territory. At Shanghai, stronghold of western trading interests, the foreign authorities were subject to severe pressure following the devastation of large areas and the crippling of commerce. In the south, Great Britain's refusal to check the inflow of munitions to China through the British port of Hongkong became the subject of bitter protest in Japan. During the first year of hostilities, however, the Japanese Government shrank from an open declaration of war on China, which would have permitted a legal blockade of war supplies passing through Hongkong. Nor was it prepared at that time to undertake a large-scale invasion of south China. Such action would have imposed a further strain upon the Japanese war machine, in addition to running the risk of entanglement with the Western Powers. In November, 1938, Japan replied to an American note of protest, that conditions had changed, the Nine-Power Pact was no longer applicable, and that the Open-Door Policy would be continued only if Japan held control—a proposed uniting of American capital and Japanese administration.

Japan's disregard of Western interests, as a matter of fact, signified a freedom of action in the Far East which would persist only so long as Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union declined to intervene for one reason or another. To be sure, the darkening clouds in Europe diverted attention from the Far East, and, in addition, Japan derived an advantage from the fact that her claim to be a "bulwark against communism" gained her powerful friends abroad. In other respects, however, the underlying balance of power in the Far East moved steadily against her from 1934 on. Her bellicose foreign policy contributed powerfully to a world-wide

armament race in which such a poor nation could only be the loser in the end. Moreover, five years of costly development in Manchoukuo brought little or no economic benefit to the nation except as it increased somewhat Japan's industrial self-sufficiency. Again, the campaign in China threatened to end in bankruptcy, or at least in the serious deterioration of the Japanese economy. Even assuming that north China could be pacified, and would present large opportunities for Japanese economic activity, the realization of such ambitions seemed dependent on securing the participation of foreign capital. Finally, the island empire was still extremely dependent on foreign trade, and especially on trade with the United States and the British Empire, which furnished her with as much as two thirds of her imported war materials in 1937. Thus, by 1938 Japan was by no means in a position to dictate the future course of events in China, and, in addition, there was grave question whether her foreign policy was not a betrayal of her real economic and political interest.

Many Japanese, indeed, have always believed that the real economic future of Japan lay in international trade rather than imperialistic adventure in Asia. The general rise of overseas tariffs and restrictions on Japanese goods after 1931, however, hardly bolstered this argument. Rather, it furnished a *rationale* for forceful empire building, either military expansion on the Continent under the aegis of the army, or naval expansion towards the rich colonial areas of southeastern Asia. Both programs have had their advocates in Japan. With the die now cast in favor of the former, any consideration of the latter must at least be postponed. Only time will tell whether China will prove to be a springboard for further Japanese advance or a bottomless morass for the Japanese military machine. Present indications point to the latter.

ROOTS OF JAPANESE EXPANSIONISM

National Fears and Ambitions. No picture of Japan in the modern world can be intelligible without some understanding of the expansionist forces in Japanese society. The record of the past sixty years in the Far East shows a persistent, if somewhat erratic, tendency on the part of succeeding Japanese governments to extend the sphere of Japanese political control by territorial conquest and political and economic penetration. To appreciate the motivating forces back of

Japanese imperialism is to possess the key to much of the recent political history of the Far East. It also throws light on the conditions of future peace and stability in that area.

Yet no question is more difficult to analyze, since it takes the student into a realm where the facts do not march irresistibly to a conclusion and where opinions are necessarily controversial. No simple generalization is adequate. Nevertheless, the principal forces can be usefully characterized, even though their relative importance is not measurable in quantitative terms.

First of all, it should be borne in mind that Japan entered the modern world at a time when Western imperialists were ruthlessly preying on a decadent Chinese empire. Japan herself narrowly escaped a similar fate. The knowledge of this danger gave a military aspect to the modernization of Japan from the middle of the nineteenth century. Since that date the foreign policy of Japan has reflected both fear and ambition for the position of Japan as a world power. Moreover, sensitivity of pride is a striking characteristic of the Japanese people—whether it appears in resentment over racial discrimination, over an inferior naval ratio, or over Chinese opinions that the Japanese are still a nation of barbarians. In a world of power politics, therefore, it is to be expected that Japan should seek prestige and power. Among the more chauvinistic elements in Japan, especially the army extremists, this takes the form of vaulting ambitions for imperial dominion in the Far East. With the remainder it reflects itself in fear for the political and social security of the island empire among its powerful neighbors—fears that are industriously played upon by the ruling minority. Whether conceived in offensive or defensive terms, in the minds of many of her leaders, Japan's objectives in China are primarily strategic, and are economic only as economic gain may serve military ends.

Intertwined with the drive for political security, however, is also the drive for economic expansion. World attention has long been focused on the upward curve of Japanese population which followed the opening of Japan to Western influences. From 1872 to 1935 the population more than doubled, and is now increasing at the rate of approximately 1,000,000 a year. Although the birth rate has been falling since 1920, the rate of increase today is still rapid. Even though the population should eventually stabilize itself, as present trends

suggest, there remains the problem of providing for an increase of some 20,000,000 during the next generation. Japanese agriculture is already overcrowded, and requires urgently to be relieved of its present numbers. With most of the rich lands of the world barred from Japanese migration, and with birth control no immediate remedy, however much it is needed, effective relief necessitates a program of rapid industrialization. For a nation like Japan, however, industrialization requires access to foreign resources and foreign markets. Foreign trade expansion, therefore, is implicit in any provision for the growing population of Japan, to say nothing of raising the present standard of living.

Japan's overseas trade has, indeed, expanded rapidly in recent decades. Until lately her export trade centered very largely in the supply of raw silk to the American market and of cotton textiles and other consumer goods to Asiatic markets. In the latter field her cheap labor and improving techniques enabled her to make heavy inroads on markets formerly monopolized by the factories of Great Britain and other industrial nations of the West. With the collapse of the yen in 1931, following a prolonged decline of silk prices, there set in an unprecedented trade boom which proceeded uninterrupted for five years.

Currency depreciation, a low wage level reflecting the distress of the farm families, from which industrial workers were drawn, and rapid improvements in industrial and business techniques—these were the principal factors. Japanese exports expanded in both volume and variety, penetrating rapidly into new markets of southeastern Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the British Dominions. The reaction abroad, however, was prompt and drastic. It took the form of an almost universal rise in trade restrictions which, although it left Japanese exports of manufactures well above the level of previous years, nevertheless appeared to set a limit to future expansion. Meanwhile, Japanese trade in China stagnated under the influence of boycotts and political disturbance resulting primarily from Japanese military and diplomatic pressure. Only in Manchuria, where Japanese loans financed a huge industrialization program, and in north China, where an active smuggling trade in Japanese goods developed under the protecting wing of the Japanese army, were substantial trade gains recorded.


Japan's crowded population and her lack of natural resources have thus provided a powerful impetus to industrialization and foreign trade. Inevitably they gave her a vital stake in foreign markets and raw materials, and particularly in the markets and resources of her huge continental neighbor. These considerations, it may be added, are commonly cited by apologists as justification for Japanese imperialism, especially since the richest resources of overseas lands have already been appropriated by her industrial and political rivals.

The question, however, is hardly so simple. First of all restrictions on raw material exports from foreign countries have been no appreciable barrier to Japanese purchases, although the possibility that they may become so promotes a feeling of insecurity in Japan. Secondly, although Japan must export to live, it may be added that mere expediency might have cautioned a less headlong assault on world markets than took place from 1932 to 1936. The redistribution of markets, which might have been easily effected if undertaken at a moderate pace and in a period of general prosperity, was bound to bring forth a host of defensive measures abroad when concentrated in four or five depression years. Rather belatedly the Japanese Government realized this, and instituted extensive measures for controlling the volume and price of exports.

More important from the strictly economic viewpoint, Japan's need for foreign trade does not justify, though it may help to explain, her policy in China. In fact, the contrary is true. Economic expansion may be accomplished either by peaceful and non-political trade and investment, or by the extension of political control over new regions. Morals aside, it is a question of which promises the greater economic return. Japan has oscillated historically between the two courses of action, with a dominant tendency towards the latter. Today the die has been cast for a decisive attempt to subordinate large areas of China to Japanese control, but whether this serves any economic purpose at all in national terms depends upon whether the costs to Japan exceed the gains.

The record to date affords little evidence that imperialism in China is a paying proposition. So great have been the costs of aggression that the program has clearly lowered the general standard of living in Japan rather than raised it. The progress of the war in 1937 and 1938 made this an even greater certainty for the future in

AN ISLAND EMPIRE ON THE PEAKS
OF SUBMERGED MOUNTAINS



J A P A N : I M P E R I A L A N D F A S C I S T

POPULATION PRESSURE. FOR HALF A CENTURY, JAPAN HAS TURNED TO WESTERNIZED INDUSTRY TO SUPPORT HER GROWING MILLIONS - ONLY 1/6 OF THE ARCHIPELAGO IS CULTIVABLE WITH ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH AVERAGING 3/4 OF A MILLION

RADICALISM DRIVEN UNDER COVER SINCE 1933 BUT UNREST GROWS WITH CHINESE MILITARY STATE POLICE UNDER MILITARIST DICTATORSHIP

GEOGRAPHICALLY A REGIONAL STRUGGLE WITH NORTH-EAST AGAINST SOUTH-WEST JAPAN

ECONOMICALLY, AN INTERNAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIAL INDUSTRY IN OPPOSITION TO FINANCE CAPITAL.

OSAKA'S FACTORIES AND KOBE'S PORT TODAY DOMINATE THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF WORKDAY JAPAN
TOKYO AND YOKOHAMA REPRESENT THE COMMERCIAL-FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY CORED BY THE MILITARY PARTY

A FACT OF PICTURE BY CHARLES HODGES



POLITICALLY A BATTLE BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY VIOLENCE MARSHIP. ALSO AN UNDERLYING RADICAL UNREST IN BOTH TOWN AND COUNTRY, DUE TO THE GREAT ECONOMIC BURDENS ON THE MASS OF THE POPULATION

THE ARMY: A SOCIAL-FASCIST FORCE VOICING SMALL FARMER RESENTMENT AGAINST THE BIG BUSINESS EXPLOITATION.

Density of Population per square kilometre

- 100
- 100 - 150
- 150 - 200
- 200 - 250
- 250 - 500
- Over 500


NOTE ONE SQUARE MILE IS EQUAL TO 2.59 SQUARE KILOMETRES

the minds of most observers, including many Japanese. Economically, Japan is following a downward curve, and the militarization of her economy is storing up enormous problems of post-war readjustment.

This unfavorable judgment upon the economic aspects of Japan's policy in China is based, it is true, upon the criterion of the standard of living. Possibly the conclusion will differ if one evaluates Japanese policy in terms of war potential, for the economics of national power takes in not only the size of the national income but also the degree of self-sufficiency in the essentials of war. The expansion of the Japanese Empire has brought within the boundaries of Japan's political control new markets and resources. It is unlikely, however, that even the successful absorption of north China could relieve Japan of a high degree of dependence on distant, overseas territories. In any case, the costs of such self-sufficiency are enormous. Since military power is a function of wealth as well as of self-sufficiency, it is doubtful if Japan's present Chinese policy is paying economic dividends even from a military point of view.

If, then, we examine the record of Japan's continental policy from 1931 to 1938, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that she was farther than ever from realizing her announced political and economic objectives at the end of the period. If this be true, it is primarily traceable to her own course of action. Her aggression in China had precipitated a naval building race in the Pacific and a great increase in soviet armament. In China it did more to advance the communist cause than any amount of soviet propaganda. At the same time it intensified the new nationalism of the Chinese to the point where long-standing antagonisms were thrust aside in a great people's movement for reconstruction and for resistance to the foreign invader. Bearing in mind the costs which all this has entailed, and the problems of readjustment in store, it appears that Japan's leaders have plunged their patient and long-suffering people into a political and economic crisis of the first magnitude.

Conflicting Internal Forces. The above paragraphs draw attention to certain basic factors in the international position of Japan. It would be quite inadequate, however, to attempt to explain Japanese expansionism solely in terms of national needs, fears, and ambitions, and without reference to group interests and attitudes within Japan which make up the complex of internal forces shaping foreign policy.




**JAPANESE EXPANSION WILL CONTINUE
UNTIL IT MEETS DEFEAT—EITHER ON
THE CONTINENT OR IN THE PACIFIC.**

Much is heard of the national unity and solidarity of the Japanese people, of Japan as a uniquely planned and disciplined state. It is true that individualism has never reached the full expression characteristic of Western democracies. It is equally true, however, that Japan, like other countries, is a congeries of conflicting interests and that these interests bear unevenly on foreign policy because of great inequality in the distribution of power. The behavior of Japan in international relations naturally reflects this characteristic of the social and political organization of the country. Without some attention to these factors, as well as those detailed above, it is impossible to understand how a peace-loving people like the Japanese can so involve themselves in aggressive expansionism abroad.

Until 1867 Japan was an agrarian nation governed by a feudal nobility who exercised their authority under the nominal authority of the emperor. The Restoration Movement which followed the coming of Admiral Perry in 1853 represented primarily the transfer of governing power to a new group of aristocrats and bureaucrats, together with the merchant and money-lender class whose rise in wealth and position had much to do with the overthrow of the old regime. In succeeding decades the Japanese Government under this compromise oligarchy proceeded energetically to the modernization of the country, especially with reference to the needs of a strong, national state.

This modernization, however, scarcely touched the technical or social basis of Japanese agriculture. Here the mass of the people continued to eke out a slender subsistence after the manner of their forefathers. The feudal dues of the peasant to his overlord, which customarily exceeded 50 per cent of his produce, were canceled with the "abolition of feudalism," it is true. In the course of time, however, state taxes, rents, and debt charges came again to levy heavy tribute on the farm families of Japan. In recent years, indeed, agrarian distress has presented the most acute social problem of the country, directly affecting half of its total population; yet the government has still to go beyond palliatives to an attack on fundamentals. The possibility of doing so in orderly fashion is now further reduced by the enormous dissipation of capital resources in military expenditures and capital investment in China and Manchoukuo.



JAPAN'S AIM TO DOMINATE THE PACIFIC IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE COLLABORATION WITH ITS WESTERN PARTNERS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST BLOC. THIS JAPANESE ACTIVITY, DIRECTED TOWARD THE WEST COAST OF LATIN AMERICA, COMBINES WITH NAZI AND FASCIST PENETRATION FROM THE ATLANTIC. THUS THE UNITED STATES IS CONFRONTED WITH DANGER ON TWO OCEANS AS THE ILLUSION OF ISOLATION ENDS.

In any case, it would require a fundamental shift in the present distribution of political power.

The Japanese "revolution," in other words, was neither a proletarian revolution nor a complete transfer of power to the still undeveloped bourgeois class. In the name of the emperor authority continued in the hands of a governing group made up of militarists, bureaucrats, and politicians reflecting primarily the interests and attitudes of landowners, financiers, industrialists, and merchants, with a strong admixture of the physical and psychological heritage of the feudal aristocracy.

Within this group, it is true, there have been sharp conflicts of interest over both foreign and domestic issues. Although big business in Japan has been strongly imperialistic, there have nevertheless been marked differences between it and the army over the rate of military expansion and the pattern of subsequent economic development, as, indeed, there have been within the army itself. Japanese financiers have struggled against the army extremists who have sought not only to extend national economic control at home but also to force the development of Manchuria and north China along strategic and state-controlled lines rather than those which might be profitable to private capitalists in Japan. Within the ranks of business, moreover, has appeared a divergence of interest—e.g., between the big monopolies and the myriads of small merchants and industrialists, and between newer groups financing armament industries in close collaboration with the army and navy and the more conservative export firms whose overseas interests are jeopardized by Japanese militarism.

On fundamental issues, however, there has been historically a substantial community of interest among these various elements in the ruling oligarchy. So entrenched is the military bureaucracy in the political saddle, and so concentrated is industrial and financial control in the great banking houses of Japan, that the resultant compromise regime has thus far successfully stood off liberalizing and democratizing tendencies latent in Japanese society.

This fact has helped to give Japanese foreign policy a strongly imperialist aspect for half a century. The reasons are twofold. To the chauvinism and imperial ambitions of the military casts have been added the profits interest of industry and finance. Partly because

of Japan's natural poverty, and partly because the development of a home market has been impeded by reactionary social policy, Japanese industry from the outset turned abroad for markets and has continued to have a dominant export interest. Moreover, that section which is not producing for overseas markets is geared into the armament business to a very considerable extent. Thus powerful economic groups in Japan have had a direct stake in foreign aggression from early days. This stake has increased rather than diminished with the progressive militarization of Japanese industry in recent years, while concurrently other sections of the business community have been badly hit by the costs of war and international friction.

Secondly, both the militarists and the propertied classes, especially the more reactionary wing, fear the spread of left-wing tendencies, or even democratizing influences, in Japan. This attitude reflects itself in foreign policy in several ways. There is reason to believe that the bitter hostility of the Japanese Government towards the Soviet Union and towards the Chinese communists has been in part a fear lest communist ideology filter into Japan and undermine the status quo despite the ever-vigilant suppression of "dangerous thoughts." And long before communism was anything but a minor political movement in Europe, the favorite device for distracting and dissolving political opposition and social unrest in Japan was to precipitate foreign adventure. This is probably still the fact—namely, that imperialism in China is in part an escape, deliberate or unconscious, from pressing social problems at home which urgently demand solution and which threaten to break down the social solidarity of the Japanese people, or at least to undermine the privilege now enjoyed by the dominant minority.

Thus Japanese foreign policy reflects not only certain geographical, strategic, and economic interests of the Japanese nation as a whole, but also the class interests and antagonisms which underlie the economic and political organization of Japan.

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately for the peace of the Far East, a program like the Japanese campaign in China, once launched, tends to move with cumulative momentum in both its external and internal aspects. In order to control Manchuria it is desirable to dominate the north of

China, but the latter aim cannot be achieved without crushing the center of Chinese opposition in the Yangtse Valley. Moreover, any attempt to call a halt is the signal for an offensive on the part of the Chinese to recover lost territory. Likewise, the war industries built up by arms expenditures in Japan require further spending to keep them afloat. To attempt to demobilize the war machine is to invite economic collapse and possibly social overturn. Moreover, the prestige and power of the ruling group is so thoroughly identified with a "positive" China policy that a confession of failure or defeat would jeopardize their political future.

If it is impossible for the present Japanese government to achieve objectives in China, it can be only a matter of time until the present policy is repudiated. How soon or in what fashion this repudiation can come about no one can say. Meanwhile the costs of the hostilities, both tangible and intangible, for China, Japan, and the world at large are staggering. It remains to be seen whether the task of reconstruction and international readjustment can be undertaken in such a way as to achieve a real basis for peace in the Far East, and not merely to lay the foundation for future conflict.

As regards Japan, this problem of a Pacific settlement is three-fold: first, to arrange for the non-imperialistic and mutually advantageous participation of the Japanese in the economic resources of the rest of the world, and especially of China; second, to guarantee the mutual political security of Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, and the legitimate interests of the Western Powers in the Far East; and, third, as a necessary pre-condition to all this, to achieve within Japan a more democratic political regime which will place the welfare of the people as a whole above the objectives of imperialistic power and special privilege.

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CHAPTER 12

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

Benjamin H. Williams

At this particular point in history the United States stands in an uncertain position, for no consistent diplomatic policy appears to promise satisfactory results in terms of the national interest. Perhaps the world situation is such that no type of action can guarantee security to this country or any other great power against impending disaster. The old and seemingly secure theory of isolation, which was embraced by Americans during the nineteenth century, has been undermined by changing conditions. The hoped-for state of collective security has certainly not arrived. The Old World, to which this country is closely bound by economic, psychological, and social ties, is in a condition of semi-belligerency. At almost any time a general war may begin over causes which do not directly concern us; but, because of the contagious character of war, we are likely to become involved in the conflict, much to our cost.*

In the midst of this interrelated, heavily armed, and poorly organized world the United States in recent years has sought safety through a variety of policies. The chief of these may be summarized as follows: (1) plans to maintain neutrality or the attempt to build bulwarks against the infection of other people's wars; (2) the renunciation of war or the endeavor to establish world peace through a general unimplemented agreement to forego armed conflict; (3) the limitation of naval armament in order to eliminate sea power rivalry as a cause of war; (4) co-operation with the League of Nations in matters mostly non-political, coupled with an unwillingness to support the collective security features of the covenant; (5) peaceful settlement of international disputes through arbitration and conciliation; (6) the withdrawal of imperialistic controls and the renunciation of intervention in the affairs of nations in the Western

Hemisphere; (7) Pan-Americanism or the attempt to build an edifice of peace and co-operation in the Americas.

NEUTRALITY

The neutrality policies of the United States since the birth of the nation have centered around two different and sometimes conflicting doctrines, *isolation* and *freedom of the seas*.

Washington's *Farewell Address* warned against participation in European conflicts. It was an expression of the desire of the newly formed state to free itself from entangling alliances, and this same sentiment has been often repeated to defend the isolationist policy of the United States. The terms of the French alliance of 1778 bound this country to participate under certain circumstances in European disputes, but the treaty was not observed and was abrogated in 1798.

Isolation was early expressed in terms of neutrality. The first neutrality law of the United States was enacted in 1794 for the purpose of compelling a proper neutral attitude on the part of American citizens in order that their actions might not involve the United States in the European war which had begun in the previous year. The statute made it illegal within the United States to recruit soldiers, receive or exercise commissions, or organize military expeditions to serve either belligerent. With some modifications in 1817 and 1818 the neutrality legislation just described continued to be the law until 1935. By 1935 the legislation had come to be regarded as a very incomplete definition of the neutral position. It permitted private trade even in munitions as well as private loans to belligerents. In 1935, 1936, and 1937, as we shall see later, these gaps were closed.

The doctrine of freedom of the seas is almost as old in American thinking as that of isolation. In the European wars which began in 1793 the United States set forth on several occasions this doctrine which may be roughly summarized as the right of neutrals to conduct commerce with nations at war subject only to definitely restricted rules of blockade and contraband. The entrance of the United States into war with England in 1812 was due in part to objections against the actions of the British navy in interfering with American commerce. A century later in the World War the United States, although still technically a neutral, conducted an enormous

trade in supplies and munitions with the Allies. Loans for Great Britain and France were floated in this country. There is no parallel in history to this immense quantity of economic assistance given by a supposedly neutral nation to a belligerent. Undoubtedly the close commercial ties thus built up did much to promote in this country sentiments favorable to the Allied cause. Thus on two occasions the doctrine of the freedom of the seas (not neutrality) has helped to bring the country into wars which in their primary causes were wholly European.

After the World War, when this country was at last a creditor nation and when the defaulted war debts made it dramatically clear that the United States could no longer be paid for goods supplied in large quantities, the policy of the government changed. Entrance into the World War was now regarded as having been a disastrous venture from the economic standpoint, and the futility of mixing in European quarrels was brought home more emphatically than ever. The doctrine of freedom of the seas lost almost all its hopes of profits for neutral American merchants. In the years 1935-1937 the neutrality policy of the country was overhauled for the purpose of making it more nearly proof against temptation to become engaged in European wars.

The new features thus added to the neutrality law may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. Whenever the president proclaims the existence of a war between two or more foreign states, it shall be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war to any belligerent. The same shall apply to a civil war whenever the president shall find that the export of arms shall endanger the peace of the United States.
2. Whenever the president finds that placing restrictions upon certain other articles in addition to arms, ammunition, or implements of war is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States, he shall so proclaim; and thereafter it shall be unlawful, except under such restrictions as the president may make, for any American vessel to carry such articles to any belligerent. If the president shall so decide, it shall also be unlawful to export or transport to any belligerent or state in civil strife any article whatsoever until all right, title, and interest shall have

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ATTACKS WORLD TRADE BARRIERS



been transferred to some foreign government or agency. These are called the so-called "cash and carry" provisions.

3. Whenever the president shall have proclaimed the existence of war or civil strife it shall be unlawful for any one in the United States to purchase or sell the bonds or securities of any belligerent state or state within which such civil strife shall exist or to make any loan or extend any credit to such state or its subdivisions. He may, however, make exceptions in favor of ordinary commercial credits and short-time obligations in aid of legal transactions of a character used in normal peacetime transactions. Funds for medical aid, food, etc., and refunding operations are expected.

4. The act shall not apply to any American republic or republics engaged in war against a non-American state or states, provided the American republic is not co-operating with a non-American state or states in such war.

5. Whenever the proclamation shall have been issued it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to travel on a vessel of any belligerent except under such regulations as the president may prescribe.

As can be seen from the above, the doctrine of freedom of neutral trade has been weakened considerably in order to strengthen the doctrine of isolation. The act has been attacked as placing restrictions upon both belligerents, aggressor and victim of aggression alike. A discretionary act which would enable the president to penalize the aggressor and not the victim has been advocated by friends of international organization. Opponents of this position, however, argue that there is at present no adequate system of collective security in the community of nations, and that, in fact, the governments are divided into two armed camps. To attempt in any war to single out the aggressor might very well throw the United States on one side of the European struggle for power. At present there seems to be no satisfactory way out of this dilemma.

The neutrality statutes were designed with European wars chiefly in mind, but the war in China has thrown a new light upon the situation. American public opinion is sympathetic to China while Japan is regarded as an aggressor and treaty-breaker. Friends of China have felt that the act would handicap the Chinese who are in desperate need of munitions. An application of the law would seriously interfere with our rapidly developing trade with both

countries. Consequently the act has not at the present writing (January 1, 1939) been applied. This attitude is in sharp contrast to that taken in the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935 when the application of the act had the effect of penalizing the aggressor. In that case the statute was almost immediately applied. It should be noted, however, that the failure of the United States to prevent an increase in oil export to Italy was an important factor in the failure of the sanctions and the crumbling of League authority.

THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR

The United States regards the problem of security with different sentiments from the nations of Europe that fear invasion and seek collective security. This country is not genuinely fearful of invasion and, therefore, does not feel the need of co-operative defense to protect its territories. At the same time the United States belongs distinctly to the peace bloc of the nations, for it is not pushed onward by the forces making for war which exist in certain dissatisfied European countries. These two factors have shaped our peace policies. A strong sentiment for peace flourishes here coupled with an aversion to co-operative security. The result is an enthusiastic negative peace policy, that is, a resolution to maintain the peace by a determination not to go to war.

The Pact of Paris seems to represent the typically American attitude of the last decade toward peace. The principal provision of the pact is found in Article I which reads as follows:

The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Fifteen nations signed the treaty on August 27, 1928; and eventually sixty-three governments became parties to it. The United States has reminded nations of their obligations under the pact in five different international crises, the Russo-Chinese controversy of 1929, the Sino-Japanese dispute of 1931, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict of 1935, the bloody Sino-Japanese war of 1937, and the Czechoslovak-German crisis of 1938. In none of these cases, with the possible exception of the last, did the pact have any deterring effect. Before one should

be too critical of this purely negative type of peace agreement, however, it would be well to remember that the League of Nations covenant, which is a more positive type of compact backed by agreements to apply sanctions, has also proved largely impotent.

THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS

The United States, for good reasons, has been a supporter of the movement for the mutual limitation and reduction of armaments. During the World War the American Government launched a large armament building program in the naval act of 1916. After the War, Great Britain and Japan were both rendered suspicious by plans for the rapid increase of American naval power. Partly to dispel these suspicions and partly to avoid the heavy costs of warship building, the United States invited the other naval powers to the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 to consider the limitation of capital ships and aircraft carriers according to a schedule which by 1942 would have given them the following maximum tonnage:

Capital Ships		Aircraft Carriers	
United States	525,000	United States .	135,000
Great Britain	525,000	Great Britain .	135,000
Japan	315,000	Japan .	81,000
France	175,000	France .	60,000
Italy	175,000	Italy .	60,000

The ratio in capital ships was thus fixed at 10:10:6:3½:3½. An agreement was also reached not to increase fortifications in islands in the Pacific west of Hawaii. The non-fortification agreement plus the ratio of 10:6 in capital ships between the United States and Japan meant that the United States relinquished any ambitions which it might have had to dominate the waters of the Far East, for with the 10:6 ratio Japan possessed at least equality of power in Asiatic waters. At the same time the Anglo-Japanese alliance was dissolved, a distinct triumph for the United States.

The Washington Conference brought about no agreement regarding cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Almost immediately afterward a race in cruiser construction followed. A naval conference was held in Geneva in 1927 to put an end to this new competition,

but no agreement was reached. Another naval conference was held in London in 1930 with greater success. Cruisers, destroyers, and submarines were now brought within the scope of limitation so far as the United States, Great Britain, and Japan were concerned. The naval treaties of Washington and London provided for substantial equality as between the United States and Great Britain and gave Japan, in relation to each of them, a general naval strength of something under 70 per cent.

With the rise in influence of the military and naval interests in Japan, the Japanese became bitterly dissatisfied with their naval ratio. The Washington Treaty could be terminated by the end of 1936 upon two years notice. This notice was given by Japan in December, 1934. The London Treaty came to an end by its own terms at the end of 1936 except for Part IV, which dealt with rules of submarine warfare. The beginning of 1937, accordingly, saw the naval tonnage limitations of the Washington and London treaties terminated. Present plans for large increases in the British, American, and Japanese navies serve to emphasize the fact that the movement for naval limitation is, for the time being, at an end.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Prior to and particularly during the World War a strong sentiment grew up in this country for membership in a world organization for prevention of war. This sentiment cooled rapidly after the World War: and in the years following the rejection of the covenant by the Senate in 1920, the active opinion for membership in the League grew relatively weak. At the same time the United States found it convenient, if not necessary, to co-operate with the League in the attempt to settle a number of problems. Some of the outstanding instances of co-operation with the League have been in certain non-political activities, such as the attempt to suppress the drug traffic. An American delegation attended the opium conference of 1924-1925 at Geneva, but after a sharp clash of opinion walked out of the conference. The United States, however, signed and ratified the narcotics drug treaty of 1931. An American is a member of the Permanent Central Opium Board, and the United States participates in the election of the board members by the council. This country has also co-operated in the attempt to solve

certain political problems such as those of disarmament and the arms traffic. The United States co-operated to a limited extent with the League in efforts to settle the Sino-Japanese controversy of 1931, the Chaco affair, the Leticia dispute, and also the slavery problem in Liberia. Private citizens of the United States have held important posts in the secretariat of the League and on boards and commissions at Geneva. Americans have represented the United States officially and unofficially in conferences and committee discussions. In 1934, the United States joined the International Labor Organization, which is connected with the League. American co-operation has been closer than most people suspect, but almost wholly in non-political activities. Very little has been done to support the war-prevention features of the covenant. Sanctions, in particular, have been shunned with the exception of the half-hearted attempt to co-operate at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict.

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

This country has likewise entered into various engagements for the pacific settlement of international disputes. The agreements are of two kinds, those for the settlement of justiciable or legal disputes by arbitration and those for the settlement by inquiry or conciliation of all kinds of disputes which cannot be otherwise peacefully adjusted. Arbitration treaties have been concluded with some thirty countries, and treaties of inquiry have been made with a slightly larger number. The type of arbitration treaty which has been promoted by the Department of State in recent years is the so-called Kellogg Arbitration Treaty. The treaty of 1928 with Poland is an example. Under this agreement justiciable questions arising between the two countries and not otherwise settled are to be submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration or some other tribunal. In each case a special treaty is to be made requiring the usual two thirds consent of the United States Senate. The following kinds of cases are excepted from arbitration: (*a*) those within the domestic jurisdiction of either party; (*b*) those involving the interests of third parties; (*c*) those involving the Monroe Doctrine; and (*d*) those involving the obligations of Poland under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The United States is also a member of the Permanent Court of

Arbitration and has entered into a number of engagements for the settlement of international disputes with Pan-American countries. The greatest disappointment to friends of pacific settlement in the record of the United States has been the failure to join the Permanent Court of International Justice (the World Court) which is the most modern and effective instrument thus far created for the settlement of justiciable disputes.

FROM IMPERIALIST TO GOOD NEIGHBOR

The recent diplomatic course of the United States has led distinctly away from imperialism. This development has been a surprising reversal of trends that had seemingly become well established. Following in the footsteps of European nations, the United States during the sixteen years preceding the World War had apparently launched upon a career of expansion. The conquest patterns of empire-building, commercial nations-seizure of markets, protection of investments by armed force, national defense of a type that leads to offense, prestige for nationals overseas, white man's burden, etc.—were believed to be applicable and had been adopted in American diplomacy.

The United States acquired the Philippines, Guam, American Samoa, the Hawaiian Islands, and Porto Rico. The Platt Amendment, forced upon newly emancipated Cuba, gave this country the right to intervene for the maintenance of Cuban independence, the protection of life, property, and liberty, and for discharging the obligations of the Treaty of Paris of 1898. The foreign borrowing of the Cuban Government was brought under American control. In 1901 the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty made way for the construction of an isthmian canal by the United States. In 1903 the American Government was temporarily blocked by the Colombian Senate in attempting to acquire a right of way for the canal through the Colombian department of Panama. Without waiting to use the patience of the diplomat, the United States, by interfering with the movement of Colombian troops during the progress of a revolution in Panama, helped to bring into existence the Republic of Panama and shortly thereafter leased the Canal Zone from the officials of the infant state. In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt acquired a financial control over the Dominican Republic by setting up a cus-

toms collectorship in that country through an executive agreement with the Dominican Government.

Philander C. Knox, secretary of state from 1909 to 1913, has been called "the dollar diplomat." His most significant efforts were his attempts to prevent certain European investments and to displace European capital that had already been invested in the region of the Caribbean. During his regime Nicaragua came under American influence, and a foothold was acquired by American bankers in Haiti. In the administration of Woodrow Wilson American imperialism went farther. Marines occupied Haiti and the Dominican Republic. By this time the United States had some form of financial control in Nicaragua, Salvador, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Liberia. Students of American policy believed that imperialism was written in the stars, and that the inflexible fate that had plotted the course of empire for the powers of Europe had dictated the same career for this country.

The Monroe Doctrine had been used as an excuse for imperialism. The main principle of the doctrine was that European governments should be prevented from extending their territories in the Americas. Theodore Roosevelt, who was apprehensive of the intentions of European powers, added to this the corollary that the United States must stand ready to extend its own control to weak and unstable countries in Latin America in order to eliminate excuses for European intervention. The Roosevelt corollary, however, made the Monroe Doctrine a ready excuse for intervention; and it, therefore, became anathema from the viewpoint of Latin America.

Within the last decade an unexpected movement away from imperialism has been one of the most strongly marked characteristics of American diplomacy. Social science has not yet developed the methodology to probe adequately the reasons behind such a turn in events. Many conjectures of a theoretical character may be made as to the causes; but, whatever the explanation, the following are some of the principal evidences of the present trend: (1) A new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine has been set forth. The doctrine is no longer to be used as a warrant for aggression by the United States but only as a prohibition against European aggression. In other words, the Roosevelt Corollary has been canceled. (2) The United States has withdrawn military forces from, and relinquished

THE "GOOD NEIGHBOR" IN THE CARIBBEAN

HAITI AS A CASE HISTORY IN U.S. IMPERIALISM - DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONTROL

UNDER THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION:

- 1) THE MARINES WERE EVACUATED IN 1934;
- 2) HAITIAN CONTROL OF ITS NATIONAL WAS RESTORED, 1935;
- 3) U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION WAS ENDED IN 1935.

DISORDER IN 1914-15, COUPLED WITH HAITIAN FINANCIAL TROUBLES, INVOLVING EUROPEAN CREDITORS, BROUGHT AMERICAN INTERVENTION

THE TREATY OF 1915 ACCEPTED U.S. FISCAL AND POLITICAL SUPERVISION, THE MARINES BY 1921 RESTORING ORDER UNDER A REGIME DOMINATED BY THE AMERICAN HIGH COMMISSIONER

ALIEN LAND DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN PERMITTED, ADDING TO THE DISCONTENT OF HAITIANS

AMERICAN BANKING INTERESTS HAVE REPLACED THE FRENCH IN BOTH RAILWAY AND BANKING IN HAITI, THE NATIONAL DEBT BEING REFUNDED IN NEW YORK

1 HAITI DISCOVERED BY COLUMBUS, 1492, WHO CALLED THE ISLAND "LITTLE SPAIN"

2 SIXTEENTH CENTURY SLAVE TRADE FURNISHED MOST OF THE POPULATION

3 FRANCE GAINED THE EASTERN PART, NOW SANTO DOMINGO, IN 1697 -- HAITI, IN 1795

4 HAITI FREED ITSELF FROM FRANCE IN THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD, 1806, ENJOYING A TROUBLED LIFE UNTIL THE TWO PEOPLES SEPARATED INTO HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO IN 1844

5 DICTATORSHIPS & PERIODIC CIVIL STRIFE ENSUED

6 VIRGIN ISLANDS U.S.

7 PORTO RICO U.S.

8 NICARAGUA U.S. MARINES OUT, 1933

9 SANTO DOMINGO U.S. MARINES OUT 1924


10 PANAMA

11 PORT-AU-PRINCE N.Y. TO 1580 MILES

HAITI

CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES UNDER SPECIAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO THE U.S. -

A FACT © PICTURE BY CHARLES HODGES



political and financial control in, certain countries. The Platt Amendment with regard to Cuba has been abrogated. Marines have been withdrawn from the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Financial controls have been modified in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Philippines are on the way to independence. (3) The United States has promoted the idea of Pan-Americanism and has accepted the principle that intervention in the affairs of Pan-American countries is illegal.

Whether the present trend away from imperialism is a temporary movement or is to be the permanent policy of a coldly logical nation, only time can reveal.

PAN-AMERICANISM

With a lessening of imperialistic activities by the United States has come also a renewed emphasis upon Pan-Americanism, that is, he peaceful co-operation of the twenty-one American republics in achieving their common diplomatic ends. The institutions of Pan-Americanism are the regularly recurring International Conference of American States, a variety of special conferences on different topics, the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, and the Pan American Union. In 1889 the first International Conference of American States met in Washington. Altogether eight such conferences have met, the last two being in Montevideo in 1933 and in Lima in 1938. In addition there have been scores of special Pan-American conferences upon particular topics.

The International Conferences of American States are the plenary legislative bodies of the Pan-American movement. They are not authorized to legislate directly except upon the organization of Pan-American institutions which are under their control. Treaties agreed upon at the conferences are, of course, not binding until ratified by the respective governments. The resolutions and recommendations which they pass are advisory in character. In addition to the Pan-American conferences there are also the Governing Board of the Pan American Union and the Union itself. The governing board consists of representatives appointed by the twenty-one governments. These representatives are customarily the ambassadors and ministers accredited to this country by the twenty Latin American Governments and the secretary of state, who represents the United

"... At least one-fourth of the world's population is involved in merciless devastating conflict. . ."

2

President Roosevelt tells Congress "that for many years this government has sought . . . to find a way to limit and reduce armaments."

3

The U.S. billion-dollar program: Specifically and solely because of the piling up of additional land and sea armaments in other countries . . ."

BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, JAPAN, ITALY, SOVIET UNION

WASHINGTON ARMS CONFERENCE, 1921

GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1930, 1936

PACIFIC
"... we must keep any potential enemy many hundreds of miles away from our continental limits."

4

5

With threats from both the Atlantic and the Pacific possible . . . "We cannot be certain that the connecting link - the Panama Canal - would be safe."

Japan's War on China

Fascist war on Republican Spain

States. They meet at the Pan-American Building in Washington and supervise the work of the Pan American Union. The board appoints the director general and the assistant director and passes upon the nominations for other posts submitted to it by the director general. It approves the budget and the regulations for the government of the union. The board also makes decisions at times on other matters of Pan-American concern.

The Pan American Union performs educational, research, and secretarial functions to advance the common interest of Pan-Americanism. It publishes the *Bulletin of the Pan American Union*. It compiles information upon matters affecting the affairs of the American states. It provides assistance to the delegates at the conferences and furnishes information on the subject matter of proposed treaties. The union is now customarily the depository for the ratifications of all treaties drafted at the conferences.

A principal function of Pan-Americanism has been the adoption of treaties designed to prevent conflicts in the Americas. Treaties now exist for inquiry into international disputes as well as for conciliation and arbitration. The Lamas Treaty of 1933 provides that in case a conflict breaks out between two states the other signatories to the treaty shall as neutrals adopt a common and solidary attitude for the purpose of maintaining peace. They shall not recognize territorial arrangements obtained through other than peaceful means. The United States has been a leading factor in the attempt to build peace treaties. In 1933 and 1936 this country signed agreements denying the right of any country to intervene in the affairs of another. Considering the long list of cases in which the United States formerly intervened in Latin American countries with military force, these agreements represent a considerable change in policy on the part of this country. The extent of this change is best shown in the Lima Conference summarized in the later chapter on Latin America.

Numerous other subjects have been acted upon at the International Conferences of American States. They include: tariff duties, customs formalities, the protection of industrial property, sanitation, aviation, shipping, a Pan-American railroad and highway, and the codification of international law.

Finally it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the United

States has strong interests in the maintenance of peace. This country is the first of the large-land nation-states to become industrialized to an advanced degree. It has become a highly mechanized, mass-producing country of an essentially new type in history. There is no desperate hunger for power and prestige to urge the government on to war. The interests of the United States lie in the field of peace. It has more to lose in war than any other country. Once set this mighty economic machine to the task of destruction, and the wastage of goods, lives, and opportunity would transcend the power of the imagination.

But how shall this country avoid war? Such international guarantees for peace as were provided under the covenant of the League of Nations were shunned by the United States, and today the covenant has been too much weakened to give any present hope in its efficacy. The United States has actively sponsored the Pact of Paris with its negative provisions, but these are clearly insufficient. This country has recently placed some hope in building an organization for peace in the Western Hemisphere, but the structure of Pan-Americanism is not yet sufficiently developed to meet the serious task of war prevention and it gives little protection against war contagions spreading from Asia or Europe. Thus the United States, refusing to accept the positive sanctions of the League but bound closely to the rest of the world, has sought halfway measures in international organization which appear to be inadequate. Finally this country has strengthened its neutrality policy, attempting through a greater measure of isolation to prevent involvement in wars that begin on other continents. Whether this apparently frail barrier will be successful, when and if the ultimate test arrives, remains to be seen. This is indeed a precarious period in world affairs, and the general doubt is reflected in the uncertainties surrounding the diplomacy of our own country.

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SUMMARY

The British foreign policies are often considered paradoxical and mysterious. Yet there is little mystery about them. As an island, Great Britain must guard against any possible interruption of her trade communications with her overseas possessions on which depend the success of her empire, and she must also guard against the possibility of domination or attack by a powerful continent or group of states.

In Europe this policy takes the form of juggling the influence of one country against any strong state or combination of states which might become too powerful and threaten to overthrow the established status quo. This explains why Germany received London's support against France after the World War and why today England is again back on the side of France. In her Continental policy, Downing Street is handicapped by the consideration of the imperial relations. Australia, for instance, has very little, if any, interest in the absorption of Austria.

The co-operation of the United States is sought most earnestly, since both London and Washington have no conflicting territorial aims. Should another European conflict break out, England hopes to receive not only moral but also material support from the United States in spite of her failure to pay the war debts. The promise of President Roosevelt on his trip to Canada in 1938 to defend that dominion in case of a foreign aggression demonstrates the growing collaboration between the two countries; indirectly, this assurance of safety for her possessions in the Western Hemisphere, makes it possible for

England to concentrate her interest and forces against Japan and in Europe.

Much depends, of course, on the men at the helm of the affairs of state. The present policy of England is in the hands of conservatives, who were aware of the danger involved in Germany's expansion along the Danube and yet were not anxious at all to settle the problem by having Czechoslovakia helped by Russia. This possibility might involve the extension of communism to central Europe and a further weakening of the dominant classes of the kingdom. Neville Chamberlain's dramatic dash to Germany in September, 1938, demonstrated further the weakening of the position of dominance which England held up to 1914, and which she has been losing since 1918. The prestige of Hitler has grown enormously since this historic meeting which indicated that the "empire on which the sun never sets" has been pushed, temporarily at least, to the position of certain international impotence by the very fact that Hitler knows the desire of the democracies to preserve the peace at any price. Today Europe's balance of power is meaningless, for, in addition to Germany's hegemony over the Continent, there are America, Japan, and Russia to consider.

The days when sea power was the key to military might are gone; the modern airplane and submarine torpedo make the military strategic worth of Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, and Singapore problematical. The heart of the empire, London, is vulnerable to air raids; the same applies to all the imperial bases from London to Hong Kong. Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo know that Britain cannot fight simultaneously on a European, a Far Eastern, and a Near Eastern front. The upshot of this situation is that whenever Britain is engaged in any one place along her life line the partners gain some concessions in their part of the world. Thus the Suez Canal, which is covered by

the British mastership of Egypt and Palestine, and the Red Sea, controlled by the naval base at Aden and friendly Arabia, are the strategic points used in the game of Rome versus London and London versus Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo. Mussolini, anxious to make the Mediterranean his "Mare Nostrum," won the first round in the Ethiopian adventure, and, despite the reported settlement of the British-Italian controversy and Chamberlain's visit to Rome, will not hesitate to deliver another blow to England through his puppet, Franco, and the fascist forces in Spain. In the Far East, the blows of Japan against China are also weakening England's former position of dominance in trade and communications there. In fact, the Tories are inclined to favor Japan's expansion into north China, since this push is creating a barrier against the pressure of soviet Russia into all China. The defense of India, the cornerstone of the British Empire, remains one of the main tasks of international policy in Asia. But the chain of fences around India on the sea coast and on the land frontiers has weakened considerably, and the internal difficulties, coupled with the agitation of Rome among the Mohammedans, are more than troublesome to the English rulers. On the whole, the power, the influence, and the prestige of Great Britain are declining and the ties with the empire are either loosening or are being gradually undermined or cut by the aggressiveness of Italy, Japan, and Germany. There are already indications that Britain will try to save herself by enticing the United States into her orbit. The pronouncements of Anthony Eden on his visit to America in December, 1938, hinted that the approach will emphasize the necessity for both countries to defend parliamentarism, racial equality, tolerance, and free institutions. The scheduled visit of the royal family of England to America in 1939 is another aspect of this campaign. Downing Street also hopes that in a

final showdown Washington will help on the high seas by protecting the freedom of the seas.

France, as a victorious nation in 1918, has based her policy on the principle of "security." Invaded three times within a century, France will do everything possible to avoid a similar occurrence. A corollary of this policy was the effort to dominate Europe through economic and political means. A series of international agreements were concluded with the capitals of the victorious and the newly formed states desiring to maintain the status quo. The support of the League of Nations and the Locarno and Kellogg-Briand pacts were but the expressions of this policy, which was at first seriously questioned by Italy and even more definitely by Hitler when he came on the scene. The attitude of France toward progressive disarmament, her refusal, as late as 1936, to accept the German proposal for demobilization of both sides of the Rhine, her naval building program, and the construction of the Maginot line are all evidence of her insistence upon "protection commensurate with safety." The growing fear of Hitler's aggressiveness induced Paris to subordinate its policy to London's directions. By signing the Munich agreement in 1938, France gave up her Continental hegemony to the Berlin-Rome axis and is now openly challenged by Italy in regard to Tunisia, Corsica, French Riviera, and France's share in the control of the Suez Canal and the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway into Ethiopia.

Until 1935 Italy's ambitions in the Balkans and in central Europe outbalanced the German threat to the Danubian countries, the allies of France with the exception of Austria and Hungary. But with the resignation of Italy to a secondary role in the Danube, perhaps in exchange for freedom to push her Mediterranean policy, and with the weakening of demo-

cratic opposition to fascist expansion, Mussolini is pushing his claims to make the Mediterranean an Italian sea.

The Soviet Union, a link between East and West, must be constantly on the alert against the possible invasion of Japan as well as of Germany. Hence she must pay attention both to Europe, and particularly central Europe, and to Asia. From 1917 to 1922 Russia tried to save her new system by promoting revolutions abroad; the high point was reached in her war against Poland. Between 1923 and 1933 Russia concentrated on the consolidation of her domestic affairs and gradually gave up her interest in the ideal of world revolution. She became friendly with Germany and tolerated the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. In 1933 the U.S.S.R. joined the League and concluded non-aggression pacts with all her western neighbors and treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia, the results of the threats from Germany and Japan. Although there is little doubt that the military superiority of the U.S.S.R. would make it possible, in event of war, to deal adequately with either Germany or Japan alone, she fears that an attack by either will be the signal for aggression by the other. Many believe that such a conflict is inevitable and that none of the major powers will come to Russia's rescue for fear of the spread of communism in their own countries through their defense of a communist state. Much depends on circumstances, however, and not the least on the ability of Stalin to retain his power.

Japan, like her allies, Italy and Germany, is blinded by her imperial "destiny" and cannot now turn back. Poor in resources, she has invested her wealth in military adventures, which are cheap only in one source—human beings, who have overpopulated the Japanese Islands. The conquest of Manchuria was an expensive venture, and the current attempt to swallow China is another step directed at the catching of the

bluebird of imperialism at the end of a rainbow of blood. Either Japan will bleed herself white economically, or some day she will be confronted by the continued resistance not only of Chinese guerrillas, but also of Russia and the Western powers. That Japan has been saved so far has been due to the "stunts" in Africa, Spain, and central Europe promoted by her allies, Germany and Italy. The margin of safety is somewhat greater for Tokyo today because of the well-known fact characterizing Western democracies—the unwillingness to fight.

Since the World War, the United States, although economically involved more than ever by foreign trade and post-War loans to foreign countries, has sought to develop a foreign policy of political "isolation," and has attempted to consolidate her position with Canada and the states below the Rio Grande. As a status quo nation, the United States has rejected every effort at political world organization toward peace, but has supported various attempts at moral persuasion to promote peace, which culminated in the signature of the Kellogg Pact.

New trends seem now to be emerging. The "Open Door" and the "Freedom of the Seas" policies were modified by Stimson's announcement in 1932 that Washington "shall recognize no territorial arrangements not obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of an occupation or acquisition of territory brought about by armed force." Since 1936 President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull, have been reshaping gradually America's public opinion until recently unequivocally against America's participation in foreign conflicts. They have indicated from time to time their opposition to foreign imperialistic steps, have publicly announced their moral support of democracies, as in the Chicago speech of the President on Armistice day, 1936, and have specifically prom-


ised to defend Canada. The military and naval appropriations indicate the willingness of the United States to strengthen the defense of the Panama Canal, to oppose the Japanese threat to American trade and investments in China, and to maintain American communications with China, the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, and Malaya.

The foreign policies of the major powers are not fixed and static. Nationalism, power politics, and imperialism are constantly modifying such policies and keeping them in a state of flux. Many basic factors are constant, however, and give direction to current trends, and it is to these that chief attention has been given in these chapters.

Some reference has been made to the minor countries, as it is impossible to discuss the policies of major powers without a consideration of their relation to regional interests. Part III will turn to these smaller nations and their constant struggle to preserve their own autonomy, to prevent themselves from being relegated to the position of pawns, and, to return to the figure of speech in the introduction, to steer their course with safety and some pleasure along the "international highway."

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY FINANCIAL U. S. EMPIRE

EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS
\$500,000,000



PART III

REGIONAL INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION

The world of states, like the world of men, is made up of individuals varying both in size and in importance. Although the two characteristics are usually related, some "little fellows" have an importance out of all proportion to size as shown in the way the World War started. An ultimatum from the mighty Austro-Hungarian Empire to a very small and, in fact, hardly significant state started a chain of events which involved the rest of the world, tore apart the Hapsburg Empire, and reconstructed world politics at their very base.

It is, therefore, necessary that the regional interests of Latin America, the Baltic countries, central and Balkan Europe, and the Near East be considered. Quite frequently, and especially today, some of these regions, and particularly central and Balkan Europe, have become the battlegrounds of interests of the large powers. If the Balkans have been frequently characterized as the "tinderbox" or "powderbox of Europe," then the powder as well as the box has been placed there by the great powers themselves. In fact, the regional interests need just as much, if not more, attention than the foreign policies of major powers. The lack of adequate knowledge and understanding of the history and even the geography of these regions has paved the way for many misconceptions and inaccurate judgments based on opinion rather than facts. At this moment no other problem affects the peace of Europe and of the whole world so vitally as that of the small countries of the Danube. Already we are beginning to hear more about the crystallization of international policies in the Americas below the Rio Grande; in the Baltic region, the former battleground between Germany and Russia; and in the Near East.

CHAPTER 13

THE NEW LATIN AMERICA

Arthur P. Whitaker

Although many details of the present Latin American picture have been familiar to connoisseurs for a long time past, many new details have been added in recent years, the colors have been heightened, and the perspective has been changed. Latin America has always been a babel and a melting pot. It was, and in a sense still is, a land of opportunity; but its people are trying with more success than ever before to make it a land of opportunity for themselves rather than for foreigners. Still highly responsive to influences from Europe and the United States, Latin America could not have stood still while they were moving so fast, and the changes that have taken place under their influence have in turn had an important effect upon its relations with them. Its present place in world affairs can best be shown by discussing successively the relations of the Latin American republics with Europe and Asia, with each other, with the Pan-American movement, and with the United States.

LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH EUROPE AND ASIA

From its establishment in 1919 until very recently, the League of Nations seemed likely to become the main focus of Latin American interest in international affairs. It had a strong appeal for them not only because it satisfied their deep desire to co-operate as equals in the construction of a world order and promised some protection against "Yankee imperialism" but also because it strengthened their connection with Europe, for which many Latin Americans have always felt a stronger affinity than for the United States. As recently as May, 1937, all but two of the Latin American states (Brazil and Costa Rica) were members of the League, and it had recently played a leading role in the settlement of an important South American question, the dangerous Leticia controversy between Colombia and Peru. At present, however, the League is suffering from a great loss of

prestige among the Latin American states as well as elsewhere, and they seem to be drifting away from it. Already four of the eighteen states that were members of it in May, 1937, have withdrawn and most of Latin America is either flirting with fascism or showing a more serious and much more widespread sympathy for the regional international order of Pan-Americanism.

With the individual nations of Europe, however, Latin America still maintains relations that are in many respects closer than its relations with the United States. European influence is greatest in the cultural and economic spheres, but even in the political sphere it is important.

England and France were once the principal agents of European influence in Latin America. That wide sector of Latin American opinion which supports democracy against fascism still wishes well to both these powers; but both of them have lost ground there in recent years. Although England still shares with the United States the leading position in Latin American investments and trade,¹ its proportion of the total in both fields has diminished considerably since 1914. Since 1933 the Ottawa system of dominion-preference has further weakened its position in the highly competitive Latin American field. While its political influence is still strong in some countries (notably Argentina), the increasing economic nationalism of Latin America will probably inflict upon it further losses in good will as well as in property, such as it has already suffered in Mexico.

France's influence, always mainly cultural, has declined rapidly; Spain's has been divided and dissipated since 1936 by its civil war; and Portugal's was never great even in Brazil. For a time the "invasion" of Latin America by the commercial and other agents of Japan threw a scare into many Americans, North and South; but even at its height Japanese trade never amounted to as much as 3 per cent of the total foreign trade of Latin America, and in this and other respects Japan's pace in America has slackened since the beginning of its war with China.

Now that Japan, Spain, and other powers have been pushed into the background, the spotlight is held by Italy and Germany. Together, they constitute the fascist menace in Latin America. Often compared to the Holy Alliance of 1823, they are generally represented as collaborating harmoniously for a common purpose among

our southern neighbors. It is true that they have used similar techniques and appear to have co-operated with each other to a considerable extent (though this must for obvious reasons remain a matter of doubt); but from the Latin American point of view there are important differences between Italian fascism and German nazism.

Italy gave the first impulse to fascism in Latin America, and it had many points of support there. Italians form the largest element in the immigration of the past half century both to Argentina and to Brazil; Italian banking interests wield great power in Peru; Italian air squadrons have exhibited their prowess to hosts of South Americans; Italy has built fighting planes and warships for South American governments and has trained many of their military aviators; and, now that France and Spain are in eclipse, Rome has strong claims to the headship of the Latin American family. Italian fascism was highly attractive to certain elements. It gave new life to the old Latin American tradition of dictatorship, it had a strong appeal for conservatives, it seemed to some the answer to the economic nationalists' prayer, and its racial and religious tolerance facilitated its adaptation to the highly diversified society of Latin America.

Aside from the opposition offered by supporters of other ideologies, one of the main obstacles to the progress of Italian fascism was the economic weakness of Italy in Latin America. Its share of the foreign trade of that region is less than one seventh as much as that of England and one twelfth as much as that of the United States; and its investments, compared with theirs, are insignificant.

With the rise of nazi Germany after 1932, fascism in Latin America entered upon a new phase, for Germany brought to the task a far greater industrial equipment, greater aggressiveness, and a new type of fascism. It bought and sold on a much greater scale than Italy and its economy was, to a much greater degree than Italy's, complementary to that of Latin America. It also pushed its interest in that region far more energetically than Italy ever had, through diplomats, cultural counselors, military advisers, salesmen, and nazi organizations among the many Germans living in South America; through subsidies to steamship and air lines; through blocked marks and barter agreements; through institutes at Berlin and Hamburg

for the study of Latin American affairs; through a flood of propaganda by press and radio; and in many other ways.

These efforts have met with a large measure of success. The World War wiped out Germany's commerce with Latin America; now Germany buys more from Latin America than do any other nations except England and the United States, and sells Latin America more than does any other nation except the United States. In the important Brazilian market its sales exceeded those of the United States, England, or any other nation in 1936-1937. In 1938 even Mexico, the most strongly anti-fascist government in America, concluded an agreement with Germany whereby the latter is supplying it with millions of dollars worth of manufactures that would otherwise have come from the United States in exchange for oil pumped from wells confiscated from American commercial interests. German thoroughness has also produced such careful studies of the Latin American countries that a strongly anti-nazi Latin American publicist has said that his people must consult German works if they wish to know their own continent.

The political progress of fascism is far more difficult to appraise, partly because in this respect its objectives are, naturally, less clear. The formidable Integralist movement in Brazil is said to have been supported from Italian and German sources both in the coup of November, 1937, in which it helped President Getulio Vargas establish his dictatorship and also in the insurrection of May, 1938, by which it sought to overthrow Vargas, whose relations with Germany had in the meantime become strained. In September, 1938, a similar insurrection was started by Chilean nazis.

Both these uprisings were promptly suppressed and in no part of Latin America has an openly pro-fascist regime been established. In view of these and other pertinent facts, some experienced observers discount the "fascist menace" heavily, whether the term is used to denote the political influence of Germany and Italy in Latin America or the conversion of its people to the fascist ideology. Others, however, believe that the menace is a serious one in both aspects; and the spectacular increase of German power and prestige in 1938 has given prominence to still another aspect of it, namely, the danger that Germany and Italy may, by force or otherwise, seek to establish direct control over some part of Latin America, in order

to secure submarine bases, military airports, and raw materials, or for some other purpose.

Under whatever aspect it may be considered, this problem is one about which no prudent person will be dogmatic. So many imponderable elements enter into it, we have so little reliable information about it, and conditions differ so greatly from one country to another in Latin America that the prospects and even the present status of fascism in that region are matters of conjecture. Nevertheless, there are a few important factors in the situation that may be stated with some degree of confidence. In the first place, while the shift of fascist leadership from Italy to Germany has made the Latin American fascists more aggressive and for the moment a greater menace, in the long run it will probably weaken them. For culturally Latin America has much less in common with Germany than with Italy, and the nazi emphasis on racial purity and hostility to the Roman Catholic Church makes the German brand of fascism less adaptable to the conditions prevailing in most of that region than was the earlier Italian brand.

In the second place, although in some of the Latin American countries the ruling classes' fear of communism and Indianism and their dislike of democracy may lead them to adopt the vocabulary and even the ideology of fascism, they are not likely to enter voluntarily into the orbit of Berlin and Rome. For in most of Latin America, nationalism is strong and jealous, and it is fed by fascism itself. In the third place, successful use of force against Latin America by any non-American state is most unlikely, since the United States Government apparently has the will as well as the power to prevent it. And finally, the economic conquest of any considerable part of Latin America by the fascist states is not a probable contingency. Even now Germany has hardly recovered the trade position it held in Latin America on the eve of the World War in 1914. Some authorities believe that this recovery rests on an insecure foundation, and in capital investments Germany still lags far behind England and the United States. Another world war would probably again destroy German interests in Latin America. What is more, it would probably ruin any satellites Germany might have there; and this consideration doubtless has its due weight with our sister republics to the south of us.

L A T I N A M E R I C A N B A T T L E - G R O U N D

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE RIVALRY REPLACED BY THE THREAT OF FASCIST POLITICS

CANADA
NOT A MEMBER OF THE
PAN-AMERICAN UNION.

ROME-BERLIN AXIS
TURNED AGAINST
THE U.S. IN LATIN
AMERICAN TRADE.

UNITED STATES
HAS SOUGHT TO BUILD UP
PAN-AMERICAN UNITY BY
CONFERENCE SINCE 1889.

BRITAIN ON THE
DEFENSIVE.

FRANCE LOSING
CULTURAL
HOLD ON THE
LATIN AMERICANS

STRONG
GERMAN &
JAPANESE
INFLUENCE

MEXICO
HOSTILE
TO U.S.
BUSINESS

BRITISH, FRENCH &
DUTCH POSSESSIONS
IN NEW WORLD A
HAZARD IN
A WAR.

JAPANESE FISHING
RIGHTS, MEXICO
TO CHILE, COVER
NAVAL ESPIONAGE.

SPHERE OF VITAL
U.S. INTERESTS.

NAZI-FASCIST BLOC
BACKS SPANISH
REBELS FOR A
SPEARHEAD TO
PENETRATE
LATIN
AMERICA

THE GALAPAGOS (ECUADOR) THE PACIFIC
KEY TO PANAMA CANAL COMMUNICATIONS.

HEAVY ITALIAN
FINANCIAL AND
MILITARY ACTIV-
ITY ONE DAY'S
FLIGHT TO CANAL.

BRAZIL
FORD RUBBER
PLANTATIONS
JAPANESE SETTLEMENTS
LARGE GERMAN
MINORITY

DECLARATION OF LIMA, VIIIth PAN-
AMERICAN CONGRESS, AFFIRMS THE
CONTINENTAL UNITY, DEFENSE, AND
PERIODIC CONSULTATION POLICY
URGED AGAINST FASCIST NAZI
PENETRATION & PROPAGANDA
AGAINST DEMOCRACY.

BRAZIL
IS VERY
PRO-U.S.

JAPAN THE PARTNER IN
NAZI-FASCIST ATTACK
ON U.S. IN NEW WORLD

BUENOS AIRES 3d LARGEST
CITY IN THE AMERICAS -
TWO TO THREE DAYS NEARER
GERMANY THAN NEW YORK.

HALF THE PEOPLE HERE
AND IN URUGUAY ARE OF
ITALIAN DESCENT.

FALKLAND IS. IMPORTANT TO
BRITISH SEA POWER FOR THE
BEEF & WHEAT TRADE FROM
AUSTRALASIA

FACT © PICTURE BY CHARLES HODGES

CAPE HORN

"POLITICAL BUSINESS" ATTACKS THE
NEW WORLD.

On the whole, it would seem that, barring a great change in the present distribution of world power, only the active co-operation of England would make it possible for the fascist states to Ethiopianize Latin America. From present indications, it is more likely that the national rivalries inherent in fascism will turn the fascist powers against each other in that region, especially since the movement there is tending to become merely a phase of German imperialism.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA

Despite the many efforts that have been made to promote Latin American solidarity, the commercial and political and even the cultural relations of most of the Latin American countries with each other have been much less important than their relations with Europe and (excepting cultural relations) with the United States. International co-operation among them has generally been confined to two or three or at most a small number of states. Conversely, their international rivalries have been conducted on a modest scale; and whereas one hears a good deal about the "Argentine bloc" and the "Brazilian bloc" of South American powers and even something about "Mexican imperialism" in the Caribbean region, rival alliances and power politics have never meant very much in Latin America. The explanation in both cases probably lies in the fact that it has been overshadowed by the great powers of Europe and North America. At any rate, in the past generation matters of general concern to it have been handled through international agencies which have their center of gravity in other continents—the League of Nations, the World Court, and the Pan-American conferences. Even in such purely domestic questions as those relating to national boundaries, outside nations have often played an important part (e.g., in the Leticia controversy, the League of Nations, with the United States in the background; and in the Chaco controversy, first the League and then in the United States).

In recent years the movement for Latin American solidarity has received strong support from elements working for social reform in the several countries. A broad appeal has been made through such slogans as "Latin America for the Latin Americans" and "resistance to foreign capitalist exploitation." Important expressions of this spirit are: (1) the APRA (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*),

which was founded several years ago by a Peruvian, Raúl Haya de la Torre, and at present has a considerable following only in Peru, but is designed for international use; and (2) the Latin American Confederation of Workers, established at a Latin American labor congress in Mexico City in August, 1938. A significant thing about the proceedings of this congress is that, according to newspaper reports, it showed less hostility to fascism than to capitalist exploitation of Latin America, and Yankee imperialism received special excoriation.

At the close of this congress, the chairman, a delegate from Argentina, said, "We have done what the diplomats have failed to do: we have united the peoples of this continent"—meaning the peoples of Latin America. The claim was excessive, for although this congress and the APRA seem to express a growing spirit in Latin America, neither of them has come anywhere near uniting its disharmonious peoples, and they are entirely too radical to suit the ruling classes in most of the countries. At present, the APRA is politically proscribed even in Peru, and the new Latin American Confederation of Workers has as its first president Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who stands close to President Cárdenas in radical Mexico but is about as popular as yellow fever with the conservative or reactionary governments of most of the rest of Latin America.

Other formidable obstacles stand in the way of Latin American solidarity. Not the least of these are the national rivalries which have long existed and have certainly not grown weaker these last few years—witness the recent massacre of Haitians by Dominicans, the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, the still unsettled boundary dispute between Ecuador and Peru, and the armaments race now going on between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Foreign influences, capitalist and fascist, are reported to be sharpening such antagonisms.

LATIN AMERICA AND PAN-AMERICANISM

The term "Pan-Americanism" has been variously defined. Here it is used loosely to denote the movement for inter-American co-operation in which the United States and the Latin American states have taken part and which has found its chief expression in the series of International Conferences of American States, commonly called Pan-American Conferences. The first conference was held at

Washington in 1889-1890 and the seventh at Montevideo in 1933. They now meet at five-year intervals; the eighth was held at Lima, Peru, beginning December 9, 1938. In addition to the regular series, special conferences have been held from time to time. The most important of these was the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, which met at Buenos Aires, Argentina, in December, 1936.

Until about 1930, Pan-Americanism suffered considerable disesteem, especially in Latin America. The scope of its action, and even of its deliberations, was still narrow, though it had broadened somewhat in the 1920's, and jealous Latin Americans regarded it as a mere tool of American "dollar diplomacy." As recently as 1932 a leading authority wrote that it had been seriously hampered by the conflicting purposes of its members and that its achievements were meager.

Since that statement was made, Pan-American stock has experienced an unprecedented boom. The main contributing factors seem to have been the apprehensions aroused in America by the rise of aggressive imperialism in Europe and Asia, the decline of Latin American faith in the League of Nations, and a great improvement in relations between the United States and Latin America. Pan-American stock began to soar at the Montevideo Conference (1933), where the United States surrendered the right of intervention as an instrument of national policy, and it reached a new high in the special conference of 1936 at Buenos Aires. There President Roosevelt made a personal appearance, and, partly under the influence of his contagious enthusiasm for Pan-Americanism, the meeting developed an atmosphere not unlike that of a religious revival. Figuratively speaking, former Yankee-phobes enfolded the United States in a fraternal embrace, and even the representatives of military dictatorships joined in fervent tributes to the Pan-American ideals of peace and democracy.

The Lima Conference was characterized by this same spirit, but in a more sombre atmosphere—the threat of war in Europe.² The Conference adopted 110 projects (declarations, resolutions, and recommendations), but no treaties or conventions which require ratification. The projects related to a wide variety of subjects, such as cultural exchanges, annual meetings of the finance ministers of the

American states, women's rights, and the standardization of immigration regulations; but the most widely discussed and probably the most important acts of the Conference were those of a political character. Special importance attaches to three of these: (1) the Declaration of Lima, which reaffirms and strengthens inter-American solidarity, (2) the Declaration of American Principles, which reaffirms the eight principles of international relations adopted at Buenos Aires in 1936 and restated by Secretary of State Hull in a well-known press conference on July 16, 1937, and (3) a declaration urging the lowering of barriers to international trade and condemning artificial restraints upon it, such as the German barter agreements.

Almost equally important were the things that the Conference omitted or refused to do. Chile and Mexico sponsored a declaration prohibiting diplomatic support of the pecuniary claims of nationals against a foreign government, and the United States and other states urged the coordination of the existing peace pacts; but action on both of these proposals was deferred until the next Conference five years hence. There was no direct condemnation of any totalitarian government or of any specific instance of racial or religious persecution. A Cuban proposal that the Conference should tender its good offices to end the civil war in Spain was rejected, and the controlled press of Lima hailed this rejection as a Pan-American endorsement of the pro-fascist Franco regime in Spain.

If the achievements of the Lima Conference did not come up to general expectation in this country, that is mainly because the ill-considered optimism of the publicity preceding it led our people to expect too much. The refusal of the Conference to adopt a more far-reaching declaration of solidarity was interpreted by nazis and fascists as a crushing defeat for Secretary of State Hull and his United States delegation; but as a matter of fact, Brazil and several of the Caribbean countries were ready and eager to go much further along the road to solidarity than was the United States. The opposition they met with certainly did not represent a triumph for nazi-fascist influence in other parts of Latin America, for that opposition came mainly from Argentina, which is one of the most democratic of the Latin American countries. Even Argentina made a strong affirmation of its devotion to inter-American solidarity; it simply did not wish to follow the lead of the United States or Brazil and did not

believe that the present threat to America is serious enough to warrant the assumption of specific, permanent obligations that might easily prove embarrassing in the not distant future.

The lesson of the Conference seems to be that the Latin American states are not ready to unite either in denunciation of dictatorships or in defiance to any non-American governments, and that the promotion of good relations between the American states is still the field in which the Pan-American conferences can obtain the best results. But the Conference also showed that the Latin Americans are more ready than ever before to resist foreign aggression against America. Additional assurance that they would be supported in this by the United States was afforded by Delegate Alfred M. Landon's reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine. They also received the eagerly desired assurance that the good-neighbor policy, which is the keystone of the Pan-American arch, is a national policy of the United States, not merely a policy of the present Democratic administration.

On the whole, it seems that Pan-Americanism was remarkably successful in standing the severe test to which it was subjected at Lima, and this success warrants the hope that it may weather the storms (most probably of American origin) that lie ahead of it.

Aside from their important service in promoting better feeling between the Americas, the main achievement of these conferences has been their improvement of the instrumentalities for the pacific settlement of international disputes in America.³ The system thus created is still far from perfect; but even now it offers a model of the regional approach to international problems which other regions of the world might study with profit. In both Americas there are some who believe that the next step should be the formation of a Pan-American League of Nations; but there is a strong opposition to this even among the warmest friends of Pan-Americanism.

The Pan-American movement has found expression in many other ways than those indicated above. Special mention should be made of: (1) The Pan American Union (at Washington), which is the permanent organ of the Inter-American Conferences. Its purpose is to develop a spirit of co-operation among the American republics in the spheres of economic, legal, social, and cultural relations. It is precluded from exercising functions of a political character. A pro-

posal to broaden its sphere of activity is now under consideration; but its activities are already numerous and valuable and extend from the gathering and publication of information, in its *Bulletin* and otherwise, to the preparation of agenda for inter-American conferences. (2) Non-diplomatic conferences. Many of these have been held for the discussion of a great variety of subjects, scientific, professional, commercial, etc. Initiated by the Inter-American Conferences or the Pan American Union, they have provided an important supplement to the work of the parent organizations, not least because they facilitate the adaptation of the Pan-American movement to changing conditions. In view of the political and economic importance that the radio has assumed, special interest attaches to the First Inter-American Radio Conference which met at Havana in 1937. Although the agreements entered into at this conference were confined to technical and administrative matters, they were significant as an instance of the extension of inter-American co-operation into a new field. Another novel feature was the participation of Canada, which has never been represented in any of the official inter-American conferences.

The recent successes of Pan-Americanism have been important; but their importance should not be exaggerated. Disagreement and jealousy still persist between some of the American republics. The Pan-American peace mechanism will not automatically settle their disputes. It is badly in need of co-ordination; and even if that were provided it would still suffer from the defect that resort to it is optional and is least likely to be made in the most serious controversies. For its successful functioning it requires of the twenty-one American republics a degree of wisdom and self-abnegation rare in the history of nations. The recent settlement of the Chaco controversy has been hailed as a great triumph for Pan-Americanism. So it was; and yet it is a sobering reflection that that triumph was won only after several years of persistent pressure by the leading powers of North and South America upon two of the weakest powers in either continent.

Pan-Americanism would seem a dismal failure if it were to be judged only by the degree of solidarity that the American republics have shown in their attitude towards the rest of the world. For they have differed sharply both as to concrete problems of the present

moment (such as those created by the civil war in Spain) and also as to what general rules (if any) they ought to adopt for the future, such as those governing their neutrality in the event of an international war in Europe. It should be remembered, however, that the main concern of Pan-Americanism has been not with the relation of America to the rest of the world but with the relation of the American republics to each other. Externally, it has sought only to unite America for defence against aggression; and here it has been successful to the extent that the twenty-one states assembled at Buenos Aires in 1936 agreed upon common consultation to meet any such emergency. Internally, it has at least aided in keeping the American republics in the path of peace and international order at a time when the rest of the world has been moving rapidly in the opposite direction.

RELATIONS BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

In the past few years the development of Pan-Americanism and the Roosevelt administration's good-neighbor policy have brought about important changes in the political relations between Latin America and the United States, changes so rapid and spectacular that they have been called revolutionary. The real revolution in their relations, however, began nearly half a century ago, was accomplished outside the sphere of diplomacy, and created a mountain of vested interests, prejudices, and traditions that it will require more than faith to move.

A half century ago, the United States was little known in Latin America save as a thriving nation that had made democracy pay handsome dividends and as a land-hungry nation that had grabbed about half the original territory of Mexico. Since then, a host of contacts have made it well known, favorably or otherwise, to its southern neighbors. In the earlier period, when foreign trade and investments were regarded by most Latin Americans as a boon, the United States had a small share of the former and an insignificant share of the latter; and now that it holds a leading position in both fields, many Latin Americans have come to regard foreign enterprise as at best a necessary evil and foreign investments as little better than a species of larceny.

In many ways the two regions have been brought closer together.

For instance, radio, telephone, and cable communications and news services between them have been greatly improved in the past decade. A United States steamship line now holds a commanding position on the west coast of South America, and United States air lines provide more than half the total air service in Latin America. Its governments have frequently employed American experts in agriculture, finance, and other fields. John L. Lewis, of the Committee on Industrial Organization, took an informal but apparently important part in the formation of the Latin American Confederation of Workers mentioned above; and the American Federation of Labor is reviving an older though long dormant connection with other labor groups in Latin America. To many parts of it the Rockefeller Foundation has brought the benefits of modern medicine. Other foundations in the United States and cultural institutes in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires are making the two Americas better known to each other; and Hollywood is a household word from the Rio Grande to Patagonia.

In the present state of world affairs, probably the most significant change in the past half century consists in the fact that the United States has greatly increased its armed forces in comparison with those of the great powers and has acquired footholds in the Caribbean region that have greatly strengthened its strategic position with reference to Latin America. For many years these manifestations of "Yankee imperialism" caused anger and alarm in Latin America. Though the feeling still persists, it has subsided in the current world crisis, partly because of the reassurance Latin America has derived from the good-neighbor policy of the Roosevelt administration.

That policy was baptized by President Roosevelt at the beginning of his first term in 1933; but it was born in 1927 when Dwight Morrow was sent on his healing mission to Mexico. It continued to grow under Hoover, and has reached maturity under the present administration. The phrase "good-neighbor policy" denotes not a specific program but an attitude—one of friendliness, forbearance, and co-operation. It has, of course, expressed itself in certain concrete measures and modes of action, and these have removed many of the remaining causes of antagonism between Latin America and the United States.

In general, diplomatic support of American property rights abroad

has been very restrained under the present administration, and American-owned Latin American bonds amounting to about one and a half billion dollars have been in default for several years without causing any diplomatic "incident," so that "dollar diplomacy" has largely dropped out of circulation. After 1930 capital investment ceased almost entirely.⁴ The existing investments were brought under some measure of control by various Latin American governments without serious protest from Washington, and so "economic penetration" became a less imminent danger. Intervention, already checked under Hoover, was further curbed by the termination of the last American occupations in the Caribbean, by the abrogation of the Platt Amendment (1934), and by the non-intervention treaty negotiated at the Montevideo Conference in 1933. The latter, however, was accepted by the United States (1934) with a reservation which apparently means that it renounces intervention as an instrument of national policy but not as a means of protecting the rights of its citizens under treaties and international law.

Pan-Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine, formerly feared as weapons of Yankee imperialism, lost most of their terrors and even became sources of consolation for many Latin Americans. Pan-Americanism at last began to seem genuinely Pan-American. Some commentators have said that the Monroe Doctrine too was Pan-Americanized in 1936 by the Buenos Aires agreement of inter-American consultation to meet any threat of external aggression; but others have said that, on the contrary, the Doctrine died at Buenos Aires. Indeed, one writer had already performed its autopsy; but that was premature.⁵ There is still a third view, which seems to be the correct one, namely, that the Buenos Aires agreement merely supplements the Doctrine; though, to be sure, the meaning of the latter is still a subject of dispute and no layman can say when or how or under what circumstances it would be applied. For the present, the most important point is that Latin American fears with regard to it have been allayed.

The United States has also done much to gain the active co-operation and sympathy of Latin America. A large part of this effort has been turned into the channel of Pan-Americanism and has already been discussed in that connection. Secretary of State Hull's efforts

(through trade agreements and otherwise) to remove barriers to international commerce have been applauded in Latin America, which is more dependent than most regions upon export trade. Special mention should be made of two new divisions of the United States State Department which were created in 1938 and which, although not confined to relations with Latin America, have a special significance for them: the Division of Cultural Relations and the Division of International Communications. An important part of their work will lie in fields covered by recent inter-American agreements, such as those dealing with cultural relations (Buenos Aires, 1936) and radio communications (Havana, 1937). The Departments of State and Agriculture are also preparing a plan to co-ordinate agricultural production in the Americas by means of educational radio programs and otherwise.

Because it conferred important benefits upon the Latin American nations, the good-neighbor policy was for a time brilliantly successful. Since 1937, however, it has been seriously threatened by the controversy between the United States and Mexico over the latter's expropriation program. The disturbance might easily extend to our relations with other Latin American countries, which keep a sharp eye on our Mexican policy, and even to our relations with England, which also has suffered heavy losses through Mexican expropriation. Although the report of the commission has been accepted by both countries and the first annual million-dollar payment is due in March, 1939, it has already shown that some of the old causes of antagonism still exist and new ones have been added; it has suggested that the protection of even the most legitimate interests of the United States in Latin America may interfere with the development of democracy there; and it has illustrated the difficulty of applying the Pan-American peace system to the more important international disputes.

One of the dangers of the Mexican imbroglio lies in the fact that combustibles for a new flare-up of Yankeeophobia exist in many parts of Latin America. The rising tide of economic nationalism in those countries has made their debtor-creditor relationship with the United States even more disturbing than formerly. Argentina keenly resents what it regards as the unfair discrimination of the United States against some of its major products; it has a long tradition of antagonism to Yankee policies, and one of its leading newspapers, *La Prensa*

of Buenos Aires, demanded that the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty (for a Nicaragua canal route) be abrogated before the Inter-American Conference at Lima was held. Brazil still seems to fill its traditional role of best friend to the United States in Latin America; but it has begun to offer serious competition to the United States in the production of cotton and is imposing new restrictions upon American as well as other foreign enterprises. Many Latin Americans still resent the exclusive control by the United States of the Panama Canal, which cuts Latin America in twain. The woes of Porto Rico, which is politically subject to the United States but culturally allied to Latin America, furnish abundant texts for a criticism of the former by the latter that was never altogether silent even when inter-American accord seemed most perfect.

At the present moment most Latin Americans, except fascist sympathizers, probably share the opinion of the United States expressed in a very recent number of the distinguished Argentine journal *Nosotros*.⁶ "When an effort is made to foresee the destiny of civilization," said the writer, "the United States must be considered a most essential factor. The very safety of Latin America and perhaps its political liberty as well require the protection of the great republic of the North. How much water has flowed under the bridge since the day when with one voice we all denounced Yankee imperialism!"

True; but the course of relations between the United States and Latin America resembles not so much a river, whose waters pass never to return, as a tide which ebbs and flows. One of the main factors in determining the movement of this tide is the condition of Europe. At present, its condition makes the United States seem the guardian of Latin American freedom and security; when it changes, Latin American opinion will assign Uncle Sam another role. What kind of role that will be, only prophets can say; but there have recently been some indications of the revival of an earlier pattern of thought, in which the United States was pictured as Caliban, Colossus, and Shylock. Now a newer ideology bids fair to sharpen antagonisms by representing it as the spearhead of capitalist exploitation, and its European competitors can always be counted upon to fan the flames of Yankeeophobia. Again, however, the reader should be reminded of the diversity of Latin America, which is increasing

and which affects the attitude of its several republics towards the United States as well as towards each other and the rest of the world.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

The world's greatest problem today is the maintenance of peace. What are the prospects of peace in Latin America? It has its own family quarrels and these may be intensified by the progress of fascism within it. Externally the great fascist powers do not appear to be a serious threat to Latin America at the present moment, although the collapse of resistance to them in Europe has made the threat seem more real than it did a year ago and has been held to justify a further increase in American armaments. Another and perhaps a more fruitful source of international discord in the years just ahead lies in the clash between the economic nationalism of the Latin American republics and the vested interests of the United States and England in those countries; but this need not lead to war.

For protection against aggression from Europe and Asia, Latin America depends more than ever upon the United States; and for the additional capital that it still needs it will probably have to turn, however reluctantly, to the United States and England. Under the present circumstances, both these factors are likely to have a generally pacifying effect. For the maintenance of peace within America, there exist the instrumentalities of Pan-Americanism, which, though still defective, have at least made it easier for the American republics to settle their disputes peaceably if they wish to do so. The present situation is full of perplexities; but there is no immediate reason why America should become as unfit for human habitation as national rivalries have made large parts of Europe and Asia.⁷

NOTES

1. The combined direct and portfolio investments of England in Latin America amount to about \$6,000,000,000, are concentrated principally in Brazil and the Plata region, and constitute about 40 per cent of the total foreign investments in Latin America. United States investments are a trifle smaller, about \$5,500,000,000, and are concentrated principally in the Caribbean region but are also important in southern South America. English investments in Latin America have increased but little since 1914; those of the United States have been created mainly since that date, when they amounted to about \$1,600,000,000.

The following table shows the share of six leading industrial nations in the

total trade of Latin America in 1910, 1936, and 1937. The tables are based on Department of Commerce, *Commerce Reports*, April 30, 1938, p. 397, and September 24, 1938, p. 847, and on supplementary information subsequently provided by Mr. George Wythe, Chief of the Latin American Section, Division of Regional Information, Department of Commerce.

	Percentage of Total Latin American Imports			Percentage of Total Latin American Exports		
	1910	1936	1937	1910	1936	1937
United States .	22.6	31.5	34.3	33.8	32.9	31.1
Great Britain .	25.0	13.5	12.6	20.5	19.2	17.7
Germany .	14.9	15.4	15.3	10.9	8.0	8.7
France... ..	8.0	3.3	2.9	8.4	5.0	4.0
Italy... ..	*	2.5	2.6	*	1.8	3.1
Japan .	*	2.9	2.7	*	1.9	1.6

* Less than 1 per cent, exact figure not available.

2. When this was written (January 4, 1939) the principal sources of information on the Lima Conference were still the news despatches and radio broadcasts issued from Lima during the Conference. According to a responsible observer, the Lima Conference "functioned under a dictatorial regime of censorship, intimidation, and spying such as never before seen in any Pan-American Conference." (New York Times, January 2, 1939, despatch from John W. White, dated Arica, Chile, January 1. Mr. White is the chief correspondent of the Times in South America and was one of its correspondents at the Lima Conference. The reader should also be advised that the credibility of Mr. White's report has been attacked from several quarters.)

3. The strictly inter-American instrumentalities were created for the most part by a series of nine treaties, conventions, and protocols, beginning with the Gondra Treaty of 1923 and ending with four agreements entered into at Buenos Aires in 1936. The agreements of 1933 and 1936 have been ratified by about half of the American republics; the earlier agreements by about two thirds of them. Many of the American republics are also parties to certain universal agreements, such as the Hague Conventions and the Saavedra Lamas Pact.

4. The principal exception was the establishment of new branch factories in Latin America. See DUDLEY M. PHELPS, *The Migration of Industry to South America*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936; and GEORGE WYTHE, "The New Industrialism in Latin America," *Journal of Political Economy*, April, 1937, Vol. XLV, No. 2, pp. 207-228.

5. GASTON NERVAL, *Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1934.

6. *Año III*, segunda época, No. 24 (March, 1938), pp. 332-333.
7. The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Professor C. H. Haring of Harvard University for his constructive criticism of the chapter.

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CHAPTER 14

THE BALTIC REGION

Joseph A. Borowik

If the role of the various parts of Europe is to be appraised by their contribution of unrest in world affairs, it can be readily admitted that the Baltic region is not a European storm center. Although it has no lack of explosive and inflammatory material, no conflagration or upheaval is likely to break out there in the near future.

This is, however, all to the good. There is no need to recall that great things happened on the Baltic in the past; the wars conducted here held the attention of the whole world; and the fate of Europe was on more than one occasion decided by the outcome of conflicts between Muscovy, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany.

The reader who is interested not only in current conflicts but also in the future of Europe can learn the underlying causes of the peace and tranquillity which reigns in the Baltic region—calm so profound that people easily forget that a fifth of the aggregate population of Europe dwells on the shores of the Baltic.

• RUSSO-GERMAN ANTAGONISM

The significance of Russo-German antagonism is realized by all. One of the main tenets of faith supporting the structure of present-day Germany finds expression in a campaign of extermination against everything in any way connected with communist ideology. The Reich has proclaimed a crusade against the Soviet Union and is striving to find allies from Europe to Asia. Even on the shores of the Pacific, a common front has been established with Japan against Russia and "communistically inclined" China. Those who are pre-eminently occupied with Germany and Russia to the exclusion of other lands may inquire: Since there is such an acute tension of contradictions and such a decided hostile attitude on both sides, why does not actual war break out?

The answer is plain, but not always realized: Germany's eastern frontier is more than six hundred miles distant from the western frontier of the Soviet Union. Poland lies between the two adversaries and today acts as a barrier of peace just as it protected Western civilization from the inroads of the East during her long and glorious history. Since Poland is one of the major military powers in Europe, her neutrality cannot be violated with ease.

Just as Poland keeps Germany, or rather all Europe, from direct contiguity with Russia, and so guarantees the peace at the present juncture, the whole of Russia's northwestern frontier is barred off from the Baltic—from the Dvina to the White Sea—by the Baltic States, i.e., Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. The last-named belongs also to the bloc of Scandinavian countries on the basis of old traditions and of firm ties with the other countries in this group.

The Scandinavian countries proper—Sweden, Norway, and Denmark—would appear to be in quite a different situation as regards Germany and particularly Russia. However, the concept of "nearness" has undergone radical change in modern times. Also the currents of thought emanating from Russia and the Reich are exceptionally strong, particularly in their blind and fanatical faith that the path traced out by each of the conflicting sides is the only effective way of assuring the future of mankind. If these factors are taken into consideration, it can be taken for granted that even the Scandinavian countries which do not border upon Russia and Germany cannot but feel keenly the danger of being dragged into unwanted controversies so that they have adopted an attitude common to the whole Baltic region—opposition to war and a united effort for the reinforcement of peace in that part of the world. It is only this concerted attitude of the eight countries around the Baltic which had forced Germany to settle accounts with the Soviet Union as far afield as the Pacific. This alone suffices to indicate that Baltic affairs are important and find expression not only on an all-European but even on a world-wide scale.

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FACTORS

A closer interest in the Baltic region is still more justified when its economic and cultural significance is considered. In both of these respects, the group of countries under consideration vastly

exceeds the limits suggested by the bare fact that 20 per cent of the population of Europe lives in these lands.

The ship traffic and commodity exchange of the Baltic can serve as indexes of that region's standard of life and economic status. It is not generally known that the volume of shipping passing through the Danish straits and the Kiel Canal is greater than that sailing through the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal. It will be a surprise to many to learn that the combined mercantile marine of the four Scandinavian countries (hence excluding the other lands on the Baltic) occupies third place in the world following the United States and the United Kingdom. Some idea of the standard of life and of the capacity of the Scandinavian markets is afforded by the fact that Great Britain's export to them exceeds that to India and is double that to the United States.

The economic understanding between the Scandinavian countries on the one hand, and Belgium and Holland, on the other, is fairly well known. Probably no less important than the economic are the political and cultural values presented by this understanding among six of the smaller democratic countries in northern Europe known as the "Group of Oslo States" in which Baltic countries play the leading role. In order to give a general idea of the status occupied by these countries in the world, it may suffice to point out that the aggregate share of the six Oslo States in world trade occupies third place after the United States and the United Kingdom.¹

The political problems and the role of this region in the evolution of international affairs are no less interesting. They would seem at first sight to present an impassable labyrinth of petty and conflicting interests, of hardly engrossing particularisms, etc., from which some secondary idea of general significance could be extracted only with the greatest difficulty. This is not so, however; the problem is in reality a much more simple and easy one if only a suitable approach is adopted.

The ten countries which go to make up the Baltic region must first be reduced by the elimination of Russia and Germany. These latter have an independent and special character, apart from the fact that the sphere of their most vital interests is clearly outside the area under consideration. The remaining countries can be treated as three components: the four Scandinavian lands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway.

and Finland, which constitute an entity in the field of foreign policy as the "Northern Bloc"; then another bloc which, for the purpose in view, consists of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, on many occasions joined by Finland, which acts as a means of liaison between the Northern Bloc and the southeastern one; and, finally, Poland, the largest country in point of population, with its ancient state traditions and the real material power which it represents today.

Naturally, even such a simplification of the task still leaves a mass of problems. It is proposed, therefore, to consider only some of the most fundamental matters, so selected that they will be representative of all the most vital interests and ideals common to the Scandinavian group, to the southeastern Baltic states, and to Poland.

NEUTRALITY—THE SCANDINAVIAN IDEAL

Neutrality, as indeed is the case with virtually every broader political or economic notion, has a theoretical and practical aspect. On the one hand, neutrality is a doctrine, a system of norms within the domain of international law with all its stock of juridical and historical knowledge. Neutrality, on the other hand, can be considered as a determinate trend in life, or simply as the practical moves of the foreign policies of a country. Both concepts, however, are based on a common postulate: that of assuring peace to the community and safeguarding it against participation in conflicts and disputes between other bodies-politic; and that this purpose is achieved by the maintenance of strict impartiality in relations with each of the belligerents.

Politicians are imbued with the same desire for peaceful co-existence. They both aim at the same goal, i.e., to avoid being dragged into war. Each strives to attain this end, but by different means. One relies upon what we will call the attractive force of his system of ideals through the spread of a knowledge of international law, and the attainment of universal respect for the existing status. The other strives, by the application of the art of statesmanship and the choice of purposeful moves, to set up relations which will assure friendly existence with the other countries.

Now in the specific case of Scandinavian neutrality, it should be stated at once that the subject could not be exhausted by an examination of these two aspects only. There is a third aspect—the psycho-

logical attitude of the whole community. As the Swedish foreign minister, Richard Sandler, very justly pointed out in a declaration issued to the French press during a recent visit to Paris:

Public opinion considers the Nordic countries to be a neutral group, but I must admit that I personally dislike this expression since it evokes confusion. As a matter of fact, the juridical concept of neutrality is not always distinguished from the political one. The former should be applied in time of war, a neutral policy in time of peace. Personally, and from the standpoint of my country, I prefer to speak of a "neutral attitude," which can be defined thus: Sweden is opposed to a policy of alliances and is not prepared to let herself be drawn into combinations which would paralyse her freedom of action just when she might most need it. Instead of neutral countries, we should therefore speak of countries without alliances. (*Le Temps*, March 20, 1937.)

The very idea of neutrality as a juridical system springs from the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. This dates back to the times of Grotius. From this early doctrine came the principle that "a free ship is empowered freely to conduct trade" unless, of course, it is smuggling commodities which have been expressly prohibited.

Eventually, appropriate means must be devised to enforce respect for even the most equitable juridical tenet. The nineteenth century expansion of internationalism, by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, brought about a definition of the principles of armed neutrality. Its four leading propositions included: (1) The arming of merchant vessels is forbidden, i.e., the practicing of piracy; (2) Contraband is excluded, all other cargoes are defended by the flag of a neutral power; (3) The property of a neutral power may not be seized, nor the freedom of communication be impaired by belligerents; (4) The blockade of ports or of whole countries can be recognized solely if it is effective, i.e., if actual control at sea is exercised by the blockading power.

Fifty years later the Hague Conference of 1907 was concluded with the resolution of the so-called Thirteenth Convention in respect of the rights and duties of neutrals. Article 6 of this treaty represents a determined effort to define the concept of contraband of war. Fraught with danger and one of the most onerous for the maintenance of neutrality, because it is one of the most elastic and

diversely interpreted concepts in this field, this concept was more precisely formulated by the London Conference of 1908; and it was definitively defined by the declaration of February 6, 1909. It can be stated that the doctrine of neutrality was greatly developed just before the World War; but during the struggle the laws of neutrality were universally evaded or broken by the belligerents. It should be borne in mind that the stipulations of the convention and of the declaration had not then assumed binding force: not all the belligerents had declared their access to the Thirteenth Hague Convention; and the Declaration of London—as it happened—had not been ratified by Britain itself.

The events of 1914-1918, in short, shook the whole fabric of neutrality to its foundations. The Scandinavian countries of course remained neutral; and they keenly felt the shortcomings of the doctrine in its application to their own cases. Whatever remained of the doctrine of neutrality after the War—theory and code of regulations—was promptly destroyed by the peace treaties.

Neutrality was condemned by those who framed the Treaty of Versailles. Branded as the origin of conflicts, neutrality was accused of prolonging the duration of conflicts once they broke out. Active disturbers of the peace were in future to be dealt with in summary and radical fashion—by the complete isolation of the aggressor and by universal mobilization against him under the aegis of the League of Nations as the international body set up to preserve peace. "In the next war," stated President Wilson, "there will be no neutrals." There was nobody in 1919 and for some time later who dared affirm that the concept of "aggression" is equally if not even more elastic and potentially dangerous than that of "contraband of war." What is more, it entered nobody's head that equality of rearmament would be the means selected for attaining universal disarmament.

These were times when all believed in the ideals and power of the League. Sweden affords an excellent example of the extent and force of this illusion. Since 1809 that country had successfully avoided entanglement in all conflicts and had fully maintained the application of the principle of neutrality. In spite of this, a large liberal-socialist majority in the legislative chambers of the country authorized Sweden's access to the League of Nations. This does not mean that caution was thrown to the winds. There were misgivings, there

was plenty of determined opposition, and there was no lack of pessimistic warnings pointing to the incompatibility between the new commitments and the old established and tried tenets of neutrality. As matters stood during the early post-War years, there was certainly good ground for these objections. Under the new order a country could be obliged "guiltlessly" to participate in the conflicts which could so easily and frequently break out in the midst of such a large and far from peacefully inclined family of nations.

Scandinavia's subsequent attitude toward the League from the standpoint of neutrality was clearly elucidated by the Swedish foreign minister, at the annual convention of the Social-Democratic Union on April 28, 1936. To be regarded as an authoritative spokesman for the Scandinavian idea of neutrality, Mr. Sandler first of all drew attention to the conquest of Abyssinia; he stated "the aggressor is triumphant; the body-politic of the attacked has been broken up—but violence does not become law simply because we note the bare facts." He then laid bitter stress on the recent events in Spain before passing to a survey of the basic currents and forces working for and against "the next war." He closed with a number of conclusions, the formulation of which is of paramount importance for the authoritative reinforcement of our observations on the doctrine and practice of neutrality.

His statements furnish indubitable evidence of the inherent union between the present idea of neutrality and the efforts made to strengthen the solidarity of the Scandinavian countries: (1) amendment of the covenant of the League; (2) Nordic solidarity; and (3) his views on the Oslo Group—the association of the so-called "Small Powers" of Europe which is working for the erection of a united front in the face of the Great Powers. His views on security are striking and much to the point:

The relative impotence of the League of Nations under the present conditions has resulted in a decrease in the co-efficients both of security and of risk. The lesson of Abyssinia has taught us that national defense cannot be supplanted by international guarantees of security as matters now stand. This lesson has also powerfully confirmed the conviction that any campaign of sanctions against a Great Power must be considered as out of the

question during the near future and perhaps even for long years to come.

In spite of this note of pessimism, he opposes the idea of unconditional neutrality:

Sweden's foreign policy to-day consists in the simultaneous maintenance of active participation in the League of Nations, of neutrality towards the conflicting interests of the Great Powers, and the avoidance of entanglements in any action incompatible with this attitude.

The basic argument which reconciles the hitherto diametrically contrary systems of absolute loyalty to the League and thorough-going neutrality is furnished by the postulate of Nordic interests:

Have they who clamour for Sweden's unconditional neutrality, ever considered what would be our attitude were one of our neighbours to fall into need? There is a direct connection which has direct influence in making the latter of current concern. The preparation of common Nordic norms for neutrality shows that we are taking careful account of the situation which might arise should a proclamation of neutrality become necessary—and, naturally, it need not necessarily be counter to the Covenant of the League. The measures taken for economic preparedness in the domain of food supplies and munitions of war likewise indicate that we are not permitting events to pass without taking the necessary steps on our part.²

In view of the above, the cautious remarks addressed to the Oslo Group are not bereft of significance. He declared:

The group of smaller countries with which Sweden collaborates absolutely refuses to be recruited to any bloc. . . . As regards the policy of the Oslo countries, I merely wish to stress that if the Oslo Powers are to achieve anything on a wider scale, the best preparation for this will be for them to show their ability to act concretely within their own restricted circle.

Finally comes another extremely important and characteristic exposition of a position which is bound up with the application of the doctrine of neutrality to the Oslo Group. Referring to the recent moves made by Belgium with regard to the covenant of the League and the Treaty of Locarno, the Swedish statesman held:

It only remains for us to express our satisfaction that we can now include Belgium amongst the countries which have shaken off alliances. . . . The Belgian nation to-day is gratified by its attainment of a status approaching to that of Holland, and therefore also to that of the Scandinavian countries, whose attitude towards alliances has been identically the same.

THE DIPLOMACY OF NEUTRALITY

It has become quite the accepted custom, when speaking of the dire experiences of the Scandinavian countries during the World War, to remark rather scornfully that they made quite a good thing out of their neutrality. Here we have in mind rather pecuniary profit on supplies than the preservation of the life and health of a whole generation. This aspect of the matter, however, is merely complementary to another—the strenuous political and especially moral effort made to preserve neutrality.

The practical experiences of the Scandinavians with the application of the doctrine of neutrality during the World War proved highly burdensome. Naturally, it was not so burdensome as active participation in hostilities; but the fact remains that the war was a four-year period of constant uncertainty and anxiety, coupled with severe property losses and humiliations of every kind. It was a period of illegality, psychologically all the more distasteful and onerous as the neutral peoples were guiltless of all fault yet were continually forced to submit to the high-handed decisions imposed upon them by the governments of other countries. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the whole of their foreign trade—thus, in view of their economic structure, the entirety of their internal life as regards earnings and consumption—was dependent wholly on the good or ill will of the belligerents. The Allies often quite arbitrarily requisitioned cargoes destined for Scandinavia; and the number of ships sunk and crews drowned by German submarines came to no mean figure. It was just as difficult to get foodstuffs, particularly meat, butter, and potatoes, as in the warring countries; coal was worth its weight in gold. It can occasion no surprise, therefore, that all the manufactured goods produced under such conditions were very highly priced. The profits netted were therefore largely illusionary, and were certainly smaller than those gained by contractors in the countries at war. Scandinavian economy and finances underwent

severe and even dangerous shocks, and the public acquired an even greater distaste for war and for all that could lead to it.

At the same time, the Scandinavians were soon convinced that the system of neutrality based on the existing status of international law had proved a complete failure. It became clear, even to superficial observers and politicians, that every neutral country—against its will and however blameless it might be—could easily be made the scene of hostilities, just as happened with Belgium and as all but happened with Holland. The attitude of both the warring side was fundamentally uniformly unscrupulous in this respect; and the reasons restraining the spread of fighting to neutral countries were largely fortuitous in nature. The relative equilibrium between the belligerents and the bitter experiences of actual fighting made both sides adverse either to extending the existing front, or to creating new fronts.

Scandinavia, and particularly Sweden, likewise gained the conviction that the successful maintenance of neutrality requires strength. This was necessary to enforce the respect of others and to secure recognition, as well as to carry out the innumerable duties of national control. It is not surprising that the experience yielded by the application of the statute of neutrality was a simultaneous record of one disappointment after another. The only mode left untried was that sponsored by the League of Nations. Adopted, it was to prove just as disappointing. The ground had been well prepared for the apostles of the League and for the founders of the new system of ideals—that of collective security and of universal guarantees in the form of concerted sanctions against disturbers of the peace. The Scandinavian countries signed the covenant of the League for they really believed in the new order and had decided to exert every effort to realize the slogans of the new peace, although they continued their habitual aloofness from the affairs of others and particularly distrusted the consequences of the latent and open conflicts of Europe.

Reaction to these charges was much more profoundly and acutely felt in Scandinavia than might be imagined. It would serve no useful purpose to list all the conflicts which took place in which the League proved powerless. The Italo-Abyssinia War is closest to us and we can state from personal observation in Sweden that Scandi-

navia became more and more aware of the risks and perils threatening those members of the League who too explicitly put their trust in the principles of collective security.

In Scandinavia, the conviction, or rather the realization, is growing that an ideology of peace requires an active attitude if it is to become effective. Return to the doctrine of neutrality is presaging actual improvements in its structure and applications. These suggest a closer bond of solidarity between the several states which have adhered to the doctrine, together with a rupture with the spirit of integral isolation and of absolute indifference to the events of the outer world.

Neutrality is primarily a mental attitude, a psychological state, determined by the action of the three powerful factors which shape a people's spirit and appear in every essential feature of its national character.

Subconscious in their action, these factors are often grossly underestimated or even quite disregarded. They are: (1) historical experiences shaping national traditions; (2) the geopolitical situation of the nation, which embraces not only geographical location but also the situation within a given variable environment; and (3) the current economic situation of the nation as an expression of its material attainments in life—its inner urge and possibilities of influencing other peoples as well as its capacity for further progress.

In Scandinavia, however, the role and significance of traditions need no champions. A proper appreciation of tradition is already deeply rooted in the national spirit and is fully honored in its policies. The simpler concept of geopolitical situation is more widely accepted in the whole world. The specific action of the geopolitical factor on Scandinavian neutrality is peculiarly apparent since the latter is largely based on the virtually insular position of Norway and Sweden and on the relative peninsular isolation of Denmark and Finland. The importance of economic status is even better understood. Probably too much stress, in fact, is laid on it. The result is that the material factor is often grossly overestimated to the disregard of idealistic values and of the psychological constituents of economic life itself. However, economic traditions do exist; they must also be taken fully into account.

If the development of the means of communication has exerted

a steady and powerful influence on Scandinavian psychology, it is not surprising therefore that the affairs of the Baltic states and of Poland are steadily tending to converge toward the lines followed by Scandinavia and especially by Sweden. This growing convergency is regarded with favor on the southern shores of the Baltic and there seems to be no reason why it should not be viewed with the same sentiments on the opposite shores. Both sides are trying to attain a better appreciation of each other's problems and policies; the further development of such *rapprochement* is contingent largely upon a fuller realization of the convergence of the basic postulates and political ideas of Scandinavian neutrality and the tenets of Poland's Baltic policies.

This coincidence of interests appears with even greater force when the dangers menacing Scandinavia are envisaged. This is the steady menace represented by the proximity of two opposing and conflicting post-War totalitarian formations—the Soviet Union and the Third Reich.

Luckily, both Germany and Russia directly and indirectly constantly are warning the Scandinavian peoples of the danger threatening them from the opposing side as well as from themselves. For instance, a German savant, Professor Haushofer, gave a number of public lectures in Scandinavia in which he depicted the soviet danger in glaring colors; but the unexpected result was that he succeeded in alarming all as to the danger of help from Germany. Public opinion in Scandinavia reacted very energetically against these unofficial offers of help and made no secret of its distrust.

"BLOC" POLITICS

Under these conditions, it is important to attain a clear comprehension of the inherent nature of the Scandinavian bloc.

There is a widespread but mistaken notion that the four countries of the Scandinavian bloc are primarily "small," "petty," and distant in the geographical sense—particularly so with regard to our intellectual and material interests.

First, there is Sweden, an exponent of neutrality and leader in foreign affairs, the only Scandinavian country which aspires to the rank of a Great Power. Then comes Norway, with her different social structure; then Finland, apparently having nothing in common

with Norway and racially distinct from the rest of Scandinavia, openly striving partly or fully to eliminate Swedish cultural influences and the Swedish language, burdened with a long and uneasy frontier with Russia, with all the possibilities of unpleasant surprises that this entails. The fourth member of the bloc is Denmark—at the western extremity of the Baltic—a country which until recent times was subject to powerful German influences. Even now it has to cope with what the Germans call a “flaming” frontier in Schleswig; hence it comes as a complete surprise when we learn that this frontier is watched, as the southern frontier of Scandinavia, by a youthful corps of 20,000 border guards recruited from all four of the Scandinavian countries.

But in politics, in economic matters, even in educational affairs, we see at every step powerful and well-endowed bodies and apparatus organizing joint action, regulating mutual relations, and reinforcing the realization of the community of Scandinavian interest. Thus it is that the Scandinavian Bloc is rising to power before our eyes. It is obvious that a number of forces are at work, influencing other countries toward more intimate relations with the group and there are also forces working in the contrary direction. Each of these factors plays an important role in shaping the destiny of the bloc. Some, such as the religious factor, or the strong partiality for democracy, can be decisive in directing the most vital political moves and the history of these countries.

Those who, dwelling on the growing consciousness of Nordic solidarity, primarily stress the ethnical elements combined with the racial, lingual, and intellectual culture which has sprung from one and the same source illustrate the difficulty of domination from without. Germany, for instance, based rather short-sighted plans of spreading German influences in Scandinavia, Holland, and Flanders upon exactly the same foundation. Today we know that the campaign has proved an unqualified failure. The German element suffered enormous cultural and material losses in these countries—particularly in Holland and Sweden—as an outcome of the misguided and clumsy efforts of the German exponents of the Nordic movement. This was the thesis that all Teutonic peoples should in effect be swallowed up by the German nation.

But vastly more important is the general psychological and

ideological pattern furnishing the basis for an homogeneous outlook on life. In this connection, it is impossible to lay overmuch stress on the following traits which are so typical of the Scandinavian peoples: (1) profound respect for the law, probably arising out of attachment to tradition and affording not only durable bases for the advancement of the nations in question, but also for mutual respect and the attainment of a closer understanding; (2) sincere democracy, as it were, second nature for these nations, causing them to be perhaps even more attached to their political structure than to their Scandinavian origins; (3) relatively high and general level of prosperity and the conscious feeling of the high standing or prestige which this gives the Scandinavians in the world.

These three traits—material prosperity, respect for the law, and conscious democratic citizenship—are the main constructive elements of Nordic solidarity. They may appear to some to be illusionary and of transient value, but in the mind of the average Scandinavian they are basic and essential factors.

Thus we see that the theory and practice of Scandinavian neutrality have passed—and are still passing—through a complicated process of evolution.

The first declaration of neutrality could be epitomized as: "We are far removed from your interests and conflicts; leave us in peace." The revised and modernized version of the declaration could be expressed: "We do not want to become involved in matters which do not concern us; we will not allow ourselves to be dragged into foreign disputes and conflicts." The latter, however, requires exact orientation as to which European matters actually do not concern Scandinavia. It demands simultaneously both will and skill, to say nothing of concrete strength, to oppose successfully every attempt to drag Scandinavia into such conflicts.

One of the prime postulates of Poland's foreign policy has been expressed by Foreign Minister Joseph Beck thus: "Nothing about us without us." This might appear in some respects to be fundamentally opposed to the Scandinavian thesis of neutrality. Yet the policy is based on the profound conviction that Poland's situation in Europe is such that she cannot remain isolated, nor can she exclude her own interests from the complex tangle of the interests of the other powers. The present writer believes moreover that

Scandinavia, in spite of its more advantageous geographical situation, already is not in a position to maintain and carry out the orthodox principles of neutrality; therefore it will be obliged, step by step and increasingly often, to adhere to Poland's formulation of the essence of her foreign policy.

There are other communities in the world whose ideals and psychological attitudes are identical with or approximate to the Scandinavian. This should make it possible, by uniting the idea of solidarity with that of neutrality, to set up a broader group of states, irrespective of the ethnic, religious, or social factors represented by such countries.

For this reason, the present writer is inclined to attribute much more importance to the Oslo Group than might at first sight be apparent from the economic program established by the members of that bloc.

There seems to be no reason why Scandinavian neutrality should not develop in Scandinavian-Baltic neutrality. The accession of Belgium and Holland indicates that the system can be extended even beyond that region.

POLAND DOMINANT

With this new importance of the Baltic in world politics, the position of Poland represents an outstanding rôle.

Probably the most universal and striking feature of post-War currents in the republic is the enormous revival of interest in the sea and all that possession of a seacoast implies. It is no exaggeration to state that the whole Polish nation is consistently concentrating its attention on that "open door" to the world represented by the ports of Gdynia and Danzig. That Poland has her own seaboard, is of first-rate importance from the viewpoint of international politics. It is a factor making for the maintenance of the balance of power and of peace in that part of the world. Although underrated as such by observers in other countries, the fact that Poland is a maritime country has exercised a remarkable influence on the nation. Not only has it affected the political and economic life of the country but also the psychological attitude of the Poles as regards events in the rest of the world.

If no note be made of the stupendous effort made to accomplish

Poland's maritime programme during the last twenty years, there can be no proper comprehension of any basic feature of Polish life or of the country's attitude to problems of international policy. This rising consciousness of the role and destiny of Poland within the concert of the Great Powers is being molded in no uncertain fashion by the maritime orientation of the whole country. It is of course possible to enumerate many interesting and important Polish affairs and great achievements which have no direct connection with the sea. Poland's independent and firm attitude with respect to Germany and the Soviet Union—both doubtless much stronger countries than she—is an example in point. Unhampered contacts with the great democracies of the world have been facilitated and fostered by the possibility of direct intercourse. Possession of a free and open route to the rest of the world has strengthened the country's economy—emancipated it from foreign control—and this cannot but find reflection in her foreign policies.

The great significance of the sea for Poland can be understood only if three vital factors are taken into consideration: Poland's historical experiences in this domain, economic requirements, and political exigencies.

An examination of the thousand-year-long chronicled history of Poland—her rise as a state, attainment of the status of a great power, decline, subjection and renascence—shows an interdependence between political and economic strength and a firm foothold on the Baltic littoral. Poland became a great power ten centuries ago when her northern frontier coincided with the Baltic coast from Stettin to Danzig, inclusive. Similarly, when the country again rose to power under the Jagellon Dynasty, after the union with Lithuania, the Polish Commonwealth was again firmly based on the Baltic seaboard; this meant from the present frontier with Germany to Livonia, i.e., the Polish littoral embraced practically all the young Baltic states, not excepting East Prussia, which now belongs to Germany.

When we speak of the economic importance of the sea, we have in mind primarily commodity exchange with overseas countries. At the present stage of civilization, the far-reaching interdependence and ramifications of foreign trade afford ample evidence that the principles of self-sufficiency cannot be effectively applied even by

the richest countries—those most endowed with the bases of primary production.

The relatively primitive stage of Poland's economy causes that country to be nearer to possible autarchy than any other country in Europe, barring Russia. It is just because Poland is at the beginning of the great highway of international commercial exchange along which she will proceed as she builds up her own economy that free and unhampered access to the sea is so keenly realized as a matter of first-rate importance.

It may appear strange at first sight that so much is made dependent on the trade passing through two ports on a seacoast only some eighty-seven miles long. Of this, half represents the shores of the Bay of Puck which is too shallow for ocean-going vessels. Poland's land frontiers with Germany, East Prussia, Lithuania, Latvia, the U.S.S.R., Rumania, and Czecho-Slovakia are 3350 miles in length; of this rather large figure, nearly 1250 miles represent the frontier with the German Reich and about 1150 miles that with the Soviet Union.

Both these countries apply a specific foreign-trade policy which is responsible for much of the economic confusion affecting the world today. It has been particularly keenly felt by Poland as the nearest and most natural partner in such trade. The Soviet Union has introduced a state monopoly for foreign trade, and its purchases are controlled and take place only in those countries which answer to the transient political needs or exigencies of the Union or the communist propaganda service. For that matter, the aggregate figure of the Soviet Union's foreign trade is of comparatively small importance and differs little from the corresponding data for Denmark, Sweden, or Czechoslovakia. Commodity exchange with the U.S.S.R. constitutes rather more than 3 per cent of Poland's total foreign trade; there is no hope of increasing this figure as long as economic considerations are subordinated to the vagaries of political tactics and of strife against the capitalistic system. Poland's other large neighbor—the Reich—is much richer and is eminently more desirable as a customer; but its attitude, as far as the Polish market is concerned, does not differ overmuch from that of the U.S.S.R. Germany waged a customs war against Poland for many years in the vain hope that political concessions would be wrung out by

means of economic pressure. For some years past such political differences have been suspended, but almost immediately after the relieving of this tension Germany inaugurated a policy of self-sufficiency and closed her frontiers to Polish farm produce even more effectively than during the height of the customs war.

To make matters worse, Lithuania has been hostile to trade with Poland up to 1938, and the frontier with Czechoslovakia ran along the ridge of the Carpathian Mountains and effectively barred closer economic communication. The only frontiers really open to normal trade are those with Latvia and Rumania—215 and 65 miles in length respectively.

It will now be clear why it is so important for Poland to have her own seacoast and ports. Unable to do business freely with her neighbors, she has unhampered use of the high seas leading to and from every country possessing a seaboard. This will also explain why such a great proportion of Polish trade is seaborne and why the volume of this trade is steadily rising.

CURRENT BALTIC POLITICS

Charles Hodges and Joseph S. Roucek

This continuation of the discussion of Baltic problems deals with current developments not possible for Dr. Borowik to cover in the preceding pages. He is not responsible in any way for the views expressed in this section of the chapter.

POLAND

The Polish foreign policy, personified in Colonel Joseph Beck, represents a combination of environment and inherited leadership. The geopolitical background gives the larger setting of Poland's intensely nationalistic politics—it dictates both national survival and national power.

The possibilities have been capitalized to the utmost. The astute pupil of Poland's irascible hero of the battle for independence, Beck has grown to the mature stature of an outstanding European statesman in the years intervening since Pilsudski's death. The clue to Poland's international politics lies in this World War and post-War relationship; Beck today projects the ideas of his beloved "chief" into the hard realities of today's crisis politics. He finds his way through the debris of democratic internationalism without illusions

and with a single object in view—the survival of independent Poland in the wreckage of Versailles Europe, survival with greater and greater power in eastern Europe.

As the most important Baltic country, Poland capitalizes its position to the full. Geographically, its strategic position makes it a major problem of its two greater neighbors to the west and the east. Though it reaches the Baltic Sea only through the Polish Corridor, all naval operations on the Baltic and its expanding sea power are based upon Gdynia. The country itself stretches a thousand miles from tip to tip; it is big enough, with three thousand miles of frontiers touching ten sovereign states, to loom large in military calculations. Here is man power, for Poland's is the fastest-growing population in Europe outside of Soviet Russia. Here is rising economic power, given the new impetus toward industrialization which is the product of population pressure and military considerations as much as business expansion itself.

These raw materials of foreign policy have been taken by Colonel Beck and made into a formidable diplomatic factor. Yet this combination of Poland's position and potentialities with Pilsudski's concepts of statesmanship has, seemingly, never been understood abroad. The mystery of Beck's moves, toward Germany with Hitler's accession to power, and now away, should be clear to all who wish to see behind the scene. The seemingly zigzag course has a definite goal—a strong Poland rallying to its middle-of-the-road position supporters of peace from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The government mouthpiece, *Gazeta Polska*, pictures Polish foreign policy as having two axes: the western-eastern axis, the axis of its fate; the northern-southern axis, that of movement, advancement, expansion.

The western-eastern axis is nothing more than the pincers formed on one side by nazi Germany and on the other by Soviet Russia. Poland can be squeezed along this line because the country lacks geographic barriers; the frontiers, with the exception of the famous Pripet Marshes to the east, are open. This absence of natural barriers is the dominant fact today in Poland's political relations with these two greater powers. Both of them used Polish territory, which they had seized and attempted to denationalize a hundred years before, as their battleground. Thus Poland has learned from the

hard reading of history how to balance these aggressive neighbors against each other. It even marked the orientation of Polish deputies in the Imperial Diet before the World War; they flirted in Vienna with the other representatives of the subject Slav nationalities but always eventually made a deal with the dominant Hapsburg element for political advantages. During the World War, Poland's rebirth became possible only because Pilsudski saw the double problem of reconstitution as an independent state; his legionnaires fought with the Allies as well as on the Austro-German front against Russia. When the latter collapsed, he was able to turn against the Germans as the other enemy of Polish freedom.

This age-long problem was less pressing during the years of the Versailles dictatorship. Germany was weak, subjected to Allied curbs; Soviet Russia, disorganized. Poland logically co-operated with the Western Powers against both potential enemies—particularly against Germany. Hence there was the alliance with France in 1921, reaffirmed in 1925. Also, there grew out of the Franco-Soviet rapprochement the non-aggression pact with Moscow in 1932, renewed for ten years in 1934. Pilsudski's realism made him aware that with the destruction of the Second Reich by Hitler the Nazi domination made Germany the greater threat. Convinced that the Soviets would not attack Poland the warrior-statesman proposed to France a preventive war against nazified Germany. Finding that Paris would not play the game, Pilsudski realigned Poland, and Beck negotiated the Polish-German non-aggression pact while bargaining power remained to Warsaw.

Though this agreement of January, 1934, has been vigorously attacked by Germany's rivals westward, the fate of Czecho-Slovakia shows how sound Beck's judgment has been in maintaining this balance of rivalries. It has enabled Poland thus far to escape the closing of the fatal pincers of the western-eastern axis. It has enabled Poland to drive actively toward a neutral eastern European bloc on the northern-southern axis where the only possibility of diplomatic movement exists. It has enabled Poland, following the disillusionment from the surrender of Britain and France to Hitler at the price of an ally, to shift eastward and also to make an audacious bid for an anti-Nazi barrier through Czecho-Slovakia's Ruthenian territory, Hungary and Italy. Though checkmated in southeastern

Europe, Beck has handled Baltic and soviet relations so that the full impact of the diplomatic disaster of 1938 has escaped Poland. Were it not for the diplomatic agility and foresight of Beck, coupled with a powerful military machine directed by Marshal Smigly-Rydz, Pilsudski's heir in army and domestic politics, Poland might well feel pessimism.

BALTIC BORDER STATES

Nowhere, then, has Munich meant more than on the Baltic. Apart from Poland and the Scandinavian countries across this politically stormy sea, four other states figure vitally in the calculations of both foreign offices and ministries of war—particularly for those of the Nazi Reich and the Soviet Union. If the clash that one group of observers expects between Germany and the U.S.S.R. develops, they must use the Baltic highway and the border states—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the last three grouped in a triangular alliance, in defense of their own jeopardized freedom. If this conflict is averted, as others anticipate, the neutral bloc headed by Colonel Beck's Poland must have the collaboration of these outposts of power politics.

Thus whatever Poland does has immense importance for her neighbors on the south side of the Baltic. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have an equal interest in Warsaw's own larger struggle for survival between the western and eastern rivals for European hegemony; a pro-German orientation of Poland today would mean the Ukrainian issue had taken its final sinister form. Even nazi audacity cannot risk a move with a hostile Poland on its flank—and with the Poles, these border states who well know German domination in the centuries of the Teutonic knights.

Like all states born, or reborn, through the Paris Peace Conference, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are vitally concerned with the maintenance of the status quo. Adventurism on the Baltic can cost them only hard-won liberties.

Lithuania. Lithuania, long merged with Poland, has a pro-Russian orientation. Even before the War, it demanded autonomy within a Russian federation. When the new state was formed on February 16, 1918, it had to face the Russian "Reds" to the east and the Poles to the south. Whereas the bolsheviks were expelled in a seesaw

contest with the Poles as the main enemy, Vilna, the medieval capital, eventually was taken over by Poland after a military coup d'état upset the decision of the Allies to award it to Lithuania. This continued as a Baltic sore spot until Poland ended the Lithuanian boycott, so to speak, by an ultimatum in the spring of 1938; the blunt threat of military action has brought about normal relations.

Difficulties between the two countries make their history a distinctly family affair. Until 1385, each developed independently of the other. The union which then took place between the Polish Queen Jadwiga and the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Wladyslaw Jagiello, effected a dynastic combination. In 1569, the "Union of Lublin" completed the monarchic connection establishing a Baltic dual monarchy—"the free with the free and equal with the equal." The King of Poland thus exercised his prerogatives as the ruler of Lithuania with the title of Grand Duke. When the eighteenth-century partition began the destruction of Greater Poland, the Russian Tsars acquired sovereignty over the eastern portion, including the Lithuanian provinces. This obtained until the declaration of the Soviet Government on August 29, 1918, invalidated the partition. Sovereignty, from the legal point of view, was then placed in the newly established Republic of Poland, but the subsequent Soviet-Lithuanian agreement of July 19, 1920, reversed this earlier deal by recognizing Lithuania's claim to Vilna. This friendship between Lithuania and the U.S.S.R. therefore, has made the little Baltic republic an important point in the nazi-soviet duel for position: for it abuts on the East Prussian lands of Germany, and the nazis have feared its use as a base for soviet air attack while the soviets have been apprehensive over a German drive through Lithuania based upon East Prussia!

Latvia. Latvia, just to the north, has its similar double threat. The natural outlet for the northwestern part of the Soviet Union, it touches Lithuania, Poland, the U.S.S.R., and Estonia just to the north. Its independence acquired through the success of the German General Staff's surprise attack known as "the Riga operations" in the fall of 1917, the Baltic state maintained itself on the map in spite of being part of the battle ground in the war against the bolsheviks. Here Polish aid enabled Latvia to escape the western march of the Reds, for Pilsudski's strategy resulted in the capture of the

key point, Dunaburg or Dvinsk, in his 1920 campaign to check bolshevik expansion. The upshot was that the Polish statesman succeeded, after the almost fatal Battle of Warsaw had been turned in his favor, in separating Lithuania from possible contact with the soviets and in establishing lasting contact northward with Latvia and Estonia. During the 1920's, pressure from soviet Russia under the agile hand of Tchicherin in Moscow made the Reds the dominant problem until Hitlerism came in the 1930's to change the trend. Though an open authoritarian rule in 1935 seemed to point to nazi ascendancy, "Latvia for Latvians" has been the actual direction of policy. The hope of disappointed Baltic barons has not waned; German influence remains in the upper-class minority who resent rule by their former serfs.

Estonia. Somewhat similarly, Estonia emerged from the World War an independent state. Polish arms here too played a decisive part in checking the bolshevik tide; for Poland took the brunt of the struggle to the southwestward and the Estonians were able to clear their territory with a resulting peace early in 1920. The same Baltic forces operated in this key to the Gulf of Finland, even to the 1935 swing toward dictatorship abandoned in 1936.

The Problem of Memel. There has been an additional trouble spot, the city of Memel, typical of German colonization territory. Even after 700 years of German rule it contained, according to the German 1910 census, 71,781 inhabitants whose mother tongue was German, and 67,124 whose mother tongue was Lithuanian, whereas, in the Lithuanian census of 1925, 43.51 per cent of Memel's inhabitants characterized themselves as of German nationality, 27.59 per cent of Lithuanian nationality and 25.18 per cent as Memellanders.³ This Germanic town controls the mouth of the river Niemen just as Danzig dominates the Vistula. Though the League of Nations assigned Memel to Lithuania with a considerable degree of autonomy after that republic's troops had entered the place early in 1923, friction between the two peoples mounted steadily. The Third Reich even had troops on the border facing Lithuanian forces in 1935; for this oldest German town of what had been East Prussian territory is on Hitler's schedule of conquest. Though the Lithuanians dread the possibility of Soviet Russian pressure, this fear has become subordinate to the more immediate nazi threat indicated in the

elections held in Memel in December, 1938, in which the national socialists polled 87.1 per cent of the vote under the slogan "Back to the Reich." Berlin is in a position to put pressure on Lithuania if Hitler should want to break up the Polish state, since Memel can become as important in Germany's penetration along the Baltic as Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) in Germany's penetration toward the Black Sea. Lithuania's strategic value is tremendous, especially since Poland's western flank is exposed at Danzig. For that reason both Poland and Germany are now wooing Lithuania, and for that reason Poland made up with Soviet Russia and was again courting France at the very end of 1938.

Finland. Finally there is Finland. Sharing with Sweden the head of the Baltic Sea and isolated from the other states on the south side by the Gulf of Finland, this succession state has felt the gravest mistrust of the Soviet Russian policy. Moscow feels equally the Finnish hostility, a deep hatred of everything Russian, even social revolution, with a countering distrust; soviet leadership has a growing fear of German influence, accelerated by nazi efforts in the 1930's to swing Finland into the fascist column. After all, following the fall of Tsarism in 1917 and the eventual ascendancy of the bolsheviks, Finland's civil war between Whites and Reds resulted in the defeat of the soviet forces because of German military intervention in 1918. The Finns, with their well-established national institutions of government and business, have turned as sharply against the nazi efforts to infiltrate here as previously they opposed the Reds. Finnish fascism, however, embroiled the country with Estonia after a nazi-inspired putsch failed; this has operated against a united Baltic policy amongst the border states in the north just as Polish-Lithuanian difficulties obstructed co-operation in the south.

BORDER-STATE COLLABORATION

Beginning with the critical period marked by the breakup of the old Russian Empire in 1917 and the German revolution in 1918, common action among the border states of the south side of the Baltic became imperative.

Here Polish leadership in the war period and the early 1920's was so successful that it seemed a Baltic league of nations would be a fact. The four states—Lithuania eventually holding aloof because of

the Vilno episode—held repeated conferences. This solidarity became a major obstacle for soviet diplomacy though it did not grow complete enough to justify the entire apprehensions of its opponents. Eventually, too, a three-cornered alliance was worked out between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This alliance was based upon a common fear of a renewed domination from Russia coupled with sharp hostility toward communist doctrines. Both of Lithuania's neighbors, however, have disassociated themselves from any obligation to support the Lithuanian position on this dispute with the nazis.

Nazi ascendancy in Europe has intensified the general alarm up and down the Baltic. The soviets, though they have concluded a general series of non-aggression pacts with all their Baltic neighbors, have been most suspicious of the Finns and the Poles. Moscow, however, is now on the defensive; Finland remains the most dangerous spot for the soviet strategy against nazi Germany. The clearing of the frontier for hundreds of miles is recent testimony to the Red apprehensions; and the mutual exploration of the Atlantic and Arctic sea sides of the Scandinavian Peninsula by both the nazis and the bolsheviks points to good grounds for watchfulness. Moscow feels correctly that Germany is not building sea power once again to challenge Britain; it is directed toward possible attack on the Soviet Union—that dream of Hitler's Baltic friend and theoretician on nazi foreign policy who hoped to run the Berlin foreign office, Alfred Rosenberg. Contrary to Poland's line of effort, too, the nazis have tried to push Finland out of Border-state collaboration. This would give the Finns a pro-scandinavian direction, where the Germans believe, probably overoptimistically, that fascistic sympathies can be developed, detrimental to both Colonel Beck's own Baltic bloc and soviet interests.

NOTES

1. The reader interested in this feature of Baltic life is referred to the *Baltic Year-Book* and to the various papers published in the periodical *Baltic and Scandinavian Countries* (both issued by the Baltic Institute, Gdynia).

2. A socialist motion demanding withdrawal from the League of Nations was defeated a month later by a majority of liberals and conservatives in the Swedish Parliament.

3. Otto D. Tolischus, "Reich Can Use Memel as Pawn in the East," *New York Times*, December 18, 1938.

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CHAPTER 15

DANUBIAN AND BALKAN EUROPE

Joseph Slabey Roucek

The region with which this study deals covers roughly the states which arose on the remains of the former Ottoman and the Hapsburg Empires. For reasons of history, of geography, and of population, the international problems of the Balkans have been intertwined with those in the Danubian basin. Both regions have been subject to the same historical pressures. "Did not the peak of Ottoman prowess in Europe—the victory at Mohacs—give the Hapsburgs their chance to complete the building of an empire? And has not the final exit of Ottoman power from Europe fallen in the same hour as the collapse of its century-old antagonist?"¹

The past and present international relations of the region can be explained, in simple practical terms, by the question: "Who is to dominate the Danubian Europe?" In other words, the attempts of this or that power, in the past as well as in the present, to subdue the region, and the counter-actions resulting from the opposition to such imperialistic ambitions, have been the backbone of the international problems there. If, for a while at least, some power, such as the Ottoman or the Hapsburg Empire, succeeded in dominating a part of this region, its domination was challenged and eventually brought about the empire's downfall.

The Danubian and Balkan regions seem to have been predestined to endless conflicts by the very geography of the region. The most favorable direction for a military entry has always been that of the river Danube, whether the invasion was from the east or from the west.² In the first thousand years of our era the Romans were for five hundred years the lords of the Danubian. During the second five hundred years the domination of the Danube continually changed hands. In modern times, the Turkish thrust which for three centuries had been directed northwestwards along the Danube³

was replaced in the eighteenth century by German pressure exerted in the opposite direction. After the liquidation of the Napoleonic menace, the German and Austro-Hungarian pressure down the Danube to the Balkans was opposed by two other revived thrusts—that from the southwest along the old Roman routes, represented by the *risorgimento* of Italy, and the Russian thrusts to the Balkans and against Turkey around the Black Sea.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire was unwilling, however, to let the Tsar's armies march into the Balkan Peninsula and block the empire's way to the Black Sea or the Aegean, or to continue inspiring the Slavs of the Hapsburgs and of the Balkans to tear the Dual Monarchy apart by their nationalistic ambitions. England, on the other hand, was determined not to allow Russia to control the Mediterranean water highway to India. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Italians also began casting their covetous eye on the Balkans as a part of the world and sea that was once Roman. In fact, Rome had to meet two major foes; not only Pan-Slavism of Russia but also Pan-Germanism. By this time, Germany convinced herself that the Balkans was the necessary springboard for her ambitions for world power. The German-Austro-Hungarian alliance ensured Berlin's connections with the Balkan Peninsula and across it to Asia Minor.

GERMANY'S DREAM OF "MITTELEUROPA"

German foreign policy moved under a beautiful dream—called "Mittleuropa." It envisioned a great and powerful German Empire whose political and economic tentacles should stretch from the North Sea and the Baltic through central Europe to the Bosphorus and across it to Baghdad, the key to the nearest East. German goods would be carried through the Balkans to Constantinople and beyond, and sold in the vast markets of Arabia, despite the French, and, in India, despite the British, as well as in markets in a dozen economically unexploited countries in between. Germany would really dominate Europe and later the Orient—and perhaps eventually the world, itself.³

It was in 1899 that a German company received the first charter from the Sultan to build what came to be known as the Baghdad railway, and in 1903 the construction of the line began in earnest.

This was one of the important factors in Great Britain's renunciation of her isolationist policy and her entrance into the series of treaties forming the Triple Entente.

POST-WAR INTERLUDE

The World War, by attempting to expedite the fulfillment of the dream, broke it. The peace treaties changed the pressure on the Danubian Basin and the Balkans. The satellite of Germany, the huge and unwieldy Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, was broken up. Austria and Hungary were made into separate countries, each much smaller than it had been, and too small to play any important aggressive roles. Poland was again placed on the map of Europe. Czechoslovakia was created out of territory that had been in the Dual Monarchy. Yugoslavia was put together out of the former countries of Serbia and Montenegro and a large slice of Austria-Hungary. Rumania was given part of the former Hungary and some of Bulgaria. The boundaries of Greece and Albania were not changed much, though the Greek boundaries were not settled until after the fighting with Turkey in 1922. Bulgaria, Germany's former ally, lost the Dobrodja, Macedonia, and her territorial access to the Aegean Sea. Russia's experiment in communism will delay, for a while at least, her former interest in the Golden Horn and the Balkans. Soviet Russia has attempted little or no intervention in the Balkans on national or Pan-Slavic lines,⁴ although she is interested, naturally, in preventing German expansion to the Balkans, since she is afraid of losing Ukraine and of having Germany dominate the Dardanelles.

The peace treaties tried to satisfy various racial and nationalistic ambitions by redrawing the boundaries and creating new states. But the peoples were so mixed that racial and political lines could not be made to correspond. Consequently, every one of the countries now contains "minorities" of people who are racially different from the majority, and these minorities are largest in the countries that profited from the war. The new boundaries left a good many Magyars in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, for example. Most of the people in Hungary are resentful because so many Magyars were taken from Hungary and because they believe that those who were taken have been badly treated in their new countries. On the other hand, Hungary's neighbors complain, and not without



— Boundaries of Nazi Germany and Austria —

Germanic peoples now outside these political frontiers

THE NAZI DRIVE TO INCLUDE ALL "LOST GERMANS" IN THE THIRD REICH LEAVES NO NEIGHBOR SECURE. SEPARATIST TACTICS OF TERRORISM, AS AUSTRIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA SHOW, CAN ACCOMPLISH WHAT OPEN WAR MIGHT JEOPARDIZE. THIS SPLITTING OFF OF GERMAN MINORITIES ONLY BEGINS A PROCESS WHICH IS NOW BEING EXTENDED TO COVER AGITATION IN STATES WITH A "BLOOD RELATIONSHIP" TO THE GERMAN FOLK; AND IT ALSO REACHES FAR ACROSS THE EUROPEAN MAP TO ESTABLISH THE NAZI OVERLORDSHIP WHERE GERMAN "CLUSTERS" OF CENTURY-OLD EMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT IN EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE CAN BE USED AS FOCAL POINTS FOR AGITATION.

justice, that non-Hungarian peoples of Hungary are worse off than the Hungarians living in the Little Entente States. Bulgars think they should have southeastern Yugoslavia because so many Bulgars live there. Even the Slavic groups in Yugoslavia—the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes—do not get on well together because the Serbs have more or less monopolized power. The Macedonian problem and the policy of terrorism agitated Europe until recently, and the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey was followed by serious internal and international problems.

In addition, the post-War settlements created new economic difficulties. For example, no consideration was given to the fact that Austria and Hungary were, to a considerable degree, an economic unit. Railway lines and main highways were cut into several parts by the new boundaries, greatly reducing their usefulness. This failure to recognize the economic factors gave additional grounds for ill feelings.

With such backgrounds, it is small wonder that the Danubian and Balkan states did not settle down peacefully immediately after the War. Political upsets, frequently accompanied by assassinations, followed each other in rapid succession in several of these countries. On several occasions, war came very near. Czechoslovakia, which aptly had been called "an island of democracy in a sea of dictatorships," was the only country that escaped such troubles up to 1938.

THE SHADOWS OF THE GREAT POWERS

Back of the bickerings of the Danubian and Balkan states among themselves appear the more dangerous shadows of the Great Powers and their policy of always being ready to use their satellites as pawns in the larger game of European politics. In fact, ever since the World War, international relations of the region have hinged on two major conflicts: the efforts of Italy and then of Germany to replace French and British influence in the Danubian Basin and the Balkans; and the struggle between the centripetal force of some form of Danubian co-operation, with Franco-British encouragement, and the centrifugal pull of the new German *Drang nach Osten*. The region has remained in a state of almost continual effervescence, not only because of the universal post-War tendency to promote self-sufficiency within even the smallest economic units and the division of

that part of the world into victorious status-quo nations and defeated revisionist states, but also, and probably for the most part, because of the tendency of the great powers to impose their own rivalries and differences on the Danubian states which are now wavering between camps of pro and anti-fascist sympathizers, between pro-status-quo and revisionist countries, and between friends of France, Italy, and Germany.

For fifteen years after the war, Danubian and Balkan Europe was an arena for clashing French and Italian interests. The second period began when a third rival, Germany, appeared on the scene, and systematically developed her *Mittleuropa* policy. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in September, 1938, by Hitler, in co-operation with Mussolini, Chamberlain, and Daladier, inaugurated the end of an epoch, the end of the whole system of collective security, a formal abdication by the Western democracies of their influence in the Danubian Basin, and the beginning of the third period.

THE PERIOD OF FRENCH HEGEMONY

The first period, the period of absolute French preponderance, lasted until October, 1933. During that time central and Balkan Europe faced only the danger from Hungary, soviet Russia, the hopes of the Hapsburg legitimists, and the steps taken by Italy to break down the domination of the region by Paris. Within this framework, each of the capitals of this region developed its own peculiar foreign policy.

Czechoslovakia. The foreign policy of Czechoslovakia was very simple in theory, and yet very complex in application. Like every satiated state, Czechoslovakia wanted to hold what she had and to live at peace with her neighbors. Under the able direction of Dr. Eduard Beneš, a consistent foreign policy was soon evolved on this principle. This, in brief, consisted of "Western orientation"—reliance but not absolute dependence on France and sincere support of the League of Nations. Very soon, also, as an answer to Hungarian irredentism, the Little Entente was formed. From these main lines the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia did not depart, much to its later misfortune, until September, 1938, when Paris deserted its ally "for the sake of peace." These developments, however, had been foreshadowed by the advent of Hitler. An alliance was concluded with

Russia, complementary to the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance, guaranteeing military protection of her borders in the event of invasion—both compromised in September, 1938.

Hungary. By the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary lost more than two thirds of her pre-War territory and three fifths of her population. Her possessions were distributed among six states: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. "Treaty revision" has become a national obsession of the Hungarians. Little Magyar children are still taught the pre-War boundaries of their country. They are told that their Hungarian brothers are under "temporary" alien rule beyond the post-War frontiers. *Nem, nem, soha* ("No, No, Never") has become the battle cry of the entire nation. Unlike its neighbors, Hungary has never belonged to the French system; her interests, grievances, and post-War position have naturally aligned her with Germany. Furthermore, Mussolini has built up his "Il Duce Line" of diplomatic fortifications by exploiting Magyar bitterness.

Rumania. Rumania, like Yugoslavia, was also interested in central European affairs and in the preservation of the status quo in regard to Hungary, the Soviet Republic, and Bulgaria. Hence her foreign policy maintained friendship and alliance with France and the Little and Balkan Ententes.⁵ The fear that Russia might ask for the return of Bessarabia prevented closer relations with Moscow for fifteen years. With the growing fear of Hitler, Stalin was induced to sign a Soviet-Rumanian pact of non-aggression in 1933, but they were not too enthusiastic friends. Of Rumania's Balkan neighbors, Yugoslavia is the one with which Rumania has enjoyed the closest relations, and Belgrade is absolutely opposed to the soviet regime.

Yugoslavia. Fundamentally, as one of the succession states, Yugoslavia must be on the side of the status quo. This dictated her support of the League of Nations, her alliance with France and the Little and Balkan Ententes—for all her friends were one way or another supremely interested in the maintenance of the Peace Treaties.

Greece. The fundamental lines of foreign policies of each of the Balkan countries are determined less by the centripetal forces of the region, and more by the centrifugal pulls, the forces relating each country to the neighboring or the Great Powers. This is especially obvious in the case of Greece, which is geographically interested not

only in the Balkans but also in the Mediterranean. Her close proximity to important eastern routes to the Suez Canal, the complexity of the Greek coastline, which can afford excellent protection to warships and military transports, and the complete dependence of her economic life and security upon sea communications force Greece to maintain friendly relations with Italy, Great Britain, France, and Turkey. The century-old policy of irredentist aggrandizement, enhanced by the desire of the Greek irredenta beyond the country's borders to liberate from alien rule, culminated in a decade of war and diplomacy, 1912 to 1922, which resulted in the gathering of the bulk of the Greek people within the borders of Greece. Since then, Greece has been interested in providing security for the state. Hence the major objectives of her foreign policy have been peace and an opposition to any kind of revisionism.

Although both Greece and Turkey have favored peace since the conclusion of their conflict in 1923, a series of disputes between Athens and Ankara, following the Peace of Lausanne in 1923, concerning the compulsory exchange of populations, irritated both countries for another half decade. Finally both countries signed a treaty of neutrality, conciliation, arbitration, and friendship on October 30, 1930, and followed it with a ten-year pact of amity and non-aggression on September 14, 1933. The fear of Italian pressure on Asia Minor and the Greek islands led both countries to add to these two treaties another, of April 29, 1938, signed in Athens, providing for co-operation in case of an attack by a third power.

Relations between Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, all of which emerged from the World War with substantial territorial gains, have been distinctly friendly in character. Great Britain has historical traditions and sentimental ties with Greece, and the commercial relations and the British fleet are of import to the Greeks. France appeals with her culture to the intelligentsia of the country; but the masses are still aware of the part that France played in the Turco-Greek struggle. As far as Italy is concerned, the Greek is convinced that the Dodecanese Islands belong by right to Greece and not to Italy. The bombardment of Corfu in 1923 by the Italian fleet remains bitterly impressed on the memories of the Greeks. As a status-quo nation, she exchanged with Great Britain, together with Turkey and Yugoslavia, reciprocal assurances of support during the

Ethiopian crisis. Germany has a large trade with the land of Hellas and, as it lies in the path of the renewed Berlin-Baghdad pressure, the Germanophile tendencies of the present dictator, General Metaxas, are causing concern in Great Britain and France.

Bulgaria. Suffering heavy territorial losses as a result of the Balkan Wars and the World War, Bulgaria is the most discontented of the Balkan powers, and believes that revision of the Treaty of Neuilly alone can assure her economic development. The Bulgarian Government is particularly anxious to secure an outlet to the Aegean Sea, and demands territorial readjustment in Thrace, which would give it a railway corridor and control of either Kavalla or Dedeagath of the Aegean. Bulgaro-Greek relations have also been envenomed by Bulgaria's assertions that Greece has failed to protect the rights of Macedonians under the minorities treaties. At various times the support of Rome of the revisionist bloc made Italy popular in Bulgaria; coupled with it is the fact that the popular queen is a former Italian princess.

Albania. The geographic location of Albania pulls that country between the Italian and the Balkan interests. Italy has invested considerable money in that little kingdom for three reasons. She needs Albania to cork up, in case of war, the entrance to the Adriatic Sea. Rome possesses the rock of Saseno which, owing to its strategic position at the mouth of the Bay of Vallona, opposite Italy's heel, commands the straits of Otranto and could, therefore, act, in case of a conflict, as a more effective stopper to bottle up the Adriatic. Albania, furthermore, is the most convenient door for entrance to the Balkans, as well as another military point of attack against Yugoslavia. Third, oil wells of Albania might become useful some day to the Italian motorized army. Italy's former conflicts with Yugoslavia strengthened Albania's fear of Yugoslav invasion, and Yugoslavia, in turn, believes that Italy will use Albania as a base for incursions into Yugoslav territory. In addition, Albania claims that about 600,000 Albanians in Yugoslavia are deprived of their cultural and political rights, and has aligned herself with Bulgaria in her steady stream of complaints on the minorities question. In 1928, for instance, Albania appealed to the League of Nations against Greek policy in respect to Albanian minorities and the liquidation of large Albanian estates under the Greek program of agrarian reform.

Today, however, Albania has become a link between Italy and Yugoslavia instead of a bone of contention, as in the past, because the countries on both sides of the Adriatic have a common fear of German expansion southward and a common interest in blocking the advance. The port of Trieste, for the first time in history near the German frontier, is valuable only as an outlet on the Mediterranean, and Italy can block that outlet if she controls Albania.

The Little Entente. As already indicated, from the standpoint of geographical interests, Rumania and Yugoslavia belong also to central Europe, and were thus partners in the Little Entente with Czechoslovakia. These states came together in 1921 with a single aim—to maintain the boundaries established by the peace treaties. To this end they concluded bilateral agreements providing military guarantees against aggression by Hungary or Bulgaria, and collaborated in resisting all threats to the existing order. In later agreements, the governments arranged to act together in international relations, and a start was made toward getting rid of tariffs on each other's goods.

The Little Entente found its chief supporter in France, which was also vitally interested in maintaining the order of the peace treaties. French sponsorship of the group, however, was limited chiefly to moral encouragement and a certain amount of financial assistance. Paris's only definite commitment was the mutual aid treaty with Czechoslovakia, negotiated in 1925 as an adjunct to the Locarno Pacts. With Rumania and Yugoslavia Paris had merely pacts of non-aggression and consultation.

The Rivalry of Paris and Rome. For the fifteen years after the World War, only Italy disputed French hegemony in the Balkans. Rome gained far less by the peace treaties than she believed herself entitled to, and soon manifested a desire to better her position in the Adriatic region at the expense of Yugoslavia. Under the circumstances, France gave moral, financial, and diplomatic support to Belgrade in the diplomatic conflicts between Rome and Belgrade, intensified particularly by the signature of the Italo-Albanian Pact of Tirana of November 27, 1926, and the Italo-Albanian defensive alliance of 1927 (extended by subsequent renewals).

The rivalry of Paris and Rome must be viewed also in the light of the prestige policy of Italy, which followed a policy of blackmail,


with its parallel, the encouraging of revisionist aims. Mussolini had at various times publicly proclaimed the necessity for treaty revision, thus favoring the aims of Hungary and Bulgaria. Time and time again he made a number of efforts to play a dominant role in the Danubian Basin, and tried to effect some sort of organization which would rival the French influence exerted through the Little Entente. Nevertheless, Mussolini, with all his efforts—including large purchases from Yugoslavia, generous overtures to Bulgaria, maritime co-operation with Greece, sedulous cultivation of the “Latin” ties with Rumania, and cordial exchanges with Turkey—was unable to overcome the distrust caused by Italian footholds on the east coast of the Adriatic or the suspicion of *pourboires* to rebellious Macedonians.

THE WANING HEGEMONY OF FRANCE


In 1933 the French hold on the European order began to dissolve and the second period began. Hitler became chancellor of the Reich on January 30, 1933, and in October dealt a blow to the League by breaking off relations with Geneva. His other steps against the peace treaties indicated that the status quo was being threatened. The Balkan Pact was one aspect of the efforts to maintain the system.

The Balkan Entente. Ever since the World War, vain attempts have been made to substitute some form of “Danubian Confederation” for a hegemony of one dominant power. The moves encountered two principal obstacles, one political and the other economic. The universal post-War tendency to seek self-sufficiency within even the smallest economic units prevented the realization of any far-reaching scheme of economic co-operation, including the Little Entente. The division of Europe into victorious status-quo powers and defeated revisionist states, plus the tendency of the great states to impose their own rivalries and dissensions on the Danubian and Balkan states, checkmated attempts at either political or economic union, with the exception of an impotent and weak Balkan Union.⁶

On February 9, 1934, four Balkan nations—Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia—signed a non-aggression pact. The spade-work for its realization had been prepared by the Rumanian-Greek treaty of non-aggression and arbitration, 1928, the Rumanian-Bul-



A N D B A R R I E R A N D H I G H W A Y




SEE HOW THE CENTRAL POSITION HELD BY GERMANY DOMINATES THE EUROPEAN SCENE.

↑
PRE-WAR COMMUNICATIONS

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AS THE KEY TO POWER, WITH ITS FORTRESS-LIKE COMMAND OVER THE ROAD EASTWARD

POST-WAR COMMUNICATIONS →



garian property settlement of 1930, the disposition of Greco-Yugoslav difficulties with reference to Salonica in March, 1929, the Greco-Turkish treaty of neutrality, conciliation, arbitration, and friendship of 1930, a treaty of friendship between Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1925, renewed in 1933, and the Turkish-Bulgarian treaty of neutrality, arbitration, and conciliation of 1929, renewed in 1933. Furthermore, the Balkan Conferences, although a semi-official and private gathering of delegates, experts, and observers, held for the first time in October, 1930, at Athens, and thereafter in other Balkan cities, taught the Balkan statesmen the methods of co-operation. But back of the Balkan Pact had been the continuous weakening of the League of Nations, Germany's new aggressive attitude, and the growing fear that the Balkan states might be more than ever again pawns in the game played by the Great Powers before the World War. Furthermore, the effects of the great economic crisis had been fully felt and loans from England and the United States had no longer been forthcoming. The Balkan Entente was the result of a growing recognition that the Balkan states were dependent on each other, and agreed in effect to let bygones be bygones in their former disputes and to deal like friends in the future.

Yet, the importance of the Balkan Pact must not be exaggerated. Albania was never invited to join on account of her subservience to Italy, who saw in the new bloc a threat to her supremacy in the Adriatic. Consequently, the far-reaching military 'guarantees at first envisaged were whittled down to a simple guarantee of assistance against an unprovoked attack on any of its members' Balkan frontier by another Balkan state. Bulgaria, when approached later, declined to join it for it was felt that to adhere to the accord in the making of which Sofia had had no part would be to legalize anew in a humiliating way the territorial losses she so recently had suffered. But the rapid and successive changes of governments since 1934 reduced the pro-Macedonian elements in Bulgaria and enabled her to sign a treaty of "eternal friendship" with Belgrade on January 24, 1937. On July 31, 1938, an agreement was reached by Bulgaria and the states of the Balkan Entente. By this pact Bulgaria's neighbors abrogated the military clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly and the Convention of Lausanne, by which the former ally of the defeated Powers was obliged to limit her military forces, including the police,

to 31,000 men, and to maintain a demilitarized zone on the Greek and Turkish frontiers. In restoring military freedom to Bulgaria, the signatories entered into a general pact of non-aggression. The most interesting aspect of this move was that it foreshadowed—for a very brief period of time—the rise of what might have developed into a new power in Europe—the realization of the old dream of a federation of the states of the Balkan Peninsula.

Germany's Renewed "Push to the East." While Italy was engaged in the Ethiopian venture, Germany took advantage of the situation to establish her hold on central and Balkan Europe. Even the steps taken by Russia—the joining of the League of Nations in September, 1934, and the Franco-Soviet Treaty of May 2, 1935, followed by the Czechoslovak-Russian Treaty of May 16, 1935—could not stop the growing pressure exerted by Germany. The Ethiopian crisis and the obvious weakness of France and Britain when confronted by the march of Hitler's troops into the demilitarized zone of the Rhine demonstrated it. The situation was complicated further by the fact that France was unwilling to guarantee unconditionally the Danubian order without the endorsement of England, and England showed very little direct interest in central and Balkan Europe. This helped Hitler to develop systematically the old dream *Drang nach Osten* stronger than ever, now with the help of the Berlin-Rome axis. In no uncertain terms Berlin announced that all German minorities must be brought under the sway of the Third Reich—a rationalization of German imperialism. That it is only "rationalization," not promoted by humanitarian motives, is evidenced by Hitler's failure to mention some 280,000 Germans in Italy's Tyrol.

Germany's desire to restore her pre-War and wartime influence over Danubian and Balkan Europe, which stretches on both sides of the "transversal Eurasian axis," entailed the necessity of bringing the Danubian and the Balkan nations within the orbit of her power. Direct advance overland on this Hamburg-Basra axis is prevented by the Black Sea, which may be passed either on the south via the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, that is the Balkans, or on the north along the southwestern slopes of the Caucasus, along a route once used in the opposite direction by Mithridates on his march towards the Danubian Basin. Hence the interest of Hitler in "saving the world from communism" and in Ukrania and in the Balkans.

On this axis are the most powerful air bases of the Old World—the naphtha fields of Rumania and Mosul. Rumania and Yugoslavia, as well as Ukraina, are also great granaries which would prevent a recurrence of the lack of food in Germany in a coming war and prevent the repetition of the World War experiences. The Balkans are to Germany what the West once was to America. The Danubian states there are long overrun, long settled, but still untamed and undeveloped, a sort of back-door colony, a kind of last frontier along the Danube and the Black Sea. Unfortunately, Czechoslovakia and Rumania protected not only the routes to the Danubian Basin and the Balkans but also those to Ukraine. It is therefore comprehensible that Hitler fulminated against the Russian-Czechoslovak alliance.

The maneuvering of Berlin in the region took three distinct aspects. The first was an attempt to bring the internal governments of the various states under German influence, either directly, as in the case of Austria and Sudeten Deutschland, by pure nazi propaganda among the Germans or indirectly through the encouragement of indigenous organizations of national-chauvinistic, fascist, and Germanophile propaganda and conspiracy among the non-German element.⁷ The second sought to make various governments dependent on Germany by means of various economic machinations. This is a determined effort to split up the existing international blocs (the Little and the Balkan Entente), and attract their members separately into making bilateral arrangements 'with the German Government, or at least into adopting a policy of independent "neutrality." The third was that of sabre-rattling and ultimatums. A nazi army massed on the Austrian border; Germany mobilized for war, armed the so-called refugee army on the Czech border, and Hitler's rasping voice shouted to the world that he would march in on August 1, 1938. The success of this threefold policy is heralded as the turning point in the history of central and Danubian Europe.

Since this area has been the field of the tournament of shadows from which Hitler has emerged the undisputed champion, it is necessary at this point to review several of the major tilts even at the risk of some overlapping with other chapters.

The Amputation of Czechoslovakia. A glance at the map will show that the first steps in Hitler's *Drang nach Osten*, predicted and outlined in detail in *Mein Kampf* almost ten years before his ascent

to power, must be taken across Czechoslovakia and Austria—two states standing in the way. So Schuschnigg was tricked and Austria became a part of the Reich in March, 1938. The German aggressor brought on the crisis of May 20 and 21, 1938, when the defiant stand of Prague against the encroaching invasion of Czechoslovakia and the growing temporary self-confidence of France and England stopped Hitler's armies from repeating the Austrian coup. For a few short weeks this "last democracy of the Rhine" retained its territorial integrity.

Before reciting the decisive events of October, 1938, it is desirable to go back over the events leading up to the Munich Conference.

The Germans of Czechoslovakia—they numbered 3,231,718 (or 22.32 per cent of the Czechoslovak population, according to the census of 1930)—had not been acquired from Germany, contrary to popular conception.⁸ Czechs and Germans lived together for eight centuries in Bohemia, the German element having come in from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries as colonists at the invitation of the Czech princes (later kings). Never were the areas settled by Germans who had been themselves a component part of the German Empire or an independent element in the former Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, the Sudeten Germans within the territory of Czechoslovakia were not themselves a homogenous group. On the contrary, they were split up, on the one hand, into a number of larger groups in the frontier districts of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and scattered, on the other hand, in language enclaves or fragments mixed up with the Czech population of those provinces.

Reduced from the position of the dominant element to that of a minority in the Czechoslovak state, the Germans naturally resented the new set-up. The effects of the depression helped Hitler to gain increasing influence in the German districts of Czechoslovakia. Whereas the German nazis could blame everything on a malicious outer world and the Jew, the Sudeten Germans could blame the Czechs for all their troubles. Hitler put new hope into the hearts of many Germans (although not all Sudeten Germans were followers of Hitler and Henlein) and particularly of those who thought that they would be again "upper dogs" in the "reorganized Europe" under Hitler.

Led by the forty-year-old Henlein—war veteran, one-time bank clerk, and gymnasium teacher—the followers of Hitler carried on at first a secret but eventually an open nazi agitation. Henlein was used by Berlin as the Trojan horse, and tried by every kind of propaganda, by open and secret terrorization, by boycotting and by blackmail, to force the entire German-speaking population to line up behind him, in order to exert more effective pressure on the Czechoslovak government. Furthermore, Prague was continuously accused of being a communist outpost in Europe, of being honeycombed with soviet military roads, dotted with soviet aerodromes, and completely under the sway of soviet officials.⁹

The technique of Henlein was directed by Berlin, whose “minimum” demands could never be met by the Czechoslovak Government, simply because more and more was asked from the yielding representatives of Prague. This is now understandable, since the problem of the German minority in Czechoslovakia was really a question of the desire of Germany to establish a new empire, to conquer the *transversal Eurasian axis*. After all, it was not to Hitler’s interest to have his followers satisfied in Czechoslovakia and thus stop his ambitions to conquer *Mittleuropa*.

The tension over the German demands for the right of “racial self-determination,” checked temporarily by the readiness of Prague to fight it out on May 21, increased again during July and August. The German propaganda machine hurled invectives and diatribes at Czechoslovakia. In early September stories of atrocities against the Sudetens screamed from the German press. Then followed the rattling of arms and an ultimatum—German troops would cross the Czech border on October the first. Beneš appealed to his allies and was assured that their alliances could be counted on. Prime Minister Chamberlain flew from London to Berchtesgarden, and Hitler outlined his terms of peace. On Sunday, September 18, Premier Daladier conferred with Chamberlain in London, and Czechoslovakia was advised to accept Hitler’s terms; on Tuesday she acquiesced “with pain.” On Thursday Chamberlain flew again to Godesberg, and the following day the conference collapsed. The “new terms” were too much even for the Tory leader of Britain, and Czechoslovakia was advised, in diplomatic terminology, to mobilize. The world girded itself for war, and London and Paris “dug-in” for air raids.

Then on Thursday, one week later and only a few hours before the expiration of the ultimatum, Mussolini telephoned Hitler, and the "1938 Big Four" met in Munich to accept dictation from Germany.

The famous Four-Power Pact was signed at midnight. Czechoslovakia, "by pressure of France and England," accepted, and on schedule, 2:00 P.M., on October 1, German troops crossed the Czech border and the period of evacuation and occupation of Sudetenland began. The first two steps in the *Drang nach Osten* had been taken without firing a shot. Western Europe, the formally democratic Europe, had abdicated its leadership to Hitler and Mussolini. The elaborate post-War system of military and financial ties between Paris and the capitals of central and eastern Europe, which had made France the Continent's "gendarme and banker," caved in.

The stripping of Czechoslovakia of one fifth of her territory and population by the Munich accord was utilized by Poland and Hungary in getting their share of the spoils. In September Poland sent an ultimatum to Prague and her troops subsequently occupied the Teschén district. She justified the annexation of 120,000 Czechs and 18,000 Germans in order to "liberate" 80,000 Poles, on the ground of restoring the situation existing in 1918. During November certain portions of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia were allotted to Hungary by the arbitration of Germany's and Italy's representatives.

NAZI PENETRATION ALONG THE BERLIN-BAGHDAD AXIS

The destruction of Austria's independence and the methods utilized against Czechoslovakia throw valuable light on what is afoot in all Danubian and Balkan states. "More fatal to Austria," reported G. E. R. Gedye, "even than the demagogic propaganda among the masses and the folly of the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg regimes, and more important even than the invasion of 100,000 picked troops, was the conspiracy to betray their country organized so successfully from Berlin among the State's executive forces."¹⁰

Hungary. The elimination of Czechoslovakia as a political and military factor opened the gate to the East. Hungary is standing at that gate and is now economically a German colony. She now appears on the road toward establishing a nazi regime herself, promoted by Count Alexander Festetics, Dr. Ferenc Reiniss, and,

the strongest of them all, Major Ferenc Szalasi (sentenced in 1938 to three years' imprisonment for conspiracy against the state). His latest strength is permeation of the army, where a high proportion of the junior officers adhere to his movement. Dr. Reiniss works among state officials, whom he organizes on a semi-conspiratorial basis. Count Festetics, like Major Szalasi, works among the 3,000,000 landless and unemployed peasantry. One third of the land is still held by great landowners, while thousands of peasants are landless and eking out a bare existence. The government's method of appeasement has been to grant, in a small measure, some of the things that nazism has promised. Jewish participation in professional life and in individual commercial undertakings has been restricted to 20 per cent. Although the German minority of 500,000 in Hungary is only about 7 per cent of the population, it wields a considerable influence; German agents, sometimes in the guise of tramps or peddlers, spread their ideology in the Schwabian villages and in every section where there is any group of the Teutons.¹¹

Germany has also been wooing Hungary diplomatically. Admiral Horthy, regent of this diminished kingdom without a king, was invited to visit Germany in August, 1938, and was the first foreign ruler to review the new German fleet and inspect the formidable refortifications at Heligoland and the Kiel Canal.

That Hitler did not give his full support to Hungary's total claims in Slovakia and Ruthenia was understandable: in order to reach Ukraine the road there must be kept open, unhampered by another "corridor" between Hungary and Poland formed out of Czechoslovakia's Carpathian Ruthenia.

Rumania. Of all the nazi fronts, next to Czechoslovakia, the Rumanian sector has been witnessing the most intense nazi offensive. The three-quarter-million German minority is only one of the pro-nazi coalitions in Rumania. Though Herr Fabrizius, the Transylvania Hitler, and his lieutenants were busily carrying on their agitation among the Teutons in the Banat, in the Saxon cities (Siebenburgen) of Transylvania, and in Bukovina, the real struggle was in Bucharest where the anti-Semitic parties waged turbulent warfare. These included: the Iron Guard, the Rumanian Front of Vaida-Voevod, the National Christian Party of Goga and Cuza, the "All for the Fatherland" group of Cantacuzino and Codreanu, and the National Cor-

poratist League of Manoilescu. The liberal premier, Duca, was killed in 1933, and Titulescu, another Francophile, is now living abroad, afraid for his life. It was only in the spring of 1938 that the Rumanian authorities gave up their extraordinary amount of official tolerance and took steps against the public terror of Zelea Codreanu's Iron Guard, asked him to explain the origin of 40,000,000 lei received "from abroad" and spent in one month's electoral propaganda, and sentenced him for high treason. After the visit of King Carol to England, France, and Germany at the end of 1938, the Rumanian authorities executed Codreanu and most of his followers. The relationship of the Codreanu movement to Berlin was revealed by the subsequent threats against these actions of the Rumanian King.

But Rumania will probably not resist the German tiger now. By the laws of geography and economics, both countries are natural commercial complements. France is far off and, at any rate, should the Rumanians prove recalcitrant, Germany can encourage Hungary and Bulgaria to ask for restoration of the territory torn away from them by the peace treaties. King Carol is not allowed to forget all these facts under the attacks of the astute and ceaseless German propaganda: friendly visits of representatives of the Hitler Youth and the German Strength through Joy movement; German trade representatives and other business groups; and German money lavishly employed, openly and secretly, where it will do the most good.

Yugoslavia. The visit of Premier Stoiadinovitch to Berlin in January, 1938, the first Yugoslav statesman to pay his respects personally to Berlin, gave Germany a chance to regard her new intimacy with Belgrade as a means of separating Yugoslavia from France and the Little Entente. The Munich agreement was a severe blow to Yugoslav democrats, while it strengthened the premier's position. The anti-German forces in Yugoslavia are now helpless. The strongest semi-nazi movement, *Zobor*, with Dimitriu Liotich as leader, is known to have received large subventions from Germany, amounting to something like 200,000,000 dinars,¹² conveyed by payment of special prices for agricultural products that *Zobor* co-operatives exported and by the dispatch to *Zobor* of large quantities of machinery from Germany to be sold without returning payment.

Despite the kingdom's distance from Germany, nazi agents have been at work among the German minority, the largest and, by

reason of its relatively high cultural and economic level, the most important group. About half a million Germans are scattered throughout the kingdom, though the majority is located in the Batchka, in the Banat, and north of the Sava. Anti-Semitic agitation, previously unknown to the south Slav State, is a symptom of the campaign directed from the Reich. Nazi infiltration into the *Kulturbund* has led to the dissolution of certain of its branches, notably those in Velika Kikinda, Novi Sad, and Maribor. However, Germany's most effective propaganda in the kingdom is the economic arm of the Reich.

Bulgaria. The exponent of nazism in Bulgaria is Professor Alexander Tsankoff, and "cultural" propaganda is carried on by the Germano-Bulgarian Association. The struggle for the reorientation of Bulgars is carried on also on another front. In the spirit of Hitler's racialism, an attempt is being made to deny the Slav background of the Bulgars and proclaim them the relatives of the Turanians. Recently a map appeared in Germany, upon which the Bulgars are classified as Mongols and the country is shown in the same color as Hungary.

Greece. German influence has increased in Greece since Premier Metaxas' coup of August, 1936. The Germanophile tendencies of the dictator are marked. He was a staff officer in imperial Germany, and was closely associated with King Constantine, a ruler of Greece whose strong pro-German sympathies cost him his throne. He has been working with the German military circles, and has made his country largely dependent upon German trade, in spite of the hopes of the liberal forces in the kingdom. These had hoped that King George, because of his personal friendship with England—where he had spent most of the twelve years of his exile—would counteract the pro-German movement; but the king has not done so. This is evidenced also from the fact that growing anti-Semitic agitation is now reaching Greece where heretofore anti-Semitism had been unknown or known only in an extremely mild form.

THE ECONOMIC OCTOPUS

The economic penetration of the Balkans by the nazis has its political as well as economic reasons.¹³ Germany needs oil, grain, cotton, fats, coffee, raw materials of every kind for its enormous

rearmament program. Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece (and Turkey) produce many of the things that Germany needs: grain, petroleum, cotton, pigs, foodstuffs, pyrites, and raw materials. The long-range policy aims to conquer the Balkans and acquire the control of these basic commodities. The current policy is to manipulate international relations with the Balkans in such a way as to prepare for the eventual expansion and also to import these commodities by economic aggression. Normal trade is impossible because of the German policy of autarchy—self-sufficiency. The genius of Dr. Hjalmar Horace Schacht answered this dilemma by his policy before his resignation in 1937.

The technique seems originally to have been largely the result of accident. Germany found herself unable to sell enough of her products abroad to pay for the imports she had to have in order to supply her industries and feed her people. In 1930, a severe economic crisis occurred in the region, and no relief came until the summer of 1936, when Schacht captured most of the trade by buying the surplus of goods of her eastern neighbors, without paying anything on account. When pressed for settlement Germany denied being able to pay cash, and virtually gave her creditors the choice of going unpaid or else taking more of her own goods in payment. Later, as the policy developed, it was refined. More goods were bought on credit than she herself needed, and the surpluses were sold to other countries for cash. Thus she obtained cash with which to buy goods in countries that refused her credit, and at the same time forced her creditors to buy more from her. This policy naturally was most effective with weaker countries, searching for markets for their products at almost any cost. To stop the growing resentment of the Balkan nations, payments are made through a complicated clearing system which works out largely to the advantage of Germany.

Moreover, Germany's economic position in southeastern Europe, already very strong as a result of five years of energetic activity by Dr. Schacht, has now become, thanks to the inclusion of Austrian trade in that of the Reich, overwhelmingly predominant. This is indicated in the following table showing the share of Germany and Austria combined in the foreign trade of the five Danubian countries in 1937:

	Exports to Germany and Austria	Imports from Germany and Austria
Czechoslovakia	21% (of the total)	19% (of the total)
Hungary .	41	44
Yugoslavia	35	43
Rumania .	27	38
Bulgaria	47	58

Only in the case of Czechoslovakia had Germany's share in her trade, both exports and imports, substantially declined. Late in 1936 Greece, for instance, had sold 33,000,000 reichsmarks worth of goods in Berlin, Yugoslavia 21,000,000, Rumania 18,000,000 million, and Bulgaria 13,000,000. These balances were in marks, which these countries could not take out of Germany to show for it. In the case of Greece, for example, the Germans had bought Greek tobacco in large quantities, establishing a kind of purchasing monopoly. Bulgaria, in a terrible situation since the United States had ceased buying Bulgarian tobacco, had been glad to sell to Berlin Bulgaria's chief produce, and take in return German engineering products, railway material, and armaments. Germany takes 60 per cent of the Hungarian agricultural produce but does not pay for this in cash, only in manufactured goods, which comprise such things as thermometers, safety razors, household utensils, and, above all, armament equipment—things one cannot eat, and the market for which, when there is a market, is strictly limited. Most of Yugoslavia's foodstuffs and raw materials are being exchanged with Germany under a clearing arrangement that provides German-manufactured goods in return. What Germany gives in return comprises munitions, war material, and minor articles that the Yugoslav peasant does not greatly prize—harmonicas, thermometers, and safety razors—and does not need.¹⁴ As far as any direct benefits to these states are concerned, the frozen credits in Berlin are liquidated, in the case of Yugoslavia, for instance, by having the Krupps of Essen construct the Zenitz ironworks at a cost of 750,000 pounds.

Taking advantage of the general nervousness in the Danubian and Balkan countries caused by the Munich Agreement, Economics Minister Walther Funk continued in the fall of 1938 the trade drive to the eastward initiated by Schacht. He negotiated a new trade

agreement with Yugoslavia. Bulgaria, who had just obtained a large loan from France, floated another in Germany for armament. A new trade treaty between Germany and Rumania was negotiated. On the other end of the Berlin-Baghdad line, Funk granted a credit of 150,000,000 marks to Turkey a few days after the Czechoslovak crisis.

FUTURE TRENDS

The new "A. M." ("After Munich") epoch in Europe's international relations will be characterized by a hegemony of Germany over Continental Europe which not only has ended the previous French hegemony but also has terminated the British policy of balance of power that permitted London to act as an arbiter in all European affairs. The helplessness against the international commission created to implement the Munich "peace," as well as the settlement of the fate of Slovakia and Carpathian Russia through Hitler's "mediation" to the virtual exclusion of the other three Munich partners, are the indications of a new order. France has been reduced to a second-rate power and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's "no-war pact" with Herr Hitler, which ignores France, is tacit British recognition of that situation.

The elimination of France and Britain from central and eastern Europe also means the collapse of the collective security that had guarded the little nations. The Pact of the League of Nations is practically of no value to the Danubian states. Equally inconsequential are all such agreements as the Pact of Paris (Kellogg Pact) and the Little and Balkan Entente agreements.

Facing Germany alone, the Danubian and Balkan states will hasten to co-ordinate themselves with Germany in their foreign, domestic, and economic policies. Nominally sovereign states, these nations will become, to a large degree, German economic colonies by the reorganization of their economies to supplement Germany's economy and the extension of their trade with Germany to such an extent that they will become nearly entirely dependent upon it.

It may not be amiss to point out that the World War was fought on such issues as the insistence that a treaty is more than "just a scrap of paper" and "to make the world safe for democracy." By the Munich Agreement the Western democracies made "scraps of

paper" out of the peace treaties which they dictated at Versailles, in addition to all subsequent documents of collective security, and have now "made the world safe for dictatorships."

The causes for this diplomatic revolution are many and deep seated. Among them are the heart-breaking desire of the European people to keep peace at any price; the unwillingness of the powerful, moneyed, and privileged classes of England, as represented by Chamberlain, to weaken further their dominant position in the social structure of the country and to loosen even more the snapping bonds of the empire's relations; the preference of Hitlerism to Stalinism in Europe as far as Chamberlain and Daladier are concerned; and the hope that the German and Russian giants may eventually bleed themselves white and thereby permit Britain to become again a supreme arbitrator on the Continent. The internal weakness of the social system of France, the passing of the strong men of France—Poincaré, Clemenceau, Cambon, Barthou—and the military situation created by the Maginot and "Siegfried" lines contributed in Daladier's decision to sell Czechoslovakia "down the river."

Russia showed unexpected weakness in defending Czechoslovakia when, during the major crisis, Moscow hid behind the condition of French participation and later when she did not move to prevent Poland from chopping off a piece of territory from the little republic. Yet, it is clear that it would have been to Russia's interest to stop Hitler with the help of France and Czechoslovakia at that propitious moment because der Führer has made no secret of his profound hostility toward communism and of his desire for eastward expansion in the direction of Ukrania. In addition to probable internal weakness, Russia was threatened with possible war on two fronts—Germany on the west and Japan on the east. Furthermore, Russian land aid to Czechoslovakia would not have been a simple matter, since rail and road transportation from Russia to Czechoslovakia must cross Rumania and is deplorably inadequate. Moscow, at any rate, never believed that Britain would fight for Czechoslovakia—and Stalin was right.

The first round of Germany's bid to establish her hegemony over Europe is significant far beyond its material gains, large as these admittedly are. The Czechs paid a high price for maintaining the

temporary European peace by handing over to Germany 11,583 square miles, a territory the size of Belgium, and 3,615,830 population from Sudeten Germany. This included a Czech minority estimated at 719,000 persons, some 14,000,000 tons of Czechoslovakia's brown coal output, 13,000,000 tons of hard coal, 40 per cent of her metal industry, two thirds of her glass industry, 49 per cent of her textile output, and 30 per cent of her shoe and leather industry.

The next moves of Hitler are not hard to predict, since he states in his *Mein Kampf* that

The German Reich as a State must embrace all Germans; its duty is not only to rally and to preserve the most valuable original racial elements, but to lead them onwards, slowly, but surely, to a position of dominance. . . . We National Socialists must unwaveringly keep to the aim of our foreign policy: to secure the soil due to the German people on this earth. . . . We start anew where we terminated six centuries ago. We reverse the eternal Germanic migration to the South and to the West of Europe and look Eastwards. . . . If we speak to-day in Europe of new soil we can but think first of Russia and her subject border states.

The growing irredentism of German minorities in Poland (and particularly Danzig), Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania is already evident. The demands of the Germans in Memel are already pressed by the Reich. Since it will be good military strategy to attack Russia not only through the Baltic, but also through the southern route, agitation will be initiated to arouse unrest among the German minorities in Rumania and the Balkan states. This will open the southern route on the basis of the principle of the rights of racial and linguistic minorities to secede under the threat of force from their sovereign state—a principle conceded by the British and French at Munich.

Since central and eastern Europe are "freckled" with minorities on the wrong side of frontiers—from a nationalistic viewpoint—and in many cases impossible to put on the right side, self-determination has now become an explosive doctrine which will be applied again and again by Germany and bids fair to blow the map of Europe to pieces. Poland, which claimed this right for the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia, has been reminded already by Berlin that she has not offered to repatriate 4,500,000 Russians (including 3,500,000

Ukrainians), or nearly 1,000,000 Germans. Hungary, which also acquired territorial concessions from Czechoslovakia by this right of "self-determination," ought to remember that she rules some 500,000 Germans, 80,000 Yugoslavs, and 141,000 Slovaks. Rumania counts almost 4,000,000 in her minorities—Russians (including Ukrainians), Germans, Jews, Poles, Bulgarians, and Yugoslavs. Yugoslavia's minorities comprise 2,000,000 made up of Germans, Magyars, Rumanians, and Albanians, and Italy rules nearly 1,000,000 aliens, including some 280,000 Germans—former Austrians, just across the Brenner Pass from Germany, and 350,000 Yugoslavs.¹⁵

There is a possibility which seems to be rather farfetched and yet quite probable. Hitler has now become the world's number-one fascist, whereas Mussolini has been relegated to the status of "second in command." German advance to the southeast is already seriously menacing the Italian interests on the Adriatic Sea and in the Balkans. Historically, Italians and Germans have been enemies in European conflicts. The era of the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" and the conquest of the northern Italian towns have not been forgotten. Italy sold out to the allies in 1915 and fought the Kaiser's armies. That the Balkans are still considered as the region for legitimate Italian expansion is evidenced by the investments of Rome in Albania and the agreements with Yugoslavia. When Germany reaches the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, then a German-Italian conflict may be probable, unless Italy will be willing to abandon the Balkans to Germany and concentrate on her "Mare Nostrum" policy. Even today, Italy, squeezed out of the Danube Basin and the Balkans by the activities of her partner in the axis, disappointed in Abyssinia, foiled in Spain, is turning her attention to the Aegean and the Levant.

We have been trying to answer the fundamental question with which we opened our discussion: "Who is to dominate the Danubian Europe?" Since Germany has apparently succeeded, the final answer is also definite. However, no great power has succeeded in dominating permanently the Danubian and Balkan Europe and the counterforces opposing such imperialism have always proved to be, in the long run, stronger than the imperialistic forces of subjection. But will history again repeat itself? If it does, then, when Germany tries to reach too far, as she is seeking to do today, she will find herself

confronted even then by the forces which she eventually will be unable to control; and, as in 1914-1918, the Balkans will again prove to be the graveyard of the imperialistic ambitions of the great powers.

NOTES

1. D. MITRANY, *The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe*, p. 3, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936. For a sociological study of the region, see: J. S. ROUCEK, "The Balkans as a World Problem," *Journal of Geography*, July, 1935, Vol. XI, pp. 286-296.

2. COLONEL E. MORAVEC, *The Strategic Importance of Czechoslovakia for Western Europe*, Prague, Orbis, 1938. This little-known but very worthwhile booklet is a very clever presentation of the geopolitical problems of central Europe and the Balkans.

3. The best single study of the Baghdad Railway problem is: E. M. EARLE, *Turkey, The Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923. J. B. WOLF, *The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad*, Columbia, University of Missouri, 1936, is a reconsideration of the problem in the light of material which has become available since Earle's work was published. According to G. P. GOOCH, *Before the War*, Vol. II, *The Coming of the Storm*, New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1938, there was never such a menace as a *Drang nach Osten*. The first prophet of the German pressure to the Indian ocean was Friedrich List, who favored it in 1838 in his *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie*. Forty years later his forgotten cry was taken up by Sprenger in *Babylonien, das reichste Land der Vorzeit und das lohnendste Kolonialfeld für die Gegenwart* (1886). The same year the same idea was propounded by Paul Dehn in his numerous works, and in 1892 KAERGER's *Kleinasien, ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld*, aroused considerable interest. In 1903 Paul Rohrbach suggested in his *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern* the creation of an "autonomous and nearly closed sphere of production and consumption." The best known expression of the idea was the well-known Berlin-Basra railway project, as described by MORAVEC, *op. cit.*

4. The only exception was the period of the Fédération Balkanique movement in 1924 when the Third International tried to unite the dissatisfied nations and political factions of the Balkans, especially the dissident Croats and Macedonians. But the dissensions within the Macedonian movement ended the experiment.

5. For the objections of Rumania to being classed as a Balkan state, see: J. S. ROUCEK, *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems*, p. 170, n. 55, Stanford University, California, Stanford University Press, 1932.

6. R. J. KERNER and H. N. HOWARD, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930-1935*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1936. Contains a good bibliography, pp. 239-263.

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CHAPTER 16

THE NEAR EAST



Hans Kohn

During the nineteenth century the Near Eastern question, then generally called the Oriental question, occupied the center of interest in the diplomatic field. Its origin can be found in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it had united in a powerful empire the vast territories of southeastern Europe, of western Asia, and of northern Africa. During the nineteenth century the Russian Empire, motivated by its claim to be the legitimate heir of the Byzantine Empire and by the expansionist desire to reach an outlet on the Mediterranean, started to accelerate the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in a number of aggressive wars and by the support of the independence movements of the Christian Balkan peoples. The British Empire tried to thwart the Russian ambitions and to keep the Ottoman Empire as a buffer state on Britain's road to India. Imperialist power politics and nationalist wars of liberation and of ambition settled the fate of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and in Africa before the outbreak of the World War. Since then the Near Eastern question has narrowed down to a struggle for the control of the Asiatic parts of the former Ottoman Empire to which, for reasons of geographic contiguity and of similarity of fate, Egypt and Persia may be added.

The end of the World War found Great Britain in a dominating position. Her two main rivals in the Near East seemed eliminated; the German Empire as a result of the defeat in the War, the Russian Empire as a consequence of the revolution and the ensuing chaos. The Ottoman Empire had collapsed, and the British found themselves in occupation of all the important strategic points, of Constantinople, Jerusalem and Baghdad, as well as of Egypt and Persia. For a short time their troops penetrated even into Baku and the Transcaspian oasis. Thus the road to India and all the important oil

**THE MOSLEM WORLD: 300,000,000
OF BELIEVERS IN MOHAMMED**

MOSLEM CRESCENT



sources of the Near East were under British control. A large middle eastern empire from the Bosphorus and the Suez Canal to the Caucasian Mountains and the Persian Gulf appeared as the result of British victory at a moment when, on account of the growing demand for oil and of the increased importance of land and air routes, the Near East seemed destined to become a pivotal point at the crossroads of the three continents of the Eastern Hemisphere.

TURKEY AND PERSIA

These imperial ambitions were partly blocked by France's claim for a share of the Near Eastern oil resources and by her traditional attitude, dating back to the Crusades, as protector of the Christian minorities in Syria. More important, however, than the long-standing imperialist rivalry was a new force which in the first years after the World War rose to unexpected strength, the nationalism of the Near Eastern peoples. In a very short time this nationalism not only modified British and French imperialist ambitions in the Near East, but also transformed the whole political and social life of the peoples themselves and changed their traditional ways of thought and their patterns of behaviour.

The new nationalism in Turkey and Persia found an unforeseen ally in Soviet Russia as it emerged from the painful years of revolution and civil war. Revolutionary Russia and the nationalist East found themselves united in the fight against "Western imperialism." Both went through a similar stage of transformation from a medieval agrarian structure of society to progressive secularization and industrialization. The success of the national independence movements in Turkey and Persia after the World War would have been impossible if their powerful northern neighbor had still pursued the traditional aggressive policy of the Russian Empire instead of a new policy based upon unconditional recognition of the complete equality of Eastern peoples with the Western nations. Soviet Russia was also the first country to renounce voluntarily the capitulations, privileges, and concessions enjoyed by Western nations in Eastern countries which had stultified all their attempts at social and economic progress.

The Peace Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, sealed the fate of Turkey. She was to be divided up into zones of influence of Italy, France, and Great Britain, and even of the former subject people,

the Greeks, who were encouraged to land troops in May, 1919, in Smyrna and to prepare for the creation of a Greater Greece which would include the economically most important parts of Asia Minor. At the same time the whole of Turkey was to become an economic and financial protectorate of Great Britain, France, and Italy. The provinces of eastern Anatolia were to form an independent Armenian Republic, and the parts of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by an Arab majority were to be ceded to Great Britain and France. Previously, in a treaty of August 9, 1919, with Persia the British Government had practically established its protectorate over this country too.

The treaties with Persia and Turkey were never executed. In 1921 a new nationalist Persian government under a successful soldier Riza Khan denounced the treaty with Great Britain, and British troops left Persian territory. In Turkey an energetic general Mustafa Kemal organized the Anatolian peasants to resist the peace treaty and the submissive attitude of the sultan to the allied occupation of Constantinople. At the head of a new army he turned first eastwards, reconquered Armenia, and then in 1922 started an offensive against the Greek army which had penetrated into Asia Minor, and succeeded in a surprisingly short time to eject them and to reoccupy Smyrna and Constantinople. The allied statesmen invited him to open peace negotiations, the Treaty of Sèvres was torn up, and in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 Turkey won her complete independence from any control or interference of foreign powers. The capitulations were abolished throughout the whole new Turkish territory, which comprised all of Anatolia, Armenia, and a part of Kurdistan in western Asia, and Constantinople and eastern Thrace in Europe. A separate agreement between Turkey and Greece provided for the compulsory exchange of population; all persons of Greek faith had to leave Asia Minor for Greece, whereas Mohammedans had to migrate from Greece to Turkey. This exchange established Turkey as a nationally homogeneous country, opened the economic positions formerly held by the Greek and Armenian minorities to Turks, and put a definite end to all Greek aspirations for a conquest of Ionia.

Thus in 1922 the foundations were established for new developments in Turkey and in Persia. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, Turkey entered a period of fast secularization and modern-

ization. The Ottoman Empire had been a medieval state with Islam as the basis of its whole life. The sultan of Turkey had been caliph of all Mohammedans, and the Pan-Islamic policy of the last powerful sultan, Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), had gained for Turkey the support especially of the Mohammedans in British India. Now Mustafa Kemal severed the traditional ties linking clearly and even identifying Turkey with Islam. The sultanate was abolished in the fall of 1922, and a meaningless and powerless caliphate was maintained as a feeble shadow of its former self until the spring of 1924. But meanwhile, in October, 1923, Turkey had been proclaimed a republic, Mustafa Kemal elected its first president, and the capital transferred from the former imperial city to Angora in the interior of northern Anatolia, where the center of resistance had been organized from 1920 to 1922. To carry his policy through, Mustafa Kemal founded in 1923 the Republican People's Party, the goal of which according to its statute is "government by the people and for the people, together with the elevation of Turkey to the status of a modern state." Although in reality Mustafa Kemal's will rules supreme in Turkey, the constitution is radically democratic, vests all legislative and executive power in an elected national assembly, and provides for complete separation of religion and politics, for the abolition of all privileges, and for equal rights without exception for all citizens, including women.

In internal affairs Turkish policy is guided by the three principles of nationalism, secularism, and industrialism. The administration of justice and education has been completely secularized; the Mohammedan chronology was replaced by the European calendar; the distinctive Oriental dress was abandoned; Islamic law was replaced in 1926 by the most progressive European codes; women were set free; and in 1928 Islam ceased to be the established religion of the state. In the same year Latin characters were adopted instead of Arabic characters for Turkish writing. A new self-esteem filled the hearts of the Turks, especially of the younger generation, and put a new valuation on all original Turkish traditions as against the later Arabian and Persian foundations upon which Turkish civilization under Islam had rested. The Turkish language was made more popular and divested of its classic and religious association. Great progress was made in the field of education. The University of

Istanbul was completely reorganized and special attention was paid to agricultural and industrial training.

Similar developments occurred in the economic field. The hold of foreign capitalism on Turkey was broken, and an energetic drive started to open up the national resources of production in the interest of the nation itself. The railroad system was developed so as to facilitate intercourse between the distant parts of the country; national banks and shipping companies were established; agriculture was modernized; intensive cultivation of the soil was fostered; and industrialization of the backward country was inaugurated according to an ambitious five-year plan which was to provide Turkey with her own industries and make her independent of the importation of foreign products, especially in the field of textiles and sugar.

At the same time an economic nationalism is being fostered. The Turks are being educated to buy Turkish products and to become adapted to capitalistic methods, to the institution of savings banks, and to a similar degree of national self-assertion in the field of economics as in the fields of politics and culture. Foreigners are shut out of many occupations in Turkey. Foreign experts are appointed only where no Turks are available with the required training, and are made to undertake the training of Turks who can ultimately fill their place. The Turkish educational system has been reorganized to supply Turkey with native experts. Industrialization has also brought to the fore the problem of labor protection legislation. New measures under consideration provide for regulations on modern lines unknown hitherto in Eastern countries.

Turkey's foreign policy since the World War has been governed by the wish to build up and preserve national independence on a sound basis. Before the World War, the Ottoman Empire, a mere pawn in the hands of the Western powers, endeavored to turn their mutual antagonisms to advantage, if only to prolong its own existence by a few years. Under Mustapha Kemal, Turkey has been following a policy aiming consciously at peace, neutrality, and friendship with all nations. The close friendship with the Soviet Union has lasted now for eighteen years. It has not hindered Turkey from entering, as soon as the time seemed propitious, into most friendly relations with the League of Nations and with Great Britain.

More astonishing than the new friendship with the powerful

northern neighbor are the cordial relations established since 1930 between Turkey and Greece which for nine centuries had fought bitterly for the heritage of Eastern Rome. It is largely thanks to the efforts of Turkey that the Balkan Entente was created and a community of interests established between the formerly hostile small nations of the Balkan Peninsula to ensure peace and to eliminate the influence and rivalry of the great powers. A similar entente, again under Turkey's leadership, has been created in western Asia. There from the beginning the Soviet Union has tried to bring together Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan into closer co-operation among themselves and with her. The first step was taken in the treaty signed in Moscow on March 1, 1921, by Turkey and Afghanistan, and the culmination of these aspirations was reached by the conclusion of the Near Eastern Pact between Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the fall of 1937. Thus Turkey was able to liquidate in her internal political and economic policy and in foreign affairs her past, and the Near Eastern Question in consequence has assumed an entirely different aspect.

The example set by Turkey in her reorganization under Mustafa Kemal was followed by other Near Eastern countries, although at a slower rate. They had to contend against greater geographic and economic obstacles and against a greater backwardness of the population, as in Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia. Or they had to concentrate their efforts primarily at the attainment of national independence which alone would allow a thorough modernization of the social and cultural life of the country, as in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Nevertheless, the effect of the currents of nationalism, secularism, and industrialism can be noticed in varying degrees in all of them.

Persia, which has changed her name officially to Iran, has followed Turkey's lead most consciously of all the Near Eastern countries. Riza Khan, who in December, 1925, was elected hereditary shah concentrated first upon the creation of a modern army which succeeded in a few years in establishing peace and order in the country and in turning a loose association of provinces and tribes, separated by deserts and mountains, into a realm where the foundations of modern state organization could be securely laid. The much-needed communications have been developed, a railway which crosses Iran

from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf has been constructed, a beginning has been made in the modernization of the backward economic system through industrialization, through the creation of the country's own financial institutions, and through the introduction of intensive farming. The alienation of trade and industry was combated, the capitulations and all privileges of foreigners were abolished, women were emancipated, a modern educational system introduced, and the power of the government so much strengthened that it could emerge victoriously in 1933 from a trial of strength with the powerful Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The area of the company's concession was limited and the company had to pay increased royalties and to employ and train a definite number of Iranians, even for the higher technical positions. Under the impulse of the deepening national consciousness, the new Iran, now completely independent from foreign control, was able to lay the foundations of the modernization of the country.

THE ARABIC PENINSULA

The situation was different in the Arabic lands. They emerged from the World War divided into two groups. The Arabian Peninsula was practically independent. It comprised three kingdoms: Hejaz, under Hussein Ibn Ali, who had been the ally of the English in their fight against the Turks and who had been promised in compensation British support for the creation of a united great Arabia; central Arabia, under Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, the leader of the religious puritan sect of Wahhabism, who was striving to divert the religious enthusiasm of his followers into modern social activity and to transform the unruly and illiterate nomads of the desert into citizens; Yemen, the ancient Arabia Felix, in the southwest corner of Arabia under the pious, energetic, but backward Imam Yehya.

The other group comprised the Fertile Crescent, the lands of Mesopotamia and of the Mediterranean coast, surrounding in the north the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula. There Great Britain and France applied Article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations, according to which certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire "have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assist-

ance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." The covenant laid down further that the well-being and development of the mandated peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory. These stipulations of the covenant were disregarded from the beginning. Against the protests of the native inhabitants, Great Britain received the mandates over Mesopotamia, which was called Iraq, and over Palestine, and France received that over Syria. After lengthy negotiations the important oil district of Mosul, which was claimed by Turkey, was adjudicated by the League of Nations to Iraq. An Iraq Petroleum Company, with a majority participation of British and minority participations of French and American interests, was formed and the full exploitation of the important oil resources began in 1935 after a pipe line, laid through the desert and terminating in Tripolis in Syria and Haifa in Palestine had connected the Iraqi oil fields with the Mediterranean.

After the World War all these different territories were animated by a growing desire for national independence and for a unification of all the Arabic countries. Backward and undeveloped, they saw their only hope for economic and cultural progress in close co-operation and in pooling together all their resources. But foreign imperialism and the rivalry of native dynasties prevented more than a gradual approach to this seemingly still distant goal. "

In the years which have elapsed since the World War, Ibn Saud has made himself the undisputedly strongest force in the Arabian Peninsula. In the fall of 1924 his armies moved against the Hejaz and at the end of the following year the whole country was conquered, Hussein and his family expelled, and Ibn Saud became king of a vast domain to which he gave the name of Saudi Arabia and which in his intention is the cradle of a future united Arabia. The important land of Asir south of the Hejaz was incorporated into Saudi Arabia in 1930, and a war between Ibn Saud and the Imam of Yemen ended in the complete victory of Ibn Saud who, however, in the peace treaty of Taif in June, 1934, renounced all conquest in "a treaty of Moslem and Arab brotherhood, to promote the unity of the Arab nation, to enhance its position and to maintain its dignity and independence."

Thus the rule of Ibn Saud marked a distinct triumph of the new national spirit over the old tribal and sectarian spirit. Peace and order ruled for the first time throughout the desert, modern technical innovations made the imposition of stable and permanent government possible. Motor car and air services were opened, the first steps towards a creation of a modern system of education and public health were taken, and the nomadic Arabs were settled and introduced to the more civilized form of existence. Although the Arabian Peninsula, on account of its immense poverty, still remains the most backward part of the Near East, great progress has been achieved during the last years under the forceful leadership of Ibn Saud.

Of the Arab lands under British and French mandate, Iraq was the first to attain the aim foreseen in the covenant of the League of Nations. After a long lasting revolt in 1920 the British tried to pacify Iraq by putting Faisal, the son of King Hussein of Hejaz, as king over Iraq and by concluding a treaty with Iraq promising early independence. Faisal, a gifted statesman of great intelligence, mediated successfully between the nationalist aspirations of his Arab citizens and the British imperialist interests. A treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Iraq was concluded in 1932, the complete independence of Iraq was proclaimed, and the young Arabic state admitted as a member of the League of Nations. As mentioned above, Iraq entered an alliance with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, fellow members in the League of Nations. Faisal and Ibn Saud worked for an entente of their two Arabic countries, and after the premature death of Faisal in 1933 an alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iraq was concluded, to which the Yemen adhered and which is to include later also Syria and Egypt. Baghdad, the capital of the new state, has become a very important junction of the transcontinental air lines and has developed from a sleepy provincial Oriental town into a modern bustling capital.

Whereas Iraq had entered definitely the path of progressive nationhood, Syria and Palestine remained unsettled twenty years after the end of the World War. In Syria the French administration tried to rely upon the antagonism of the Christian Maronites of the Lebanon Mountains to the Mohammedan majority of the country. A Lebanese republic including the fertile and commercially most important coastal districts was created with Beirut as its capital. There the

Christian elements were in a slight majority and, in recollection of the ancient feuds between Mohammedans and Christians in the Ottoman Empire, were willing to accept French protection against the Mohammedans in Syria. Under the influence of growing Arabic national consciousness an increasing part of the Lebanese youth showed itself more and more favorable to union with the rest of Syria which had been made into another republic with Damascus as its capital. After long years of struggle which found its culmination in a great national uprising in the years 1925 and 1926, the French Government concluded treaties in 1936 with Syria and the Lebanon according to which the two states should become, three years after the ratification of the treaties, completely independent and members of the League of Nations. In spite of these treaties, the situation in both countries is still unsettled. With their absorption in the struggle for independence and for internal consolidation, little progress was achieved in the cultural and economic reconstruction of the country under French mandate.

Even more complex is the situation in Palestine. There the British Government had promised the Zionist Organization in 1917 to assist in the creation of a Jewish National Home in the country. In 1922 the land east of the Jordan, Transjordan, was separated from Palestine and put under the rule of Emir Abdallah, another son of King Hussein of Hejaz. In Palestine Jewish immigration and enterprise were facilitated, and the Jewish community grew within eighteen years from eighty thousand to about four hundred thousand. The Jewish immigrants have applied in every province most modern methods of agriculture and industry, of education and social welfare. Agricultural and urban settlement were developed on a most considerable scale, unknown elsewhere in the Near East, and a splendid school system was entirely built up upon the basis of the revived Hebrew language. The Arab population in Palestine, afraid of an ultimate Jewish majority, protested against the growth and consolidation of the Jewish settlement. Since April, 1936, open revolt has kept the Holy Land in a state of permanent suspense. This revolt has not subsided after more than two years in spite of the heavy repressive measures taken by the British. The plan of partition of Palestine into a smaller but more fertile Jewish State in the coastal plains and an Arab State in the interior, as proposed by a Royal Commis-

sion in 1937 and accepted in principle by the British Government, did not satisfy the Arabs and part of the Zionists, although the majority of the latter was ready to accept the principle of partition. But the unprecedented increase in Arab revolutionary activities, which in September, 1938, embraced the whole country where a revolutionary national government held sway over large parts, led the British Government to a reconsideration of its policy.

EGYPT

Like other countries of the Near East, Egypt has gone through a period of storm and stress since the World War. As in other Eastern countries, the World War awakened the Egyptian peasantry from its age-old lethargy. Its national awakening found a leader in Saad Zaghlul, a lawyer of peasant stock who represented the rise of the gifted sons of the peasant class to leading positions in the towns. At the head of a deputation or, in Arabic, *Wafd*, Zaghlul approached on November 13, 1918, the British High Commissioner in Egypt for passports to lay before the Peace Conference Egypt's claims for a termination of the British protectorate and occupation. The passports were refused, Zaghlul was arrested and exiled, a long-drawn unrest followed, and finally Great Britain recognized Egypt's independence in February, 1922, although reserving to herself, until further negotiations, the protection of the imperial communications and of foreign interests in Egypt and the administration of the Sudan. Egypt was granted a democratic constitution and her ruler Fuad assumed the title of king. But Egypt's path towards the attainment of complete independence was not smooth. The Wafdist Party, which represented the overwhelming majority of the people, found itself faced by the king's bitter opposition to popular representation and his desire for personal government, and it had to fight repeated British interference in Egyptian politics. Thus brief spells of parliamentary government were followed repeatedly by unconstitutional attempts at royal dictatorship backed by the British and a part of the aristocracy. The death of Zaghlul in 1927 robbed the popular movement of its great leader who had won recognition even from his opponents.

Two attempts at settling the outstanding differences between Great Britain and Egypt in 1929 and 1930 failed. Only at the end of 1935

a united Egyptian front under the leadership of Mustafa Nahhas, Zaghlul's successor, forced King Fuad who died in April, 1936, to restore the democratic constitution, and in August, 1936, a treaty was signed between Great Britain and Egypt which established the complete independence of Egypt. It promised within a short time the termination of British occupation of Egypt and proclaimed a perpetual military alliance between the two countries. British troops were to be concentrated in a small zone at the Suez Canal, in the Sudan effective condominium was re-established, and the protection of the interests of foreigners was relinquished by Great Britain. In the following year Egypt was admitted to the League of Nations, and at a conference at Montreux in April, 1937, the system of capitulations, of the judicial and fiscal privileges of the foreigners in Egypt, was abolished.

Thus the most serious obstacle in the path of the social and industrial development of Egypt was removed. Egypt had re-established her independent custom's regime in 1930 and had gained thereby the possibility of protecting native agriculture and promising branches of industry. The economic reorganization of Egypt was promoted by the Misr Bank, founded in 1920, the first bank with exclusively Egyptian capital and an Egyptian staff. Within a decade it succeeded in establishing and supporting Egyptian industries and trading and transport companies. It educated Egyptians to take responsible positions in the economic life of their country, an aim promoted also by numerous newly established schools of industry, handicraft, and commerce.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

The Near East has entered, since the World War, into an entirely new period of its political and social development. All the foundations upon which life was built before 1914 have been fundamentally changed. New forces, political, economic, cultural, and religious, have entered the field. At the same time the Near East has become again a field of great international tension. It is a part of the Mediterranean basin where the expansive forces of the new Italian imperialism confront the interests of the British Empire. Under the leadership of Chancellor Hitler, Germany seems to have regained greater power, twenty years after her defeat in the World War, than

she ever possessed, and to have resumed the spread of her influence southeastward. The French Empire depends upon the Mediterranean for its most vital communications. An uneasy feeling prevails in Egypt and in Turkey about the intentions of Mussolinian Italy. The attempt at collective security which seemed to promise protection to the smaller nations has broken down because it was never seriously supported by the British Government and other powerful nations. With this return to the chaotic international world that existed before the World War, the only hope for the Near Eastern countries seems to reside in their close co-operation. Perhaps they may then succeed in avoiding the danger of foreign domination or interference, and in securing peace in a part of the world which has been traditionally one of its storm centers.

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SUMMARY

Since Latin America is, geographically, besides Canada, the most important collection of neighboring states, Washington has been interested in that part of the world since the very beginning. On December 2, 1823, President Monroe set forth the famous "Monroe Doctrine," which announced to the world that the American continents were "henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization" and that "any attempt on their (European powers) part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere" would be regarded as "dangerous to our peace and safety." Washington has been able to enforce these principles on the whole, as exemplified by the downfall of Emperor Maximilian in Mexico after the Civil War. The United States has found valuable markets in Latin America not only for its goods but also for capital, and "dollar diplomacy" has had its heyday until recently.

By 1937 the international situation had its effect on Latin America. German and Italian settlers had been receiving support from Rome and Berlin for promoting the fascist ideologies. The flow of Japanese immigration into South America has to be considered also. The growing danger from these movements and the efforts to co-ordinate the defences of all American states against the possible encroachments by any European or Asiatic power have tended to inject more life into the Pan American Union, the attempts of the Latin American Republics to "forget" about the former United States penetration and seek Washington's political collaboration. The danger is becoming quite obvious in the economic sphere, best exemplified in a compensation agreement between

Germany and Brazil. The awareness of the penetration of cultural propaganda of the fascists has induced the State Department of Washington to establish a special section for the promotion of cultural relations with her southern neighbors under Ben Cherrington. Not the least disquieting signs have been several fascist uprisings in Latin American states, a definite threat to democracy as conceived by the United States. These considerations led to President Roosevelt's trip to South America at the end of 1936 and to his appeals in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro to "maintain and defend the democratic form of constitutional government," and "to watch and guard our hemisphere." The multilateral agreements, negotiated at the several conferences, and providing for consultation in the event of war or a threat of war against the peace of the American republics, were another expression of this tendency.

There are apparent, however, two spheres where conditions are not so satisfactory. In Porto Rico, Cuba, and Haiti there has been much political unrest, and the attempt of President Cardenas to accelerate the social revolution of Mexico since 1934 has led to the strained relations between Washington and Mexico City due to the unwillingness of the government to pay remunerations for the expropriated property of Americans and other foreigners.

The Baltic countries, whose foreign policies turn mainly by the pressures provided by Germany and Poland, are situated in the regions which have everything to lose in case of a war between Germany and Russia. The German octopus is spreading its tentacles to this part of the world—as it has a tendency to go everywhere—and, in spite of the desire of all these states to remain at peace with the rest of the world, the explosives are laid there by the ambitions of Berlin to reach Russia, and especially the Ukraine.

The situation is even more dangerous in central Europe, characterized today by the recrudescence of aggressive nationalism, typified in Hitlerism, and the collapse of the League of Nations system of collective security. Central Europe and the Balkans comprise the meeting battle-ground of powerful conflicting interests, dominated by the German dream of *Drang nach Osten*. Hitler is driven on by the wish to disrupt the balance of power in the Danubian area and to create a region from the Baltic to the Persian gulf under the hegemony and direct domination of Berlin. It seems that the question of world peace will be decided in that area—as it was in 1914 when a shot in a previously almost unheard of village (Sarajevo) brought on a chain of events culminating in the World War.

The organized terrorism in Palestine indicates the state of affairs in the Near East, another subject of imperialistic designs of Great Powers. Particularly is Mussolini fishing in the troubled waters for the support of the Arabs and the Mohammedans. London is here between the devil and the blue sea, like most of the situations it has had to face in the international sphere since the World War, not knowing whether to offend the Jewish interests the world over and particularly in the United States, or to offend the Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic issues involved. Strategically, the Near East is another crossroad which interests all the Great Powers—England, Italy, France, and Russia.

The welfare of the major and minor powers is woven together in an inextricable web. The day has passed when any nation may continue in isolation. The two preceding sections have shown the interlocking of national interests and the dominant forces at work throughout the world: nationalism, imperialism, power politics, and war, both actual and impending.

PART IV

WORLD ORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION

The states of the world, whether at war or at peace, need to transact their relations in some organized way. The hope that some order can be brought out of chaos has been a matter of concern to many great thinkers who have developed numerous practical as well as utopian proposals of world organization. Regardless of the emergence of a new form of world organization—dictation by major powers—no substantial bases of world peace will ever be established without some form of united action based on reason rather than force.

Concurrently, the development of international law is another expression of hope that some day the world will be transacting its affairs along the lines of enforceable state and municipal law.

The use of diplomatic channels for the transaction of interstate relations is so well-established that some adequate knowledge of its theory and practice is as fundamental for student and layman as for the diplomat. "Secret diplomacy" is still a phrase leaving an unsavory impression on the mind of the uninitiated. But whether "secret" or "open," diplomacy must be studied as an instrument of transaction among the nations of the world.

The creation of the League of Nations, the World Court, and the International Labor Organization after the World War was hailed by all well-meaning and war-weary individuals and groups as a recognition of the interdependence of the world. Much has been accomplished by these organizations and, no doubt, much will be accomplished in the future, although these bodies must now contend with the growing

tendency to observe only the law of "the fang and the jungle." It is true, however, that the post-War years of world politics can be understood only in relation to the League and its two other independent bodies, and particularly to their operations.

Many individuals and organizations abhorring any war and the possible "foreign entanglement" of the United States in outbreaks in other parts of the world placed their hope in legislation for neutrality and sanctions. Without questioning the sincerity of the proponents of the plan, it is necessary to evaluate its value from the pragmatic viewpoint and to determine its effectiveness from the standpoint of practical world politics.

CHAPTER 17

THE GROWTH OF THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Frank M. Russell

International organization arises in response to human needs and aspirations. For the origin of the idea and the phenomena which suggest it, we must go back to the states of antiquity rather than merely to the period of the rise of the modern national states. The co-existence and propinquity of two or more politically independent communities immediately presents problems of political and social intercourse, and furnish the basis for the development of the idea and for its embodiment in appropriate institutions. It may be, of course, that the relationship of such communities will be continuously one of war and hostility until the stronger absorb the weaker and a single state eventually emerges supreme. The threat of such a development, however, has usually caused the weaker communities, as a matter of self-preservation, to unite their forces in order to repel the common foe. This decision for common action takes on great social importance, for those, allying themselves together, even for this negative purpose, have made the first breach in the wall of political isolation with which they formerly surrounded themselves, and have taken the first step toward international organization. If and when the common danger is removed they may return to their former "splendid isolation," but should it continue and increase they may be forced to slough off their particularistic notions sufficiently to enable them to combine their forces more effectively and add to their strength. And this may involve agreements establishing certain common procedures and institutions.

ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF ORGANIZATION

In ancient times the most favorable conditions for the growth of the idea of international organization were to be found among the

Greek states. Among the latter there was a "consciousness of kind" which tended, especially in times of danger from the Persians and other "barbarians," to mitigate the spirit of particularism characterizing the individual Greek communities, and cause them to emphasize the cultural homogeneity of Hellas, and deplore action that would endanger Greek civilization. Although in reality there were not only divergent political systems, but also more or less important religious differences and varying customs to be found among these states, the Greek world and the Greek view of life were sufficiently different from that of the other states of antiquity to catch the imagination of some of the lofty spirits of the time and inspire them with a vision of Hellenic peace and constructive endeavor for the states of Hellas.

Philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle deplored warfare among Greek states, looked upon it as of the nature of harmful civil strife, and even on occasion called it fratricide. But the idea of the inappropriateness of warfare among particular states leads to the exploration of other means of adjusting the differences that will inevitably arise when such states have commercial and other kinds of intercourse. At this stage they are definitely on the road to interstate organization, although whether they will proceed along it to the point of setting up common organs of government will depend perhaps more upon the pressure from without than from within. For example, the various leagues of Greek states that arose at one time or another in the ancient period were undoubtedly formed chiefly because of a common danger from another state or other states rather than from a sense of abiding common interests capable only of being served by a permanent union or even by permanent interstate institutions such as courts of arbitration.

In several instances, the Greek leagues required their members to submit all their differences to arbitration, something which the Great Powers of the present day are loath to do. Too much significance, however, must not be attached to this early development. If the leagues concerned arose in the first place chiefly because of the desire of the members to pool their strength in order to enable them to resist other states or leagues of states, it is obvious that their power of resistance, or offense, as the case might be, would be weakened unless their members gave up the right to war on one another. The

arbitration of their differences, therefore, was a practical necessity. On the other hand, their inability to visualize abiding common interests over and beyond their security from external attack was attested to by the fact that they never rose to the conception of a true federal union, and fell apart after a brief existence. The will to live as individual entities which drew the various states together into temporary leagues prevented their ever rising to the concept of a permanent league of all the Greek states for the purpose of attaining security and enjoying the benefits of a common political existence.

In the turbulent and chaotic period following the breakup of the Roman Empire and the end of the *Pax Romana*, philosophers and theologians might dream and speculate on the organization of the Western world for peace, security, and justice but there was no power strong enough to take the initiative and provide the necessary leadership. In any case, the thought of the time looked rather in the direction of an imperial world order than toward an organization of voluntarily associated states. This was, of course, natural. In the first place, there were in the earlier period no states in the Western world of sufficient maturity and consequence to form the basis of any extensive international society. The thinkers of the time, therefore, were likely to speculate in terms of a cosmopolitan or imperial world order.

Christianity had spread the notion that *all* men, regardless of race, are brothers—the children of one God. And theologians of a now strong, well-organized, and influential Church were likely to see in Christianity the central and supreme authority of the world to which lay rulers and their subjects should turn as the cohesive agency which could give peace, law, and order as well as spiritual light. Princes, to be sure, might exact obedience from their subjects, and establish separate political authorities independent of one another, but, above all, and ultimately giving commands to all, was the Church, providing the necessary unifying force for the children of Christ. Lay thinkers such as Dante, likewise ostensibly animated by Christian doctrine, and the aspiration to see the peoples of Christendom at peace, looked rather in the direction of a new Roman empire whose head would give commands to the princes in all matters affecting the entire Christian community. This idea of universalism characterized early medieval thought, and it was not until new nations

began to emerge in western Europe that the idea of an international as contrasted with an imperial organization began to take root in the minds of certain lay thinkers.

THE EARLY EUROPEAN IDEA

By the fourteenth century the idea of an international organization of Europe under the leadership of one of the newly developing national states began to emerge. The need for defense was once more made to serve as the compelling reason—the defense of Europe against the infidels, the protection of the Cross of Christendom against the Mohammedan Crescent. The threatened desecration of the Holy Land and the drive of the Turks toward Europe supposedly furnished the inspiration for Pierre Dubois, subject of Philip the Fair of France, who proposed at about the beginning of the fourteenth century a plan for uniting Europe in a loose confederation under the leadership of France. Dubois argued that Christian Europe must be united against the infidels in a political association that would rule out war among the Christian states, and enable them to unite their forces against the Turks and recover the Holy Land. He rejected the notion that this could be accomplished either by a universal imperial authority, or through the Church. The latter had never been able to maintain peace in Europe through prayer and exhortation, and as for the imperial solution it was unthinkable. The rule of no one man would be acceptable to all the diverse peoples of the world. However, if all Christian states would combine on a voluntary basis, rule out war among themselves, accept a system of arbitration for the settlement of all their differences, and punish any state which refused to live up to its obligations, they could enjoy peace among themselves and successfully wage war with the Eastern infidels.

The ideas of Dubois, and of George Podebrad, King of Bohemia, in the following century, made little appeal to the truculent feudal lords and ambitious monarchs of Europe. War against the Turks had its appeal, but peace among themselves was too high a price to pay. War and the fruits of war undoubtedly furnished greater satisfactions to the fighting gentry, and to princes anxious to consolidate their position and enhance their power. As for the latter, the maxims of Machiavelli were far more helpful in making their particular

dreams come true. They were not interested in the organization of Europe for peace, but in subjecting rebellious feudal lords, in freeing themselves completely from the authority of Church and Empire, and in extending their domains. Holding these objectives, the idea of international organization could be only repugnant to them.

It was not until a century and a half later, in the midst of devastating wars between the newly developed states of Europe, that the distinguished Dutchman, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), sought to interpose the barrier of law against the unbridled savagery which often characterized warfare in his day. Assuming that this ancient and honorable method of self-help could not be eliminated altogether, he proposed that certain rules of warfare should be recognized by all nations in the interests of humanity. The chief significance of his work, however, in relation to the idea of international organization lies in the fundamental assumption, upon which his whole system of international law was ultimately to rest, that man has "an impelling desire" for the company of his kind, and is endowed with reason which enables him to distinguish between what is good and bad for him.

This was a reading of human nature quite different from that of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and the other power worshippers of the Renaissance who professed to regard men in general as so mean and selfish and anti-social that force and fraud rather than law must be relied upon in governing them. Using these twin methods, ruling princes might impose their own will as law upon their subjects, and maintain peace and order within their several domains, but between states there could be only hostility and war, each state inevitably attempting to expand at the expense of its neighbors. If, however, as Grotius declared, man is essentially social rather than predatory, and naturally seeks rather than avoids the companionship of human beings, there is a psychical foundation upon which to build a system of voluntary international law and upon which in turn to erect an organization of law-abiding states. The possibility of arriving at the latter development was not explored by Grotius in his great work *On the Law of War and Peace*. He does remark, however, that "it would be advantageous, indeed in a degree necessary, to hold certain conferences of Christian powers, where those who have no in-

terest at stake may settle the disputes of others, and where, in fact, steps may be taken to compel parties to accept peace on fair terms."

A contemporary of Grotius, however, had already (1623) published a plan for the international organization of the entire world, which was addressed "to the Monarchs and Sovereign Princes of the present." Éméric Crucé (1590-1648), in this work, *The New Cyneas*, was more modern in his general outlook and in his conception of the need for such an organization than any one in his day. His remarkable religious and social tolerance precluded his excluding *any* state anywhere in the world, and prepared him to envisage a universal organization which would include Turks and Asiatics as well as European Christians. All were human beings set apart for peaceful association by "the similarity of natures, true base of amity and human society." Even as he wrote, the religious wars were raging, and he was prompted pointedly to ask: "Is it necessary to wage war for the diversity of ceremonies, I will not say of religion, since the chief object of these lies in the adoration of God, who demands rather the heart of men, than the exterior worship and sacrifices, of which so much parade is made?"

The progressive outlook of Crucé was nowhere more in evidence than in his attempt to break down physical and doctrinal obstacles to an unfettered world-wide commerce and in his assault upon the hoary conception that one nation can gain through another's loss. "There are those," he remarks, "who think so little of strangers that they consider it a prudent policy to sow among them dissensions, in order to enjoy a more secure quiet. But I am of a different opinion and it seems to me that when one sees the house of his neighbor burning or tumbling down that one has as much cause for fear as compassion, because human society is a body of all whose members have a common sympathy, so that it is impossible that the sickness of one shall not be communicated to the others." The implications of this philosophy, in the fields of politics and economics, were embodied by Crucé in concrete proposals. The world should be politically organized for peace among *all* peoples, and barriers to trade and communication should be broken down by the improvement and extension of roads and waterways, and by the adoption of a single system of weights and measures. Crucé seemed to envisage an international organization of the world not only for the purpose

of keeping the nations at peace, by a forum for the settlement of their disputes, but also apparently for the role which it might play in promoting their common interests. His strong emphasis upon the need for the liberation of economic forces for the material well-being of mankind testifies, incidentally, to the growing importance in France of the Third Estate which, as contrasted with the monarchy and the nobility, was more interested in trade than in glory.

In *The Great Design*, formerly attributed to "Good King Henry" (Henry IV of France), but probably the work of his minister Sully, we have a conception of international organization different in certain important respects from that of Crucé. Once more the alleged desire was to realize "the establishment of a universal most Christian republic . . . composed of all those Kings and potentates who profess the name of Christ." The broad toleration of Crucé is absent. The "good and perfect union" of the Christian states is to present a united and militant front of the followers of the Prince of Peace against the hated Turk. On the other hand Sully declares, in his *Memoirs*, that Henry, who had set an example of religious toleration in France, was eager to have the Christian community agree to the extension of toleration in religious matters to three principal confessions of Europe—the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist faiths—although apparently not to the smaller, less influential sects. Crucé's plan had also called for the maintenance of the territorial status quo of the various states, although he left the door open to the reconsideration of particular boundaries by the "great assembly" of states should a ruler feel a deep grievance. The burden of proof would, nevertheless, have to be borne by the complaining sovereign. Henry and Sully, on the contrary, were anxious to reduce the territorial holdings of the powerful House of Austria, and took the position that this must be done before the European peace federation, which was visualized in *The Great Design*, could be realized. Sully asserted, however, that the intent was not to aggrandize France at the expense of the Austrian House, and therefore she would not seek any of the territories Austria was to be asked to relinquish. Rather did the King desire the establishment of an equilibrium among the states so that no Power would be in a position to endanger the peace and safety of the others.

Here, it may be noted, is an early assertion of the need for "peace-

ful change" and an alleged desire to attain peace and security for the nations of Christendom on the basis of the voluntary relinquishment by the "haves" of Henry's day of some of their wealth and power. *The Great Design* is notable for another idea which had never been taken seriously by the sovereigns of Europe, but which, with the development of *nations*, was to command increasing attention. Territories were not to be redistributed exclusively from the standpoint of effecting a political equilibrium, but account was to be taken, as far as possible, of the wishes of nationalities inhabiting those territories. It was therefore proposed that ". . . in every attempt at new combinations . . . care must be taken to respect the natural dispositions and peculiar characteristics of peoples and races and thus guard against the folly of trying to unite in any one state . . . men whose differences of temperament or diversity of language, law and tradition are so great as to be incompatible." This, to be sure, in its implications was an argument against the status quo which Sully hoped to have changed, but it was also the admission of a principle which in the course of time was to have great weight among the peoples of the world.

DEVELOPMENT DURING THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

The "climate of opinion" of the seventeenth century was more congenial to the *Machtpolitik* philosophy of Machiavelli than to the ideas of world organization of Crucé or even the less disinterested plan of Sully for the union of Europe. The individualism of the Renaissance, however, characterized as it was by a bold attack on old dogmas whether of church or empire, and the opening up of new intellectual vistas, prepared the ground for that exaltation of reason over authority which was to lead intellectuals to further and more profound explorations in the field of social relationships in the Period of the Enlightenment.

It was inevitable that the relationship of states and the possibilities of international organization would be included in the ambitious agenda of the philosophers of that aspiring and optimistic age. For war between, as well as social maladjustments within, states was a blight which mankind should be able to remove through the employment of reason and the discovery of the social laws of the universe. The discoveries of the astronomers tending to show order

rather than chaos in the physical realm suggested to them the possibility of discovering laws for an ordered cosmos in the social world. Some were even to ask what was to prevent mankind, by the use of intelligence and the proper use of physical resources, from realizing not merely social *progress* but attaining eventually *perfectibility*? If the distance seemed great it was because man, during the greater part of his historic march, had walked with his face turned backward.

One of the most intellectually robust and optimistic planners of a new world of peace and justice in this period was the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743). His fertile brain teemed with interesting and ingenious plans to improve the untractable world in which he lived, the most remarkable being *A Project for Making Peace Perpetual in Europe*. The Abbé, following Grotius, based his treatise on the premise of the existence of natural law and the predisposition of man toward social intercourse. Human beings, he believed, instinctively have a sense of justice, and conventional laws for its expression arise out of this instinct. Unfortunately, the still, small voice of conscience had not deterred princes such as Louis XIV from waging senseless wars, but the Abbé believed that an appeal to reason and self-interest could be made to them after a period of education, for, like all men, princes are endowed with the faculty of reason. They must be brought to understand that they would gain more than they would lose by coming together as equals, forming a European union or alliance, agreeing to surrender their right to make war on one another, and leaving the settlement of their quarrels to a common court on which they would all be represented. For, although they might not henceforth resort to war except to carry out a judgment of the Grand Alliance, they would, on the other hand, be free from having war made on them, and would be secure in their possessions. Thus all would surrender a part of their freedom, but each one would benefit from the surrender of that freedom by the others. A peaceful Europe would be a more prosperous Europe, and each monarch would experience a benefit, for wars always result in the diminution of trade, and when the king's subjects lose trade the king himself loses revenue.

Nothing less than the permanent organization of Europe, however, would suffice, in the Abbé's opinion, to ensure peace. Sporadic international conferences such as had been held in the past, would

do nothing more than register the shortsighted ambitions of the parties. What was needed was a European congress to occupy itself constantly with European affairs. The prevention of war and the punishment of transgressors were important and primary, but the Abbé conceived of a European union that would be equipped with various bureaus and organs of administration to handle different matters of common interest. For example, an international commercial law should be developed in order to protect and promote international commerce. It should also concern itself with the reform of the calendar, the standardization of weights and measures, and the unification of the coinage system.

In spite of the Abbé's confidence in the power of reason to convince even princes of the error of their ways and cause them to accept his solution in their interest, the realistic sovereigns remained obdurate. Frederick the Great, who had been somewhat of an idealist himself in his early days, is credited with the remark: "The thing is most practicable; all that is lacking for its success is the consent of Europe and a few similar trifles." The philosophers of the time, however, did not take it so lightly, and it probably inspired both Rousseau and Kant to explore the subject on their own account. In fact, from the former it drew forth some of the most penetrating observations and the keenest analysis of the fundamental difficulties in the way of a federation of Europe that had been made by anyone up to that time.

Rousseau was thoroughly in accord with the idea of the desirability of a federation of the states of Europe. He agreed that the Abbé's plan was altogether reasonable, but he did not think that an appeal to reason would have much weight with the monarchs of Europe, for he believed that men in general "are led very seldom by their reason, and very often by their passions" and that, although it was easy to prove that the true interest of despots is to obey the law, they could not be expected to give up "the precious right of being unjust when they please." Animated as they were by the desire to extend their dominions at the expense of other states, and by the ambition "to achieve a more absolute rule over their subjects," princes would inevitably oppose a plan such as the Abbé's which would have circumscribed their freedom of action in both directions. Peace and justice between nations, in Rousseau's opinion, could

not be realized by attempting to unite the large, despotically governed states of Europe. Despotism must first give way to democracy. Justice and substantial equality within states had the best chance of being realized if the states were small. Rousseau finally seemed to take the position that if the world could be made up exclusively of small democratically governed states united by a loose, federal bond, the necessary conditions for international peace would be met. That these conditions would ever be realized, however, he did not venture to predict.

Another "Child of the Enlightenment," Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), also set his mind to work on the problem of international federation, and, although undoubtedly influenced by Rousseau, made his own contribution toward the advancement of the idea. A "closet philosopher," at first interested in pure speculation unrelated to the social problems of his day, Kant, about 1770, perhaps again through the influence of Rousseau, turned in his thought to such considerations as the "purpose of the race" and the "moral destiny of mankind." His views as to the ultimate realization of a federation of the world and the attainment of permanent peace between nations were based on his observations and interpretation of the long-range trend of history rather than on the admittedly discouraging prospects of his own day.

Man's nature, Kant wrote, in so far as it was egoistic, unsociable, and acquisitive, had placed obstacles in the way of his progress from the social anarchy which characterized the original state of nature. On the other hand these traits were themselves in part responsible for the development of man's latent capacities by arousing him from sluggishness and a desire merely for ease and comfort. If they led him to seek personal possessions and power, there was yet a saving factor—reason. By it he learned that he must live in society if he is to have scope for his ambitions and the conditions necessary for the satisfaction of his desires. Thus his "selfishness is forced to discipline itself" by the acceptance of laws and government. This process of evolution is destined to go on and embrace the relationship of national states. In the course of time nations will realize the increasingly heavy cost of war as well as its interferences with their freedom to live and develop, and will abandon their present state of anarchy and seek an international regime of law just as they have been com-

pelled to do within the several states. Eventually, then, nature will see to it that the human species shall realize "a perfect state of civil constitution for society in its internal relations, and in its external relations also, as the sole state of society in which the tendencies of human nature can be all and fully developed."

Kant, like Rousseau, saw no hope for the realization of a united Europe (neither one seems to have advocated, as did Crucé, a league of *all* peoples) as long as most of the states were despotically governed. Despotic rulers can always be depended upon to plunge their countries into war over the most trivial matters, for it is an amusement for which they do not have to bear the cost. Republicanism, therefore, must replace despotism in the states to be united. Although Kant does not take quite the position that a league of republican states would never voluntarily wage war, he does assert: "If, as must be so in a Republic, the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well before undertaking such a bad Business. For, in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies that they must fight themselves; that they must hand over the cost of the war out of their own property; that they must do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind." Self-interest, in short, will predispose the rulers of republics toward peace whereas it has always inclined despotic rulers toward war.

With such a conviction Kant naturally welcomed the American and French revolutions and regarded them as hopeful signs of that evolution toward a "civil constitution for mankind founded upon law." And, as if in confirmation of his and Rousseau's view as to the inclination of republics for peace, the National Assembly of France in 1790 introduced into the fundamental law the following article: "The French nation renounces the right of undertaking any war the aim of which is conquest, and will never use its forces against the liberty of any people."

The philosopher of Koenigsberg was not content, however, merely to let nature take its course in this desirable evolution, and he therefore made certain specific suggestions which were calculated to lay the necessary foundation for, and hasten the consummation


THE U. S. OCCUPIES ONE-SIXTEENTH OF THE WORLD'S SURFACE AND CONTAINS ABOUT ONE-SIXTEENTH OF THE INHABITANTS. EUROPE OCCUPIES ONE-FOURTEENTH OF THE LAND AREA; IT SUPPORTS OVER ONE-FIFTH OF THE PEOPLE ON THE EARTH.

THE U.S. IS A SINGLE NATION WITH A TRANS-CONTINENTAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM

EUROPE IS TWENTY-SEVEN NATIONS WHOSE POLITICAL HATE AND BUSINESS RIVALRY DIVIDE IT AGAINST ITSELF CONSTANTLY.

THE U.S. IS ONE AND A HALF TIMES THE SIZE OF CAPITALISTIC EUROPE. THAT IS, EXCLUDING COMMUNISTIC RUSSIA.

THOUGH THE AMERICAN POPULATION IS ONLY ONE-THIRD OF EUROPE'S, THE NATIONAL WEALTH IS THREE-QUARTERS THAT OF THE OLD WORLD. THE AVERAGE PER CAPITA WEALTH IN THE U.S. IS APPROXIMATELY THREE TIMES THAT OF EUROPEAN NATIONS. WEALTH IS UNEVENLY DISTRIBUTED, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIAL AND THE AGRICULTURAL NATIONS BEING PRONOUNCED.



HERE IS THE U.S. PLACED UPON

A MAP OF EUROPE

IT IS THE CONTRAST BETWEEN A NATION WHICH IS A CONTINENT AND A CONTINENT OF NATIONS

EUROPE, BEFORE THE WAR, DID TWO-THIRDS OF THE WORLD'S TRADE; NOW IT DOES ABOUT ONE-HALF BECAUSE OF INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION IN THE U.S., JAPAN, AND THE SOVIET UNION

THE U. S. EXPORTS TEN PER CENT OF ITS PRODUCTION; BUT THE TRADING NATIONS OF EUROPE MUST EXPORT FROM TWENTY TO OVER THIRTY PER CENT TO SURVIVE.

THE WORLD DEPRESSION, THREATENING CAPITAL, AROUND THE GLOBE, IS THE BREEDER OF TODAY'S FASCISTIC SWEEP OVER NEARLY ALL EUROPEAN NATIONS.

FASCISM, WITH ITS MILITARIZATION OF BUSINESS, DESTROYS OUR MODERN WORLD ECONOMY. THE TRADE OF NATIONS IS PUT BEHIND THE WALLS OF "AUTARCHY" IN A CHALLENGE TO EVERY LIBERAL CONCEPT.

EUROPE'S ARMAMENT BILL ACCOUNTS FOR TWO-THIRDS OF THE WORLD'S TOTAL ARMS EXPENDITURE. THE GREAT POWERS, UNABLE TO STABILIZE STATE FINANCES AND PRIVATE BUSINESS, ARE SPENDING SEVEN TIMES THE PRE-WAR FIGURE FOR THEIR NATIONAL DEFENSE.

A Fact Picture Prepared by CHARLES HODGES

of, the Parliament of Man. Imbued with the French revolutionary doctrine of the Rights of Man, he denounced the universal practice of rulers bartering their subjects about in territorial transfer as if they were cattle, and called for an international agreement forbidding any state from acquiring another by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift. Kant declared that a state is not to be regarded as a "piece of property"; it is a "Society of people over which no one but itself has the right of command or disposal." The practice of maintaining standing armies also brought forth his condemnation as fostering competition in armament and tending to breed war. In Kant's time the luxury of fighting on borrowed money was already appealing to the imagination of rulers and he proposed to eliminate this easy way to war by means of an international agreement which would prevent a state from contracting a debt "for external state enterprises." He also proposed that states should relinquish the too common practice of intervening in one another's internal affairs. Finally, he took his stand with Grotius and in opposition to Machiavelli in declaring that in the relation of states as in all other public relations good faith is essential.

THE AMERICAN IDEA

In the first half of the nineteenth century a peace movement that was to gain considerable momentum and eventually exert a great deal of influence in the direction of international organization developed in the United States. If there can be said to be a distinctively *American* idea of the way in which universal peace between nations is to be realized and their common interests served, it is perhaps embodied in the widely publicized plan of William Ladd (1778-1841). In his *Essay on a Congress of Nations*, published in 1840, Ladd advocated the establishment of two organs of world government, a Congress of Nations and a Court of Nations, patterned after the Swiss Diet and Court of Judges. The former should have as its first task the drafting of a code of international law which would furnish a universally recognized and authoritative basis for decisions of the Court. Ladd's chief interest was in the international court. The Congress of Ambassadors, he pointed out, would be a transient body of shifting personnel meeting from time to time to exercise legislative powers. As in the American political system,

it would be separate and distinct from the Court. The latter was to be a permanent body of judges chosen for good behavior, and exercising strictly judicial functions after the manner of the Supreme Court of the United States. Unlike the Continental writer whose views have been examined, Ladd proposed no executive organ to enforce or administer the decisions of the Court. He shared the common American conviction that standing armies "are a way dangerous to liberty," and "fleets and armies" as means of enforcing international obligations were repugnant to him. Public opinion, therefore, was to be the executive in Ladd's scheme. It would be "amply sufficient," he contended, "to enforce all the decisions of a Court of Nations."

The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 may perhaps be regarded as the first fruits of the labor of these and other aspirants for a more ordered world. Likewise the Concert of Europe, as it functioned at one time or another in the course of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, betokened official recognition of the principle, at least, of collective inquiry and settlement of matters of common concern to the international community, and to some extent paved the way for establishment, after the World War, of the League of Nations system.

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CHAPTER 18

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Quincy Wright

The purpose of international law is to facilitate the coexistence of organized groups of human beings with different cultures and governments. It is recognized that the environmental differences of the various portions of the earth's surface and the cultural differences arising from the divergent histories of peoples occupying these areas render a uniformity of human culture throughout the world unlikely for an indefinite future, and that even if such uniformity were possible it would probably be undesirable because the experiments and rivalries of diverse national cultures are an important stimulus to human progress. At the same time it is clear that each group will probably believe in the superiority of its own culture and will develop policies with respect to outside peoples based upon that belief. These policies will unavoidably come into conflict at certain points with the policies developed by other groups.

In modern times the development of internal education and communication has tended to increase the consciousness among the members of each group of the distinctive features of its national culture and of the policies which they imply. During the same period the invention of superior devices for external information, mobility, and attack has increased the confidence of the members of each group in the group's capacity to enforce these policies. As a result intergroup conflicts carried on by violence have tended to become more injurious to all the groups engaged in them.

The advance of the human race has, therefore, witnessed a paradox. With the progress of man's conquest over nature and mastery of principles of human organization, the governments maintaining internal peace have increased in efficiency and expanded the

area of their rule, but the clashes between these governments have become, though less frequent, more devastating when they have occurred. The problem of intergroup conflict has become more difficult to solve, but its solution has become more necessary for the welfare of the human race, and of each of the groups composing it. International law has attempted to solve this problem.

HISTORY

Whenever in the world, whether among primitive or civilized people, distinct political groups have been in contact with each other, rules of international law have arisen to meet the problems of intergroup conflict by facilitating the peaceful solution of controversies or by mitigating the severity of force if that is resorted to. Rules relating to heralds, diplomatic negotiations, arbitrations, on the one hand, and relating to the initiation, conduct, and termination of war on the other, have been recognized by all such groups; but among primitive peoples these rules are part of the mores or folkways of the group and have not constituted a rational system.

With the advance of civilization, however, the concept of law governing relations within the state has presently led to conscious formulation of the rules and practices dealing with external relations. Thus in the civilizations of China, of India, of Egypt, of Babylonia, of Greece, of Rome, of Western Christendom, and of Islam, each of which was originally composed of many states, rules of international law were recognized.

The period of the Renaissance witnessed a revolution in human affairs. Geographical discoveries, the development of the art of printing, and the improvements in the arts of war, navigation, and industrial expansion in the west brought groups both within and outside Western civilization in closer contact with each other. Conflict was inevitable but a common pattern developed throughout the world—the sovereign national state. From the relations of these national states arose a system of international law, more systematic and self-conscious than any such system of the past.

Beginning as a systematic study among Spanish writers of the sixteenth century, who were confronted by the problems of Spain's relations to the civilized Indian states of Mexico and Peru, international law was developed by the "classical" writers of England,

the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as indicated in the previous chapter.

Since the "classical" period, the literature of international law has rapidly expanded and with its expansion there have developed international institutions—consular services, diplomatic services, treaties, international conferences, international unions, arbitral tribunals, and, most recently, the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the International Labor Organizations. Parallel with its increasing integration, "the family of nations" acknowledging international law has expanded in area from the original group of European Christian nations to include first, newly established Christian states in North and South America, and eventually the ancient non-Christian states of the Near East and Asia.

THE FAMILY OF NATIONS

International law proceeds upon the hypothesis that controversy between separately organized human groups is inevitable. To prevent these controversies taking violent form, generally disadvantageous, formal definition of the interests of these groups should be accepted so that the emotions incident to controversy can be canalized into channels which may be controlled by rational argument or formal procedure. This is the object of all law, but the person in international law is the politically organized group, not the biological individual who constitutes the normal person in municipal law. Thus the community within which international law functions is not a community of individuals but a community or family of nations.

The early writers on international law made much of the analogy between the state and the individual, but it is clear that this analogy is far from perfect. Although it is true that new states have occasionally broken off from their "mother countries," the number of states has tended to decrease. Whereas there were over a thousand in Europe alone in the sixteenth century, there are today only about seventy in the world as a whole.

This emphasizes a major difference between the family of nations and a community of individuals. Even the small states have hundreds of thousands of inhabitants; consequently the force of the whole is so superior to any probable group of lawbreakers that

WORLD COMMUNITY

WORLD LAW

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF STATES
Begins with rise of national states, 1450 onwards; a systematic exposition of a law of nations, Grotius, 1625; secular state system, 1648.

Extended by Russian occupation between 1650 and 1700

UNITED STATES by Revolutionary War, 1776-1783

LATIN AMERICA by colonial revolt against Spain, 1810-1825

CUBA, by revolt & Spanish-American War, 1898

HAITI & DOMINICAN REP.

MOROCCO 1906 STATUS ANOMALOUS

LIBERIA 1847

GREECE: War of Independence 1827-1830

ABYSSINIA (ETHIOPIA) Holds League membership.

LEAGUE COVENANT "ANY FULLY SELF-GOVERNING STATE, DOMINION OR COLONY. MAY BECOME A MEMBER OF THE LEAGUE"

Oriental powers, beginning with treaty relations 1842/1854 and completed about 1894-1900

Approximate stages in the development of the world community are shown, with present boundaries. The colonial possessions of the powers are not indicated.

A Fact Picture

WORLD ORDER

Prepared By CHARLES MONROE

sanctioning institutions supported by the state as a whole are ordinarily effective. Only rarely does revolt from the law become so widespread that it cannot be suppressed by police action and takes the form of civil war. In the family of nations, however, the power of certain of the nations is so great that all the rest combined cannot easily suppress a revolt from law by that one state. Physical sanctions are thus much less effective in the family of nations than within a single nation. Other difficulties arise from the fact that sanctions against a state would inevitably injure many innocent people who have not supported a law-violating policy of the state, that such sanctions are likely to stimulate psychological solidarity and resistance rather than modification of policy by the law-violating state, and that a policy of sanctions may prove very burdensome to some of the states participating in the sanctions, thus making it difficult to maintain solidarity within the group of law-enforcing nations. All these factors complicate efforts to develop systems for the enforcement of international law analogous to those customary for the enforcement of municipal law.

The differences alluded to also mean that international law finds it more difficult than municipal law to define the interests of each of its members in terms which are compatible with the interests of the others. Often the interest of one state is to expand at the expense of the territory or even the existence of a neighbor. When such an interest exists international law may not be able to prevent its execution because of the inability of the community as a whole to enforce rules of law upon its more powerful members. Respect for the prescriptions of international law must rely mainly on the consent of states. This situation has resulted in a tendency for international law to divide into two schools of thought.

THEORIES

Some writers regard international law as including only those rules which states seldom have any reason for violating because the rules do not affect their vital interests. They would include such matters as the immunity of diplomatic officers, precedures of negotiation and conference, rules of war in so far as they do not hamper action which the commander deems a "military necessity." These writers look to actual practice as the main source of international

law and consider that interests which historically have not been regulated by uniform practices are not governed by law at all. There are "gaps" in international law within which the state may act as its policy suggests. This conception governed the early arbitration treaties which excluded from arbitration any controversies which one of the parties considered to involve its "independence, national honor or vital interests."

A second school of thought regards international law as a theoretically complete analysis of all state interests. Legal materials can be found on every possible international controversy. Thus all disputes are theoretically susceptible of solution according to law. This school looks to treatises by jurists, to international conventions, and to maxims of law or private law analogies as sources supplementing practice and custom for determining what the law is.

The first school, which emphasizes the sovereignty of the state, is often called the "diplomatic" school whereas the latter, which emphasizes the subordination of sovereignty to the community of nations, is sometimes called the "juristic" school.

At present the better writers on international law attempt to compromise between these two points of view. They recognize that whereas, theoretically, international law is a comprehensive system, regulating all interests of states, in practice, sanctions for its rules are inadequate in some fields. International law must, therefore, develop legislative devices for continually modifying rules so that they will better correspond to the current interests of states in a changing world and for continually improving sanctioning institutions and procedures so that states will be more reluctant to depart from the rules even though such departure is suggested by an immediate interest.

Thus today international law tends to be looked upon as a process whereby the family of nations at any given time analyzes, systematizes, and realizes the interests of its members. It is the organization of thought whereby statesmen and jurists may say, with an approximation to objectivity, what the long-run interests of a state are in a given situation and how these long-run interests may be best protected.

The politician or journalist may be better able than the international lawyer to describe what the leaders or the public of a

state think are their interests at the moment. The historian may be better able to decide what the leaders and public of a state have thought were their interests from year to year in the past. The political scientist, economist, or sociologist may be better able to estimate what the probable behavior of governments will be in the immediate future. The international lawyer, however, utilizing data from all these sources, tries to find words which will precisely express ideas, distinguishing interests, applicable not to one but to all states, not to the present moment or to particular past moments, but to long periods of history and to a considerable future.

He, of course, realizes that history is dynamic, that no generalization of state interests can approximate universality and eternity as can the statement of a law of physics or chemistry. His effort, however, is to invent generalizations with as broad an application as possible and to define the time and space applicability of each with what precision he can. International law is thus conceived as the process and effort by which intelligence penetrates the conduct of international relations, gradually superseding the reign of emotion in that realm.

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although this conception of international law distinguishes it from other approaches to the study of international relations, it does not suggest the criteria by which particular propositions can be designated propositions of international law. For this purpose a definition should allude to the sources of international law. These have been defined by jurists and in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Article 38) in four categories, which may be briefly designated as agreement, custom, reason, and authority.

It has been said by many writers that international law, differing in this respect from municipal law, rests only on the consent of the persons bound. Thus, agreement or convention is the only source. Agreement may be formally expressed in instruments such as treaties. The annual output of treaties has steadily increased during the past century and in the post-War period the development of international law by express agreement has been greatly accelerated

through the increase of multilateral treaties, often called international legislation.

A multilateral treaty accepted by sixty states performs the work of 1770 bilateral treaties. In fact, it does even more than would that number of bilateral treaties because in the multilateral treaty each pair of states stipulates not only that they will conform to the terms of the agreement in their relations *inter se*, but also that they will regard such conformity as an obligation owed to all the other parties to the multilateral treaty.

Even those who consider consent the only source of international law recognize that consent may be tacitly as well as expressly evidenced. Consent may be indicated by the practice of all states coupled with such moral approval of the practice as to constitute it a custom, thus, in the words of anthropology, making a practice or "folkway" one of the "mores" of the family of nations. The majority of modern writers tend to consider custom a source of international law independent of agreement, perhaps even more fundamental because it is only by citation of a custom of the family of nations that a legal duty to observe agreements can be proved, unless indeed the doctrine *pacta sunt servanda* is a fundamental principle inherent in the very nature of any system of law.

Some writers of the diplomatic school consider agreement and custom the only sources of international law, but after a long debate the jurists who drew up the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice considered that there must be other sources, otherwise there would be "gaps" in international law. The Court, they thought, could not refuse jurisdiction of a dispute properly submitted to it on the ground that there was no law on the subject. If general custom or an agreement binding the parties yielded no rule, then they thought the Court should resort to "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," and this phrase was written into the Statute. Commentators have assumed that it refers to "maxims of justice" or juristic principles common to all systems of law. They recognize that before a principle of private law can be applied to international relations it must be shown that the principle is really accepted by all the civilized systems of private law, and that it concerns a relationship of individuals, which is not

merely analogous to the relationship of the states in question, but which is expressive of a relationship common to the persons of a system of law, whatever may be the psychological or sociological characteristics of those persons.

Thus, general principles of law are seen to be logical deductions from such basic hypotheses of a system of law as that legal change should take place only by legal procedures, that self-instituted violence by a subject of law cannot change its rights, that good faith should be observed among the subjects of law, and that the rights of every member of the community should be equally respected. From these principles of continuity, peace, good faith, and equity, especially the last named, it follows that there should be logical consistency throughout the system, excluding the possibility that a claim may be legally sustainable or not legally sustainable according to the point of view from which it is approached. General principles of law thus turn out to be simply principles of logic which make a body of law a system of justice rather than a mere collection of arbitrary rules.

In systems of municipal law, authority is usually the dominant source of law. A rule is law because the king, the supreme legislature, or the supreme court has said it is. International law differs from municipal law in assigning a very subordinate role to authority as a source. The community of nations has no true legislative or executive authority, and a system of regular and authoritative adjudication is only beginning to be achieved through the wide ratification of the optional clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Without some authority, however, suggesting at least the infancy, if not the maturity, of external sanctions, a system of rules is not a system of law. If the only reason for observance of rules is the conscience, or subjective estimates of self-interest of the persons bound by the rule, the system is one of ethics or morals, not one of law. To have law there must be a community, including all those bound by the law, with a competence to interpret and apply the law superior to that of any member. *Ubi jus ibi societas est* ("Where there is law, there is a society").

According to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the principal "authorities" in international law are "judicial

decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" but they are merely "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." Even decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice have "no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." They end the controversy by the principle *res adjudicata* ("things decided") but they do not provide a rule for like cases in the future by the principle *stare decisis* ("to follow precedents"). The actual influence of these decisions as precedents is, however, very great.

It is possible that some legal authority should be attributed to resolutions of general international institutions, such as the League of Nations Council or Assembly, with respect to the members of those institutions, even when they have not all consented to the resolutions, provided the resolution has been passed by an accepted procedure. This may be especially true of resolutions according collective recognition to new states or territorial transfers. Such recognition by less than unanimity may gain in practice as a supplement to "the Stimson doctrine" which prohibits individual recognition of changes achieved by means of illegal violence. In general, international institutions are more and more departing from the rule of unanimous consent for certain types of resolutions.

Diplomatic procedure may lend authority to a rule of law even when the means are lacking to support this procedure by physical sanctions. Rules, the violation of which have habitually resulted in formal diplomatic protest by the injured state, are considered to have the authority of law. Since diplomatic protest is the only procedure universally open to states for enforcing their rights, it has been suggested that it may provide the best basis for distinguishing rules of international law from rules of international morality or comity. States may make diplomatic "representations" about anything, but they do not lodge formal diplomatic "protests" unless they consider that there has been a violation of international law.

The four sources which have been referred to—agreement, custom, reason, and authority—may all be suggested by defining international law as the body of mutually consistent rules, principles, and standards observed in the practices, professions, and protests of members of the family of nations.

STATES

The subjects or persons of international law come into being through recognition of their jural personality by the members of the family of nations individually or collectively. These subjects or persons include not only sovereign states but also many international organizations such as the European Danube Commission, the Universal Postal Union, the International Institute of Agriculture, the League of Nations, and many semi-sovereign states including protectorates such as Tunis and Morocco, vassal states such as Tibet and Outer Mongolia, mandated communities such as Syria and Palestine, and dominions such as Canada and the Irish Free State. The members of federations may in some instances have a limited international personality.

The sovereign state, however, is the normal subject of international law, and its interests defined by international law include security of its domain, its nationals, its government, and its status. A state may be defined as an organized community of human beings occupying a definite territory and recognized as a member of the family of nations. Without territory, population, government, and membership in the family of nations, a state does not exist as a person of international law, and thus the security of these attributes of state existence constitute the state's prime interest.

STATE INTERESTS PROTECTED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Domain. International law defines domain as that portion of space over which a state has ultimate power of control and disposition. It defines the modes of acquiring domain in the land, sea, and air. Domain may be acquired originally by discovery and occupation, by accretion, or by general recognition of the statehood of communities which have long occupied territory outside the original family of nations. It may be acquired derivatively by cession, by prescription, or by general recognition of transfers of territory effected by methods originally non-legal, such as conquest or insurrection. International law also provides rules for determining precisely boundaries which a treaty or other instrument has defined roughly as a strait, a river, or a range of mountains, and for determining the boundary of the marginal sea. It recognizes that the high seas beyond

the three-mile limit from low-water mark and beyond territorial bays are not subject to acquisition by any state.

Nationality. Nationality is defined by international law as the characteristic of an individual whereby a state may control and protect him under international law wherever he may travel. It recognizes the modes by which states confer their nationality originally by birth within the territory (*jus soli*) or by descent from a national (*jus sanguinis*), and derivatively by individual or collective naturalization, marriage, or transfer of territory. It also defines how corporations, ships, and various types of property may acquire a national character.

Nationality as a term of international law is to be distinguished from nationality as a term of sociology and politics. The latter may refer either to the sentiment which causes an individual to consider himself as belonging primarily to one political group, or to the group of individuals who react positively to the symbols of the same actual or potential state. A school of international jurists, following the opinions of Mazzini, at one time attempted to make the nation rather than the state the person of international law as indeed the name *international*, as used by Bentham, suggests. This interpretation has not been generally accepted, but conventional international law has given some recognition to the "principle of nationality" which insists that the sentiment of the population which inhabits a territory should control its sovereignty. Thus treaties, particularly since the World War, have provided for popular plebiscites before territory is transferred, for protection and eventual self-determination of communities under mandate, and for the protection of cultural, religious, and linguistic minorities within certain states.

Jurisdiction. International law defines jurisdiction as freedom to organize and administer government and to make, apply, and enforce municipal law. A state, in general, has complete jurisdiction within its domain and some jurisdiction over its nationals, ships, and governmental agencies abroad, but treaties or special customs have often extended or limited this normal jurisdiction. Thus every state has jurisdiction on the high seas to suppress piracy and to defend itself, and some have, by virtue of treaties, jurisdiction to suppress slave trading and to protect marine life and submarine cables. States have sometimes by treaty acquired jurisdiction in servitudes and

leased areas in foreign territory, in their aircraft passing through foreign aerial domain, and in their vessels passing through foreign rivers or canals connecting them with the sea. All states have jurisdiction over their vessels in innocent passage through the marginal sea of foreign domain and over their diplomatic missions abroad. Treaties have sometimes provided complete extraterritorial jurisdiction over nationals in certain territories and for extradition of fugitives from justice.

These extensions of the jurisdiction of a state into foreign domain imply qualifications of the jurisdiction of states within their domain, especially to respect the immunities of foreign sovereigns, diplomatic officers, consuls, military and naval forces, and to observe certain limitations in the treatment of resident aliens.

Status. International law defines the classes of person subject to international law, the ways of acquiring status, and the respect which is due to persons of different status and their agencies of government in matters of negotiation, ceremonial, order of precedence, and so forth.

Political scientists have considered sovereignty the characteristic which gives a state full status, and some of them have defined sovereignty as superiority to all law, thus apparently denying the existence of international law. The international lawyer, however, has a conception of sovereignty which will escape that disastrous consequence to his subject. He distinguishes international law and municipal law as distinct systems based upon different sources and different sanctions. Sovereignty is, according to this conception, the characteristic of an entity superior to municipal law but subordinate to international law. Whatever the sovereign state enacts as law is law from the point of view of that state's municipal law, but it is law from the international law point of view only in so far as territory, persons, or activities to which it applies are within the state's jurisdiction as defined by international law.

International and national courts have, respectively, illustrated these points of view. When confronted by an enactment of the supreme legislative authority of the state, exceeding the authority of the state, under international law, international courts have considered the enactment invalid, but national courts have considered

themselves bound to act in accord with the legislation, if the legislative intention to transcend international law was clear. Even national courts, however, act upon the presumption that the legislature did not intend to violate international law, and, consequently, if a construction of the legislation in harmony with international law is possible they have adopted it. Thus, for example, when there was an effort to apply the Sherman Anti-Trust Law to prevent a monopoly in restraint of trade in the state of Costa Rica, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, although literally this legislation referred to "all" monopolies in restraint of trade, the legislative intention should be construed as applying only to monopolies within the jurisdiction of the United States as defined by international law.

From the international law point of view a state has internal sovereignty or jurisdiction to make, apply, and enforce municipal law within a sphere defined by its domain, its nationality, its treaties, and the rules of customary international law. It also has external sovereignty or the legal power by taking action or initiating procedures recognized by international law to change the legal position of other states. Among these are the power to acquire and transfer domain, nationals, and jurisdiction; to negotiate treaties and recognize changes of status or territory of others; to participate in international institutions and invoke international procedures; and to utilize force in defense or for other purposes permitted by international law.

PROCEDURES

In addition to defining the interests of states and the ways of acquiring them, international law prescribes procedures of negotiations, mediation, consultation, conference, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration, reprisals, interventions, and war for protecting those interests. These procedures may have the object of prevention or of remedy. Prevention may be achieved by defensive diplomatic or military action or by the conclusion of treaties by which two or more states accept new obligations of respect, renunciation, action, or guarantee. Remedy may also be effected by such direct action as reprisals, but more commonly remedial procedure is designed to bring about an agreement, award, or decision for the payment of monetary damages,

the restoration of domain, property, or nationals, or the performance of specific acts such as apology or the punishment of individuals.

Such procedures involve not only the measurement of the damages which the plaintiff has sustained but also the difficult problem of determining whether the defendant state is responsible. The numerous arbitrations in this field indicate that a state is responsible when injury to the domain, nationals, officials, property, or dignity of another state has resulted from the wrongful act of its officers acting within the color of authority, from negligence in maintaining proper standards of adjudication, administration, or police within its jurisdiction, or from failure to pay its debts to other states or to fulfill other liquidated international obligations.

War. One of the outstanding problems of international law has been that of determining the role of violence. Although medieval theologians and the classical international jurists tried to define the circumstances which permitted resort to violence, and to elaborate criteria for distinguishing the just from the unjust side in wars, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a tendency, both in juristic writings and in practice, to treat war as a fact, the justifiability of which lay outside the realm of international law. International law, therefore, confined itself to defining the circumstances under which force short of war could be used, as in reprisals or interventions, and to defining the proper methods for conducting hostilities, once war existed.

Rules of war, many of them of ancient origin, were developed and to a considerable extent codified in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Besides certain rules designed to protect the higher military officers and to preserve military honor and good faith, these rules attempted to state compromises between the sentiment of humanity and the strategic objective of bringing the enemy to complete submission as rapidly as possible. Unnecessary suffering or unnecessary destruction of life and property was forbidden, and special rules were set down for the protection of prisoners of war and non-combatants.

The substitution of conscript for mercenary or professional armies and the practice consequent upon the industrial revolution of mobilizing the entire nation for participation in the industrial if not the military service of war have made the old distinction between

combatants and non-combatants less obvious. Also, the invention of new weapons, especially the submarine and the aircraft, has made extensive attack upon the civilians behind the lines practicable. As a result, terrorization of the civilian population, starvation blockades, and direct attacks upon the industrial and political nerve centers of the enemy have become both practical and of strategic value. As a result, the time-honored compromises have been less observed in recent wars than formerly.

Neutrality. As a consequence of the renunciation by international law, as it existed before the World War, of an effort to determine the circumstances under which war could properly be resorted to, a doctrine of neutrality had developed upon the theory that states, not parties to the war, should treat the belligerents impartially, should abstain from direct aid to either side, and should prevent their territory from being used as the base of operations by either side. This conception of neutrality was not endorsed by Grotius who thought that non-participants should do nothing to help the just or to hinder the unjust side in a war. He recommended impartiality only where the just side could not be determined.

A large body of case law was built up by prize courts set up by belligerents to adjudicate maritime captures. This law defined the belligerent's right to qualify the "freedom of the seas" enjoyed in time of peace by neutral and enemy merchant vessels. The belligerent was entitled to visit and search all merchant vessels on the high seas and to capture and condemn those found to have an enemy character or to be engaged in the carriage of contraband, breach of blockade, or unneutral service.

The League of Nations Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and other post-War treaties have attempted a radical modification of these branches of international law. Assuming that under modern conditions a war anywhere is injurious to the interests of all states, these instruments have declared hostilities illegal unless entered upon in individual or collective defense. Although the Covenant recognizes war as legitimate after a lapse of time in which specified pacific procedures have been attempted, the Pact of Paris forbids all use of non-pacific means in the settlement of international controversies. A state which has violated the Pact, however, loses its benefits. Thus all states are free to use force in defending themselves or in co-operat-

ing in preventive action against a state which has initiated armed attack.

A state which is responsible for beginning military operations against another state is always a law violator and it has not proved difficult to place that responsibility. There has been considerable success in such instances as the Greco-Bulgarian, Manchurian, Chaco, Ethiopian, and Chinese hostilities to apply procedures and criteria for determining the aggressor. Consulting states have considered that the belligerent which refuses to accept their invitation to stop fighting and to withdraw its troops is the aggressor. The organization of sanctions to prevent or stop aggression has not been successful, but the states have generally accepted the "Stimson doctrine" forbidding individual recognition of transfers of territory or changes of status resulting from aggression. Most of the powers refused to recognize "Manchukuo." The same policy of non-recognition was followed originally in regard to the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, but a number of states have now recognized these conquests. Chamberlain, during his visit to Rome in January, 1939, pledged a toast to "his Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia."

It has also been assumed that treaties, to the making of which illegal violence has contributed, should not be considered valid. Thus, in the future, "treaties of peace" imposed by a victor after war may be of questionable legal validity.

The anti-war treaties imply important modifications in the conception of neutrality. After the aggressor has been determined, parties to the Pact of Paris, whose rights will have been violated by the illegal breach of the peace, are not obliged to treat the two belligerents impartially but may discriminate economically or otherwise against the aggressor. While the Pact imposes no duty to discriminate, the League Covenant does.

These new developments of international law, although established by generally ratified treaties, have not always guided the practice of states. Whether they will eventually be accepted into the customary as well as the conventional law is highly controversial. There seems little doubt, however, but that the general interest of states in suppressing war has been greatly increased by the technological inventions of modern times which spread its economic, political, and moral effects more broadly and intensively than under past conditions.

AN APPRAISAL

International jurists have, therefore, since the World War, given particular attention to the organization of effective procedures for collective security and peaceful change in the community of nations, in order that the role of violence may be restricted and international law may be more rapidly responsive to changing interests and more regularly observed. The inadequacy of a system of law which does not closely relate rights to remedies has been realized, and procedural law has, on the whole, attracted more interest than substantive law. The collective efforts to improve and codify the latter bear witness, however, to the general appreciation that procedures for enforcing the law are not likely to succeed unless the substance of the law is continually adapted to the changing interests of states.

The dramatic incidents which have occurred in recent years, involving violation of the territorial integrity of states and contempt for treaty obligations, do not prove that international law can be dispensed with. Rather, the increasing armament expenditure, hostility, tension, unrest, and impoverishment which have followed these incidents have shown the need for improving the organization of the community of nations so that they will not be repeated.

It is not the province of this chapter to apportion blame among the great powers for the recent collapse of law. All of them have been guilty either of negligence or wrongful action since the War. The United States upset the balance of the peace which it had contributed to making by refusing to enter the League of Nations, and departed from the spirit of the Washington Far Eastern settlement by ignoring Japanese sentiment and needs in regard to immigration and trade. France, shell shocked by the War, and disappointed in the guarantees it had expected from England and the United States, used its dominant position on the continent of Europe to render the German Republic unlivable and preferred its Italian understanding to its League obligations in the Ethiopian affair. Great Britain faltered in League obligations in the Manchurian crisis of 1931 and in the Ethiopian crisis of 1935, as well as in the Czech crisis of 1938. The Soviet Union contributed nothing to support the institutions of world order until threatened by the aggressions of nazi Germany and Japan after 1933. Japan, Italy, and Germany brazenly violated obli-

gations under the League of Nations Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, and other treaties after 1931.

The decline in the authority of international law resulting from these circumstances is not to be wondered at, but it is to be hoped that this decline will stimulate statesmen to appraise the conditions with which the world is now confronted and to adopt policies designed to restore respect for law as the essential basis for more just, orderly, and prosperous conditions.

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CHAPTER 19

DIPLOMACY

DeWitt Clinton Poole

The mechanism of peaceful official intercourse among the whole body of sovereign states is "diplomacy," one of the most interesting of man's political creations. "Diplomacy" is sometimes used to mean state policy in its external bearings, as one may speak of the "diplomacy of Bismarck" at a particular juncture; but the word will be used in this chapter to designate a political mechanism, a system of intercourse, a way of doing business. In this sense diplomacy is the oldest instrumentality of world organization and, I should say, the most efficacious and durable that has yet appeared.

Diplomacy was not, as one recent writer would have it, "invented" as a system of intercourse. It came into being spontaneously in response to practical needs. It has developed as practical needs have developed through successive eras; and apparently it is continuing to develop in conformity with the drastically changed requirements of recent times. At the present moment this system of intercourse comprises some sixty foreign offices at as many national capitals and a world-wide intermeshing of about twelve hundred national diplomatic missions and five thousand or more consulates. These separate units are national; but the whole system emerges from its integral working as something like an international organism, becoming in spirit and activity more international and less national, or the reverse, according to the temper of the times. This duality of character gives to diplomacy its special interest as a political phenomenon. Diplomacy at work mirrors vividly a world which is divided and yet indivisible.

Diplomacy as a system of intercourse began to come into being at the time when the rise of numerous small sovereignties in Renaissance Italy first foreshadowed the contemporary international world. The little Italian states had to rub elbows within the restricted area

of the Italian peninsula as the contemporary sovereignties have now to share rather closely a common planet. Inevitably these "independent" governments had business to transact with one another. So far as the business was not disposed of forcibly by war and military commanders, peaceful agents or ambassadors were sent to talk it over quietly and to come if possible to mutual accommodations. As the life of Europe flourished, growing richer, more active, and more complicated, the need for continuous exchange and accommodation among all its parts increased accordingly. Diplomatic missions which at first were temporary had become permanent in many instances by the end of the fifteenth century, and during the seventeenth century the personnel also grew to be less casual, diplomacy taking its place in society as a life-long vocation or career.

Jules Cambon puts the birth of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs at January 1, 1589, on which day the conduct of the king's external relations, previously divided among four secretaries of state, was consolidated into the hands of one of them, Louis Raval, who became the first of the 137 ministers who have continued to discharge this high function during the 349 succeeding years. In England the conduct of foreign affairs was left in the hands of two co-ordinate secretaries of state until as late as 1782, when the existing British Foreign Office was organized as a separate department, contemporaneously almost with the United States Department of State, which began its career, along with our present government, in 1789, succeeding a Department of Foreign Affairs which had been organized eight years earlier under the Confederation.

ORGANIZATION

Every sovereign state now has a foreign office or ministry of foreign affairs; none could get on without it. Despite the deep diversities of political philosophy and governmental form which today divide the states, all the foreign offices—those at London, Berlin, Moscow, Washington, and Tokyo—are organized along strikingly similar lines. This is not the result of any formal agreement, but the outgrowth of practical requirements which everywhere are essentially the same.

At the head of each foreign office is a cabinet minister. In democratic countries the minister is a politician who comes and goes with

the government of the day, though changes in the ministry of foreign affairs are usually less frequent than in other departments. In dictatorial countries the minister of foreign affairs is more likely to be a professional expert. In democratic countries the protectional type appears more frequently as a permanent undersecretary, who stands next to the minister. Under this leadership one finds in the sixty-odd foreign offices essentially the same subordinate structure: geographical divisions whose personnel specializes in relations with assigned groups of countries (such as a Far Eastern Division, a northern European Division, an American Division, and so on); a legal adviser; an economic adviser; an office of protocol; a press bureau; offices of administration and personnel. Of course, variations in size and detail are found from capital to capital, and in the larger countries foreign ministries are "reorganized" from time to time in order to adjust them more efficiently to current needs; but the basic pattern persists and an experienced diplomat taking up his post at a new capital knows well enough in advance what he will find the structure of the foreign office to be.¹ His only anxiety relates to the personalities of the individuals who are occupying the well-known offices at that particular moment and how he may come on to a good footing with each of them.

The latter task is delicate but not extensive. Foreign offices are small organizations as governmental departments go, counting their total personnel in hundreds while other departmental rosters run into many thousands; and the concentration of authority is such that all the individuals of consequence even in the largest foreign offices can be told off at any time on the fingers of two hands. Nor does the experienced diplomat taking up his duties in a new capital usually come wholly among strangers.

The foreign offices are the major units of the diplomatic system. In addition each government maintains under the administration of its foreign office a field service, known as the Diplomatic and Consular Service, or the Foreign Service. The personnel of these services man the twelve hundred or so diplomatic missions and the five thousand or more consulates which are the smaller and more numerous units of the diplomatic structure.

To obtain a mental picture of the whole system, it is best to think first of the mechanism maintained by one country and then of all

the national mechanisms as they articulate throughout the world. The Government of the United States maintains: at Washington, its Department of State or Foreign Office; abroad, 17 embassies and 37 legations (at present) in as many other national capitals, and 282 consulates in what are for the United States the most important foreign commercial and maritime cities. Every other sovereign government likewise maintains its foreign office and a similar field service, though a less numerous service, of course, in the case of smaller countries, corresponding to their smaller resources and the extent of their foreign interests. Think now of the sixty national mechanisms all at once, fitting neatly into each other, and a single world mechanism appears, which is certainly something more than just the sum of its parts.

At London, to illustrate, there are gathered around the British Foreign Office the diplomatic missions—the embassies and legations—of between fifty-five and sixty foreign countries, these being almost all the independent countries of the world because London is so important a capital. At Kabul, Afghanistan, to cite the other extreme, but eight countries maintain resident missions at present, because only those countries—namely, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iran, Italy, Japan, Turkey—have sufficient interests in that mountainous and backward land to warrant the expense of permanent representation. At Paris and Washington there are about as many foreign missions as in London, and in other capitals anywhere from fifty down to a dozen, or even fewer, depending on the importance of each country and its external ties.²

The foreign minister of each country sits in his capital, then, surrounded by resident official representatives of every foreign land with which his country is at peace and has any large volume of current business. He sits, as it were, in a telephone exchange and through these resident representatives, as well as through his own representatives abroad, he can make such connections with foreign governments as he desires, when he desires. He in turn is accessible to the foreign representatives. Between them pass formal written communications, such as might conceivably be telegraphed directly from one foreign minister to another without the intervention of a resident diplomatic representative, and informal and oral communications in connection with which personal acquaintance, face-to-face

talking, mutual confidence and understanding may spell the difference between success and failure in negotiation—and not impossibly turn the balance between peace and war. Of course, communications of the first kind form the background of communications of the second kind, and vice versa, and, practically, the two cannot be handled apart.

As international business has become more voluminous and specialized, resident diplomatic missions, especially in the case of the larger countries, have ceased to be, as they were formerly, simply an individual ambassador or minister aided by one or more quite subordinate secretaries. Now the representation of one of the Great Powers in the capital of another amounts to a minute reproduction of the government which is represented, as illustrated by the representation of the United States in Berlin in 1928, with which the author chanced to be connected. In all, at that time, about seventy American citizens, not counting their families, were required to carry on the work of representation and were maintained in Berlin by the United States Government for that purpose. The embassy comprised the ambassador,⁸ a counselor (or principal assistant to the ambassador), four secretaries of career, and some ten American clerks and stenographers; military and naval attachés, each with several assistants; and a commercial attaché with a large staff. Then there was the consulate-general; the American personnel there numbered eight or ten, and the subordinate German and foreign staff as many as forty. In addition the United States Department of Agriculture maintained a representative in Berlin to report on matters of particular concern to it, and the United States Treasury Department and the Tariff Commission one or more agents for their especial purposes.

In theory the State Department and its field agents in the embassy and consulate-general spoke and acted for the whole American Government, but in practice the commercial attaché was in direct working contact with the *Wirtschaftsministerium* of the German Government; the military and naval attachés, with their respective ministries; the representative of the Department of Agriculture, with the corresponding German authority; and so on. Though some pains had to be taken to preserve co-ordination and consistency, the practical result was good. The working contact between the two

governments was enlarged and facilitated—the bearing surfaces, so to speak, were increased, and the general cause of international understanding and co-operation was fostered. The dramatic conflicts of nations are news rather than their slow, quiet adjustments, so that few people realize to what an extent in recent times, even despite war's alarms, though these make everything uncertain at the moment, the separate national governments, without full consciousness of the fact, have been interconnecting their common activities under the impulse of practical convenience.⁴ Such a development holds the more promise because it is little perceived and hypersensitive nationalism may spend its energy in fretting over other crackings in its walls.

Recently the Government of the United States has begun to put up consolidated office buildings in the principal foreign capitals to house together the embassy, consulate-general, attachés, and the others, and so to mold the national representation more tightly into something like a microcosm of the government at home. Diplomacy moves pretty well abreast of the times.

This may be illustrated further: In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries communication between a foreign office and its representatives abroad was by couriers, who required a month to travel from London to St. Petersburg, for example, and the newspaper hardly existed. The ambassador's responsibility was very great both as to the reports which he sent home on the progress of affairs in the country of his residence and as to the decisions he had to make frequently on his own initiative and judgment. The telegraph worked a revolution, but the methods of diplomacy were adjusted thereto with small delay. The radiotelephone has brought a further great change,⁵ curtailing incidentally the golfing freedom of diplomats whose capitals are not far off and whose foreign ministers are likely to call up at any hour. To some outside observers instantaneous communication has appeared to reduce the diplomat's part to that of messenger boy, but here is a thoughtless judgment which fails to take account of decisive personal factors in negotiation and the influence which the diplomat himself exerts through his own dispatches and telegrams upon the instructions which are sent to him. Far from belittling the diplomat's importance, the general acceleration of

movement has created a quite unprecedented demand upon his quickness of apprehension and presence of mind.

Diplomacy reflects not alone the material progress but also the spirit of the times. When the political life of Europe was generally corrupt, diplomacy was not less so. Today a diplomat's best asset is recognized to be a reputation for straightforwardness.⁶ In recent decades diplomacy has been strongly affected by the tides of nationalism and the progress of democracy, and it is adapting itself, or being adapted, to these new influences—with Procrustean heedlessness, as it seems to the less malleable diplomatists, for the living body of tradition.

NATIONALISM AND DIPLOMACY

The middle decades of the nineteenth century appear in retrospect to have been an era of cosmopolitanism, almost of internationalism. Europe dominated the world, and a dominant note in Europe was struck by free-trade Britain, busy with a world-wide empire. Monarchs still had an influence in international politics, and almost all of them in Europe belonged to one large supranational family. The personnel of the diplomatic services was mostly aristocratic. Aristocrats, more than the middle class, are cosmopolitan in outlook: they speak foreign languages, travel, and intermarry with the aristocrats of other countries. True, the international political rivalries of those times were intense, but the "old diplomacy" was more international in its composition and spirit than the "new." The diplomatists of every country looked upon themselves as belonging to an international profession, and they accepted international adjustment and conciliation as their supreme objective.⁷

Economic nationalism, first of all, imparted to diplomacy a new temper and activity. The change began with the strong incursion, about 1890 and after, of united, industrialized Germany into the markets of the world, which Great Britain had theretofore easily dominated. Then came the United States, and later numerous other countries. Until then diplomacy—except at Constantinople, which provided a strange forecast of what impended generally⁸—was concerned with political issues. The problems of diplomacy now became politico-economic. First consuls, then even ambassadors, and in one remarkable instance a royal prince ceased to be simply the agents of

government; they appeared instead on the international scene as the active sales representatives of their respective national exporting industries, and even as the business-getters of particular companies. The close relationship which came to exist between government and business, notably in Germany, gave to diplomatic activity a concrete particularism contrasting strongly with the spacious atmosphere of *haute politique* which had gone before; and this development was carried much further by the politico-economic conditions which the World War engendered.⁹

What the American Government denominated "trade promotion" on the part of its diplomatic and consular representatives began to take on organization and fervor some time after the establishment of the Department of Commerce and Labor at Washington in 1903. During the administration of President Taft the State Department publicly dedicated itself to the pursuit of "dollar diplomacy." The succeeding Wilson administration repudiated so sordid a slogan, but up to and even during the period of the World War officers in the American career were made aware of a direct connection between their own promotion and the "concrete results" which they obtained for American business in the countries and districts of their official residence abroad.

After the War the diplomatic and consular officials of all the principal industrial countries were thrown as shock troops into the international commercial strife. Commercial attachés, a distrusted innovation just before the War, and the still newer "commercial counselors" took high rank and importance in embassy staffs. The British Government set up the Department of Overseas Trade as a link between the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade. The French and German Governments took similar steps. Herbert Hoover became United States Secretary of Commerce, and in 1932 the annual appropriations for the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce totaled \$5,334,122, compared with less than a million in 1921 and \$159,422 in 1913.¹⁰ One heard in Washington how much more effectively the British, or German, or French Government was aiding its export interests; one heard in London about the prodigious efforts of the United States Government; and so on around.

One of the first acts of the new administration at Washington in 1933 was to curtail drastically the large staff of commercial experts

DIPLOMACY = TANGIBLES (CITIZENS+PROPERTY) + INTANGIBLES (DEFENSE+IDEALS) ETC.

Trade pacts with state monopolies

NEUTRALITY
Neutrality in international conflict / aid to victims of aggression

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

OPEN DOOR in China

Diplomacy first
line of national defense in vital spheres

MONROE DOCTRINE
Security of the Americas against European and Asiatic threats

Racial discrimination, Nazi, etc.

trade discrimination, Nazi, etc.

Neutrality in civil war

Protection of U.S. shipping in troubled zones

Fostering cultural relations

Reciprocal trade treaties easing business barriers

PROTECTION OF AMERICANS ABROAD
Department of State watches over 348,000 Americans who live in foreign countries.

THE U.S. MAINTAINS 67 DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS COVERING THE WORLD OF STATES PLUS

288 CONSULAR OFFICES

ABOUT 3,600 FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS & OTHER EMPLOYEES

EACH FIGURE REPRESENTS 10,000 AMERICANS LIVING ABROAD, OR FACTION THEREOF, WITH APPROXIMATE DOMICILE LOCATED ON MAP

A FACT OF PICTURE

Picture by CHARLES HODGES

which had been added to the American diplomatic service during the preceding years; and an "important change in policy" was announced restricting the specific services previously rendered to individual American exporters.¹¹ However, in the summer of 1937, Secretary of State Hull published officially a statement entitled "Assistance Rendered to American Commercial Interests by the Department of State and Its Foreign Service."¹² One reads here:

In the Argentine Republic the United States Embassy was occupied during the year in endeavoring to obtain additional official exchange for American exporters. As a result of its efforts it is estimated that an increase in the sale of American products in Argentina to the extent of \$5,000,000 was obtained. In another case, at the request of an important American manufacturing organization, the Embassy intervened with the Argentine Government and obtained the issuance of a decree fixing the customs classification of accounting machines at the former rate of duty, thereby making it possible for this American commodity to be sold in the Argentine market.

In Belgium during the year "it was discovered that no quota had been granted for wool bathing suits under the Belgian tariff, and at the request of a Wisconsin company representations were made by the Embassy at Brussels to the Belgian Government and an annual quota of 500 kilograms obtained for bathing suits of American origin." The consular branch is at least equally assiduous. Secretary Hull tells us that "a statistical study made in the Department of State of the estimated results obtained by consular officers in promoting the sale of American merchandise through trade opportunities submitted and through contacts provided in commercial letters, as well as new business provided by consular officers in bringing traveling representatives of American firms in direct contact with foreign importers and savings realized to American trade interests in the settlement of trade disputes indicates that since 1927 the estimated results of these activities of the Consular Service were \$72,858,830."

The parochial exclusiveness of economic nationalism is further sharpened now by the romantic nationalism of the dictatorships. Hitler's "official program" demands that Germans abroad must be "not 'apostles of humanity,' but bearers of the Nordic idea." "Those who represent Germany abroad," the program asserts, "must not

try to 'feel at home' in a foreign way of life, but the preservation of their German individuality, the superior German character, must be the task of Germans abroad, and of our official representatives."¹³ One is reminded that Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf* that "any one who really from his heart desires the victory of the pacifist idea in this world should support by every means the conquest of the world by the Germans."

DEMOCRACY AND DIPLOMACY

Concurrently with nationalism, democracy has wrought its revolution. The "sovereignty of the people" was replacing personal or concentrated sovereignty almost everywhere, until the emergence of the new dictatorships. The diplomat had no longer to persuade a prince and his minister; he must strive to understand a nation, and so it still is. Such has been the spread of literacy in recent times and so miraculous the improvement in communications that all forms of government, even the governments of indefectible "leaders," depend upon popular sentiment. A diplomat at any modern capital, if he is to serve his government well, must be not only a negotiator, or diplomat in the traditional sense, but also something of a political seer, even something of a sociologist. Neither of the latter qualities is to be achieved simply through innate sensitiveness and discernment, but rather by long study and systematic observation.¹⁴

The democracies have, to varying extents at different times, put persons who are diplomatically quite inexperienced into important diplomatic posts. The United States has made more of such appointments than any other Great Power, as is natural under the circumstances. When the "political appointee" possesses practical political experience and acumen, he can, and often does, do creditably under the generally democratic conditions which now prevail. This is especially true if he has the sense to let his "career" subordinates make good his own lacks in technical equipment. Yet it must be said in general of democratic government and democratic leaders that they are least efficient externally, in an immediate sense at any rate.

Democratic government, with its checks and balances and brief bestowals of authority, is farthest removed from the theoretical nature of the state as an international person or unity; and democratic leaders normally emerge from local situations. They are well in-

structed in the conditions and problems of domestic life but not in problems outside the country's borders. They do not ordinarily speak foreign languages and are little acquainted with foreign lands. They are likely to be sentimental and prejudiced in international questions, whereas diplomacy calls for objectivity and *sang froid*. Moreover, an efficient diplomat works quietly for the long pull; successes are credited to his government, at least publicly, and not to himself. The conditions of domestic political life habituate politicians, by contrast, to personal display. The naive vanity of some American "political" ambassadors in Europe has made them useless, even detrimental, in the conduct of American foreign relations.

The debacle of 1914 tended quite naturally to discredit the "old diplomacy" and diplomats of career; but the performance in 1919 of the domestic political leaders who gathered at Paris from the several victorious countries for the peacemaking in 1919, and their subsequent endeavors to cope with Europe's and the world's post-bellum ills through "diplomacy by conference" and direct contact, did not, unfortunately, achieve the results that were hoped for. It is generally recognized that improvements in the conduct of international affairs have not been absent since the War, that progress has occurred (notably for some years, through the institution of periodic meetings of key statesmen at Geneva, and the generally better co-ordination of international activity under the League of Nations); but the marked tendency of the moment, despite Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich, is to return to the quieter unobtrusive ways of the older diplomacy. The professional diplomatist is today regarded more highly and is more used than at any time since the War.

The collapse of peace in the summer of 1914 was the consequence of profound defects in the political organization and life of Europe, but secret negotiations and secret treaties had helped to bring it on, and secrecy was in any case uncongenial to democracy. So Woodrow Wilson placed at the head of his Fourteen Points: "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view." This, more than any other point, caught the public fancy and gave rise to exaggerated expectations, especially on the part of journalists, which soon came home to plague the author of the promise, then in Paris contending with the

infinitely delicate task of reconstituting a broken world. Ray Standard Baker tells us that Wilson never meant that "the birth pains of peace" should be utterly exposed. "When I pronounced for open diplomacy," Wilson himself wrote to the Senate in 1918, "I meant, not that there should be no private discussions of delicate matters, but that no secret agreements should be entered into, and that all international relations, when fixed, should be open, above-board, and explicit."¹⁵

Plainly, an important distinction exists between privacy in negotiation, which beyond any doubt is indispensable to good results, and secrecy respecting the results. The latter is as certainly pernicious as the former is helpful. The clandestine treaties themselves may not directly do the chief harm, but rather the poisoning suspicion and fear that are bred internationally, frequently beyond all real need, by rumors which inevitably leak out. The published treaty which in April, 1904, established an entente between France and Great Britain was accompanied by five secret articles. When intimations of this secret addendum reached the Germans, they sensed a conspiracy against the Rhine frontier and were needlessly disturbed. It would have served French and British interests better, Harold Nicolson avers, if the Germans had known from the beginning that the secret articles were relatively harmless, relating like those of the public treaty to Egypt and Morocco and not directly to the situation within Europe.¹⁶ Uncertainty gives play to an alarmed imagination. A state of mind is soon induced, of which competitive arming becomes one symptom, and which may carry with it, as the World War proved, the seeds of ultimate disaster.

Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations requires that "every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered." There appears to have been so far very general, but still not complete, compliance with this new principle of international conduct.¹⁷ The *Treaty Series*, which the League of Nations has published since 1920, comprises now more than one hundred and fifty volumes, constituting a public record of the highest moral and political value. Here indeed is one of the most substantial items of progress growing

out of the World War, but under the diplomatic practices of the dictatorships retrogression now threatens.

DIPLOMACY AND THE PRESS

Twin brother of open diplomacy, mothered also by democracy, is the newspaper press, or at any rate the press that is free. The activities of the press and the workings of diplomacy have come to be very closely interconnected in the practice of the liberal democracies. In the dictatorships press and diplomacy are almost identical, because it is none other than the voice of government that is heard in either case, albeit pitched in different keys.

The minister of foreign affairs in every country maintains some organized contact with the press; most ministries have special bureaus for the purpose. The press bureau in the Department of State at Washington, called the Division of Current Information, is staffed by three or four experienced officers and a considerable subordinate personnel. Thirty or forty correspondents frequent the department daily, representing the press agencies and larger newspapers. They are handed written communiqués or "releases" on particular subjects, often several a day; and twice a day the correspondents are received in a body by the Secretary of State or other high officer of the department. An exchange of questions and answers takes place, often very pointed. Secretary Stimson told the correspondents during a farewell talk on March 3, 1933, "When I first came to the State Department, it seemed to me that I was being projected, every time I came through that door, into a cage of very active young lions seeking an opportunity to tear me to pieces"; but, he said, "I have learned better. . . . For months past we have had difficult and delicate situations in different parts of the world. The most difficult one was that in the Far East. I have the highest praise for the breadth of understanding and sympathy and forbearance with which the news relative to that situation has been treated by the American press. . . . That attitude and that treatment have been a great advantage to your country, and I am grateful to you for it."¹⁸

It is interesting to recall within how short a time diplomacy and the press have come into such a relationship as Mr. Stimson's remarks portray. The old-school diplomats who attended the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 agreed at the outset of their meetings, as

Andrew D. White, the principal American delegate, recounts in his diary, that "communications to the press should be reduced to a minimum, comprising merely the external affairs of the Conference." But three weeks later White wrote that "the whole original Russian plan of maintaining absolute secrecy has collapsed, just as the representatives from the constitutional countries in the beginning said it would." Inaccurate accounts of the proceedings had come into the newspapers, and "after a great deal of talk it was decided to authorize the chairman of each committee to give to the press complete reports, so far as possible keeping in the background the part taken by individuals."¹⁹

Thirty-four years later, at the London Economic Conference, the intrusion of the press became excessive. That conference was doomed to failure in any event, but the disagreements and international asperities there vented were unnecessarily sharpened by daily, hourly publicity, prying without restraint. The American journalist, William Hard, speaking at a public luncheon in Paris soon afterwards, recommended that the next big international conference "should be on a ship at sea, and there should be a few destroyers around the ship to keep away all newspaper correspondents and radio broadcasters."²⁰

Progress had o'erleaped itself in thirty-four years. For the most part, within this span, diplomacy and the press have come into sensible working arrangements, helpful to the conduct of international relations and to democratic government generally. Most recently the radio has been added to our technical equipment, and it too affects diplomacy, though so far indirectly for the most part, so that radio can be more appropriately discussed under other headings. Despite the recent fateful conversation by telephone between Mussolini and Hitler, there seems to be no immediate prospect that national rulers will use the radio to talk their international concerns over directly among themselves from hour to hour. Even if such a procedure were made feasible technically, politically it would be very dangerous, because—first, the dispatch of executive business and of diplomatic business, to be successful, calls, if not for different temperaments, at least for different moods. Secondly, the ultimate authority should not ordinarily place himself on the firing line of negotiation, as Woodrow Wilson's experience at Paris demonstrated.

Finally, the mere intervention of time is helpful to adjustment and conciliation. Diplomacy is a shock-absorber.

THE FUNCTION OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy provides the normal means of peaceful official intercourse among the whole body of sovereign states. Moving in its practical development abreast the times, accommodating itself to successive innovations, this instrument is always at the hand of governments and peoples, ready to be used to the end desired, normally the end of making practicable the common life on the surface of one small planet of numerous diverse and self-assertive nations. Diplomacy can be made to do so much and it costs little. The appropriation for the State Department in Washington for the fiscal year 1937-1938 was \$2,220,000 and that for the Foreign Service abroad \$12,164,000. Add to these two figures about \$4,500,000 to cover the cost of international conferences, boundary commissions, and similar activities, and the grand total comes to \$18,000,000, or hardly 2 per cent of the combined appropriations for the Army and Navy.

It might be said that, being an instrument, diplomacy cannot add or subtract substantially from political achievement, but this is far from true. Diplomacy is a living instrument. Its living members perceptibly influence the course of events, the success and failure in particular instances of international life. Governments and peoples would be well advised to look more carefully to their diplomatic services. A direct contribution can be made to the cause of national security or of world peace (wherever in the individual mind the emphasis may lie) if pains are taken to assure—first, that fully adequate appropriations are voted annually for the diplomatic branch, which is so small and easily lost to view until the emergency befalls; and, second, that the best available human material is regularly attracted into, and kept at high efficiency in, the diplomatic posts. During the last twenty years the United States has moved some distance forward in the two directions indicated, but more remains to be done.

Upon the individual who elects to enter diplomacy a heavy responsibility devolves, and it is not in every case accepted in full

seriousness. Each calling has its characteristic defectives. Those of diplomacy are the traditionalist and the play boy. The play boys are not in fact numerous at present, though in the American service they may include political appointees aged from fifty years upward. More seriously detrimental are those who hold blindly to tradition, resisting the movement of the times and failing in new requirements. Not infrequently the latter are strong personalities. I suppose they have to be tolerated or disposed of, as in other branches of political life. The record shows that they do not prevail for long.

The traditionalists and play boys have created some impatience and contempt in the public mind regarding diplomacy, and dubious opinions continue to circulate, especially in the United States, as is natural in view of the continued use of the Foreign Service, though to a less extent now, for political pay-offs. However, public opinion, more especially in the United States, does not do justice to diplomacy, its present quality and achievements or its potentialities. Those who question the intellectual fiber of the personnel, or the serious requirements of the work, should look through any recent entrance examination for the Foreign Service of the United States; they might then turn to the even more exacting tests set for diplomatic aspirants in London, Paris, and Berlin. The entrance examination for the United States career service a year ago was taken by more than seven hundred young men and women in all parts of the country. From this total, thirty-five were ultimately selected for appointment. The selections are entirely on merit. Politics retains its hold only in the topmost ranks.

Being in the service (that is, the Foreign Service of the United States or that of any of the principal Powers), the diplomatic neophyte is confronted by a period of probation and special schooling. If he survives these and goes on, he is stationed during the rest of his active life in one country after another, visiting his own country for short periods only. He and his family have continuously to adjust themselves to alien places, people, and ways, seeking to understand, to be liked, and to gain confidence. "The day is long past," said Secretary Hull in a recent radio address,²¹ "when diplomacy was synonymous with a pleasant, easy-going existence. Today it means hard work, long hours, technical knowledge in a variety of fields, objectiv-

ity, skill in negotiations, and, on rare occasions, physical danger in carrying on the work." And if the diplomat is to measure up to his responsibility he must labor incessantly by study, interchange, and thought, to comprehend that world-wide human drama in which he plays a part that can be of vital consequence.

The future of the nation and the future of the world, and so the happiness of nearly every one of us, depend, in a degree that might be decisive, upon the sustained efficiency of the diplomatic instrument, as well as upon the uses to which the instrument is put.

NOTES

1. For detailed information respecting the organization and operation of foreign offices, see *The Department of State of the United States*, rev. ed., June, 1936, Washington, Government Printing Office; W. T. STONE, "The Administration of the Department of State," *Foreign Policy Association Information Service*, February, 1929; G. HUNT, *The Department of State*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1914; J. TILLEY and S. GASELEE, *The Foreign Office*, London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, Ltd., 1933; W. T. STONE, "The British Foreign Office," *Foreign Policy Association, Information Service*, Feb. 6, 1929; H. K. NORTON, "Foreign Office Organization," supplement to *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CXLIII, 1929; F. L. SCHUMAN, "The Conduct of German Foreign Affairs," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1934, and *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic*, Chapters II and III, New York, Whittlesey House, 1931; K. COLEGROVE, "The Japanese Foreign Office," *American Journal of International Law*, October, 1936; R. B. MOWAT, *Diplomacy and Peace*, Chapter 13; D. P. MYERS, and C. F. RANSOM, "Reorganization of the State Department," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 31, pp. 713-720, October, 1937.

2. Current information regarding the diplomatic representation at each capital, and about diplomatic and official personnel in general, is found in the *Almanach de Gotha* (in French), published annually since 1773 at Gotha, Germany, now by Justus Perthes.

3. Those interested in the diplomatic hierarchy and the more precise aspects of diplomatic organization and procedure are referred to G. H. STUART, *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice*, or SIR E. SATOW, *Diplomatic Practice*, or any standard work on international law. Contrary to a rather wide misconception, the formal rules of diplomacy seem very few indeed, especially when compared, for example, with the body of intricate technique which has been built up for the governance of parliaments and other deliberative bodies.

4. This development has in general been little noted and commented upon, but there is a reference to it in D. MITRANY, *The Progress of International Government*, pp. 126-127, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1933.

5. An early instance of the use of the trans-Atlantic telephone in diplomacy is described in State Department *Press Releases*, p. 585, June 25, 1932.

6. For a commentary on the traditional charge that diplomacy is essentially insincere and dishonest, see M. BERNARD, *Lectures on Diplomacy*, pp. 124-131, London, Macmillan and Company, 1868.

7. See Chapter 3 in MOWAT, *Diplomacy and Peace*, for a sympathetic appreciation of the "old diplomacy"; also CAMBON, *Le Diplomate*, Chapter 1.

8. Described in Chapter 11 of MOWAT, *op. cit.*

9. For a succinct review of this change by a participant therein, see SIR V. WELLESLEY, "Old and New Diplomacy," being the introduction to SIR V. WELLESLEY, and ROBERT SENCOURT, *Conversations with Napoleon III*, London, Ernest Benn, 1934.

10. J. BARNES, *Government Promotion of Foreign Trade in the United States*, New York, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1933.

11. Department of State, *Press Releases*, p. 123, August 26, 1933.

12. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1937.

13. G. FEDER, *Hitler's Official Programme*, p. 76, London, Allen and Unwin, 1934.

14. Interesting observations in this connection will be found in MAURICE T. PRICE, "Sociological Clarification of International Relations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 192:138-155, July, 1937; and "The Modern Diplomat," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 15, No. 8, pp. 509-515, April, 1937.

15. For further discussion of this subject, see R. S. BAKER, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. 1, Chapter 8, New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922, and C. SEYMOUR, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. 4, Chapter 6, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926-1928.

16. H. NICOLSON, *Portrait of a Diplomatist*, p. 110, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1930.

17. See POOLE, *The Conduct of Foreign Relations under Modern Democratic Conditions*, p. 31, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1924.

18. "Releases" reach the correspondents in mimeographed form, but they are gathered up and printed weekly in the Department of State *Press Releases*, Washington, Government Printing Office. See *Press Releases* of March 11, 1933, for Secretary Sumson's statement.

19. A. D. WHITE, *Autobiography*, Vol. 2, pp. 264 and 295-296, New York, Century Company, 1905.

20. As reported in the Paris edition of the New York *Herald* and subsequently confirmed by Mr. Hard.

21. *Activities of the Department of State*, radio address by the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, Sept. 1, 1937, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1937. A good brief sketch of what goes on in the State Department.

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CHAPTER 20

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Pennington Haile

ORIGIN OF THE LEAGUE

The idea of a World Community of Nations is not new. It has been the logical goal of all political thinking since the first organization of the city-state in ancient Greece. No vision of a whole world organized as a single community could come into actual being until the scope and complexity of civilization had developed to a point where real community of action was possible.

During the World War it was seen by statesmen in many lands that some new means of preserving international peace must be devised if the world were to have any hope of avoiding repetitions of that catastrophe. The systems of armed isolation, of military alliance, and of the balance of power had lamentably failed to preserve peace. Furthermore, the realization was growing that these settlements were precarious means of keeping the world from war because, by their very nature, they led to a situation which was more that of an armed truce than of real and lasting peace. In England, Sir Edward Grey and Prime Minister Asquith repeatedly urged the development of a League of Nations as the only alternative to repeated international wars. Statesmen in both France and Germany were coming to the same conclusion. In the United States, an outstanding step in this direction was the formation of the League to Enforce Peace. This society was organized in 1915 and former President Taft was elected its first president. An enthusiastic supporter of the principles of the League to Enforce Peace was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge who later on, for political reasons, became the most bitter opponent of United States entrance into the League of Nations as recommended by President Wilson.

After the United States entered the World War in April, 1917,

President Wilson became an outspoken champion of the idea of a League of Nations. On January 8, 1918, Mr. Wilson stated his well-known Fourteen Points, upon which the conditions for peace were to be based. The last of the Fourteen Points was: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." From this time on, it was known by all that, included in the settlement to be made as soon as hostilities ceased, was to be a Covenant for the League of Nations. When the German Government made its first overtures in October, 1918, it referred specifically to Wilson's Fourteen Points, and, as the armistice was to be based upon them, by so doing implicitly accepted the idea of the formation of the League. When the delegates gathered in Paris for the Peace Conference which followed upon the armistice, it was President Wilson who was the chief exponent of making the Covenant of the League of Nations the pivotal point around which the peace settlement was to be made.

It soon became evident that the delegates from the other leading allied powers were not nearly so enthusiastic for this development as Mr. Wilson, and furthermore a sharp difference of opinion as to the primary purpose of the League soon emerged. The statesmen of France, headed by Georges Clemenceau, were interested in the formation of the League, principally as a means of preserving the new status quo in Europe and especially as a means of making impossible any renewed aggression on the part of Germany. The difference of opinion which existed in this regard prevailed also with regard to the actual disposition of territories gained from the defeat of the Central Powers. President Wilson's idea of the self-determination of peoples was applied to the map of central Europe but its application was only a measured one, since coincident with it was the realization of the desire, principally on the part of France, to arrange the new map of Europe in a manner to enhance the dominant position which France then enjoyed, and make possible a system of alliances which would guard against German aggression in the future.

Any study of the deliberations of the Paris Peace Conference, from December, 1918, to June, 1919, will reveal these unfortunate differences of opinion and the promised solution, with regard to the peace

settlement which they made, as almost inevitable. Mr. Wilson, during these deliberations, maintained his predominant interest in the formation of the League of Nations and relied upon the League in the future to remedy many of the settlements which were incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles and the accompanying treaties made with the allies of Germany.

The Covenant of the League of Nations was submitted to the Conference and was approved on April 28, 1919. By the terms of this Covenant the first meetings of the Council and the Assembly of the League were to be called by the president of the United States. In accordance with this Mr. Wilson called the first meeting of the Council of the League, which met in Paris on January 16, 1920, and the first Assembly, which met in Geneva November 15, 1920.

ORGANIZATION OF THE LEAGUE

The Covenant of the League of Nations, "in order to promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security," bound the "high contracting parties" to accept the obligation of not resorting to war; to conduct their affairs by "open, just and honorable relations between nations"; to the "firm establishment of understandings of international law as an actual rule of conduct among governments"; and to the "maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another." In order to administer the obligations of the Covenant, the work of the League was to be carried on through an Assembly, a Council, and a permanent Secretariat.

The Assembly of the League consists of representatives from all its member states.¹ Each member may have as many as three representatives but has only one vote. The Covenant provided that the Assembly should meet at "regular intervals," and it soon became the practice to hold an annual meeting of the Assembly each September in Geneva. This parliament of nations was given broad, general powers by the Covenant, which itself provides that the Assembly should have the power to deal with any matter "within the sphere of action of the League, or affecting the peace of the world."

The Council, which is best thought of as the cabinet of the League of Nations, just as the Assembly may well be considered its parliament, was originally scheduled to consist of representatives from the

United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—the principal allied and associated powers—together with four other nations. The first five nations were supposed to be permanent members of the Council and the last four non-permanent, their places to be held by various nations in turn. It soon became evident, however, that the small nations felt themselves denied a fair share in the important work of the Council, and the number of members on the Council was extended, first to nine and later to fifteen. When Germany entered the League in 1926, she was given a permanent seat on the Council, as was Russia in 1934. The Council was required to meet at least once a year and has, as a matter of fact, always met more often, usually holding either three or four meetings annually. Like the Assembly, the Council was empowered to treat with any matter affecting the peace of the world. Whenever the Council deals with a matter affecting the interests of a member state not represented on the Council, a special invitation is always issued to that member to send a special delegate to its deliberations. No member of the League can have more than one representative on the Council, or more than one vote.

The third main arm of the League is the Secretariat, a sort of social service corps for the League. The founders of the League of Nations hoped for a far greater degree of success in the political work by the Assembly and Council in the adjustment of international difficulties than has been actually achieved. They did not, however, fully realize how immensely important the Secretariat was to become, or how successful its various branches of activity would be. The Secretariat consists at present of about seven hundred trained workers who spend their entire time in research and routine League work. Article 23 of the League Covenant provides for various non-political activities, the administration of which is entirely in the hands of the League Secretariat. The chief obligations imposed upon members of the League by this Article are (1) to "secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children," (2) to "entrust to the League the general supervision over the execution of agreements, with regard to the traffic in women and children and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs," (3) to "entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition," (4) to "make provision to secure and maintain free-

dom of communications and of transit, and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League," (5) to "endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of diseases."

These various activities are at present administered by the respective sections of the League Secretariat. It is in these fields that the League has achieved its most outstanding successes. It is interesting to note that, although the world has not yet reached the full realization of its interdependent unity in matters of international politics, it has realized it in many other fields. In pursuing its activities, the Secretariat is under the administration of a secretary-general, at present M. Joseph Avenol of France, a deputy secretary-general, and three under secretaries-general, and fifteen sections each with its own corps of organizers, a library, and various administrative services, chief among which are the documentary services.

NON-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

As illustrations of the way in which various sections of the Secretariat successfully developed their work, we might well consider first the work of the Health Section. The purpose of the whole organization is to promote the protection of public health by international co-operation. It comprises, first, the General Advisory Health Council; second, a health committee; third, a secretariat, which is manned by the Health Section of the League Secretariat, a service on public-health statistics, and information about epidemics and an epidemiological bureau at Singapore, as well as an international center for research in leprosy at Rio de Janeiro.

Never before in history has there been such a world-wide attempt to correlate information on diseases and their treatment. The co-ordination of the work of the League's health organization makes possible the rapid assimilation of knowledge as to the most efficient means of combating diseases which have been found in all parts of the world. It has made possible the standardization of serums and antitoxins, and has prescribed standard units of measurement in the administration of medicinal drugs. It has performed an invaluable service in combating such epidemics as typhus, cholera, and bubonic plague in Europe and Asia. The health organization arranges trips for medical students to visit hospitals and consult with doctors and

surgeons of various countries which are in the forefront of the development of medical technique. It provides medical aid to parts of the world that are backward in the fight to control and combat diseases. A study of the work of the health organization makes dramatic reading and is recommended to anyone who is interested in understanding how co-operation on an international basis can speed such a fundamentally important undertaking as the production of the health of mankind.

Another highly successful section of the League's work is that which is performed by the organization dealing with problems arising from the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. This organization functions through activities of (1) an advisory committee in the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs, (2) the Permanent Central Opium Board, (3) a supervisory committee which includes four members of the advisory committee, together with the Permanent Central Board and the Health Committee of the League of Nations. Through the activity of these bodies it has been possible to prepare statistics showing the amount of drugs which is needed for legitimate medicinal purposes, and to supervise the growth, manufacture, and shipment of these drugs. Any country which exceeds its quota of manufactured drugs is subject to penalties imposed by the organizations. An important convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs was signed in Geneva in July, 1931.

These two illustrations must suffice in this account of the non-political work of the League of Nations, but anyone who is interested to know more of the varied activities of the League should pursue a further inquiry which will lead him to the conclusion that the activities of the various non-political sections of the Secretariat represent one of mankind's most important achievements, and anticipate the time when co-operation in political, as well as non-political, fields will be achieved and maintained.

One field of League activity which, although not directly political, impinges so fully upon the field of international politics that its successful functioning has been thereby hampered, is that of international economic planning. Repeatedly, during the first years of the League, its economic section urged increased international economic co-operation as a means of removing some of the fundamental causes

of war. Finally, in 1927, a great world economic conference was held in Geneva under the auspices of the League. Basing its discussions upon the carefully prepared work of the committees of experts, the conference recommended to the world many suggestions which, had they been heeded, might have done much to prevent the economic collapse which began in the United States in the autumn of 1929 and which spread rapidly to all parts of the world. However, nations were reluctant to accept the theory that the time had come when the world was so much of an interdependent economic unit that economic policies based merely upon national interests would inevitably bring catastrophe. They were unwilling to see the wisdom of lowering barriers of international trade in order that commerce might be stimulated and the unequal resources of various nations might, at least to some degree, be made more equal.

Even after the world-wide depression had caught the ordinary life of all nations in its grip, most governments were unwilling to accept the necessity of economic planning on a world-wide scale and tried to combat the depression by selfish protective measures which merely made matters worse. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff, adopted by the United States in 1930, is a case in point. This measure did little, if anything, to offset the depression in the United States and much to increase the false policy of economic nationalism with its necessary corollary of huge armaments. It might be well to mention here that Secretary Hull's reciprocal trade agreement program is completely in line with the suggestions made by League experts at the Geneva Conference in 1927.

One of the obligations entered into by all members of the League, according to Article 8 of the Covenant, is the need for "a reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety." Various attempts to make progress toward disarmament through international agreements were made in the early years of League history, but despite some special agreements, such as that reached by the great naval powers at the Washington Conference of 1922, little real progress was made. Finally, in 1932, a World Disarmament Conference met in Geneva. Here, as in the case of the World Economic Conference, careful preparation had been made and statistics had been prepared showing the status of the armaments of all nations, together with recommendations as to their actual

needs for national security. That the conference was unsuccessful was due principally to the fact that Germany's former enemies were unwilling to grant her equality in armaments. By the Treaty of Versailles Germany had been disarmed under the theory that this step would be only the first toward general European disarmament. No further steps toward this end had been taken, however, and by 1932 Germany was unwilling any longer to accept inferiority in armaments. Her departure from the Disarmament Conference and subsequently from the League rendered further discussion of disarmament, at least in Europe, useless at the time. In the cases both of the Economic and Disarmament Conference it can easily be seen that the facilities for research and the opportunity for consultation offered by the League of Nations were of vast importance but that nations were as yet unready to accept reasonable counsel.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY

It is, however, in its direct political history—in the attempts of the League to preserve peace and order—that the attention of the world has quite naturally always centered. For the purpose of studying these activities it is well to remember that during the first ten years of its existence the League has a record of genuine accomplishments in dealing with political disputes. From 1920 until 1931 this record is good, for during that period it dealt with almost thirty important disputes which might in several cases have resulted in war. From 1931 on, its prestige has been steadily diminishing. The reasons for this will be treated in the general summary of the reasons for the growth and decline of the power and influence of the present League of Nations. First, however, it will be well to review a few of the cases in which, during its earlier years, the League functioned as its founders hoped it would be able to function.

Nations have long realized that other means than war for the settlement of international disputes should be devised and maintained. Arbitration implies that the parties to the dispute consult a tribunal of impartial judges to render a decision and so settle the point at issue. One of the chief functions of the League, therefore, was, of course, to act as a permanently organized means of settling international quarrels. Article 11 of the Covenant of the League provides that "any war or threat of war . . . is hereby declared a matter

of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effective to safeguard the peace of nations." When Article 11 is invoked this means that the disputing parties may accept the League Council as a Board of Arbitration. This procedure, which is only one of the means for pacific settlement provided by the Covenant, was designed to be customarily followed in the first stages of dispute between nations. The difficulty is that the Council's solution must be approved by both parties as well as by all the other members of the Council. This rule of unanimity of approval renders very difficult the settlement of a dispute in which important interests or national honor of one of the disputants is involved. Nevertheless, many important controversies have been settled by this method.

One of the earliest questions was a dispute between Finland and Sweden concerning the Aaland Islands in the Baltic Sea. The dispute was brought before the Council in July, 1920, by Britain, exercising the "friendly right" of any member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or Council a situation threatening international peace. The Aaland Islands had belonged to Finland during the long period in which Finland had been a part of Russia. When Finland gained her independence there was a problem concerning the islands because their inhabitants were mostly Swedish and many wished union with Sweden. Finland was not at the time a member of the League and at first objected to interference by the Council. Finally, however, the Council was successful in securing a promise that neither Sweden nor Finland would take any hostile action during the period of investigation. After the investigation was completed the Council decided that the Aaland Islands should remain under the sovereignty of Finland but that their inhabitants should be guaranteed the preservation of their Swedish traditions and background. In June, 1921, both Finland and Sweden accepted the decision of the Council.

Another important incident, and one which perhaps best illustrates a successful instance of arbitration by the League Council, was the dispute between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925. In October of that year there was a border skirmish between Bulgarian and Greek troops in the course of which the latter advanced several miles into Bulgarian territory. Bulgaria thereupon appealed to the League,

not only under Article 11 but also under Article 10. The latter article is the one in which each member of the League undertakes to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of all other members. The president of the Council immediately telegraphed to the Greek and Bulgarian governments, called attention to their obligations under the Covenant, and stated that their troops must be withdrawn behind their frontiers. A meeting of the Council was also summoned by telegraph. While this meeting was in session both Greece and Bulgaria notified the Council that they had complied with its request and a commission of inquiry, sent immediately thereafter by the Council, fixed the blame upon Greece and asked for a substantial indemnity which the Greek Government promptly paid. In this case fighting had actually begun and was speedily terminated by the prompt and official action of the Council, with the willingness of the two governments concerned to abide by their obligations as League members.

These two instances will show the methods by which the Council can intervene in disputes between nations, and illustrate a procedure which it had been hoped would soon become one of the most important yet devised for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Members of the League undertake, in Article 11 of the Covenant, to settle all problems either by this method, by submission to a specially appointed board of arbitration other than the Council, or by submitting a dispute to the jurisdiction of the World Court.

A later outstanding achievement of the League in the political field illustrates another type of activity. This was the successful manner in which it treated the problems which arose in connection with the plebiscite held in the Saar Valley in January, 1935. At the end of the war this region had been turned over to the supervision of the League with the provision that at the end of fifteen years the inhabitants should vote as to whether they would return to Germany, be joined to France, or remain under League control. The fact that the national socialists had come into power in Germany meant that a violent propaganda campaign for union with Germany had been launched and that there was danger of disorder and bloodshed. The League sent an international police force to the Saar and patrolled it so that the plebiscite was held in an orderly manner. There had been little doubt that the inhabitants would favor union with Ger-

many, but the prompt action of the League averted the possibility of international difficulties over the occurrence of the plebiscite. It is most unfortunate that the model of orderly procedure provided by this incident has not been followed on other occasions.

We must remember that, with the exception of the Saar plebiscite, all the disputes which we have mentioned occurred during the first ten years of the history of the League. It is only fair to point out that during this period strong national forces which were later to oppose the League had not yet accumulated sufficient strength to challenge its authority. During the latter period of post-War history the League has failed lamentably to live up to its original promises.

In 1931, when Japan overran the Chinese province of Manchuria on the pretext of restoring order, the League took no action beyond a vote of censure upon Japan and the dispatching of a commission of inquiry under Lord Lytton. A year later, the Lytton report, which granted Japan economic opportunities in Manchuria but insisted upon Chinese sovereignty in the province, was accepted by China but refused by Japan. The latter nation thereupon withdrew from the Council and Assembly of the League but retained until November, 1938, its mandates in the Pacific and its membership in the International Labor Organization.

The failure of the nations to take collective actions against Japan through the machinery of the League set a precedent which has had most disastrous results. There is little doubt that had the League, with the promised support of the United States, invoked "sanctions" against Japan, not only could the Japanese have been stopped but that later cases of conquest by force and of the disregard of international treaties and obligations need never have occurred.

Unfortunately, the course of history did not move in this direction. Those nations which had felt ever since the World War that they were denied equality of opportunity and that their attempts to achieve recognition of their grievances and claims had met with no success were tempted to aggression by force by the realization that the world lacked the will to use the technique of collective security, as embodied in the League, to oppose them. In March, 1935, Germany announced a wholesale program of rearmament against the express provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Before the world had time to recover from this shock, it became evident that Italy was

planning to invade Ethiopia, a fellow member of the League, and was not disposed to let a pretense at arbitration stop her. In October, 1935, her troops crossed the Ethiopian borders and launched an offensive obviously directed at the extinction of Ethiopia as an independent state. On this occasion, the League, for the one time in its history to date, made use of Article 16 of the League Covenant. This is the Article which provides that if any member of the League resorts to war, disregarding its obligations under Article 12, 13, and 15, it shall be considered to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League. The Article goes on to provide that in such case all other members shall take steps to check its course. Such "sanctions" may take the form of severance of economic and financial relations or, in the last resort, military measures. The League has no power to command its members to take such steps; it can merely urge them to do so.

In October, 1935, fifty-one nations in the League adopted a program of sanctions against Italy. This included an embargo on arms and certain raw materials, a ban on loans and credits, a boycott on Italian goods, and measures for mutual assistance to nations whose economic life was injured by this procedure. From the beginning it was seen that the embargo on raw materials should be extended to include oil and other key commodities without which Italy could not wage a successful war. Britain and France, however, were reluctant to estrange Italy completely because of the growing menace of the power of Germany under Hitler. Not only were stronger measures not adopted, but in December, 1935, Prime-Minister Hoare, of Britain, and Premier Laval, of France, engineered a compromise scheme by which Italy was to receive a large share of Ethiopia. The Hoare-Laval plan was repudiated by popular demand, but it undermined the faith of many in the possibility of effective action through collective pressure, and in March, 1936, Germany's remilitarization of her Rhineland provinces disturbed Europe so profoundly that all incentive to prosecute the sanctions campaign against Italy disappeared. Thus again, as in the case of Japan's aggression in Manchuria, the possibility of setting a precedent which would deter nations from aggression by force was lost.

In July, 1937, when Japan again began her campaign of conquest on the mainland of Asia, there was a discussion of the possibility

of taking collective action against her. The League Assembly in September of that year again denounced Japan as an aggressor and called for a conference to be held under the terms of the Nine Power Pact, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China to which the United States is a signatory. The conference held in Brussels in November, 1937, failed, however, to take any effective action.

By 1938, when Germany forced the annexation of Austria and the world was brought to the brink of war by the crisis over Czechoslovakia, the League's prestige had fallen so low that no member state called for any collective action against Germany. In November, 1938, Japan announced that she would definitely withdraw all her people from Geneva, from all departments, and from the International Labor Office.

THE CASE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

It is necessary to analyse basic factors to understand why the League, while highly successful in its non-political fields, has failed in the preservation of peace and in the outlawry of war. All through the history of the League there has been an unfortunate tendency to mingle two separate and incompatible concepts of its political function. One is a concept of the League as a dynamic force to oversee the mechanics of change by peaceful means, at the same time resisting change by force. The other is the unfortunate concept of the League as a means of preserving the peace settlements of 1919. In so far as the latter has prevailed, it has prejudiced the League's chances of success from its very inception and has substantiated the claims of dissatisfied nations that they could never gain equality of treatment by the functioning of the machinery of the League Covenant. If the League had had sufficient wisdom to admit the necessities of change by peaceful procedure and sufficient strength to resist change by force, we should have a better and more orderly world today. To take a specific instance, there is no doubt that a vast majority of the people of the Austrian Republic, organized at the end of the War, desired union with Germany in 1919. In fact, the first parliament of the Austrian Republic voted overwhelmingly in favor of such union, but the fear on the part of certain nations, notably France, of increasing the size and power of Germany in any way prevented an Austro-German *Anschluss*. If it had occurred

in the years immediately following the War the violence of 1938 would have been averted. This is but one instance of the tragic failure of the League to make use of Article 19 of its Covenant which provides that "the Assembly may from time to time, advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

There must always be change in international conditions. The responsibility of the League should have been to see that changes were effected by pacific means. Article 19 and Article 16 are complementary. The first without the second would lead to a world in which the demand for change would inevitably run wild. The second without the first would mean a world in which change by orderly processes would be impossible. A strong and vital federation of the nations of the world must make use of the principles embodied in both articles.

Another extremely important factor in the declining prestige of the League is the failure of the United States to take its expected place in the Assembly and Council of the League, thus devitalizing the whole institution from the very beginning. Lacking the probability of co-operation by the United States in any program to check aggression, the members of the League have been far more reluctant to adopt repressive measures than they need otherwise have been. At the same time, the absence of the United States from the council tables of the League has meant that the spirit of detachment and moderation which our nation was in a position to adopt has not been present to encourage the consideration of the claims of nations which have felt themselves unfairly treated. In more recent years, the renewed tendency of the United States to seek refuge from world disorder in an impossible isolation has undermined the confidence of the world in the effective possibility of orderly procedure, since no orderly world can conceivably be built without the co-operation of the world's most powerful nation. Since 1935, our "neutrality law" has rendered illegal the very possibility of participation by the United States in any program of collective pressure upon an aggressor state. This has been because our law has not provided for any discrimination between an aggressor and its victim. In other words, if the law is invoked we apply its provisions against

both sides in a conflict equally. It can easily be seen, therefore, that this law has stood squarely in the path of progress toward a world in which law and order, instead of force and violence, might hold sway.

The official position of the United States with regard to co-operation with the League has gone through interesting changes. At first, on the wave of political bitterness led by Senator Lodge and others, this country refused to co-operate in any way and correspondence from Geneva was often left unopened by the State Department. Gradually, however, a more co-operative spirit appeared and in recent years the United States has been represented at almost all the committee meetings of the non-political sections of League activity. In health work, social service work, in warfare against traffic in drugs, and in many other fields, the League now has co-operation from Washington. In 1934, a joint resolution in Congress approved our entrance into the International Labor Organization which is independent of, yet closely related to, the League of Nations. The United States was also represented at the Economic Conference of 1927 and the Disarmament Conference in 1932, which have already been mentioned. In recent years the State Department has voluntarily co-operated with all members of the League in observing Article 18 of the Covenant as though it were itself a member. This article provides for the registration with the Secretariat of all treaties and international engagements and specifies that no such treaty or international engagement shall be considered binding unless it is duly registered. Although still somewhat reluctant to abandon the plausible but misleading doctrine of isolation, the United States seems more and more to realize that the only logical basis for peace is to be found in world-wide organization for peace through collective security in which the United States must play its necessary and reasonable part.

Another factor to consider is the reluctance of many European nations to put their trust in collective security. Habits of political thinking change slowly and the old tendencies to seek peace and security through armaments, alliances, and attempts to balance international power still predominate. The League of Nations has recently been challenged not only by the power of nations which, ever since the War, have had reasons to suspect its impartiality, but also

by the failure of its own members really to trust its machinery. The latter weakness was apparent during the Italo-Ethiopian War and since November, 1937, has been steadily undermining the whole framework of collective security as embodied in the League.

Despite the fact that in June, 1935, the people of Britain voted overwhelmingly for a foreign policy founded firmly on collective security, the British Government has been reluctant to accept such a policy. Finally, during the Brussels Conference, in November, 1937, they departed from it by sending a member of the Cabinet—Lord Halifax—to interview Hitler in Berlin, thus attempting a first step toward direct negotiations with a nation outside the League and embarking upon a road which led by logical stages to the conference at Munich, in September, 1938, and Chamberlain's "talks" with Mussolini in Rome in January, 1939. Various steps along this road were the dismissal of Anthony Eden, champion of the League, as foreign secretary, the Anglo-Italian Accord of April, 1937, and the direct negotiations between Chamberlain and Hitler which preceded the Munich parley. In all these steps it was apparent that Britain, upon whose support the League depended far more than upon any other nation, was deviating in her foreign policy from her principles of collective security and returning to the pre-War diplomatic game of direct two-party interviews of big-power politics. One of the most tragic ironies in political history was the coincidence of the holding of a conference in Munich, where peace was bought at the price of concessions to force and the threat of force, and a meeting of the Assembly in Geneva in which the crisis which threatened the world was not even officially considered.

IS THERE A "FUTURE" FOR THE LEAGUE

What is there ahead for the League of Nations and why should its preservation and revitalization be of concern to the world? In the first place, never before has the world been so keenly aware of the alternatives which confront it in the field of international relations. On the one hand, there has been a vision of a world from which change by force and violence should be banished, of a true community of nations which should manage its affairs according to the dictates of reason and common sense instead of the dictator of militant nationalism and mass hysteria. On the other hand, there

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TODAY

Germany - withdrew 1935

Italy - 1939

Japan - withdrew 1935

Guatemala, 1938

Honduras, 1938

PACIFIC OCEAN

Nicaragua, 1938

El Salvador - 1939

Costa Rica - withdrew 1927

Venezuela - 1940

STATES NOW MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE

MANDATED TERRITORIES

STATES NOW WITHDRAWING
with effective date
of their resignation

Chile - 1940

Paraguay - withdrew 1937

Brazil - withdrew 1928


FORMER MEMBER STATES OF THE LEAGUE

STATE NEVER MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE

Note

Ethiopia still de jure a League member with resistance still extensive against Italy. Manchukuo regarded as conquered territory, held by Japan as a puppet state.

A FACT OF PICTURE
BY CHARLES HODGES



is a despairing sense of the recrudescence of political tendencies which are utterly incompatible with such a vision. The world is beginning to realize more and more fully that it must choose between building itself into an orderly community and resigning itself to being a tragic battleground of horror, waste, and devastation. Only with the former can come freedom, a democratic spirit, and a chance for oncoming generations to live lives of fruition and utility. With the latter can come nothing but the return to savagery, a savagery made more terrifying than any heretofore known by mankind's iniquitous cunning in devising engines for his own destruction.

No civilized nation could exist without institutions for the redress of grievances and for the preservation of order—in other words, without a court system and a police power. The alternative for any country is injustice and anarchy. But the world is only beginning to realize that the same is true in its affairs at large. The problems that stand in the way of achieving an orderly world are far greater than those which impede the growth of order within a single nation, but the difference is one of degree rather than of kind. Sooner or later, with or without the repetition of disastrous wars, the world will realize the interdependent character of its many nations and that its political life must be brought into accord with this fact.

As for immediate steps to achieve this desired end, it seems an open question today as to whether the present League of Nations can survive, in its political function, the current storm of international anarchy which the world is undergoing. Various remedies have been proposed to strengthen it. In fact, the 1936 Assembly asked all member states to submit their plans for Covenant revision, and committees of experts have been working on these plans ever since. There are some states that feel that the "sanctions" provisions of Article 16 should be made optional entirely. Others feel that these obligations should be regionalized so that, for example, European nations would undertake them in full measure only for Europe, and American nations only for the Western Hemisphere. A contrary school of opinion holds that the League should be made stronger through being given power to demand the co-operation of its members in repressing aggression instead of merely requesting it. This envisions the League as a superstate to which all member states surrender in small part

their sovereignty. Such a superstate would inevitably have an international police force to back up the decisions of its tribunals of international equity. This view is markedly compatible with that of Richard Price, whose opinions were quoted in the first paragraphs of this chapter. One of the major reforms in the League Covenant has been its separation from the Treaty of Versailles in which it was originally incorporated. Unfortunately, this was not done until 1938. Another possibility of reform is to be found in the suggestion that the League Covenant be used to implement the Kellogg Pact of 1928, outlawing and renouncing war. This pact lacked, however, any suggestion as to how failure to observe its principles was to be punished.

Granting a degree of partiality, it can be forcefully stated that the League of Nations, despite a lack of wisdom and a lack of strength, has given to the world a glimpse of the possibility of order and security exceeding anything the world has ever known. With its companion institutions of the World Court and the International Labor Organization, it provides machinery for a peaceful world based on social justice, which needs only the will of mankind to come into actual existence. It is not conceivable that the vision of an orderly world, once having occurred, can cease to trouble the dreams and the thought of all men who have in their hearts the desire to see mankind freed from the scourge of war and set upon the road to security, freedom, and justice. The only question is whether men will have the courage and the foresight to mend the institutions of peace in time to prevent a long, dark interval of horror and destruction before the vision again revives and mankind is led into the light of the sort of world which has haunted his thinking throughout his known history.

NOTES

1. Status of individual countries in relation to the League of Nations November 1, 1938:

MEMBER STATES

Afghanistan	Ecuador	Netherlands
Union of South Africa	Egypt	New Zealand
Albania	Estonia	Norway
Argentine Republic	Ethiopia	Panama
Australia	Finland	Peru
Belgium	France	Poland
Bolivia	Greece	Portugal
United Kingdom of	Haiti	Rumania
Great Britain and	Hungary	Salvador ³
Northern Ireland	India	(El Salvador)
Bulgaria	Iran	Siam
Canada	Iraq	Spain
Chile ¹	Ireland	Sweden
China	Italy ²	Switzerland
Colombia	Latvia	Turkey
Cuba	Liberia	U.S.S.R.
Czechoslovakia	Lithuania	Uruguay
Denmark	Luxemburg	Venezuela ⁴
Dominican Republic	Mexico	Yugoslavia

¹ Gave notice of withdrawal June 2, 1938

² Gave notice of withdrawal December 11, 1937

³ Gave notice of withdrawal July 26, 1937

⁴ Gave notice of withdrawal July 11, 1938

Austria is technically still a member but is not represented.

STATES WHICH HAVE WITHDRAWN

Brazil	Honduras
Costa Rica	Japan
Germany	Nicaragua
Guatemala	Paraguay

STATES WHICH HAVE NEVER BEEN MEMBERS

United States of America
Saudi Arabia

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CHAPTER 21

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

Phillips Bradley

ORIGINS OF AND PRECEDENTS FOR THE IDEA OF A WORLD COURT

One of the three major institutions established after the Great War to further the process of pacific settlement of international disputes, the Permanent Court of International Justice marked the culmination of a long series of efforts to convert the ideal of a world court into a reality. It was no sudden or preconceived notion of the utility of such a court that induced its integration in the framework of the peace treaties. Rather, the culmination of a continuous recognition among many philosophers and some statesmen of the practical necessity for such an agency and the exigencies—and the possibilities—created by the peace settlements, made the consummation of the idea possible.¹

In the meantime, another influence was developing which was a powerful factor in promoting the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice (the P.C.I.J.). Arbitration, once widely used as a means of amicable settlement both before and after the Greeks applied it to interstate disputes, was slowly but steadily revived during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.² Modern arbitration is usually dated from the articles of Jay's Treaty of 1794 providing for arbitral settlement of property and boundary issues between Great Britain and the United States. From the end of the eighteenth century to the Great War, there was an accelerating development of arbitration treaties and of their utilization.³

Arbitration is a somewhat restricted form of pacific settlement by reason of the limitations often imposed on both the organization and the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in the terms of general or specific arbitral agreements. But these very restrictions perhaps

explain the relatively rapid progress of the practice of arbitration, and of the comparatively early success in organizing an international arbitral tribunal. This seems true when compared with the slower conversion into actuality of the broader stream of ideas, noted above, supporting the idea of general judicial settlement of all international disputes. In any case, a century of experiment with international arbitration was climaxed, in 1899, by the creation of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration—the first of several projects which may be viewed as precursors of the P.C.I.J.

The Permanent Court of International Arbitration is, in fact, neither permanent nor a court. Its organization comprises, briefly, a series of nationally nominated panels of four judges each (there are at present forty-nine member states). From the whole list of these national panels, for each arbitral case agreed to be brought under the terms of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the parties select from one to five to act as an *ad hoc* arbitral tribunal for the particular dispute. From 1899 to date, twenty-one arbitrations have been conducted within the framework of the Hague system. At the same time, it should be recalled that both before and since the Great War, there have been a great number and variety of bipartite arbitral conventions, including some which approximated more closely agreements for general judicial settlement.⁴

The movement begun in 1899 was carried further at the Second Hague Conference of 1907 at which several projects for a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice were put forward. A plan for such a court, in which, in the words of the instructions of the American delegation to the Conference, "the judges (would be) judicial officers and nothing else . . . (to) devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility" was agreed to in the Final Act of the Conference.

Here was the germ of a genuine international tribunal with a general jurisdiction over all types of international dispute. Aside from the interruption of the Great War, two issues militated against the acceptance of this idea by enough states to ensure the establishment of such a tribunal at that time. First, there was the question of the selection of judges. A court composed of one judge from all member states—to satisfy the fiction of the sovereignty (and equal-

ity) of all states—would, clearly, be unwieldy. On the other hand, to give certain states, because of their practical power and influence, representation while excluding others from continuous membership in the rostrum of judges would no less obviously infringe upon the dogma of sovereignty. Between 1907 and 1914, no solution for this issue was found, and the project failed of realization.

But there was a second difficulty inherent in the situation—both then and now. What is in fact an international dispute? The old phrase, frequently found in arbitral agreements, exempting from the obligation to arbitrate disputes involving “national honor and vital interest,” has gone out of fashion.⁵ But at the turn of the century the problem of what was an international dispute susceptible of arbitration was left largely to the parties (as, for instance, by Articles 16-19 and 37-40 of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, respectively). Since the defendant state could always allege national honor or vital interest, there was little actual prospect at the time of advancing in practice the principle of compulsory submission of disputes to an international tribunal.

A second precedent for the P.C.I.J. is to be found in the Central American Court of International Justice, established by the Central American Peace Conference of 1907, which met a few weeks after the Second Hague Conference had adjourned. The conference, influenced by the effort to create a court of arbitral justice at the Hague, established the Central American Court, to be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the national legislatures of the five Central American republics for five-year terms. Two substitute judges for each state were to be similarly appointed. The quorum of the Court was set at five. Judges from all the states must be present at the hearing of a case, and judges might sit in disputes to which their national states were parties. The jurisdiction of the Court was exceedingly broad, including “all controversies or questions which may arise among them, of whatever nature and no matter what their origin may be.”

Ten cases were brought before the tribunal during its ten years of existence. Its decision in the cases brought by Costa Rica and El Salvador against Nicaragua over the alienation to the United States of sections of the Gulf of Fonseca by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1914, upholding the plaintiffs' contentions, resulted in the

defiance of the Court by Nicaragua and its practical demise. The exceedingly broad scope of its jurisdiction and the national representative character (rather than a truly international selection) of the judges resulting from the political nature of their choice by national parliaments militated, from the beginning, against the prestige and effectiveness of the Court. But it did provide some valuable experience with the difficulties and hazards to be resolved in the creation of an international tribunal.

One more precedent may be briefly noted—the draft convention for an International Prize Court submitted for ratification by the Second Hague Conference of 1907. Although never brought into force, the convention is interesting principally for the solutions proposed for the selection of judges, and for the provisions for appellate jurisdiction from national prize courts. As to judges, it was provided that fifteen were to constitute the court, although nine were to be a quorum. All judges and deputy judges were to be selected for six years by their respective member states, the judges of eight Great Powers were to sit permanently; other states were to be represented for six-year periods in a rotation enumerated in the convention. Appellate jurisdiction was, for the period, broadly conceived; indeed, no actual appeal from a national to an international tribunal has as yet been established by convention.⁶

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PERMANENT COURT

It is from these precedents and out of the body of previous philosophical and juristic thought that the outline for the P.C.I.J. took shape. From these various and unco-ordinated sources, the implementation of the specific framework for an international court and the indispensable diplomatic procedures for organizing the court as a working instrument of judicial settlement were carried through in less than two years. That there should be a genuine court for the settlement of international disputes and to act as a legal-advisory agency of the League of Nations was recognized by the drafters of the peace treaties in Articles 13 and 14 of the Covenant of the League. Numerous drafts, proposals for such a court, from belligerent and neutral sources, were submitted to the Peace Conference. The German and Austrian delegations submitted counter-proposals which would have conferred on the Court compulsory jurisdiction in

international disputes and a limited jurisdiction in disputes involving private persons. The final draft of the Covenant took little or no account of these proposals. Its authors contented themselves with defining precisely the four classes of dispute "generally suitable for submission to arbitration," imposing an obligation on members of the League to arbitrate such disputes and to carry out arbitral awards in good faith, and conferring on the Council of the League the power to formulate a plan for the establishment of a court with general and advisory jurisdiction.

The Council, at its second meeting on February 12 and 13, 1920, appointed twelve jurists representing as many countries, to serve on a committee "to prepare plans . . . and to report to the Council." Six of these either declined or were unable to serve, whereupon the Council appointed four others. The Committee as actually constituted included jurists from Belgium, Brazil, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United States (Mr. Elihu Root).

Various plans were submitted by different governments to the Committee, which had before it also the arbitration treaties mentioned above. It succeeded, largely on the inspiration of Mr. Root, in solving the difficult problem of selecting the judges, and went on record in favor of a broad definition of compulsory jurisdiction for the Court. The Council reviewed the draft plan of the Committee, made one important change as to the jurisdiction of the Court (by eliminating its compulsory character), and transmitted "the Statute" to the members of the League of Nations. At the First Assembly, no important modifications were made in the Statute, which was adopted by an Assembly resolution on December 13, 1920, and for which a Protocol of Signature was opened on December 16. By September 1, 1921, more than the required majority of the members of the League having ratified it, plans were drawn for the election of the members of the P.C.I.J. during the Second Assembly later in the month. The Court began its first session on January 30, 1922.

Thus, with remarkable dispatch and with little open disagreement, there was established one of the three major international institutions of the post-War period. Designed to create a "family of nations" organized protectively against the outbreak of another war and positively to promote international co-operation, the Court, with the

League of Nations and the International Labor Organization, was looked upon as an integral element in "the structure of a lasting peace." To appraise its utility, actual and potential, in such an enterprise, it will be useful to review its organization, functioning, and jurisprudence during the first decade and a half of its activity.⁷

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT

The P.C.I.J., as originally organized, was to be composed of eleven judges and four deputy judges, a number which might be increased to fifteen and six, respectively (Statute, Art. 3). The number was set at fifteen full-time judges by the amended Protocol of 1929, which came into force February 1, 1936 (Art. 3). Nationality is irrelevant, but judges must be "persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law" (Art. 2). They are elected for nine years and may be re-elected (Art. 13). They are precluded from engaging in any political or administrative functions, or (since 1930) "in any other occupation of a professional nature" (Arts. 16 and 17), a provision which has also been made more stringent as to legal activities.

The method of the selection of judges has proved as successful as it was ingenious. As has been pointed out, the problem of finding a method of their selection for a permanent court proved a stumbling block more than once to the creation of an effective international tribunal. Largely on Mr. Root's initiative, a device for nomination and election was incorporated in the Statute (Arts. 2-12, 14-15) which obviated the difficulties inherent in nationalist conceptions of sovereign right.

Nominations are made by the national panels of judges for the Permanent (Hague) Court of International Arbitration, or, in the case of states not members of that court, by a panel appointed by its government in conformity with the principles laid down in the Hague Conventions. The number to be nominated by each national panel must never exceed twice the number of places to be filled in any election or by-election, and in no case more than four. Not more than half the nominees of any national group may be of that nationality. Requests for nominations are made at least three months

before the date of an election by the secretary-general of the League who then draws up an alphabetical list of nominees and submits it to the Assembly and the Council. The list of nominations has always in practice been considerably below the theoretical maximum since there is generally a consensus on a few nominees considered by many national groups as especially qualified for election. The electors are cautioned (Art. 9) to bear in mind the importance of having represented on the Court as a whole "the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world."

The Assembly and the Council proceed to ballot separately for election of a number of judges equal to the vacancies. Anyone receiving an absolute majority of votes in each body is declared elected. If not all places are filled, two further sessions may be devoted to separate balloting, after which a conference committee of six (three from each body) is to be elected. The committee selects one name for each vacancy, even from persons not on the original nominee list, if it is unanimous in the choice. If the committee's selections are not elected, then the already elected members of the Court fill the vacancies from the candidates who have received votes in the Assembly or the Council. (Various prescriptions of minor importance are omitted here.) As a matter of fact, the two general elections to date have been completed in three sessions and one, respectively. The system, elaborated in the Statute in 1920, has proved its value also in the seven by-elections which have been held since the establishment of the Court.

The Court regulates its own procedure (Art. 30) and elects its presiding officers (for three years) from among its members. A quorum is nine. Although under the revised statute the Court is continuously in session, in practice (Arts. 23-25) there are provisions for extensive leaves and "dispensations" from sitting as long as at least eleven judges are actually available to sit. Three special chambers of five judges and two substitute judges each, appointed for three years, are provided for, one for labor cases, one for communications and transit cases, one for cases brought under a summary procedure (Arts. 26-29). Finally, in cases in which one or both parties are not represented on the Court or in the Chambers by judges of the nationality of the parties, special national judges are *added* to the Court on nomination of the unrepresented parties (Art. 31)

Apart from its organization, the problem on which there was the greatest difference of opinion was that of the Court's "competence" or jurisdiction. First, only "States or Members of the League," not private individuals, might be parties to cases.⁸ Second, non-members of the League were to be admitted as parties on a basis of entire equality with members (Arts. 34-35). Third, the law to be applied by the Court was defined in general terms on the basis of (Art. 38):

1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states.
2. International custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.
3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
4. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.

Moreover, as a concession to the civil lawyers, it was provided (Art. 59) that a decision was to have "no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." This attempt to restrain the use of precedent by the judges of the P.C.I.J. has not been conspicuously more successful by the civil-law than by the common-law trained members of the Court.

Finally, there remained the question of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. By Article 36, the Optional Clause, the four classes of disputes mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant were adopted. These included jurisdiction as to: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

A signatory of the Optional Clause would accept a defendant's position before the Court "*ipso facto* and without special agreement." On March 1, 1938, forty states were signatories of the Optional Clause, although almost all had signed it with one or another type of reservation.

The original statute contained a series of articles (39-64) dealing in a general way with procedure such as: providing for separate and dissenting opinions, establishing certain requirements as to

written and oral evidence, open hearings, and notice to parties. As already noted, however, the detailed elements of procedure have been developed by the Court itself in the course of its experience, and incorporated in the Rules.


The revised Statute of 1929 contained a final section dealing with procedure in advisory opinions (Arts. 65-68). These were taken over partly from the Court's own procedural rules, and partly from the discussions regarding reservations of the United States on the matter of advisory opinions. They were incorporated in the Statute itself in order to ensure due notice to all interested parties. Although they do not touch on the delicate questions, raised by the United States, of the Court's competence to render advisory opinions in the face of opposition from a state which "has or claims" an interest in the issue, they represent a further emphasis on procedural regulation in the Constitution (the Statute) of the Court.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COURT

As has already been indicated, the United States was among the most influential states in the creation of the P.C.I.J. The continuous concern of this government since 1794 in the advancement of arbitration of international disputes was an important factor in the official support given to the idea of such a court. President Wilson's immediate interest in and influence on the Covenant of the League⁹ and the important contributions of Mr. Root, on the Committee of Jurists, to the successful solution of controversial issues implicit in the drafting of the Statute of the Court are generally recognized. The refusal of the United States Senate to advise and consent to the ratification of the Covenant no doubt reflects a continuing popular opposition to membership in the Court. In the minds of most Americans, both in and out of Congress, the Court was inextricably bound up in the purposes and organization of the League.

The United States has, however, wielded a considerable indirect influence on the work of the Court. There has been, continuously from its establishment, an American judge, elected by the votes of other states in the Assembly and Council. Four Americans have served on the Court: John Bassett Moore, who was elected for the First Period of the Court and served until 1928; Charles Evans

W O R L D J U S T I C E L A W I S C I V I L I Z A T I O N



A Fact Picture

Prepared By
CHARLES MOORE

Hughes, who served from 1928 until his appointment as Chief Justice of the United States in 1930; Frank Billings Kellogg, late Secretary of State, who was elected for the Second Period, and served until 1935; Manley Ottmer Hudson, the principal American expert on the work of the Court, professor of law at Harvard, who was elected in 1936 to succeed Judge Kellogg. Two of this group are distinguished public servants, having served as secretaries of state; two are equally distinguished jurists of outstanding reputation in international law both here and abroad. The American Government had no official part in their nomination or election, although the American panel members of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration have regularly submitted nominations. This fact suggests the significance placed by other governments in including American jurists in the personnel of the P.C.I.J.

The record of efforts made by successive administrations, both republican and democratic, to secure senatorial consent to formal membership in the Court has been one of continued frustration. On February 17, 1923, Secretary of State Hughes suggested to President Harding that the United States should adhere to Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the P.C.I.J. of 1920, subject to "certain conditions and understandings."¹⁰ These proposals were laid before the Senate by President Harding and later supported by an almost unanimous vote (302 to 28) on March 3, 1925. On January 27, 1926, the Senate approved by a vote of 76 to 17 but with certain added reservations, which provided for the right of "withdrawal" of its adherence at any time, and for a special procedure with respect to advisory opinions. This reservation read as follows:

That the Court shall not render any advisory opinion except publicly after due notice to all States adhering to the Court and to all interested States and after public hearing or opportunity for hearing given to any State concerned; nor shall it, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest.

The Council of the League, in considering these "conditions, understandings, and reservations" transmitted to the signatories of the 1920 Protocol by the United States, proposed a conference, to be convened in September, 1926, to consider their acceptance and

incorporation in the Protocol. The United States refused to attend the conference officially, and its results were negligible as to the other signatories' acceptance of the American reservations as they stood.¹¹

The United States revived the question in 1929, in a note to the secretary general of the League and the signatories of the 1920 Protocol, suggesting "an informal exchange of views" as to the differences of interpretation of the "rights and interests of the United States," on which "there seems to be but little difference of opinion." There had already been created, by a Council resolution of December 14, 1928, a Committee of Jurists to consider revisions of the Statute, to which committee Mr. Root had been appointed. His efforts to redraft the points at issue resulted in a resolution of the Committee which seemed to meet American objections.¹² A Conference of Signatories of the 1920 Protocol was convened at the time of the Tenth Assembly in 1929, which "unanimously and without alteration" accepted the report of the Committee of Jurists which was followed by similar action of the Tenth Assembly.

The Protocol of September 14, 1929, which included a revision of the Statute, as well as a separate instrument for the adherence of the United States, was signed on behalf of the United States on December 9, 1929.¹³ It was submitted to the Senate, in which the Foreign Relations Committee twice (1932 and 1935) reported it favorably. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull, as had all their republican predecessors, strongly urged its acceptance by the Senate. When, however, after an unprecedented propaganda campaign, a vote was taken in the Senate on January 29, 1935, it failed to obtain the necessary two thirds majority by seven votes (52-36).¹⁴ For the present, at least, there is little prospect of reviving the question officially.

AN EVALUATION OF ITS WORK AND FUNCTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

It would be both interesting and profitable to review in detail the work of the P.C.I.J. during its first sixteen years. An examination of the judgments, orders, and advisory opinions of the Court would provide a valuable digest of the evolution of international law since the Great War and indicate the importance of the work

of the Court in the development of an international jurisprudence. Such an examination, however, is outside the scope of such a general summary as this and is previously included in Chapter 18.¹⁵

Perhaps the most important point to consider is that on which American opinion is most hostile—the alleged subservience of the P.C.I.J. to the League. This arose in part from its incorporation in the Covenant, in part from the obligation on the Court to render advisory opinions to the Assembly and Council, and in part from the relations of the Court to the peace treaties. As to the first, there is no substantial merit to the contention that the P.C.I.J. is the League's court. Clearly, there must be some constitutional basis for the creation of any international agency; the fact that that basis was incorporated in the instrument designed and expected to create an integrated international organization to obviate resort to war was in no sense a limitation on the Court's independence.

The obligation to render advisory opinions on the request of the Assembly or the Council of the League did, in fact, create a certain direct link between the Court and the League. But that link was in no sense one of political subservience. The function and practice of advisory opinions rendered by courts to legislatures are well known in the American states, in which the dogma of the separation of powers is still a fetish of political theory and oratory. It has proved, moreover, of substantial value in developing effective procedure in the settlement of disputes by League agencies or in facilitating the organization and work of various other international agencies, such as the International Labor Organization, the Greco-Turk Mixed Commission, and the river commissions. It is, indeed, a matter of even greater urgency in the international than in the domestic sphere in which political and administrative agencies are neither so long established (and so steeped in organizational patterns and procedures) nor so closely knit (and hence potentially capable of more effective co-operation among competing agencies).

The existence of some detached and impartial agency to clarify procedural and legal questions arising in the course of the work of international political agencies is perhaps the only, certainly the best, insurance against the complete breakdown of negotiations for settlement not on the merits of a dispute, but on the matters of precedent and procedure (often the last refuge of obstruction).

It is interesting to note, also, that the utilization of the Court for advisory opinions has steadily declined—in part certainly because precedents already settled have tended to be followed in later analogous situations. Since 1932, only two advisory opinions have been rendered. And it should be noted finally that the Court early showed its independence of dictation from League agencies in the *Eastern Carelia Case*,¹⁶ in which the Court refused to render an advisory opinion at the behest of the Council on the ground that one of the parties concerned was not a member of the League and had refused to participate in the proceedings.¹⁷

As to the third point, the relation of the Court to the peace treaties, it is pertinent to note that the drafters of the Statute themselves expanded the jurisdiction of the Court in this field by including (Art. 36, par. 1) the provision that the Court's jurisdiction comprised "all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force." They brought within its competence a wide range of questions which were not easily susceptible of automatic adjustment in treaty terms. Within the framework of the peace settlements, disputes as to the interpretation or application of treaties regulating the protection of minorities, mandates, labor, communications, and transit and numerous administrative treaties (such as those concerned with the traffic in women and children and narcotic drugs) were to be referred to the P.C.I.J. for definitive determination of the legal issues involved.

There has occurred since 1920 an even more impressive indication of the value placed by governments on having available a detached and impartial judicial agency like the Court. An increasing number of bipartite arbitration treaties during the 1920's included provisions submitting certain classes of disputes to the P.C.I.J. or utilizing it as a court of last resort in disputes over the interpretation or application of these treaties. This trend, until it was retarded by the current relapse into nationalism and intransigence, was perhaps the most unequivocal proof that the Court was gaining steadily the confidence of many states as an agency of first-rate judicial importance.

A second important aspect of the work of the Court has lain in its contributions to the development of international law. Its opinions already form an important body of precedents which are

increasingly cited in national courts as embodiments of present international law on the points at issue. The fact that there have been numerous dissents is evidence enough that, in many areas, the law is by no means fixed. The very existence of the P.C.I.J. makes for the more rapid definition of disputed issues of public international law.

On several occasions, the question has been raised as to whether political pressures had not deflected abstract justice in the decisions arrived at—for instance in the *S. S. Wimbledon* or *Austro-German Customs Union Cases*.¹⁸ The events surrounding these and other cases give a superficial validity to such appraisals of the Court's susceptibility to outside pressures. It is certainly too soon to be able to examine the evidence that diplomatic archives may some day yield. The memoirs and private papers surrounding some of the most "political" of our own Supreme Court's decisions have sometimes posthumously exposed the motivations of the decisions and the pressure exerted by interested parties on the judges. But we do not condemn that Court because on occasion abstract justice has been—as indeed it always will be, since judges are as other men—deflected or distorted by those "inarticulate major premises" which govern opinion. The roster of the judges of the P.C.I.J. is perhaps the best guarantee available in a fallible world that detachment and impartiality are here as widely represented as on any court. Certainly the pressures of the parties interested and the unconscious motivations of nationalism are more powerful and persistent in an international than they are likely to be in any national tribunal.

Finally, a word as to the function of the Court in the international community of today and tomorrow. The present is not a period in which international solidarity is increasing either as a theory of social organization or as a practice of the society of states. The cycle of the post-War movement for the integration of international organization seems, for the moment, ended. The reversal of the trend has led many to discouragement, even disillusionment. But there is another point of view which holds that institutional development, however slow, is nevertheless a continuous process which builds the new on the foundations, even the ruins, of the old.

Which view men will hold depends upon many factors which it

is unnecessary to explore here. Appraisal of the work of the Court to date suggests the significance of its creation for the design of any future and more articulated international order. The judicial function is clearly as indispensable to the international as to the national organization of order, justice, and the pacific settlement of disputes. The P.C.I.J. has performed invaluable service during its first fifteen years in the settlement of specific disputes, and has made substantial contributions to the more effective establishment of that function, present and prospective. As has been indicated, the ability of states to agree on the organization and competence of an actual international court marked a very real advance over pre-War experiments. It can, indeed, be argued that among the three branches of government, the judicial is further advanced toward effective operation in the international sphere than the legislative or the executive. Many hold that the surest road to a true international order lies in the direction which the P.C.I.J. has been charting. The work of the Court is unspectacular but it is an essential part of the working plans of an international order.¹⁹ If this is so, the efforts of its architects and of the judges who have served upon it have a significance that transcends the current frustrations of a world order by the forces of anarchy.

NOTES

1. For a number of these plans, see W. E. DARBY, *International Tribunals*, London, J. M. Dent and Company, 1900. Numerous studies in the field exist.

2. C. PHILLIPSON, *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome*, 2 vols., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1911.

3. Among the many sources, see J. H. RALSTON, *International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1929. Lists are cited in M. O. HUDSON, *The Permanent Court of International Justice*, p. 3, notes 1-3, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1934.

4. M. HABICHT, *Post-War Treaties for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931.

5. The idea of "national honor" may, indeed, be said to have been reincarnated in modern dress in the contemporary conception of "matters of solely domestic jurisdiction." But, as noted below, substantial progress has been made in removing the determination of the character of the dispute from the decision of the state alleging the pretext to an international tribunal, the P.C.I.J. itself.

6. See Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-375.

7. It would be an interesting comparison to appraise the relative position of

the Confederation Supreme Court, or even of the Constitutional Supreme Court, in this country during the formative years with that of the P.C.I.J. as to prestige, activity, creation of a jurisprudence, etc.

8. It is interesting to note, however, that the doctrine of *parens patriae* has more than once been resorted to by states desiring to bring essentially private claims before the Court. See, for instance, *Mavromatis Concessions Cases*, Series A, Nos. 2, 5, 11.

9. See D. H. MILLER, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928; D. F. FLEMING, *The United States and the League of Nations*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932.

10. For the text of these conditions and understandings, see Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 211, note 9. They included no important conditions: adherence was not to involve any legal relation to the League; the United States was to be allowed to participate in the election of judges on a basis of equality with states, members of the League; the Congress of the United States was to determine the "fair share" of expenses of the Court which would be paid by the United States; the Statute was not to be amended without the consent of the United States.

11. See Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 214 ff.

12. The essential part of the resolution was reproduced in Article 5 of the Protocol, as follows:

1. With a view to ensuring that the Court shall not, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall, through any channel designated for that purpose by the United States, inform the United States of any proposal before the Council or the Assembly of the League for obtaining an advisory opinion from the Court, and thereupon, if desired, an exchange of views as to whether an interest of the United States is affected shall proceed with all convenient speed between the Council or Assembly of the League and the United States.
2. Whenever a request for an advisory opinion comes to the Court, the Registrar shall notify the United States thereof, among other States mentioned in the now existing Article 73 of the Rules of Court, stating a reasonable time limit fixed by the President within which a written statement by the United States concerning the request will be received. If for any reason no sufficient opportunity for an exchange of views upon such request should have been afforded and the United States advises the Court that the question upon which the opinion of the Court is asked is one that affects the interests of the United States, proceedings shall be stayed for a period sufficient to enable such an exchange of views between the Council or the Assembly and the United States to take place.
3. With regard to requesting an advisory opinion of the Court in any case covered by the preceding paragraphs, there shall be attributed to an objection of the United States the same force and effect as attaches to a vote against asking for the opinion given by a Member of the League of Nations in the Council or in the Assembly.

13. The Protocol for the Revision of the Statute has been signed by 56 states and ratified by 48 (through 1937). It entered into force February 1, 1936.

14. There have been some suggestions that the same procedure be followed for American adherence to the P.C.I.J. as that utilized with respect to the International Labor Organization, a joint resolution of Congress. See the paper by W. L. Tayler in this volume. Resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives in 1932 for American contributions to the expenses of the Court. See HUDSON, *The World Court*, pp. 309, 310.

The history of the 1935 campaign for and against American adherence to the Court has not yet been adequately detailed or appraised. The anti-Court radio campaign of Father Coughlin was generally considered the primary factor in the defeat of the Senate resolution. It is probable that other factors, such as administration strategy, pro-Court propaganda tactics, and the apathy of public opinion on foreign affairs at the time—as well as the widely held antipathy to the League, of which the Court was considered to be an agency (or even a subservient tool)—must also be considered. See MANLEY O. HUDSON, "The United States Senate and the World Court," *American Journal of International Law*, April, 1935, Vol. XXIX, pp. 301-307; "The World Court Vote," *The Christian Century*, Feb. 13, 1935, Vol. LII, pp. 198-200; "Should the United States Have Joined the World Court?" *The Commonwealth*, Feb. 15, and March 21, 1935, Vol. XXI, pp. 441 and 594-595.

15. The official reports of the Court's jurisprudence are to be found in Series A (Judgments and Orders) and Series B (Advisory Opinions), since 1931 consolidated in Series A/B of the Publications of the P.C.I.J. Abstracts of the opinions are to be found in *Annual Reports* of the Court (Series E); HUDSON, *The World Court* (1921-1938); HUDSON, *The Permanent Court of International Justice*. During its first fifteen years (1922-1937), the Court delivered 72 opinions. There were, on June 1, 1938, 540 bipartite and multipartite treaties which conferred jurisdiction as to disputes or the interpretation and application of treaties on the P.C.I.J. See Publications of the Court, Series E, 14th Year (1938), pp. 289-316, for the latest list of such treaties. For "instruments in force," see *ibid.*, pp. 317-53.

16. Series B, No. 5. See Note 15, second reference to HUDSON, pp. 446 ff.

17. For a discussion of the problem of advisory opinions, see M. O. HUDSON, *Recueil des cours*, Académie de Droit International, The Hague, 1925, Vol. 8, p. 345; *International Conciliation*, N. Y., 1925, No. 214; "Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts," *Harvard Law Review*, 1924, Vol. XXXVII p. 970; *op. cit.*, p. 443 ff. For a critical view of advisory opinions see J. B. MOORE, "Memorandum" in *Congressional Record*, Vol. LXVII, p. 2293.

18. Series A, No. 1; Series A/B, No. 41.

19. See H. LAUTERPACHT, *The Function of Law in the International Community*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1933; KARL STRUPP, *Le droit prophylactique de guerre du pacte de la société des nations et du pacte de Paris* Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1937.

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5. Series D. Acts and Documents concerning the Organization of the Court Publication began in 1922 (7 numbers have been published).
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CHAPTER 22

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

William Lonsdale Tayler

Although the International Labor Organization was a direct outgrowth of the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, which was held at the close of the World War, many attempts to establish uniform labor legislation on an international scale had been made during the preceding century. The first efforts, made early in the nineteenth century, were directed toward the establishment of legal limits for the normal working day. These efforts were being carried on simultaneously in the different industrial countries, and their lack of success demonstrated the need for international co-operation. In accordance with this long-felt need, plans were laid at Brussels in 1897 for an international association devoted to labor legislation, which developed into the International Association for Labor Legislation by 1900. This advance had been accomplished only with much educational work.

The International Association for Labor Legislation was an unofficial body. It was handicapped by the difficulty of assuring effective enforcement of international labor standards, but did succeed, however, in doing away with the use of poisonous white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches. Up to 1906, when the treaty on this subject was adopted, white phosphorus had been used by many nations in the manufacture of matches—even though it cost the lives of hundreds of workers—because it was cheap. No one state, acting by itself, could afford to use a more expensive substitute. Finally, however, the countries decided to regulate by international treaty what no one country could afford to do alone. The result was the Berne Convention of 1906, prohibiting the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches. Steady progress was made in the work of the International Association for Labor Legislation until the outbreak of the World War in 1914.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE I.L.O.

At the close of the War the Peace Conference appointed the Commission on International Labor Legislation and charged it with the responsibility of drawing up the text of a scheme embracing employers, workers, and governments. Mr. Samuel Gompers, then president of the American Federation of Labor, served as chairman of the commission which drafted the Constitution of the International Labor Organization and submitted it to the Peace Conference for inclusion in the peace treaties.

Recognizing that injustice, hardship, and privation to large numbers of people produce unrest "so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled," the Preamble of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization sets forth the purpose of this agency in the following language:

. . . the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labor supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organization of vocational and technical education and other measures. . . .

The International Labor Organization was the first of the three great international institutions to be established at the close of the World War. It actually held its first conference in the fall of 1919 in Washington, D. C., upon the invitation of President Wilson of the United States, thereby getting its start several months before the League of Nations or the World Court, and before the treaty was really in effect.

The Constitution provides that the original states, members of the League of Nations, should be the original members of the International Labor Organization, and that subsequent membership in the League of Nations should carry with it membership in the I.L.O. However, no converse provision was made, that all members of the International Labor Organization must be members of the League

of Nations. In fact, Germany and Austria were admitted as members of the International Labor Organization by the Washington Conference in 1919, long before their entry into the League of Nations. Brazil and Japan withdrew from the League of Nations but continued as members of the International Labor Organization; however, Brazil later resumed her membership in the League and Japan withdrew from the I.L.O.

The United States became a member of the International Labor Organization, August 20, 1934. A joint resolution of Congress, approved in June, 1934, authorized the President to accept membership. The International Labor Conference then in session unanimously voted an invitation to the United States to join the Organization. President Roosevelt accepted this invitation on August 20, with the explicit understanding that in so doing the United States accepted no obligation under the Covenant of the League of Nations. A presidential proclamation, issued by the State Department, made public record of our entry into the I.L.O. The membership of the Organization now totals sixty. In fact, all of the independent governments of the world are members except those of Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Germany. Italy, on December 15, 1937, and Japan on November 3, 1938, announced their intention of withdrawing from the Organization. These withdrawals will not be legally effective, however, until two years from the date such notice was given.

The headquarters of the International Labor Organization were established on the shores of beautiful Lake Geneva, on a site given by the Swiss Government and the authorities of the city of Geneva, with Mont Blanc rising majestically in the distance. In this friendly atmosphere the staff of the International Labor Office, consisting of more than four hundred men and women from practically every country in the world, were brought together in a building of their own. These experts constitute an international civil service whose duties are to collect, collate, and analyze reports from every nation. The Office, which has been described as the greatest fact-finding organization in the world, serves as the secretariat of the Governing Body and the Conference, and prepares reports which are submitted periodically to the member states.

Governments, employers' associations, trade unions, and other organizations have learned to look upon the International Labor

Office as an intelligence department to which they can apply for information on any question relating to labor and industry. The number of inquiries addressed to the Office increases year by year. All this work involves the collection of sources, extensive research, and correspondence. The library of the International Labor Office is the most complete of its kind in the world. Its catalogue included in 1934 approximately four hundred thousand items in more than thirty languages, and the weekly average of accessions amounted to six hundred. In addition, nearly four thousand periodicals from more than a hundred countries, published in forty-five languages, are received by the Office and used by its various services for their information and for reference.

The unrivalled resources of the International Labor Office are placed at the disposal of the world chiefly by means of its own publications. These include a weekly paper, a monthly review, textbooks, and translations of new laws relating to labor, a general year-book, an annual statistical handbook, and a number of non-periodical works embodying the results of special investigations or of the day-to-day research work of the Office. Nearly all these publications are issued in English and French, but some are reproduced in German, Italian, Spanish, Japanese, and other languages. A complete set of the publications issued every year comprises approximately thirty thousand printed pages.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

The work of the Office is directed by the Governing Body, which serves as a board of managers. Among its many duties, the Governing Body appoints the director of the International Labor Office, prepares the budget, decides on the agenda of the Conference, and checks upon the observance of conventions. The Governing Body is composed of 32 members, elected for 3 years, and it is made up of representatives of governments, workers, and employers. Sixteen members represent governments, 8 represent workers, and 8 represent employers. Of the 16 government representatives, 8 are permanent representatives of the member states of chief industrial importance. These are Great Britain, Canada, France, India, Italy, Japan, (both withdrawing) the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The other 8 government dele-

gates are appointed by the member states selected for that purpose by the government delegates to the Conference, excluding those mentioned above. Of the 16, 6 are from non-European states. The worker delegates to the Conference elect their representatives on the Governing Body, as do the employer delegates, and two of each of these must be from non-European states.

Unique in character, the International Labor Organization brings together not plenipotentiaries of governments, such as had been the custom, but rather representatives of workers, employers, and governments to discuss their common problems. This tripartite system of representation is seen throughout the workings of the Organization and in all of its committees. By means of conference, research, and co-operation, the International Labor Organization first studies the labor laws, the labor and industrial conditions, and the nature and effects of the measures adopted in all countries, thus putting the experience of each member country at the disposal of the others. Then through the International Labor Conference it defines standards and policies which can advantageously be applied everywhere except in regions or under circumstances explicitly allowed for; and these standards are embodied in agreements submitted to member countries for their voluntary and independent ratification.

The International Labor Conference meets at least once a year, usually in Geneva. It is composed of four delegates from each country. Two of these delegates represent the government, one represents the workers, and one represents the employers. The workers' representative is chosen by the government in agreement with the most representative workers' organization, which in the United States has thus far been considered the American Federation of Labor. The employers' delegate is chosen by the government in agreement with the most representative employers' organization, which in this country is the United States Chamber of Commerce. Although bearing credentials from the government of the member state, the four delegates do not vote as a unit and are under no instructions from the government to vote in accordance with its wishes. In fact, it is not at all uncommon to find the two government delegates and the employer delegate voting on one side of the question and the worker delegate on the other, or to find the worker delegate in agreement with the government delegates as opposed to the em-

ployer delegate. On numerous occasions, as in the case of the treaty providing for a forty-hour week, all four United States delegates have voted together. It is interesting to note that only two employers, Sam A. Lewisohn of the United States and Gino Olivetti of Italy, supported the principle of the forty-hour week at the Nineteenth Session of the Conference (June, 1935).

A two thirds majority vote is necessary for the adoption of a labor convention or recommendation, which means that no one group by itself, such as the government group, is strong enough numerically to approve a convention. In other words, it takes the votes of the government group, plus some support from the workers' or the employers' group to muster the two thirds vote necessary for decisions. Looking at this matter from another angle, we see that the employers' group, even though it voted as a bloc, would not be strong enough to stop the passage of a treaty or recommendation if the proposal had the support of all the government and workers' delegates.

PROCEDURES

The procedure of the International Labor Conference guards against any hasty action on the part of the body. If a member state feels that a certain matter should be made the subject of a recommendation or convention by the Conference, that state may suggest to the Governing Body the inclusion of such item on the agenda of a future Conference. If the Governing Body agrees that the matter should be placed on the agenda, it then instructs the Labor Office to study the question and prepare a questionnaire to be sent to all the member states so that the fullest information regarding the question may be made available.

Some questions are so complex and difficult that years of preparatory work are necessary before final action can be taken. The Office spent eight years, from 1922 to 1930, in research, investigation, and field study on the question of forced or compulsory labor before a draft convention was adopted. The usual procedure is for a matter to be placed on the agenda of the Conference for a preliminary discussion. On the basis of that discussion, a report is drawn up by the Labor Office and submitted to the member states before the opening of the next Conference, when final decision may be taken.

Once a treaty or recommendation is adopted by the Conference, it is authenticated by the signature of the president and the director of the Conference. This method is in contrast to the usual diplomatic practice of having the delegates of the participating nations affix their signatures to the document. The document is then deposited with the secretary-general of the League, who in turn communicates a certified copy of the recommendation or draft convention to each of the member states.

What obligation rests upon the member states after the adoption of a treaty or recommendation? The Constitution of the International Labor Organization explicitly provides that each member state undertake to bring the draft convention or recommendation before the "authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies" within a period of one year from the close of the session, or in exceptional cases, no later than eighteen months after the close of the Conference. The obligation is thus to bring the matter to the attention of the legislative agencies that have jurisdiction over such questions. It will thus be seen that there is no obligation on the part of any state to ratify the labor treaties. The obligation is discharged when the matter is brought before the competent authority. Even those states which voted against the matter in the sessions of the Conference have, nevertheless, the same obligation to submit the treaty or recommendation for consideration. The states, however, have been quick to sense public opinion and have in nearly every instance given careful consideration to the labor treaties and recommendations. And in cases where the states have not actually ratified the treaties, the public discussion of disputed industrial practices and the formulation of minimum accepted standards have served to guide the member states in the solution of their own industrial problems through national codification.

Formal ratifications of the labor conventions are communicated to the secretary-general of the League of Nations. Each state ratifying a convention agrees that it will take such action as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of the convention. Furthermore, each state ratifying is required to submit an annual report to the International Labor Office on the measure which it has taken to give effect to the conventions which it has ratified. These reports are examined by a committee of experts, who may request a govern-

ment to supply further information if such procedure is deemed advisable. The director presents a summary of these reports to the next meeting of the Conference for its consideration. The action that the member states take to enforce the provisions of the conventions which they have ratified is thus given wide publicity.

Any workers' group or employers' group may at any time make representation to the International Labor Office if it feels that its government has failed to secure in any respect the effective observance of any convention to which that government is a party. The Governing Body may communicate this representation to the government against which it is made and may invite that government to submit such statement on the subject as it may deem expedient. For example, in 1924 a protest was made by the Japanese Seamen's Union, which claimed that the Japanese Government was not enforcing the Convention of 1920 concerning the employment of seamen. The convention provided among other things for the gradual abolition of fee-charging employment agencies. The International Labor Office requested a fuller explanation from the Japanese government. The reply given proved to be satisfactory to both the Labor Office and the Japanese Seamen's Union, so the matter was dropped. Again in 1930 and 1931 the labor unions of Latvia charged that the Latvian Government was not enforcing the provisions of a labor convention to which it was a party. However, as in the former case, the Latvian Government offered a satisfactory explanation and no further action was needed.

ILLUSTRATIVE AREAS OF ACTION

The first official delegation from the United States went to Geneva in 1935 and was accredited to the nineteenth session of the International Labor Conference. The government delegates were Miss Grace Abbott, professor at the University of Chicago, and Dr. Walton Hale Hamilton, professor at the School of Law of Yale University. The workers sent as their delegate Mr. Dan W. Tracy, president of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; and the employers were represented by Mr. Sam A. Lewisohn, vice-president of Miami Copper Company.

Reduction of Hours. One of the most important questions under discussion at this session of the Conference pertained to the reduc-

tion of hours of work. It is significant that all four American delegates supported the principle of a forty-hour week and the success of this proposal was due in no small measure to the contribution made by the delegates from the United States.

Early in the discussions of the Conference, Professor Hamilton, speaking in the name of the United States Government, said:

So long as the people in our country are poorly fed, as they are, so long as they are poorly clothed, so long as they are poorly amused and so long as they are purely humbugged, then there is adequate opportunity for a vast improvement in the standard of living. The terms of the larger problem are clear beyond peradventure; the resources exist for an abundant life for all. The consumption of the present time is vastly lower than it need be, and we need to strike a balance between the part of our resources that goes into the tangible things and that which goes into leisure—the part that constitutes standard of living and the part that leads to a richer life. Here we are called upon to undo what the revolutionists of the nineteenth century did. At the beginning of the century we had a way of life, a way of living, a way of work, that was richly varied. At the present time the god of the machine has claimed his toll, with a result that work has become rather arduous; and since it has become arduous, leisure has become more or less essential. It seems to me that we must have some direction and some end in view, and must value leisure. We must coordinate leisure with work. We must go forward from one tentative solution to another, and if I may repeat what I have already said, it is by no means certain that we shall be able to do this, on account of the fact that man has not yet been stripped of the finiteness of his mentality. We have not yet learnt to work together in unison in the way that we ought. We have the simian capacity for making mistakes. We must take a chance, and there is no escape from that; but the stakes are very large, and I think I am speaking for our people when I say that we would rather take a chance at doing something than a chance at a theory which was put forward yesterday—that God wound up the clock in the beginning and threw the key away.¹

Vigorous opposition to the proposed convention reducing the hours of work, in principle, to forty a week was voiced by the employers' delegates, with the exception of Sam A. Lewisohn of the

United States and Gino Olivetti of Italy, as pointed out above. The adoption of this treaty by more than a two thirds majority vote of the Conference heralded a new objective of the International Labor Organization.

So sharply, however, were the representatives of employers and workers divided on the question of the reduction of hours of work that little success was achieved in applying the principle to specific industries. Attempts were made at the nineteenth session of the Conference (1935) to apply the forty-hour week to public works, the iron and steel industry, building and contracting, coal mining, and the glass-bottle industry. The first four proposals failed to receive the necessary two thirds majority whereas the fifth, providing for the reduction of hours of work in the glass-bottle industry to forty-two a week, was adopted.

The struggle to extend the forty-hour week to other industries was continued by the twentieth session of the Conference (1936) at which time a treaty pertaining to the reduction of hours of work in public works to forty a week was adopted, largely because of the support given to this proposal by the four American delegates.

The Textile Industry. The need for an examination of the whole textile industry with a view to the conclusion of a treaty had long been felt by many members of the Organization, but it remained for the United States Government delegates to propose to the twentieth session of the Conference that a technical tripartite meeting be called "to consider how the work already undertaken by the International Labor Conference in connection with the improvement of conditions in the textile industry can best be advanced and to take into account all those aspects of the textile industry which, directly or indirectly, may have a bearing on the improvement of social conditions in that industry."

The adoption of this resolution led to the convocation, in April, 1937, of the World Textile Conference in Washington, with the United States Government acting as host. Twenty-seven nations were represented, including every important textile-producing country except Italy. Fifteen nations sent full delegations consisting of representatives of employers, workers, and governments, and the remaining countries were represented by government delegates or observers.

This conference, which was presided over by Mr. John G. Winant, former governor of New Hampshire, was a new experiment in the life of the International Labor Organization—an experiment in world co-operation toward the solution of economic difficulties besetting a sick industry. It demonstrated conclusively the need for international action to improve the depressed conditions found in the textile industry.²

Although not intended to formulate specific decisions, the World Textile Conference was highly successful and paved the way for more definite action by the International Labor Conference at its twenty-third session (June, 1937). Because of the extensive preliminary discussions of the whole textile industry, the Conference had before it a wealth of information and opinion which clearly indicated the need for a reduction in the hours of work. Once again the four American delegates threw their support in favor of a treaty limiting the hours of work in the textile industry to forty a week and its adoption by 88 votes to 41 heralded a new day for the millions of workers throughout the world and their families who are dependent for their happiness and well-being upon the textile industry.

Children Who Work. Interest in the problem of working children was one of the first and most important questions to come before the International Labor Organization. As early as 1919, when the Conference met in its first session in Washington, the question of the prohibition of child labor was on the agenda. The discussion showed the wide difference in practice existing in the member states. In countries like India and Japan, where children mature at an earlier age, the lower age limit of twelve was permitted, but the general regulation set the minimum age of fourteen for admission of children to industrial employment. This convention had been ratified by twenty-eight member states on January 1, 1938. Not satisfied with the minimum age of fourteen years, the International Labor Organization at its Conference in June, 1937, changed the age limit from fourteen to fifteen.

Although the above-mentioned convention deals only with children in industry, later conventions were adopted setting a minimum age for employment at sea and in agriculture. Children engaged in non-industrial occupations were protected by a treaty adopted in

1932 and revised in 1937, when the minimum age was raised from fourteen to fifteen years. Night work was also limited to persons over eighteen, except in certain specified industries where the minimum age was set at sixteen.

Conditions of Employment. Night work was recognized early as having an unfavorable effect on the health of workers, but in the competitive industrial world no one organization could afford to close its plant at night if others in the same industry were operating continuously. Work at night was a particular problem of the baking industry, and international regulation was required to eliminate the evil. On the theory of protecting health, night work for women had been banned in the Berne Convention in 1906 long before the International Labor Organization came into being. That was a start, but because it was felt that public opinion had advanced beyond the standard set by the Convention of Berne, the first session of the Labor Conference in Washington (1919) adopted a new convention which embodied certain changes prohibiting the night work of women. This convention was partially revised in 1934 to exclude women holding responsible positions of management who are not ordinarily engaged in manual work.

Industrial hygiene has been made the subject of several important labor conventions, especially in the fields of occupational diseases and prevention of accidents. These conventions are designed to afford compensation for industrial accidents and disease, and the recommendations suggest methods for preventing them. The form of compensation provided for in the Convention on Industrial Diseases is more inclusive than similar legislation in many of the states of the Union. Among the subjects covered by the recommendations are compulsory disinfection of goods infected with anthrax spores, protection of women and young persons against lead poisoning, inspection of factories covering conditions of work, and protection of women wage earners in agriculture before and after childbirth.

The humanitarian interests of the International Labor Organization are perhaps best illustrated by the large number of measures pertaining to social insurance which have been adopted by the International Labor Conference. As far back as 1927 the Conference adopted conventions which provided for sickness insurance for workers in industry, commerce, domestic service, and agriculture.

The scope of these protective measures was greatly broadened in 1933 by the adoption of six draft conventions and one recommendation designed to provide old-age insurance, invalidity insurance, and widows' and orphans' insurance. Several nations have already ratified these treaties, and many more have availed themselves of the vast research facilities of the Labor Office in setting up their own plans for social security. John G. Winant (assistant director of the International Labor Office) left the post temporarily (September, 1935, to May, 1937) to become chairman of the United States Social Security Board.

With the progressive contraction in employment during the depression, the International Labor Organization has devoted much thought to the problems arising from unemployment. It has made extensive studies of the possibility of relieving unemployment through the establishment of government employment agencies, and has recommended courses of action which governments might pursue to increase employment, such as programs of public works, raising the age at which young persons leave school, utilizing workers' spare time, giving vocational training.

In January, 1936, the first regional International Labor Conference (in America) was held at Santiago, Chile, to discuss problems of particular interest to the states of the American continents.³ The Conference adopted more than twenty resolutions dealing with social or labor questions of peculiar interest to American countries. These resolutions were referred for action to the International Labor Conference meeting in Geneva. Among the principal questions considered were: compulsory social insurance, women's and children's work, nutrition, unemployment, migration, labor of native races, the truck system, agricultural work, and the relations of the International Labor Organization with American countries. The United States was represented at the Conference by a strong delegation headed by the Ambassador to Chile, the Honorable Hoffman Philip. Delegates from twenty countries contributed to the success of this Conference, which may be the forerunner of many other regional conferences in different parts of the world.

The Maritime Conferences. No discussion of the International Labor Organization, no matter how brief, would be complete without mention of the outstanding achievements of the Maritime Con-

ferences convened under the auspices of the International Labor Organization in Geneva in the autumn of 1936. Seamen, shipowners, and government representatives of thirty-two nations, having 82 per cent of the world's sea-going merchant tonnage, met for a period of three weeks and framed conventions and recommendations covering hours of work, adequate crews, minimum age of employment at sea (which was raised to fifteen years), holidays with pay, adequate training of officers, and protection of sailors in port and in case of sickness.

To us in the United States the achievements of the Maritime Conferences are of more than ordinary importance, for it is in the field of maritime matters that the United States has registered its first ratifications of international labor conventions. The debatable points of federal and state jurisdiction often raised when labor subjects are mentioned in the United States do not occur in the maritime field, where the federal government enjoys jurisdiction.

On August 19, 1937, President Roosevelt submitted the six maritime draft conventions and two recommendations to the Senate of the United States and requested that body to give its advice and consent to ratification, which it did on June 13, 1938, with respect to the five following: (1) holidays with pay for seamen; (2) minimum age for employment of children at sea; (3) hours of work on board ship, and manning; (4) minimum requirements of professional capacity for masters and officers on board merchant ships; (5) liability of the shipowner in case of sickness, injury, or death of seamen. A sixth draft convention concerning sickness insurance for seamen was recommended for further study before ratification.

On two previous occasions, June 18, 1936, and June 28, 1937, the President had submitted the draft international labor conventions of the nineteenth (1935) and twentieth (1936) sessions of the Conference, respectively, to the Congress of the United States rather than to the Senate alone, probably because the treaties related to matters of more immediate domestic than international concern. In June, 1938, he submitted the treaties of the twenty-third session (1937) to the Congress with a special covering letter on the textile treaties which grew out of the special Textile Conference held in Washington a few months previously.

THE I. L. O. AND WORLD PEACE

The point may well be taken that, as between federal and state jurisdiction, the United States Government, by virtue of its treaty-making power, may be the competent authority in regard to all international labor treaties. Thus far, no treaty provision has ever been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as being beyond the scope of the treaty-making power. If the international labor treaties are within the proper exercise of the treaty power, then the legislation carrying the treaties into effect would also be valid. The power to make treaties would be an empty one unless Congress had the power to enforce them. There is no legal obligation on the part of the United States to ratify the international labor treaties. There is, however, a duty which we owe as a member of the family of nations to co-operate in the establishment of universal peace based on social justice.

Probably no international gathering offers more drama than an International Labor Conference in session. The workers' and employers' delegates are not bound by restrictions of their governments and do not have to consult their "home offices" before speaking. The problems discussed are vital ones, affecting the workers and employers directly, who usually speak vividly and with deep conviction. The system of telephonic translations permits the discussions to continue without undue loss of time. Each delegate has on his desk a set of radio headphones and can pick up the speech in any one of four languages as it is delivered from the platform. This is made possible by translators who literally take the words from the speaker's mouth and translate them into other languages so fast that their versions seem like the original speech itself.

The International Labor Organization has definitely taken its place as one of the three great international institutions of all time. It is filling a long-felt need in a world which has too often been torn asunder by strife and misunderstanding. It is building upon a solid foundation a new order of world peace based upon social justice. The United States, as a full member of the International Labor Organization, is assuming its part in a great humanitarian enterprise—a membership which Professor Lindsay describes as "a new opportunity for every American man, woman and child to enjoy the

fruits of wider cooperation in the expression of American ideals and of greater security in the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness."

NOTES

1. International Labor Conference, *Record of Proceedings*, Nineteenth Session, p. 83 (1935).
2. For a fuller discussion of the World Textile Conference, see *Industrial and Labour Information* (published by International Labor Office, Geneva), Vol. LXII, No. 8, May 24, 1937), pp. 274-284.
3. A second regional conference will meet in Havana, Cuba, in November, 1939.

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CHAPTER 23

NEUTRALITY AND SANCTIONS

Edwin Borchard

THE PRINCIPLES OF NEUTRALITY

Neutrality as a principle and a practice was a concomitant of the maturity of the modern state system. It represented a triumph for reason and sanity in a world that had not yet overcome the habits of war. Nor was it easy from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries to win the right to stay out of the wars of other peoples. States, especially small ones, were almost compelled to join in the wars of larger neighbors and risk their existence on picking the winning side. But when neutrality had acquired a fully accepted legal status in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was realized that a contribution toward the welfare of mankind had been made. Large areas of the world could now with the support of law cultivate the arts of peace when others lost their sense of self-restraint and decided to go to war. From the seventeenth century onward the path of progress was deemed to lie in the firm abstention from other peoples' wars and in the development of that privilege into a legal system. In this the United States made notable contributions.

In this period illusions concerning the state of the world were not so common as they are now. It was not assumed that in a highly competitive world of hundreds of millions of people of varying outlook, wealth, territory, and mores, with unfair competition a common practice, all conflicts could necessarily be avoided. But the effort of constructive statesmanship was devoted to ameliorating tensions, to deflating the causes of conflict, to devising mediatory and arbitral methods of conciliation and settlement, to keeping alive an atmosphere conducive to negotiation, to preventing fundamental cleavages between peoples. The Treaty of Vienna kept major peace in Europe for a century, and modifications were facilitated by a com-

prehensive European outlook. No superstate was assumed. No panaceas were proposed, because statesmen respected their reputations. As the international structure was at best precarious and delicate, it had to be treated with a certain degree of discretion and caution. No undue demands were made upon it. It was also perceived that in spite of all safeguards nations did at times feel themselves impelled to indulge in the orgy of war. This constituted that revision of status or treaty which in private law is accomplished by legislation. Intelligent endeavor to understand the causes and reasons marked the conduct of non-participants. Moral judgments on fellow members of the state community were generally withheld. Such practices, although they did not profess to find a guaranteed cure for war, nevertheless did much to ameliorate its occurrence, kept a large part of the world at peace, narrowed the area of conflict, and were conducive to sensible treaties of peace.

From the fiery crucible of many a war there was gradually evolved a group of principles and rules by which belligerents and neutrals achieved reasonably definite guides for the conduct of their reciprocal relations on land and sea. No nation was always a belligerent, and even the belligerents, while under temptation to overstep the bounds when under pressure, subject to legal responsibility, nevertheless appreciated the necessity for rules of law as an alternative to anarchy and unregulated force. Treaty, custom, prize courts, claims commissions, diplomatic settlements, had over a period of four centuries developed a great body of rules founded on intelligent principles and compromises for regulating the relations between belligerents and neutrals. These rules were known to informed persons and afforded a compass by which to guide the ship of state through dangerous waters. Belligerents had an incentive to observe them in order to hold down claims and to avoid the risk of adding to the list of their enemies; neutrals, in order not to expose themselves to legitimate criticism, damages, and attack, and risk plunging their people into war.

MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A system of independent states of varying size and power could not, however, develop a legal system such as prevails within each one of the states. There, a legislature or lawgiver in more or less con-

tinuous session relieves social strains by frequent changes in the law, and a balanced division of governmental powers helps to maintain, after a fashion, the social equilibrium. The system of independent states is far too primitive for so organic a legal system. Many of the political errors of recent years have been due to the easy assumption that there is a close analogy between the law within a state, whereby the unruly are hailed before the civil authorities, and the international system, in which no nation is authorized to assume the role of policeman or judge. The assumption ignores the facts. Enforceable law must be based on experience of human propensities and activities. The moment even municipal law exacts too much, it proves unenforceable. Witness the experiment with prohibition. International relations are much less susceptible of external control. Any attempt to impose a rule which does not grow out of previous experience is almost sure to fail. Thus, mere hatred of war is not enough to justify extravagant hopes of a fundamental change in international relations.

Neutrality is an old institution, which finds its source in candor, in the obligation to hold the scales even, to remain a friend of both belligerents, to lend support to neither, to avoid passing judgment on the merits of their war. It assures both belligerents that they are dealing with a friend, not a disguised enemy. The belligerents must know who is in the war and who is not. In return for obligations assumed by a neutral, the belligerents undertake to respect his rights as a neutral, including the right to stay out of the war. There are those who regard this life-preserving role as insufficiently heroic and who recommend joining in foreign wars on the "right" side as a "world service." But they seem unaware of the humiliations which the "servant of mankind" brings to his own people and the confusion which interference in foreign quarrels spreads to the rest of the world.

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR IN DISPARAGING NEUTRALITY AND IDEALIZING SANCTIONS

This is not the place to examine the way in which the United States entered the European War in 1917. This action has been analyzed in the recent book entitled *Neutrality for the United States*, by the writer and William P. Laye. In brief, however, the basic

reason may be found in a departure from those fundamental precepts of candor, impartiality, and detachment which neutrality imposes on a neutral. You cannot help one side at the expense of the other and hope to escape the penalties of unneutrality. You cannot have it both ways. If you wish to remain neutral you must also respect the obligations of neutrality, know what is neutral and what is not, and display some capacity to handle yourself. When you openly disregard the rules and take legal positions that are unsustainable, you are soon hopelessly entangled.

The reaction from the World War was curious. Two schools of thought soon developed. One was wedded to the belief that the way to peace was to "prevent war" by collective action against what they called an "aggressor." Had it been termed, correctly, a military alliance, people would have been repelled; but called "collective security," the idea was zealously embraced. This has always seemed a tragic mistake, born of the notions disseminated during the War. This is the theory of the League of Nations, by which quite humanly, but unwisely, the status quo of 1919 was to be enforced against any revolter. While lip service had been paid in Article 19 of the Covenant to the realization that change was necessary, no practical possibility of change was actually afforded. The system thus had the effect of sitting on a safety valve. Yet the theory of "sanctions" was put into effect on three occasions, in Manchuria, in the Chaco, and in Ethiopia. As was to be expected, it has only humiliating failures to exhibit.

The very idea that important nations could be coerced by some of their fellows, and that starvation and boycott might be employed as a weapon, has had the effect of centrifugally driving the nations of the world apart. It places in all nations the fear that at the will of the well-supplied they may be starved into submission. Nothing could more greatly stimulate the urge for self-sufficiency and conquest. This idea has helped to poison international relations and necessarily encourages the growth of armaments, for prospective coercers and coerced alike.

With such a system, neutrality is necessarily incompatible, and accordingly neutrality, especially United States neutrality, was vigorously attacked as selfish, immoral, and cowardly. How could any one remain out of the *posse-comitatus*, when an "aggressor" was on

the loose? In this oversimplified fashion the relations of nations were portrayed to a gullible America. The long-established international law, which like all law had been founded on practical experience of human affairs, was now disparaged as inconsistent with the "new" law which conceived the world as divided between the peace-loving and the war-loving nations.

It might have been realized that the new scheme was exceedingly superficial, for it left out of account the causes of war, historical, biological, psychological, and economic; the nature of nationhood in the modern world, including those factors known as prestige and "face"; the unfortunate and precarious status quo created in 1919, which bore within it the seeds of future conflict. The theory proceeds from the assumption that the distempers and discontents which move masses of people or even their governments have a moral origin; it overlooks provocations to resentment but denounces the expression of resentment.

It also ignores the fact that nations do not judge others objectively, as municipal judges do parties to a dispute, but in the light of their interests, their alliances, and their prior commitments. It disregards the fact that the life of nations is not static but dynamic and that nations rise and fall; that no country can be guaranteed against the consequences of maladministration and its own ineptitude, against a falling birth rate, against deterioration of its resources, physical and spiritual; that the attempt to maintain an unhealthy status quo might be the very reverse of constructive action.

Although the idea is thus in all its connotations unrealistic and destructive, it is nevertheless deeply embedded in the Neutrality Act of 1937, as will be explained presently. It has had ardent defenders in administration and academic circles. Although it is now under something of a cloud, the demand for joint action of the so-called "democratic" nations against Japan is its direct progeny. It doubtless inspired President Roosevelt's speech of October 5, 1937, in Chicago. It is responsible for the unremitting demand that presidential discretion to discriminate between the belligerents, the very antithesis of neutrality, be included in the Act. The idea is embodied in that provision of the executive trade agreements which permits an embargo on commodities "needed in war" or "other military supplies." It is perhaps not fully appreciated that a sanctions policy

and a trade-promotion policy are inconsistent. The idea encourages the "taking of sides" and, it is to be feared, resents obstacles to belligerency, such as the Ludlow resolution for a popular referendum, as a condition of a declaration of war to be conducted on foreign soil.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEUTRALS TO THE NEUTRALITY ACT OF 1937

A second school, seeking its authority in history and in law, more responsive to the actual facts of international life and skeptical of the possibility of reforming the world by paper formulas, has preferred to have the United States actually stay out of foreign wars and employ the well-known standards of candid neutrality to achieve that end. This school deplored departures from neutrality, because experience has taught that violations of neutrality usually mark the road to war. This school observes that no other nations have succumbed to fanciful notions of "discriminatory" neutrality—a contradiction in terms—or to the sacrificial insulation against trade with belligerents which the Nye group in Congress would have the United States adopt. Perhaps the 1938 demand of some of this group for lifting the embargo against Loyalist Spain, shows weaknesses in the foundations of their general position.

Neutrality never got the United States into any war, as the sanctionist school would have it. The War of 1812 was stimulated by the war-hawks who thought it a bright idea to expand to Canada, Florida, and the southwest while Europe was engaged in fratricidal strife. As Benjamin Franklin said, man is a reasonable animal because he can always find a reason for doing what he wants to do. So a reason was found in 1812 in the impressment issue, which was not even mentioned in the peace treaty of Ghent.

In 1914-1917, the Administration was anything but neutral. Having in practical effect taken sides as early as 1914, they permitted themselves to adopt the most unsustainable legal positions, for example, that an armed belligerent vessel was a peaceful carrier and that American citizens on board such vessels were as a matter of national honor immune from unwarned submarine attack. Although Mr. Lansing in January, 1916, admitted the unsoundness of this view, the vested interest in the error had grown so great that he was not allowed to withdraw from it and the Administration then bent its

THE ECONOMIC SUFFOCATION OF NEUTRALITY -- U. S.

U.S.S.R.

The state-controlled economy permits complete commercial and financial dictation of relations with foreign states - hence an effective embargo system.

U.S. stops plane shipments to Japan for China War by State Department's "moral control" over aviation concerns, 1938.

U.S. ships scrap metal to Japan, essential for munitions, 1937-1939. U.S. loans China \$25,000,000 for interior reconstruction for aid fight against Japan, Dec. 19, 1938.

U.S. helps both China & Japan by impartial silver purchases.

POSSIBLE EVASION American plant: go to Canada, with loss to labor.

U.S. Not self-contained in raw materials or trade.

AMENDING ACT OF 1935, as revised 1936, to cover both international and civil war, providing for executive "locking of act" prohibiting munition exports, "cash & carry" purchase of other goods, no American travel on belligerent craft, except Latin American republics in war with non-American powers.

INVALIDATING clause by "cash & carry" control of sea.

Pyramiding of British gold deposits in N.Y. AND Use of nearby intermediaries for trans-shipment.

Japan cuts off our China trade, save by the Burma back door for practical purposes.

THE CONFLICT OF LEGAL CONCEPTS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS DECISIVE:

BORCHARD - "YOU CANNOT HELP ONE SIDE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER AND HOPE TO ESCAPE THE PENALTIES OF UNEUTRALITY."

HODGES - "YOU CANNOT BE NEUTRAL WHERE OUR DEMOCRATIC INTERESTS ARE THREATENED BY FASCISTIC WAR."

Vital interests of the U.S. in Latin America under the Monroe Doctrine protected by EXCEPTIONS to Neutrality Act of 1937 when war involves NON-AMERICAN POWERS.

SPANISH WAR

Tests strict U.S. neutrality. Net effect: Democratic countries stop all munitions, while state-controlled munition plants in fascist states supply rebel Franco regime with arms (and men) for destruction of Republican Spain.

A FACT PICTURE

Prepared by CHARLES HODGES

forces to defeat the Gore-McLemore Resolutions which merely sought to restate the elementary rule that American citizens on belligerent vessels assumed the risks of their location.

The contribution of this neutral school to the Neutrality Act of 1937 was an insistence on impartial and equal treatment to both belligerents, and a prohibition upon American citizens to take passage on armed belligerent vessels. They would have preferred a simple declaration that such citizens, like those in a war zone, assume their own risks, for the prohibition may operate with severity if other vessels are not available. This school also advocated the prohibition to use American ports as sources of supply to cruisers at sea, and keeping armed vessels, surface or submarine, out of American neutral ports, as did Holland during the late war. They supported the Nye group in their demand that an arms and loan embargo be also declared, while realizing that at times an arms embargo might work hardship on weaker powers, as in the case of China and the Spanish Loyalists, and that the manufacture of arms and ammunition in each nation might thereby be augmented. This school has no sympathy with the view that a nation must inevitably be involved in a foreign war whether it wishes or not, for they observed that numerous countries stayed out of the World War and that Great Britain in 1933 officially declared that "under no circumstances will this government authorize this country to be a party to the conflict" then raging in Manchuria.

THE INSULATIONIST CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NYE SCHOOL

A third school of thought on neutrality is an outgrowth of the Nye investigation on the influence of bankers and munitions makers during the late war. This school ultimately took the initiative in 1935 in getting legislation on the books, and some of the more drastic features of the Act of 1935 emanate from them. This school is thoroughly neutral, has no use for the inflammatory conception of "aggressor," and is determined to stay out of foreign wars. It would insulate the United States through prohibiting trade with the belligerents, so far as possible. Its intentions are excellent. It proceeds, however, from certain premises that seem to the writer to be false and does not make adequate allowance for the consequences of its

policies. Its position is based in part on the premise that American neutral trade and the injuries to that trade got us into the last war and that, if we have little or no trade, at least in American carriers, the incentive to conflict will vanish. It is not so simple as that. It was not trade that got us into war; it was sheer unneutrality, the favoring of one side against the other, the writing of "strict accountability" notes taking legal positions that were not sustainable. Nor did the bankers or the munitions makers, however interested, write the ultimatums which finally led to intervention. It is the writer's firm conviction that the economic interest was far less a factor than political romance. No legislation can effectively prohibit that.

The other error of the Nye school is the belief that distress at home will have few if any repercussions. Even the limitation of trade to pre-War proportions, for which the Nye school obtained Administration support in 1936, would serve little practical purpose, and the difficulties in the management of such a policy would be great. Embargoes have had a rather sorry history in the United States, and in 1812 nearly brought about the secession of New England from the Union. Moreover, to withhold goods from people who need them will be regarded as a hostile act and is likely to have unforeseen international consequences. Nations will not wish to be dependent upon supplies that may be withheld when they most need them. It is to be hoped that the embargo obsession will soon pass.

The Nye school was mainly responsible for the cash-and-carry provision written into the Act of 1937, though the group yielded to objections by limiting it to two years. As contrasted with the mandatory prohibition on arms exports and loans and on traveling on belligerent vessels, the cash-and-carry provision can come into effect only at presidential discretion and then only as to goods, presumably contraband, which the president places on an embargo list. These may then be carried only in foreign vessels and after payment in cash or short-term bills, so that title passes out of American into foreign hands. This was supposed to keep American commerce on the seas, while exempting it from the risks of American entanglement because it would be under foreign flag and under foreign ownership. It is not very practical, is probably unenforceable, and would unnecessarily damage American foreign trade. Besides, in

the selection of commodities for the embargo list, an unneutral president could aid or injure one side, and that could hardly fail to expose the United States to the charges and consequences of unneutrality.

THE WAR IN CHINA

On the first occasion for the application of the Neutrality Act, the war in China, the Administration declined to put it into effect. What the reason is we do not know. It can hardly be on the unsound ground that there is no war in China because it is undeclared and because ambassadors were not at once withdrawn. War is a fact and does not depend on declaration or on the name given it. It ought not to be on the ground that the Curtis-Wright decision (*United States v. Curtis-Wright Corp.*, 299 U. S. 304) incautiously announced a broad presidential discretion in dealing with foreign affairs, for the language of Justice Sutherland in that connection related only to the president's power of "negotiation and inquiry" which the justice, as pure dictum, thought could not be limited by statute. A suggestion that Congress cannot constitutionally pass an act prescribing the conditions of American neutrality and the conduct of American citizens in order to maintain American neutrality would be unfounded.

Nor ought the Act to be disregarded because it is assumed, not convincingly, that the Act will be of greater assistance to Japan than to China, for that would be an unneutral ground distinctly repudiated by Congress. If the Act remains unenforced because it seems to the executive inappropriate, the answer would seem to be: that it has become the law of the land; and that the only parts of it which come into operation mandatorily are the prohibitions on arms exports and loans and on American citizens traveling on belligerent ships, prohibitions which would not greatly affect the present situation. Practically all the rest of the provisions come into force only at the discretion of the president. The rules of international neutrality are now binding on the country. If it is argued that the president should have even greater discretion, which he has not yet asked, we must remember that much of the pressure for executive discretionary embargoes has come from those who wanted the discretion for unneutral purposes, i.e., to help one side defeat the other.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S CHICAGO SPEECH AND THE
EMPHASIS ON SANCTIONS

Possibly a reason for reluctance to bring the Neutrality Act into force may be found in President Roosevelt's Chicago speech of October 5, 1937. The president then startled the country with the announcement that a "reign of terror and lawlessness" prevails in the world, that if it is permitted to continue our civilization will be lost, that our Western Hemisphere is in danger of destruction, and that "the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality." In his speech we were called on to "quarantine" the 10 per cent of aggressive peoples; the law-abiding 90 per cent "must find some way to make their will prevail."

This unexpected disparagement of neutrality and the endorsement, as generally construed, of sanctions were alarming. If the writer understands the position correctly, it proposes intervention, not neutrality, as a current national policy. It goes much beyond the Norman Davis commitment of May, 1933, at Geneva, when the United States promised, in return for a substantial degree of disarmament, that if the League Powers agreed on an aggressor and took steps to invoke sanctions, the United States, if it agreed with the League judgment, would "refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort." Now, without any disarmament, the American people were invited to associate themselves with the "peace-loving" nations in undertaking hostile measures to extinguish aggression.

This position appears to be a difficult one, and no practical way has been suggested to achieve it. War might be tried, but war would probably have the reverse from the desired effect, as it has had before, and so far as concerns Japan, possibly spread to most of Asia the chaos now prevalent in one section only. What such a policy would mean to the United States one hesitates to think. It could easily ignite another world war. But for some reason not yet clear, the Brussels conference was convened, with results known

to all. Britain at once announced that it would have nothing more to do with sanctions, but would go along with the United States in whatever steps the United States wished to undertake. Again this country was out in front. Japan was charged by the United States with violating the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact as well as the Covenant of the League. To the Covenant of the League neither the United States nor Japan is a party. The Nine-Power Treaty is based on a condition contrary to fact, the assumed unimpaired sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, a condition that, by the infringements of the Great Powers, has not existed in China for a century. The Kellogg Pact is legally a hollow mockery. The legal case is therefore exceedingly flimsy. Besides, it is dangerous to attribute great sanctity to vague political treaties, which at best are *modi vivendi* that are deemed rarely to survive the circumstances which gave them birth.

THE ALTERNATIVE POLICIES OF NEUTRALITY AND SANCTIONS

Much as we may sympathize with the righteous emotions which prompted President Roosevelt's speech of October 5, 1937, one cannot help a feeling of disquietude at the oversimplification of international relations which it implies. Dictatorship is a concomitant of poverty and misery. How can it be cured by increasing poverty and misery? At this late day it seems strange to suppose that collective coercion against "aggressors" can mean anything but a military alliance against certain countries we happen to dislike. In the new vocabulary of semantics, wars for "democracy" are merely wars for foreign imperialisms. One had the right to hope that after the experience of the last twenty years the zest for foreign adventure would have become tempered and sophisticated and that, after the ghastly failure of sanctions and other supposed short cuts to peace, a genuine appreciation of the wisdom of neutrality might have received public and governmental support.

All the attempts to find a new way around neutrality have but shown that there is no useful substitute for it. Long-established law is hard to extinguish, even when the intentions are good. The search for Utopian goals has but proved the wisdom of a reliance on honest neutrality and its manifold rules as the only known way to

preserve the welfare of a people desirous of remaining aloof from foreign wars. Very little legislation would be required if there were a real intention to remain neutral. But as President Roosevelt accurately stated in a speech at Chautauqua, New York, in August, 1936: "The effective maintenance of American neutrality depends today, as in the past, on the wisdom and determination of whoever at the moment occupy the offices of President and Secretary of State."

RELATION OF SANCTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Ever since the foundation of the League of Nations, there has been an attempt, notably in American colleges, to present the view that a new world had been created and that nations would now conform to the new pattern. The pre-1914 order has been painted as "anarchy" and the new League order as the new "international organization." Books have been written and courses given under the title "International Government."

However, a hard and recalcitrant world has refused to follow the pattern. The consistent failure of all the efforts to apply sanctions and to coerce the unruly has not enlightened but has rather incensed the more ardent devotees of the Geneva theories. A more philosophical understanding of the facts of international relations would have made unnecessary the current disappointment. The supposition that coercion could be applied among a group of legal equals or that they would seriously agree to permit themselves to be policed by their fellows was romantic in the extreme. It was not often suggested that the adventitious status quo of 1919 was almost an incitement to revolt and that only a transcendental optimist could assume that the political arrangements of 1919 would last long. This would be true, even if we leave out of account such important factors as the mockery of disarmament, the determination not to admit certain nations to the benefits of League management, the fact that the League never was universal, that resignation from it was voluntary, that agreement among the coercers would be very rare, that the coerced might be strong enough to defy the coercers, and that to work an unworkable machine might smash it.

Yet all such practical considerations the political and legal engineer has to bear in mind, and these considerations have proved over-

whelming. The very word "aggressor" or "aggression," with its opprobrious connotations, was most unwise. It is a fighting word and arouses the combative instincts of both coercers and coerced. It is no contribution to peace or orderly relations. There may be a provocation or reason for mass movements, and, until a peaceful method of distributing territory or resources is found, forceful methods will be hard to outlaw. Indeed, before 1914 much progress had been made by conciliation and arbitration in adjusting conflicts of interest that formerly might have created war. By now grasping at too much and attempting to stop unwelcome aggression by alliance, some of the gains of the past have been jeopardized. However precarious the pre-Geneva order may have been, it did keep a large part of the world at peace for long periods and did not poison international relations. Although not professing to be able to stop all wars, it did not promote wars. The system of collective coercion is promotive of conflict, and for that reason alone should be discarded. One may pay all deference to the good intentions of those who backed it; but in politics, the unworkable cannot long be tolerated. It is better to confess error than to pursue it to its very bitter end.

The mistake of 1919 was not merely that the League Covenant was inevitably the enforcer of the treaties with which it was associated, but also that too many factors concerning international relations were overlooked. The deflation of exaggerated sovereignty is undoubtedly much to be desired, co-operation is indispensable, and the more co-operation we have the more organization will be necessary. Nations are sensitive bodies, however, and the only motive that will induce them to abandon any part of their sovereignty is self-interest. The only way to make them appreciate this self-interest is by innate conviction and possibly persuasion, both of which presuppose trust and confidence. The very notion of coercion, organized or not, destroys that trust and confidence and willingness to co-operate which must be won. The error of 1919 lay in the false analogy between the internal state's authority to coerce the recalcitrant citizen and the external state's position in relation to its fellow nations. In the latter relation each is independent of the other, and none is legally superior. Coercion therefore must be imperatively rejected if any progress is to be made.

Sovereignty is relinquished, if at all, gradually, as the necessity becomes apparent. A central organization for the exchange of information and for non-political ends carries on an old tradition and deserves support. Instead of letting the structure grow from the bottom up, they tried at Geneva to build it from the top down and used threat and coercion as a cement to hold it together. Nothing could have been more fatal to its duration; it was bound to crumble.

It is hard to say how much the errors of these past twenty years have impaired the chances for effective international co-operation. It may have injured the opportunities of Geneva even in non-political fields to become a useful instrument of co-ordination, and that is a misfortune. But the facts can no longer be covered up by moral phrase-making. We must recover some of the virtues of candor and respect for law which heretofore have helped to achieve some advances in a field none too easy to conquer for law and understanding. It is therefore necessary in Europe to negotiate a peace treaty, which was not done in 1919 when it should have been done. It will now be more difficult and distasteful, but if more war is to be avoided it will have to be done. If trust and confidence can then be restored, it may be possible to break down some of the economic and now ideological barriers which have kept nations apart. When people again have something to eat and lose their feeling of terror and danger, they may be less disposed to tolerate the hardships of dictatorship, which indeed may become unnecessary. Then the world may again take up the thread of honest co-operation in the many and unlimited fields to which it may be applied. Out of such co-operation will grow those institutions which are deemed necessary to administer the common interests. But it is probably inescapable that such co-operation must come from innate conviction and at most friendly persuasion, and that any attempt at organized coercion will make general co-operation all but impossible and doom to collapse any structure that may be erected upon it.

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SUMMARY

The hopes of mankind for the establishment of world peace, advanced in numerous ideas of world organization and international law by both theorists and diplomats, were incorporated after the World War in the establishment of the League of Nations, the World Court, and the International Labor Organization, all monuments to man's great idealism. The history of the first decade of post-War relations demonstrates to what degree the problems of international relations were hinging on the role played by the League in the affairs of the world.

The drawing of the world into economic crises since 1929 and the political collapse of the League system of collective security under the successful attempts of Germany, Italy, and Japan to overthrow the status quo have weakened the usefulness of this international system. The gradual desertion of the ranks of the League by several states, including Japan and Germany, and the diminution of the powers of the League have followed as a matter of course. This lessening of League power culminated in 1938 in the announcement of the Swedish and Netherlands governments in the League's Assembly of their repudiation of the League's obligatory coercive provisions and their return to what the Netherlands called "armed neutrality."

The traditional forms of diplomacy were also undergoing changes by 1938. Although diplomacy is still a useful and legitimate means of communication among states, the visits of Chamberlain to Hitler and Mussolini forcefully demonstrated that, at least in crises, relations between nations depend

more upon direct communication between the heads of governments than upon intermediaries. The public is already accustomed to the personal intervention of dictators in diplomatic affairs. Foreign ministers have been, in many cases, reduced to the position of aides-de-camp to the heads of government, whether totalitarian or democratic. The situation is succinctly summarized by Augur, "Europe Now Ruled by New Diplomacy," *New York Times*, September 18, 1938:

In that sense we are back in the epoch of Louis XV of France, who excelled in the art of duplication of diplomatic action by sending confidential agents alongside officially accredited Ambassadors. That throwback is due to the instinctive shrinking of statesmen from the light of publicity shed by the press. Moreover, democratic governments, to keep pace, are obliged to adjust their methods to those used by forceful dictators. Today it is usual deliberately to direct the attention of the public toward showy dummy activities while vital talks proceed in the shadows. Three days ago, for example, stress was placed on the presence in Downing Street of French military experts, while the central interest, we now know, really was in measures preparing for Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Herr Hitler.

It would be inaccurate to say that Europe is ruled by a four-power pact, but it is right to declare that the affairs of the Continent are in large measure decided by agreement or dissension among actors like Mr. Chamberlain, M. Daladier, Herr Hitler and Premier Benito Mussolini.

In British politics the new era of one-man diplomacy became apparent when the Anglo-Italian agreement had been prepared. It is safe to say that that transaction would not have seen daylight were it not for direct contact between Mr. Chamberlain and Signor Mussolini. The world heard about messages exchanged on that occasion, but how many others remained hidden behind a discreet veil?

The result is that a new type of diplomat has appeared on the scene, often brought into the diplomatic game by chance meeting or a promise of adventurous intrigue. Their names are often unknown, and quite often they are utilized for a short period in one particular business or because their excellence depends upon careful preservation of a complete incognito. It is significant that Austen Chamberlain's widow has been credited by the press with bringing Chamberlain and Mussolini together. Hitler sends Captain Fritz Wiedmann on personal missions of a confidential nature.

It would be interesting, although fruitless, to write a speculative history of international relations during the last twenty years based upon the enthusiastic entry of the United States into the League and the World Court. (After more than ten years of political "buck-passing" the United States joined the innocuous I.L.O.). Despite the important part played by Wilson in the formation of the instruments of collective security, our foreign policy has wavered uncertainly between complete isolation and "neutrality and sanctions."

The failure to achieve any consistent policy has resulted from two major influences: economic expansionism and political machination. On Armistice Day, 1935, Roosevelt described the Neutrality Act as the "most significant legislation in our generation, for now where men are killed and territory is invaded, there is war." Yet in Spain loyalists and rebels continue to die by American-made bullets, Chinese women and children are shattered by American-made bombs, and soldiers on both sides of the conflict are mowed down by American-made machine guns. It pays dividends to be "neutral."

Yet a consistent policy of neutrality and sanctions is a potential basis of world organization for peace. Although sanctions through the League have collapsed (largely because of the policies of the United States, England, and France), it

might still be possible to make them effective through a unilateral agreement of the major powers. If and when a consistent policy of neutrality and sanctions can be made effective for the United States, a significant step forward in the interest of world peace will have been taken. We must not be too optimistic about such a possibility, however, because, at the present, the obligations of the states to the League and the unilateral and multilateral treaties are disregarded with impunity.

From the official point of view of the United States, some of the principles which appear indispensable to a satisfactory international order were presented by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in his address at Nashville, Tennessee, on June 3, 1938. The most important are: the advocacy and practice of maintenance of peace, the abstention from use of force in pursuit of foreign policies and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations by all nations, the seeking of adjustments of problems in international relations by peaceful negotiation and agreement, the support of the principle of the sanctity of treaties and of faithful observance of international agreements, modification of provisions of treaties by orderly processes, the respect by each nation of the rights of others and the established obligations, steps to be taken toward promotion of economic security and stability through lowering or removal of barriers to international trade, and the willingness of all nations to limit and reduce their armaments progressively.

PART V

MAKING WORLD OPINION

INTRODUCTION

The making of world opinion is one of the greatest tasks in the contemporary world. What the sociologist knows as "social attitudes," or the psychologist as "conditioning processes," are the herculean tasks which engage the attention of every leader, in democracies as well as in dictatorships. The mind of the average citizen is largely "made up for him." The newspapers, the radio, photographs and motion pictures, textbooks, lectures, and a thousand and one other devices are molding the minds of the "little man" and the "big man" alike in the directions designed by those who control these means and have the power to enforce this manipulation.

The art of propaganda has reached the pinnacle of its effectiveness, particularly in the showmanship and the regulation of public life in Germany, Italy, and Russia. The control of the reactions of the masses by means of slogans, symbols, color, mass movements, music, and ideologies is not a new art. Its novelty lies, rather, in the fact that it can now be used on an unprecedentedly large scale. There are new and instantaneous means of communication available; we know more today about the "irrational" factors of our behavior; and there are unscrupulous leaders ready to exploit their knowledge of human nature and ruthless in utilizing them for their own selfish and primarily nationalistically aggressive goals.

If we take for our example the most glaring instance of this making of world opinion, we can see that Germany is utilizing it on the principle that "peace is the continuation of war by another means"—an improvement on von Clausewitz' "war is politics continued by other (that is, forcible)

means." When we analyze the various techniques offered to the German and foreign public, we can see that the hammer blows of Germany's diplomacy contain the following elements:

The public is first informed of the "resentment of the people." At first surprised to learn of their own feelings, the German people develop this state of mind because they are informed that they have an attitude of "resentment." This creates a vivid impression on the democratic statesmen and diplomats who know that *real* resentment in public masses is a serious matter which might lead to an overthrow of government.

The second step is to inform the world about the "provocations" against Germany. Hitler learned a lot from Lueger, an old mayor of Vienna, who is credited with this classic statement: "I decide who is the Jew." Berlin simply decides when and where and by whom the German people are being "provoked." Thus the prohibition of the speaking of the German language in the Italian Tirol is not a "provocation"; but a chance hitting of a Sudeten German with a riding crop is "the most serious provocation" against the one hundred million Germans the world over. This is a useful technique as it makes it possible to find out how nervous the enemy is and how far the victim "dares" to continue his other "provocations."

The next step is to describe vividly the "resulting terror." A neighboring state desires to re-establish public peace and order, and sends gendarmes into the streets. This gives an opportunity for screaming headlines about the "brutality," "bestiality," "terror," and "murderous activities" in the attacked state.

The fourth element of propaganda involves the demands for "equality." The neighboring state is accused of not allowing its citizens to carry guns or to instigate riots. This

is considered the denial of all rights of "equality" and the indication of "intolerable oppression."

"Prestige" and "national honor" then become the new rallying cries. The "unbearable offense to this great power" is presented to the world with the assumed justification that a smaller power had dared to mobilize or had dared to put some rioters into jail. The smaller the opponent, the more "unbearable" the offense. The German newspapers can print anything about anybody in the world, and no abusive terms are left out. Beneš is called a "liar" in a public speech by Hitler and Baldwin is characterized in German newspapers as "guttersnipe." But should the same term be used by Beneš against Hitler . . .

Threats comprise the next propaganda weapon. Since most people desire to live in peaceful relations, propaganda increases its display of the most abhorrent thing to the common man—war. Such news items are multiplied from week to week, from day to day, and from hour to hour. The news of mobilization, the visits of Hitler to the borderlands, the pictures of the war lords reviewing the formidable weapons of war, all are constantly inflicted upon the public to make the entire world nervous and anxious to "surrender" before the danger is too imminent.

The final technique is the "wearing-down" process. Psychologically, the attacks on man's nerves are effective to a certain point and then the "nervous breakdown" comes. To achieve this objective, German propaganda has built up a whole series of methods. News is freely given out about "secret" weapons, insinuations are openly made about the terrible effects of new poison gases, hints are passed out about mysterious bacteriological poisons, and photographs of flying air squadrons dropping incendiary bombs are made available. The desired effect is to break down the opponent and to convince the people that any kind of peace is preferable to the horrors of war.

This is a new kind of warfare, unknown to the previous generations, at least to the extent now used. It is war, but a warfare where the "shooting" is done with propaganda and by the manipulation of public opinion rather than with hand grenades and machine guns. The shots are aimed not at the body but at the mind. The attempt is made not to destroy the strength of the "enemy's" combatant forces of war, but the common sense and morale of their non-combatants. The fight is led not so much by a military marshall, as by a talented propagandist (or shall we say "advertising" agent?) who has learned much from social psychology, and particularly from the field of psychoanalysis, and also a great deal from the American commercial promotion schemes.

The perpetuation of peace and of the conception of democracy in America and abroad or the realization of the democratic ideal depends largely upon our education program—one which will deal adequately with the "why" and "how" of making world opinion.

CHAPTER 24

THE PRESS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Robert W. Desmond

Native to man is the wish to know and the need to know his place in the cosmos. He seeks constant escape from his own mortal limitations, first through what is nearest at hand: his family, neighbors, and nature itself. He seeks to share in all that they can tell him. Then he reaches over the horizon, up to the stars, down into the depths of the sea. The zest to know and to understand is akin to the need which man has to feel himself an integral part of the complete universe. It is upon this insatiable desire for information that newspapers have built.

In the centuries since printing began, the press has risen from the most embryonic forms to its present status, in which it provides constant, almost instant, reports from nearly every part of the world. So it meets an important human need. Governments always have maintained diplomatic and consular representatives throughout the world to gather the information they required. Business and trade groups, so far as their finances have permitted, have reached out for data of value to them. But private individuals have had to turn to the daily papers for most of their current information.

Under any government it is desirable that the people be well informed, but under the democratic form of government it is essential, since there the people hold the ultimate power. Whatever information reaches an individual naturally helps to determine what he believes to be true, and so governs his behavior at the polls and elsewhere. Multiply that one person, and his reaction to what he learns, by hundreds of others, or thousands, or millions, and the resulting opinion—public opinion, so called—becomes an enormous force at work in any group, community, nation, or in the world itself. Even in totalitarian states, where thought is regimented to a

considerable extent, public opinion is powerful, though its formation and expression are far from normal.

Because the press is the medium through which nearly all information is distributed to the public, it is vital in world affairs. The work of the journalists, who actually gather and write the reports which we read, and the technical considerations governing press associations and the newspapers themselves are matters of very real social importance. What the press reports becomes the basis for public opinion. It is essential, therefore, that those reports be as complete, true, and accurate as is humanly possible. Just to the extent that they depart from that ideal, to that extent the public welfare is adversely affected.

GATHERING THE WORLD NEWS

The news of world affairs concerns the intricacies of human relationships all over the face of the earth. The events which spring, phoenix-wise, from the simplest human actions and emotions sometimes become the overturnings which produce the trends of tomorrow. They do not actually get into the stream of world news, however, until they reach a point at which, in interest or importance, they begin to transcend the limited boundaries of the countries in which they occur.

By far the greater amount of world news seems to originate in a few key cities. They are known as the "news centers" of the world, and they are identical, for the most part, with those cities wherein government, trade, finance, and cultural activities also center. The list of news centers changes somewhat as new chapters are written in history. Appearing most frequently, however, are the datelines of London and Paris, Berlin and Washington, Tokyo and Rome, New York and Moscow. Until recently, Geneva and Vienna and Prague were important, but events have reduced the degree of that importance. Shanghai and Buenos Aires, Calcutta and Warsaw, Rio de Janeiro and Hong Kong—these and other cities are in the news today, were yesterday, and probably will continue to be.

In fact, the list of news centers and potential news centers is as long as the list in the gazetteer. News may "break" anywhere, but one need only examine any good newspaper to learn that the leading news centers are the fifteen or more political and commercial cities mentioned.

Within each such center, also, the news of world-wide interest commonly tends to originate in a few spots—"news sources," as they are called. These sources include departments and officials of government, especially the chief of the administration or his representatives, directors of policy, heads of departments, and influential leaders. The Foreign Office, by whatever name it may be called is always important. Newspapers and other periodicals of the country are scanned with great care for the information, comment, and suggestions which they contain, or—especially in totalitarian countries—for the news which they do *not* contain. Embassies, consulates, and legations very often are good news sources. Banks, business houses, professional and industrial associations, educational institutions, and fact-finding organizations, reviews and reports, hotels and clubs—these are among the other more important sources of news. And always individuals, of course, persons who are in positions to know what is happening, and are able and willing to disclose something of that information, are news sources within news sources at all times.

To gather the news from these sources there has been evolved a rather complex system. It rests, in the final analysis, upon the individual reporter. He is a journalist, or correspondent, who represents a newspaper, press association, or syndicate in a foreign news center. Or he is a local resident, possibly a journalist connected with some newspaper published in the country itself. In either case, he is responsible for watching the local or national news sources and rating each development. That development—whether it be a surface event, a pertinent comment, a general situation or trend, or a deep movement or swing of opinion or sentiment—he puts into words, writing of it himself or conveying it to someone who will write it.

No press association or newspaper is prosperous enough to maintain a staff representative in every city of the world, or even in every capital. If it has men in a dozen of the chief cities it is doing exceptionally well. In such cities, where news runs heaviest and where communication lines center, there will be a bureau feeding news into the headquarters of the newspaper or press association at home, and using every means to get it there as quickly as possible.

But each bureau is itself a center, or a "control point," as some-

times called, for the general area in which it is situated. The bureau either dispatches one of its own staff to an area requiring attention or it arranges with local correspondents throughout its area of responsibility, when necessary, to have them "cover" such news of world-wide interest as may develop in their particular territories. These local correspondents telephone, telegraph, or write what they learn to the "control point." So the net is spread throughout the world, and little which is newsworthy slips through its meshes.

COVERAGE OF WORLD NEWS

The coverage of the world news has grown enormously. It began more than a century ago, in a few newspapers owned and edited by men of wider interests and vision than others. Newspapers inclined to do so, and financially able, have sent their own staff members to some of the news centers of the world; certain press associations and syndicates have done the same. In a few instances newspapers have syndicated dispatches from their own staff correspondents to other newspapers in non-competitive territories in the United States. So they have defrayed the large cost of maintaining representatives abroad and paying transmission tolls.

Newspapers published in the United States, which have outstanding foreign representation of their own, include the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Chicago Daily News*, and the *Chicago Tribune*. Several other American newspapers maintain a more limited representation abroad. In Great Britain *The Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Morning Post*, the *News-Chronicle*, the *Daily Herald*, *Daily Mail*, and *Daily Express*, all of London, and the *Manchester Guardian* present foreign reports from their own correspondents. In France the best treatment of world news is in the *Petit Parisien* and *Paris Soir*, but *Le Temps*, also of Paris, has some foreign representation.

Several newspapers in the Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and a few other European lands maintain representatives abroad, particularly in London, Paris, and Berlin. But, generally speaking, European newspapers are too small to have much space available for world news; usually they prefer to depend upon press association services rather than go to the expense of maintaining their own representatives abroad, even when they are

financially able to do so. That is true, also, of most newspapers in the totalitarian countries, which depend for their news chiefly upon their own official press associations. A few newspapers of South America are good in their world news offering, notably *La Prensa* and *La Nación*, both of Buenos Aires, but none has any staff representation of its own in the important news centers. Some Japanese papers, such as the Tokyo *Nichi Nichi* and the Osaka *Mainichi* and the *Asahi Shimbun*, also of Osaka, have sent some representatives abroad, particularly to the Asiatic mainland.

Very few countries are without at least one press association, and twenty-nine of the older associations, usually the best established, form a loosely organized World League of Press Associations, whose members exchange news among themselves. There were thirty members until Austria's official Amtliche Nachrichtenstelle was absorbed by Germany's official Deutsches Nachrichten Buro in March, 1938. Three or four of the larger agencies of the world maintain staff correspondents in most, or many, of the news centers of the world, and so can build their own services almost completely. But the smaller associations, without such extensive coverage of their own, find this exchange arrangement an immense advantage because through it they receive information from every corner of the globe, all available to an individual paper at an expense which is only a fraction of the actual cost involved in gathering the news. There are over fifty active news agencies today.¹

THE SOURCE OF NEWS

Correspondents, whether representing newspapers or press associations, naturally must turn to almost the same sources for the information which is to become "news." Because most of them stationed in a foreign capital serve non-competitive papers and agencies, they can afford to co-operate rather freely, and many of them do so. All lean heavily upon the information provided through the press of the countries in which they are stationed. They read the newspapers. Sometimes they arrange to receive, at a price, advance proofs of matter which is to appear in the next edition of some one newspaper published in the city to which they have been assigned, or they subscribe to one or more of the local press association services.

Representatives of press associations, whose reports go to news-

papers of many shades of opinion, must steer a conservative middle course if they are not to offend some of those papers by what they write. That means that such correspondents must hold close to the facts, seek to be utterly objective, and generally avoid any interpretation, unless it be the insertion of some indisputable historical background. But usually even that is inserted, if at all, by the foreign editor at home, rather than by the correspondent in the field.

Special representatives of newspapers, on the other hand, while avoiding duplication of the press association service, so far as possible, run rather heavily to factual interpretation, always with due consideration for censorships, and sometimes slip into outright *editorial* interpretation.

The agency correspondent is often working against time, because a newspaper taking his service is going to press somewhere almost every minute of the day or night and is paying for, and naturally wants, the latest possible information. Newspaper special correspondents, on the contrary, although obliged to consider the time element, usually can round up all the elements of the news and convert them into a well-rounded report for transmission all at once, rather than in hurried fragments.

Under normal circumstances, a correspondent who has been well trained as a research man, investigator, and writer—which is the peculiar combination required for successful journalism of the better type—can do his work with satisfaction to all concerned. In the years since the World War, however, he has encountered increasing difficulties, particularly in the authoritarian countries, although not there alone. Censorship, which was disappearing prior to the World War, has grown large in extent since that time, and has been accompanied by an increased use of propaganda methods by government, as well as by pressure groups of all sorts.

The accelerated trade relations of the world's people prior to the War meant an increased public interest in events and trends everywhere. Press associations and newspapers hastened to serve that interest and need. The coming of the War itself intensified the concern of people in what was happening within the warring countries of Europe, particularly. Staffs were augmented and re-organized to gather that news and, so far as possible, to sift out the propaganda and interpret events in an objective way. After the

War there was little diminution of interest in those affairs which had world-wide implications, so that the budget of international news tended to increase in most newspapers which made any pretense to significance.

CENSORSHIP

There was hope, with the cessation of hostilities in 1918, that the democratic ideal, including freedom of speech and of the press, was going to become generally accepted. That hope met early resistance, but not *general* resistance at first, for even so recently as 1929 correspondents encountered a serious censorship only in Russia, Italy, Venezuela, and China, with periodic restraints in the Balkan countries. Those censorships were not unduly troublesome, by later standards, at least, and to balance them there was a ready and friendly co-operation between the press and agencies of government and administration in almost every other capital, including Berlin, and particularly at the League of Nations headquarters in Geneva.

A change for the worse began in 1933, when the National Socialist Government took control in Germany. After that the Italian and Russian censorships were tightened up, those in China and the Balkan countries, the same. Japan came under more severe press control. The Spanish situation became increasingly difficult. Brazil and other Latin American countries, even including the Argentine, imposed censorships, some of which remain in force, or are intermittent. Although the League's relations with the press did not alter, the liberalizing influence of the Geneva idea evaporated, and even France and Great Britain showed some marked disposition to control the news. Conditions were not even so free in Washington as they had been, and nationalist-inspired propaganda in virtually every country intensified the problem of getting the news.

GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS

It has seemed wise for governments to control what is known concerning their activities during times of war. In recent years economic and social crises have been added to the older style military crisis. Under such circumstances, governments which formerly revealed little or nothing to the press, either in wartimes or in peacetimes, began to reveal such facts as they chose, or to issue "statements," but

they also continued to regard a great deal of information as "not in the public interest." Perhaps they were right, but the press, where it was free to do so, insisted upon guessing and speculating, with results more confusing than helpful to the public. Where a complete policy of censorship existed, the situation became even more difficult. It was complicated further by the element of propaganda, often of government origin, and the muddlement of public thinking became worse confounded. That has been the situation in the world for some time.

Censorship is regarded as essential during wartime, as it probably is. In peacetime, its announced purpose, within a country, is to prevent the public from becoming alarmed or aroused at reports which may or may not be true, but which in either case might cause disorder. In a time of crisis, with the increased volatility of public emotion, a censorship sometimes is imposed, where it might not otherwise exist, or it is more strictly enforced at such a time. The purpose of a censorship on outgoing news reports, where it exists or is enforced successfully, is to prevent the publication abroad of information, true or false, which would reflect discreditably upon a nation's honor, prestige, financial standing, or attractiveness to tourists, or upon the honor and prestige of the nation's leaders.

There is no question but that sensational and untrue reports have been disseminated about some countries. Irresponsible and mischievous newspapers have played loosely with facts. Every censorship is portrayed, therefore, as intended solely to prevent malicious reports, lies, and innocent mistakes from gaining currency. Sometimes censorship accomplishes that reasonable purpose, but it always has been true, and probably will continue to be true, that a censorship is also used to conceal circumstances which it is not to the advantage of a government to have known, although it may be quite proper for others to know about them.

Censorship has taken various forms, its wonders to perform. So far as it affects publication within a country, it has been accomplished by preventing governmental information from becoming known at its source. That is a matter of administrative policy. Apart from that, official censors have been maintained in newspaper offices to look over all matter intended for publication. Loyal members of the regime have been established in responsible editorial positions, to catch

anything offensive before it appears in type. On other occasions, newspapers have been required to submit galley proofs or page proofs to authorities prior to publication. Or the first copies printed must be delivered to officials for inspection, and entire issues have been confiscated under this arrangement when they have been regarded as containing objectionable matter. On some occasions offending newspapers have been suppressed, temporarily or permanently.

To prevent objectionable matter leaving a country, correspondents writing for alien publications may be obliged to maintain some official relation to the government through registration and license, or perhaps through membership in a government-sponsored journalistic organization. Sometimes they are required to submit all copy to a duly constituted censor, who must approve it before it can leave the country by telegraph or cable or radio. Or the government, through its control of communication lines, will arrange with these offices to refer all press messages, as soon as filed for transmission, to some government representative, who will inspect each message before it is sent. In his hands it may be changed, delayed, or even destroyed if sufficiently objectionable. Foreign radio and cable companies, or private telegraph companies, operating from a national base, or within the country, will be threatened with the loss of franchise or operating license if they permit any matter which might be interpreted as unfriendly to the government to be transmitted over their facilities. Thus the government forces the communications company, by way of protecting its own investment, to set up an unofficial censorship.

In all these situations, except where the copy must be submitted directly to a censor, the correspondent probably does not know whether his message has been sent, delayed, changed, or otherwise tampered with. Not until copies of his newspaper reach him, long after, can he be sure, and not always then, unless possibly through a separate confirmation of dispatches received and total wordage each day, which he can compare with what he knows he sent.

Writers for foreign publications sometimes evade a national censorship by sending their reports in the mail. But mail may be examined, both incoming and outgoing. They frequently use the telephone to reach a bureau in another country, unaffected by the censorship, from which messages may be sent on without difficulty. But a deter

mined government, even though it may have been a signatory of a international agreement forbidding interruption of telephone connections, may see to it that the connection is bad, may refuse to grant a connection at all until the copy has been censored in advance, or may listen into the conversation and record it for future reference or may see that an "accident" breaks the connection. Messages have been sent out of a country in the care of travelers, and codes have been used to evade the censorship in some instances.

A writer who does evade a censorship, however, and transmit a report which is displeasing to the government of the country in which he is stationed reaps a dubious reward. Momentary glory in his home office is countered by the fact that the offended government may place obstacles in the way of his obtaining future information. This naturally reduces his value as a representative of his paper in the country concerned.

Where such a government censorship is combined with a terroristic policy, as it is in some totalitarian countries, anyone who gives, or suspected of giving, unauthorized information to newspaper correspondents is subject to a fine, to imprisonment, or even to execution. Applying to all persons, from government officials to private citizens and including native journalists or secretaries to the correspondents themselves, this policy has been used to help bottle up information in such countries as Russia and Germany. The chief recourse of a foreign journalist, under such circumstances, is to remain in the country long enough to gain sufficient understanding of its people and problems so that he can estimate a situation for himself, without being told very much by natives. But even then, he may hesitate to write as he thinks, if his thoughts would be unwelcome to the government, lest he be expelled for his pains, or find other news sources closed to him, so reducing his value to his newspaper or press association. It is this possibility which tends to keep correspondents sufficiently reticent to make some national censorships relatively effective.

Even so, however, the German Government, for one, has been disturbed at times by a hostile press in some other lands, and to counteract such an influence it has proposed a journalistic and diplomatic novelty in the form of newspaper non-aggression treaties, which actually has concluded with Poland and Italy. Such agreements, s

officials of the Reich contend, are as practical as agreements to suppress cocaine smuggling or white slavery and are justified because they help to preserve a peace which otherwise might be imperiled by irresponsible journalists.

Journalists in free-press countries continue to insist, however, that such treaties would permit the suppression of truth as well as halt irresponsible practices. No legislation or treaties, they believe, will prevent emotional reactions or their expression in one way or another, and nothing is gained in the end by suppressing a fact, if it is a fact. The ultimate solution for international difficulties, they insist, so far as it depends upon the press, rests in a press that is free, made by honest and able men who can get the facts and present them, and who are aided in that purpose, rather than obstructed, by publishers interested in producing newspapers which will inform readers as fully and accurately as possible, without alarming them unnecessarily, or stirring hatred toward other peoples.

TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS

World news is sent on its way by every means of communication. A vast amount goes by regular mail and by air mail. The telephone is much used. The telegraph, cable, and radio are all so much utilized that the companies offer reduced "press rates" on matter intended for newspaper publication. Part of the correspondent's task is to know how to get his information to headquarters as quickly as possible, making proper allowance for censorship, costs, and possible delays in transmission because of volume of business or adverse weather conditions.

Transmission methods have improved at a dizzy pace. It is scarcely a century since mail and news matter all went by stagecoach, sailing ship, and courier. The ultimate in speed was offered by the pony express and the carrier pigeon. Invention of the telegraph in 1844 was the first great step toward quick communication, and its use spread promptly throughout North America and Europe. Submarine cables began to go down in 1851; the North Atlantic was so spanned in 1858, but that cable broke, and the Civil War prevented the second being completed until 1866. Other lines were extended beneath the seas as rapidly as seemed practicable. Telegraph and cable together

made the world a unit by 1870, a date which marks the beginning of modern history, and partly for that reason.


Other means of communication have given added solidarity to the world. The telephone began to be used extensively for news communication after 1900, the wireless after 1907, the radio after 1920, the "beam" system of radio and wireless transmission after 1924, the radiotelephone after 1930, the short-wave radio after 1931, and picture transmission after 1934. The printer telegraph machine, under various trade names, came into use early in the century to disseminate news from a central point, particularly from a press association bureau to newspaper offices throughout a wide area. Its younger brother, the teletype, is now used for related purposes, and portable sending and receiving radio sets have been brought into operation on a few occasions, with prospects that they will become more common.

With about 7,000,000 miles of telegraph wires in the world today, 300,000 miles of cables, and 115,000,000 miles of telephone wires, the globe is wrapped in a skein of communications lines, with an invisible outer layer of wireless and radio wave bands. The press has taken to using the long-distance telephone both to gather news and to transmit it. Many of the foreign correspondents stationed in the capitals of Europe telephone dispatches regularly between London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, and other places. London and New York newspapers and press associations telephone across the Atlantic. Press connections are made across the Pacific, or between New York and Buenos Aires or Tokyo, or from Geneva or London to Tokyo, or Cape Town to San Francisco. All sorts of connections are possible, with costs apparently of secondary importance.

London is a great communications center. That is one of several reasons why that city is the most important news center in the world. News flows in there because of the widespread character of the British Empire, because of the broad political, financial, investment, and commercial interests which center in London, and incidentally because British capitalists controlled the companies which laid down many of the early cables. Britain also had the advantage of owning islands and other areas on which cable stations could be placed, so keeping the entire communications line, the world around, under national control. London now is a center, also, for world telephone

BRINGING WORLD NEWS TO THE U.S.

THE UNITED PRESS FOREIGN NETWORK



circuits, and its radio and wireless towers broadcast to every part of the globe.

Since the time of the World War, however, the United States has assumed a position of almost equal importance in the communications field. The development of the Radio Corporation of America, utilizing the Alexanderson high-frequency alternator, an American wartime invention permitting wireless messages to bridge greater distances without the former loss of signal strength, marked the beginning of modern American communications success. The communications map of the world now is dominated by a few companies, including the Radio Corporation of America, the gigantic British communications merger known as Imperial and International Communications, Ltd., the Western Union Telegraph Company of the United States, by three other American companies—Postal Telegraph, Commercial Cables, and All-America Cables, and by the Danish-owned Great Northern Telegraph Company, linking Copenhagen and Shanghai by way of Siberia and Russia.

To use the various means of communication naturally is an expense for newspapers and press associations, which transmit thousands of words each day and send more material by mail. Although there are lower "press rates" for telegraph, cable, and radio use, there are no such special rates for the telephone or for the postal service. Also, despite the lower rates where they are available, the press often finds itself obliged to rush messages, paying the high "urgent" rate to do so. Even at a cable press rate of 5 cents a word, as between New York and London, the bill soon mounts up, while news sent between Shanghai or Tokyo and New York or London costs about 16 cents a word even at the press rate. The urgent rate is near a dollar per word, and a considerable amount of news is sent that way.

The cable lines of the world are chiefly in the control of three countries; more than 85 per cent of the mileage is owned by interests in Great Britain, the United States, and France. Wireless and radio are chiefly controlled by the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France, although Russia, Italy, and Japan have some importance in that realm also. The radio provides an aerial channel free of alien control, such as affected the cables at times, but a certain power over all radio and wireless communication rests with any country which cares to "jam" such communication through setting

up deliberate interference on the wave lengths used. Such "jamming" has accompanied some of the propaganda battles waged in Europe, the Near East, middle East, and in Latin America.

Correspondents covering the news of wars, crises, and conferences throughout the world have had occasion to learn much of the communications channels and of the vagaries of censorship. There have been instances when the shortest distance—in time—between points has been the longest way around, geographically. This has been the case fairly often with news from China, intended for publication in the United States. Instead of sending it across the Pacific, it occasionally has been more certain, although not less costly, to send it across Siberia and Russia, via the Great Northern Telegraph Company line, to Copenhagen, to London, and thence to New York, to be further distributed from there over press association and newspaper syndicate networks. Correspondents also have sent messages over several routes, simultaneously, or mailed out two or more copies of dispatches, hoping that at least one would arrive, despite censorship, or heavy volume of transmission, or bad weather.

The greatest volume of world news communication always has been from Europe and the United Kingdom to the United States. A considerable flow moves in the opposite direction, also, but the flow between the Far East and Europe, between the Far East and the United States, and between South America, the United States, and Europe is smaller as concerns volume of total wordage per year. The volume is regulated in part by the cost of transmission, by the degree of interest manifested by one part of the world in another, and by the way in which the news happens to develop. An important event in some country not ordinarily an active news center naturally will send up the total wordage dispatched from that place into the world news channels.

A large news agency, such as the Associated Press, spends approximately \$10,000,000 annually to gather and distribute the news of the world, of which about \$80,000 goes for foreign news, including personnel, bureau maintenance, transmission charges, and other items. The United Press spends about \$8,000,000, and certain individual newspapers may spend between \$250,000 and \$1,000,000 for foreign news alone, depending upon the extent of the service.

Transmission tolls are a large item of expense in world-news

handling, because millions of words annually must be sent at costs occasionally running as high as two to three dollars a word. In the past, an effort was made to save money by an extreme condensation and combination of words, known as "cablese." Although some such condensation continues to be practiced, it does not amount to a code, as it once did. Nowadays the ratio of words cabled to words printed is about one-to-two, whereas it used to go as high as one-to-ten. The lower ratio is more expensive, but rates are lower than they were before the World War, and before the turn of the century, and the news now comes through in more complete form, expressed nearly as the original correspondent would see it printed.

ADAPTATION OF NEWS


A newspaper's own correspondents, the press associations, and various types of syndicates provide practically all matter, apart from the advertisements, which is not locally produced for publication in the paper. Undoubtedly the telegraph and the press association are the most important cogs in the distribution of news matter within a country such as the United States, although much also arrives by mail. Both the material which originates abroad and that within the country, as in Washington, New York, and elsewhere, is expertly shifted about until it reaches its final destination. This may be in the columns of a newspaper, or it may be in an editor's wastebasket.

News matter arriving from abroad in the office of a press association or in a newspaper office is at once converted from the cabled form, somewhat abbreviated as that is, into prose form. That version is polished by the copy editor and made ready for publication, which presently takes place if the news is regarded as worthy of use. If the newspaper also resells its dispatches on a syndicate basis, the representative of each subscribing newspaper receives a mimeographed copy of the dispatch, which he sends in its entirety if he believes his paper may want to use it all, or he cuts it to a suitable length and puts it on the wire to his paper. Or, if the paper has no representative on the spot, all the dispatches are sent along in full, by wire, and edited in the office of destination.

In a press-association office, on the other hand, where news reports frequently arrive in more fragmentary form, owing to the need for greater speed, those fragments are assembled as quickly as possible

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BRINGING WORLD NEWS TO AMERICANS FROM OFFICES AND CORRESPONDENTS IN 282 CITIES ABROAD, THE "AP" SERVES 36 MILLION OUT OF THE 39 MILLION PEOPLE WHO BUY DAILY PAPERS. THIS 286,000-MILE NEWS WIRE SYSTEM REACHES ITS 1400 NEWSPAPERS AT A 60-WORD-A-MINUTE CLIP WITH A TOTAL DAILY REPORTING OF 200,000 WORDS.

to make a satisfactory report, and sent to subscribing papers in sections, or "takes." The association has client papers in all parts of the country. The western part of the United States may be less interested in certain European news than the Atlantic seaboard. For that reason, news of Europe, which arrives in New York, may be distributed in full to Boston and Philadelphia subscribers. But the Boston bureau, for example, will cut the full report to a shorter length for redistribution to the smaller papers of the smaller New England cities and towns. Similarly, the report which is filed from New York for use in Kansas City may be shorter and somewhat less detailed than the report sent to Boston. The Kansas City bureau, in turn, before sending the dispatch on to Denver and the Pacific Coast, may cut it still more.

News from Washington will be of interest in all parts of the country, but if it concerns agriculture it will be more interesting to the middle west and other agricultural areas, and it will be less interesting to the industrial east. The Washington bureau uses that varied interest concerning different subjects as a guide in determining the volume and character of news to be sent to Kansas City, New York, Atlanta, and elsewhere. From such points it will be redistributed, with further changes to suit the newspaper clients and their readers. The United States is a large country, with varied and sectional interests. Those interests help to determine the treatment of news in volume and stress, as provided by the press associations, which offer a highly developed, custom-made service to the public, through the newspapers.

Syndicates, which distribute weekly columns, daily columns, special articles, pictures, cartoons, and other features, use the mails to distribute a great deal of their output. But columns of political comment and other features with immediate news value are distributed to subscribers by leased wire, very much as straight news is handled.

In foreign countries, somewhat comparable methods are used. Reuters, Central News, Exchange Telegraph, and the Press Association, all in Great Britain, distribute their news on varieties of printer telegraph machines. The same is true of Havas in France, although cyclists aid in the distribution at times and in certain places. In Germany, also, the printer telegraph machine provides news from the Deutsches Nachrichten Büro.

Both Germany and Italy, however, also resort to the distribution of information and instructions to representatives of the newspapers through ministries of the government. This is a means of censoring the press, and of distributing propaganda. The instructions are more or less secret, although there are occasional "leaks." They concern what may and may not be printed, and how and when certain information is to be presented. Sometimes there are positive orders. These instructions usually are communicated to press representatives orally, at a certain hour each day, and are passed along to acting editors in Rome or Berlin, or to others throughout the countries, by means of the telephone or notes.

In Russia, where sufficient proper communication lines have been lacking, some effort has been made by the Tass agency to distribute news by radio to the growing press of that country. Some press associations, such as Havas and Reuters, and agencies in Italy, Germany, and Russia, particularly, have used the short-wave radio to distribute news and commercial information to all parts of the world, either for use free or on a toll basis, by newspapers or others. Such methods also have been used for propaganda purposes, particularly in Europe, the Near East, and Latin America, with competing ideologies frankly presented on the airwaves, or implicit in the real or pseudo-news which sometimes has been the burden of the radio messages.

The distribution of the news is hampered by censorship which governments impose, by propaganda campaigns, or by the prejudices and predilections of readers or editors or publishers. These same things influence the selection of matter which is to be printed, and help to modify the degree of emphasis given it in the pages of the newspapers. It is this, very largely, which prevents newspapers, even in the United States, from measuring up to what they might be, and indeed may become some day.

PRESENTING A CLEAR PICTURE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of the press in helping to form world opinion. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, at least, there is nothing deliberate, much less sinister, about the part which most newspapers take in this process. There may be exceptions, but generally speaking, that is true. The influence, such as it is, is inherent in the task which the press, by its nature, must try to per-

form. Its business is, first of all, to inform. If it fails at times, blunders, makes mistakes, and proves itself less than perfect, that seems inevitable, because there will be no perfect press until the people themselves, in the mass, are more nearly perfect.

Faulty as it is, in certain ways, the press of the United States, the press of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the press of Scandinavia, of the Netherlands, of Switzerland, and of one or two other countries are all relatively free of official or unworthy private influences. They are providing a service of information that is extremely good, better than the world has ever known before. If enough readers will demand a service still finer, and always support the best available, the press is capable of becoming far better, and is ready to do so.

Pending that time, newspapers must do the best they can, and readers who are interested in getting a service of world news must seek it where it is to be found. Even the best-intentioned newspaper today is 'badly handicapped by the censorships upon the news and upon the press of many countries.

Newspapers which merely print the news dispatches about world affairs are not doing enough to keep their readers informed. Those news dispatches inevitably reflect some of the reticences of censorship, the shadings of propaganda. The newspaper sincerely concerned with helping its readers to understand what all these stories mean must present interpretative material in addition to the news itself. The interpretative material cannot come from the correspondent on the spot for the same reason that a wholly objective and complete news story cannot come from him—he cannot get all the facts, perhaps he cannot get the story out of the country if he writes it, and his future value to his paper would be lost if he displeased the government. Instead, such interpretative accounts must be prepared outside the country, preferably by someone who sees not only the events in one country, and knows the national background from personal study and experience, but who sees also the entire canvas of world affairs, and can relate one event to another. He may be writing in the office of a newspaper, or he may be writing for a syndicate which sells his interpretations to various papers. But, in any case, the newspaper which makes no effort to provide such an interpretative treatment of news, which in itself is usually fragmentary and meaningless to most readers, is failing seriously in its opportunities.

In general, it is true that a nation gets the kind of press its deserves, just as it is said that a nation gets the kind of government it deserves. When the people want a better government sincerely *enough*, they will get it, and public opinion, largely formed through the press, will help to crystallize that desire in the future, as it has in the past. Similarly, when the people want a better service of information concerning world affairs, they will turn to the newspapers already offering the best treatment of such matters. By turning to those newspapers in sufficient numbers they will be giving eloquent testimony as to what they want in the press. Other newspapers will take the cue from that trend, and will improve their own services of world news. That is the history of progress in journalism.

NOTES

1. Among the more important press associations of the world are those which follow. The associations which belong to the so-called World League of Press Associations, for news exchange, are indicated by an asterisk (*) before their names. Some of them are official agencies of the governments, which means that the information they disseminate is written with care to present the point of view which the government wishes to have accepted on matters of policy. Others are semi-official, which in practice means that they co-operate with the government in virtually the same way. The leading press associations are:

Albania	Albanian Press Bureau and Telegraph Agency
Australia	Australian Associated Press, Proprietary, Ltd.
Belgium	*Agence Télégraphique Belge (Belga) (semi-official)
Brazil	Agencia Brasileira
Bulgaria	*Agence Télégraphique Bulgare (official)
Canada	*Canadian Press, Ltd. (co-operative, independent)
China	*Reuters, Ltd. (branch of British agency) Central News Agency (Kupmintang, official)
Czecho-Slovakia	*Československá Tisková Kancelář
Denmark	*Ritzaus Bureau (Ritzaus) (independent)
Estonia	*Eesti Telegraafi Agentuur A. S. (Eta)
Finland	*Finska Notisbyran Suomen Tietotoimisto (STT) (semi-official)
France	*Agence Havas (semi-official) Agence Télégraphique Radio Agence Fournier (financial and political news)
Germany	*Deutsches Nachrichten Büro G.m.b.h. (DNB) (official) Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz (semi-official)

	Transocean-Nachrichten (semi official; for radio and overseas service)
Great Britain	*Reuters, Ltd. (independent) Central News, Ltd. Exchange Telegraph Co, Ltd. Press Association, Ltd. (affiliated with Reuters for domestic news handling)
Greece	*Agence d'Athènes (semi-official)
Hungary	*Magyar Távirati Iroda (semi official)
India	Associated Press of India (Independent) United Press of India (Independent)
Italy	*Agenzia Stefani (official) Agenzia di Roma (semi-official, political news) Agenzia Volta (financial news)
Japan	*Domei Tsushin Sha (semi-official)
Latvia	*Latvijas Telegrafa Agentura (Leta)
Lithuania	*Agence Télégraphique Lithuanienne
Mexico	Agencia Noticiosa Telegrafica Americana (ANTA) (semi-official, controlled by Havas)
Netherlands	*Algemeen Nederlandsch Persbureau (ANP) Nederlandsch Correspondentie-bureau (semi official) Persbureau Aneta (Colonial news)
New Zealand	United Press Association of New Zealand
Norway	*Norske Telegrambyra (independent)
Poland	*Polska Agencja Telegraficzna (PAT) (official) Agencja Telegraficzna Express (ATE)
Portugal	*Agence Havas (branch of French agency)
Rumania	*Agence Orient Radio (Rador) (official)
Russia (U.S.S.R.)	*Telegrafnoje Agentstwo Ssojasa (Tass) (official)
South Africa (Union of)	Reuters, Ltd (branch of British agency)
Spain	*Agencia Telegrafica Fabra (Fabra) (official) (Loyalist and pre-War Controlled by Havas)
Sweden	*Tidningarnas Telegrambyra (semi-official) Svensk-Amerikanska Nyhetsbyran (Swedish-American) (News Agency)
Switzerland	*Agence Télégraphique Suisse, S A
Turkey	*Anadolu Ajansı (Anatolie) (semi-official)
United States of America	*Associated Press (AP) (co-operative, independent) United Press Associations (UP) (independent) International News Service (INS) (Hearst service) North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA) (independent)
Yugoslavia	*Agence Avala (Avala) (semi-official)

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CHAPTER 25

MOBILIZING PROPAGANDA

O. W. Riegel

In every age, the stability of political organizations has depended in a large degree upon the vigor of the political concepts current in society. Propaganda, here defined as a deliberate effort to influence the human mind for the purpose of promoting an idea or cause, has long been employed by political leadership as an auxiliary of force and patronage in securing and extending political power.

FACTORS IN EXPANSION OF PROPAGANDA

A number of novel conditions and circumstances have given rise to the expansion of propaganda activity in recent times. Foremost among them is the growth of nationalism itself. Nationalism, based upon the premise that loyalty to the national state transcends all other loyalties, requires a centralization and integration of political power and a dominant symbolism of geographic and racial unity, of cultural kinship and prestige. Coincident with the rise of nationalism has occurred a rapid increase in population, especially in the Occident, which has served to broaden the base of political control and to emphasize the importance of public consent in political action and organization. The multiplication of population has produced what Ortega y Gasset has called, in *The Revolt of the Masses*, a "democratic condition," by which he means that all governments, whether despotic or democratic in outward form, must, in order to remain in power, enjoy the acquiescence of the new national masses.

Another reason for the acceleration of propaganda activity is the rapid increase in literacy throughout the world. The rise of popular education, coinciding more or less with the phenomenal multiplication of the human species, has greatly increased the number of persons capable of receiving propaganda suggestions and of disseminating them. Again, the rapid shrinkage of the world in a geo-

graphical sense, discussed in the preceding chapter, has assisted in the enlargement and unification of national states and increased the number of contacts and frictions between peoples of different nations, who were formerly separated by barriers of land and water. The modern world has also produced entirely new sets of frictions, mainly economic in character and arising out of the economic needs and desires of the national state, which have been added to traditional frictions such as those arising from differences in race and religion.

The promoters of propaganda have recently begun to enjoy the services of highly ingenuous and effective technological devices, such as rapid postal service, high-speed presses, photo reproduction devices, motion pictures, wireless, and radio broadcasting, which have greatly increased the nearness and vividness of propaganda suggestions. As a result, the world has recently witnessed, especially since the World War, a rapid increase of professionalism in public-opinion management, with the emergence of a large number of experts in every nation who are especially skilled in human psychology and the organization and manipulation of the instrumentalities by means of which propaganda suggestions are disseminated. Lastly, the political history of recent times, especially in the period of burgeoning nationalism following the World War, has been marked by a mass mobilization of human and economic resources spurred by intense national rivalries, so that political life is increasingly keyed to military efficiency for defense or aggression. The incidence of actual military conflict is apparently increasing, and new world wars are expected. Economic, cultural, and ideological wars between national states or groups of states are constantly in progress. Great attention is therefore being given to propaganda as an adjunct of military strategy.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PROPAGANDA

In view of these circumstances, propaganda must not be considered so much a conscious creation of political leaders as it is the natural product of the historic situation in which the world now finds itself. Propaganda as now practiced by the various national states faces two ways, toward the domestic populations of the states themselves, and toward the checkerboard of allied and rival states beyond the national frontiers. In spite of the sensational interest which has been created

by recent promotional campaigns intended for populations outside the national frontiers, the preponderant propaganda effort of modern states is directed toward the control of domestic public opinion. Domestic propaganda strives for two major objectives, unity and efficiency, both of which are essential to the creation and maintenance of national "prestige," the abstract symbol of the success of the state at home and abroad.

The domestic propaganda for unity may take various forms. It may promote racial unity, or a sense of national kinship based upon likeness of blood. In its positive forms, this type of propaganda emphasizes pride of race, its exclusivity and homogeneity, its superiority over the races living under a different national flag. In negative forms, racial propaganda wars against the foreigner within the gates (in modern times frequently the Jew) who, because of his supposed racial inferiority and separatism, is depicted as the devil who is constantly threatening the unity of the superior (nationally dominant) race. Geographical unity is promoted by appeals to patriotism (literally, love of place) which makes of cities, villages, regions, hills, streams, and valleys the familiar symbols of national identity.

A propaganda of economic unity seeks to harmonize the conflicts between economic classes under the hegemony of the ruling clique by preaching the doctrine that the economic welfare of the state takes precedence over the welfare of any individual or class. Whether the unifying symbolism is the corporative state, as in Italy, or the Labor Front, as in Germany, or collectivism, as in the Soviet Union, the effort is uniformly in the direction of submerging separatism in a national economic unity. In more strictly political forms of domestic propaganda, an effort is made to promote a similar sense of oneness in respect to political organization and creed. The goal of nationalistic political propaganda is "one big party" (totalitarianism), as in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union, and, in the case of empires, the doctrine of the political identity of outlying possessions with the mother country. Domestic cultural propaganda exalts the national type, language, literature, art, and religion in an effort to enlarge and strengthen folkways which will exert an emotional and unifying effect upon all national citizens who come under their influence.

The other main goal of domestic propaganda, efficiency, seeks to exalt the national state as a "going concern," an economic and

political success. Deprivation as well as prosperity have propaganda uses in proving to citizens that the national state is efficient, disciplined, and imbued with great energy and stamina. Propaganda is also used to assure the population that the nation is efficient in the defense of its interests, and that it will be a formidable enemy in war. The propagandas of unity and efficiency go hand in hand, but the sense of unity alone, without the other doctrine that the national state is superior to other national states in practical efficiency in both peace and war, lacks the prestige power for which modern states strive.¹

Propaganda directed by a nation to individuals and groups beyond its frontiers has multiple purposes. It may seek to promote, for example, a sense of racial unity among persons from the same racial stock who happen to be living in a foreign state. Pan-Slavism was promoted by Tzarist Russia, and is still a propaganda force in the Balkans and central Europe. Germany has fostered a pan-Germanism which is particularly effective among German minorities in Europe and resulted in the *Anschluss* with Austria and the assignment to Germany of "minority territories" formerly belonging to Czechoslovakia. Hungarians have even promoted pan-Turanism, a doctrine which proclaims the essential racial unity of Magyars, Finns, Ests, Bulgarians, Turks, Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese.

Propaganda also seeks to promote geographical unity (irredentism) with regions which have supposedly been forcibly drawn outside the natural frontiers of the national state. Regions which are now special targets for irredentist propaganda include the Teschen and Corridor areas of Poland and Memel in Lithuania which were formerly a part of the German Empire, and former provinces of Hungary which were parceled out to other states by the Trianon Treaty. German support of the movement for a united Ukraine is primarily to bring this area into the Reich economic, if not political, orbit. The promotion of political unity abroad is directed not only toward nationals and blood-kin residing under other sovereignties, but also toward persons of other countries who may be brought into ideological unity with the promoting nation. Such, for instance, is the purpose of communist international propaganda, and the deliberate exportation of fascist and democratic doctrine by, respectively, the fascist and democratic nations.²

Foreign propaganda may seek also to enhance national prestige in

the arena of international diplomacy by pointing out, either directly or by implication, that other nations are not nearly so disciplined, efficient, clever, and skillful as the nation which is promoting propaganda in its own self-interest. Such, for instance, is the burden of Adolph Hitler's recent statement, broadcast to the world, that "there is nobody in a responsible position in this State who doubts that I am the authorized Fuehrer of this Reich, to which the nation has given a mandate to represent it everywhere in every position." The 1938 Christmas Eve message from Berlin included a statement that all Germans everywhere remain loyal to the Reich for they are first, last, and always Germans! The frequent acts of force and aggression performed by dictators, the taking of plebescites on foreign policy, the building of a de luxe subway in Moscow, and the enforcement of punctuality on Italian railroads are all examples of the promotion of efficiency for prestige value.

Another purpose of propaganda abroad is to demoralize enemies and rivals by iterating the weaknesses of political and economic life in other countries (as when the controlled Italian press recently taunted the United States with being a "third-rate democracy"), discrediting political leadership elsewhere, and stirring up antagonism and dislike between rival countries which are active or potential allies. Foreign propaganda may also stress economic success abroad, or serve as a salesman in expanding the national market in other countries. Such has been the purpose of a considerable part of the European, American, and Japanese propaganda directed toward South America and the eastern mainland of Asia. Foreign propaganda also strives to cement friendships, for purposes of trade and diplomatic collaboration in time of peace, and for military, economic, and moral aid in time of war.

The tendency to use military terminology in describing the purposes of modern nationalistic propaganda is not likely to lead to a misapprehension as to the true character of propaganda activities. As Talleyrand once said to Napoleon, "You can do everything with bayonets, Sire, except sit on them." In the domestic life of nations, propaganda supplements the army and the police power in maintaining discipline, order, and unity. In international political life it is a powerful weapon for attack and defense, an important adjunct of military, economic, and diplomatic potency in an age of power

politics. The nations have therefore expended great sums of money and energy in the mobilization of competitive propaganda armaments comparable with armaments for naval and military warfare.

THE STRUGGLE FOR PROPAGANDA POWER

The competitive struggle for propaganda power may be illustrated by citing the development of world communications, the network of cables, land wires, and wireless impulses which are the actual or potential channels of propaganda activity. The early emergence of England as a great commercial and imperial power was due in part to England's early development of cable communications with all parts of the world. London became the communicational capital of the world. Pre-eminence in communications not only gave English commerce and finance a decided advantage over the commercial interests of other nations, but also made possible a relatively high degree of cohesion between the various parts of the empire, and was even useful in injecting a pro-British slant into commercial and political intelligence distributed in non-British regions of the world, such as the Far East. The strategic importance of control of communications in time of war was proved during the World War when the Allies cut the German cables, leaving the Central Powers without adequate means of presenting their case to the outside world, and giving England virtually complete control over news and the interpretation of news disseminated throughout the world regarding the events and issues of the war. British dominance over cable communications was challenged by other powers, notably by the United States, but it was not until the rapid development of the wireless and radio broadcasting facilities during the 1920's and 1930's that a radical change in the relative effectiveness of communications power among the nations began to occur.

Powers which had been lagging in the development of cable facilities discovered that radio provided them with a means of communication which was not only cheaper than cables, and therefore within their means, but also more rapid, more vivid, and much more immune to monopolistic competition or interference in either peace or war. The dictatorships and countries that had causes to argue and that were playing power politics with zeal took the lead in developing their radio resources. Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union not


only developed domestic radio coverage for propaganda purposes, but also, by means of short-wave radio, effective over great distances (especially in the form of the so-called "beam" radio, capable of directing short-wave impulses to particular regions of the world with high signal strength), began to broadcast political and cultural propaganda to the rest of the world, generally in the languages of the nations to which the broadcasts were particularly directed.

England meanwhile developed an elaborate cable and wireless network, without, however, successfully maintaining the semi-monopolistic communicational supremacy she once enjoyed. Harried by anti-British propaganda in her colonies and spheres of influence, England has recently abandoned her tradition of broadcasting only in the English language and has inaugurated short-wave broadcasts in Arabic to combat Italian radio propaganda in North Africa and the Near East.³ The United States, after having developed an extensive cable and radio system mainly for commercial traffic and for its news services, has also been forced recently to recognize the effectiveness of the communicational powers of Europe. Concerned by propaganda inroads in spheres of American commercial and political influence, mainly South America, the United States has lately encouraged the development of American short-wave facilities, has granted licenses for the broadcasting of cultural programs in the Spanish and Portuguese languages for South America, and is seriously considering the establishment of short-wave broadcasting stations under government auspices.⁴

Paralleling the development of electrical transmission facilities has been the growth of service agencies, such as news-gathering associations, which utilize the communications networks under the sponsorship of the various national governments. The extent to which news agencies have been mobilized for propaganda purposes varies according to the nation. In Germany, for instance, both the *Deutsches Nachrichten Buro* and *Transocean Nachrichten*, the radio news service for the foreign press, are exploited deliberately and skillfully for nationalistic promotion at home or abroad. Whatever national promotion may be present in the news reports of American agencies, on the other hand, is mainly unintentional. In virtually all countries, the promotional value of news services is recognized by governments, and various forms of direct and indirect subsidization are common.

THE NATIONAL CONTROL
OF THE NEWS - THIS IS THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL ARMAMENT OF
DICTATORSHIP



Relatively free from political control

Indirect control and censorship

Direct government control of news, press, public information, etc.

Nazi and allied fascist propaganda assault on Latin America by radio and press - virulently anti-American using the "news-ite" technique.

The Agence Havas, for instance, receives financial assistance on the grounds that the government, in the national interest, must make good the deficits incurred in sending French news to French colonies. Indirect subsidies are granted by most countries in the form of preferential "press rates" for press messages over electrical transmission systems. Even among the independent or co-operative news agencies which are not directly owned or controlled by the government, such as the Press Association and Reuters in England, a certain amount of nationalistic bias may arise from the fact that the interests and policies of the news association reflect to a considerable degree the interests and policies of the nationalistically inclined newspaper members or clients of the news agency.⁵

The intensification of propaganda activities for nationalistic purposes, with the growth of cheaper and more rapid means of world communication, has challenged the former pre-eminence of Anglo-Saxon news services. Until 1932, the leading news associations of the world were joined in a so-called "Ring Combination," as described in the previous chapter. The liberalization of the latter arrangement in 1932 so as to permit any agency to sell its news anywhere it could is an indication of the growing nationalistic, competitive character of news distribution. Governments found that with short-wave radio they could bombard all parts of the world with news cheaply, rapidly, and without dependence upon the communicational systems of cable-owning nations.

Because of nationalistic competition in radio-news distribution, news has recently become, as a matter of fact, a greatly cheapened commodity. In many parts of the world, such as South America, where the news services of various nations are engaged in a bitter fight for dominance, news may often be obtained for little or no cost, to the detriment of independent agencies which are not primarily the subsidized tools of nationalistic promotion.⁶ The struggle for news markets and spheres of influence also looms behind telecommunications politics, as, for instance, in the effort of the cable countries to limit the enlarging and cheapening of radio services of rival nations.

Auxiliary and other means of disseminating propaganda are too numerous to detail here. As examples, however, might be mentioned radio-receiving instruments, often distributed cheaply at home and

abroad to enlarge the propaganda audiences; schools; churches; motion pictures; newspapers, magazines, and books; "good-will" aeronautical flights; mass military and political demonstrations; diplomatic victories; mass plebiscites; building and land reclamation achievements; fairs and exhibitions; official awards, honors, and academic degrees; and the encouragement of foreign tours.

NATIONALIZATION OF PROPAGANDA

Modern national states have achieved a high degree of integration in the organization of promotional activities and personnel, a development spurred by the desire for "efficiency" in the nationalistic propaganda effort and by the propaganda competition of other nations. The most highly integrated forms of propaganda organization are presented by the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda in Germany, the *Glavpolitprosvet*, or "Main Political Education Committee of the Republic," in the U.S.S.R., and the Undersecretariat for Press and Propaganda in Italy, although other countries, especially in central and eastern Europe, have not lagged far behind these dictatorships in the perfection of propaganda machinery.

Even in the more "democratic" countries, there has been increasing agitation for centralized promotional activity. England yielded to competitive pressure early in 1938 by organizing central committees to develop foreign and domestic propaganda.⁷ A central federal press bureau has been⁸ proposed in the United States, but public opposition has so far prevented its establishment.⁸ During the summer of 1938, however, a new Division of Cultural Relations was organized within the Department of State "for the free flow of ideas and cultural production from this country abroad and from other nations to the United States,"⁹ and a new Division of International Communications was organized about the same time to deal with international aspects of problems connected with radio, cable, telegraph and telephone, aviation and shipping.

Although the democracies have no such co-ordinated propaganda power as that wielded by Goebbels, whose ministry controls virtually every phase of communicational and cultural activity, they have shown an increased interest in public opinion through such agencies as the press bureau of the Foreign Office in France, press attachés in

the Home and Foreign Offices in England, and the publicity officials attached to various governmental agencies in the United States.

An amazing thoroughness of organization is exhibited by the highly integrated propaganda departments of the totalitarian states. The director of propaganda controls an elaborate network of organized professions and skills comprising a vast army of promotional workers, including teachers, newspaper editors and correspondents, motion-picture and stage producers, religious and social workers, diplomatic and consular agents, press attachés, steamship line and travel agents, and directors of cultural, economic, and political societies and foundations. State regulation of the personnel of the promoting professions and organizations is assured in a number of ways. Professional schools are organized under government supervision to assure a constant supply of public opinion specialists who are trained in propaganda skills and indoctrinated with the "right" political opinions.¹⁰ Licensing systems are in vogue which permit professional workers to practice their skills only after they have been certified by the government as "sound." In Germany, for instance, all persons practicing the profession of journalism must be registered with a vocational unit called the *Landesverband der deutschen Presse*; cancellation of a journalist's name in the register means that he may no longer make his living in the field of journalism.¹¹ Lastly, governments exercise the formidable power of censorship, the force of which is felt with particular effect in the communications fields of press, radio, and motion picture.

Censorship is considered the absolute prerogative of all national states in time of war, and in dictator states at all times. With the growing intensification of international friction, and the prevalence of domestic economic and political emergencies, liberal states have shown a tendency to adopt the censorship methods usually associated with the stress of wartime emergencies; in England, for instance, the press has censored itself "voluntarily" in the national interest¹² and submitted to "suggestions" from the War and Foreign offices. Everywhere is marked a growing tendency to feel that consideration for the well-being of the national state, because of contemporary stresses and tensions, may justify interference with the privilege of disseminating news and opinion freely.

EFFORTS TO PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

Efforts to control or limit the extension of propaganda armaments have for the most part failed. As far as the communicational network is concerned, there exists no political conception of international unity comparable with the international physical network of wire, cable, and wireless. In spite of the fact that the world is now closely knit in a communicational web which would seem to make practical a condition of understanding and collaboration among the nations, current political philosophy holds that each nation is the undisputed master of its particular segment of the international network, with the right to exploit its communicational resources in the interests of nationalistic aggrandizement without a sense of international responsibility and without consideration for the rights of other nations or for the rights of world populations to have access to free and untrammelled news and opinion.

Although international conventions have been formulated at a series of conferences which began at St. Petersburg in 1875 (the most recent, the meeting of the International Telecommunications Union, occurred at Cairo, Egypt, during February and March, 1938), agreements have been effective mainly in technical matters, rates, and systems of accounting. Communications diplomacy, indeed, is motivated by a desire to obtain as much as possible for the national states whom the diplomats and experts represent, and not by the wish to guarantee to the people of the world a free system for the exchange of international intelligence. No right of sovereignty in communications has ever been given up by any state, and no resolution attempting to guarantee the integrity of the world communications system has ever prevented a national state from interfering with its section of the international system when national policy seemed to require such action. No organization exists, as a matter of fact, that could enforce protection of the integrity of the world communications network, were a convention guaranteeing such integrity to be enacted.

The League of Nations, the nearest approximation in recent years to a supranationalistic control body, has sponsored discussions of communicational safeguards, but without tangible results. Concerted international action has been prevented by nationalistic rivalries

within the framework of the League, by rivalries between League members and non-League members, and by the fact that the League has itself become a pressure group exerting propaganda in behalf of the bloc of national states whom it represents. The recent eclipse of the League as a decisive factor in international politics means that no propaganda safeguards may be expected from this source in the future.

Various semi-official and unofficial bodies of professional, commercial, and religious workers have attempted to organize international resistance against the propaganda activities of national states. Several organizations of journalists, for instance, have sought to establish a professional *esprit de corps* which would cut across the world's communicational system. A report embracing this idea was prepared by the international Association of Journalists Accredited to the League of Nations.¹³ The working journalists of the world, under the auspices of the International Federation of Journalists, tried to fight false and tendentious news by the establishment of a Tribunal of Honor at the Hague, where journalists who libeled a state were to be punished in much the same way as journalists are now punished by the courts of various nations for the libel of individuals. The Tribunal has never implemented its authority because American and Russian journalists refrained from co-operating with it and because the journalists of Germany and Italy are forbidden by official decree to have anything to do with organizations affiliated with the International Federation of Journalists and its Tribunal.¹⁴ The idealistic resolutions against censorship and propaganda adopted from time to time at international conventions of university teachers, peace workers, chambers of commerce, and religious societies are also without influence.

A certain amount of control over international propaganda is obtained occasionally by means of unilateral treaties between individual nations. Nations will sometimes agree, usually in connection with economic or political pacts, to suspend propaganda campaigns directed against the other contracting nation. The German Government, for instance, prior to the *Anschluss*, agreed to stop the Habicht broadcasts directed to Austria, and now has so-called non-aggression press pacts with Italy, Poland, and Hungary.¹⁵ A promise to abandon communist propaganda in the United States was one of the conditions

accompanying the recognition by the United States of the Soviet Government. Such agreements are not always carried out. Even when they are, their effects are of minor consequence in relation to the vast amount of international friction created by propaganda activities.

Propaganda broadcasts in the national language of the foreign state to which they are directed are a continual cause of international protest and reprisal. Important political broadcasts are often "jammed" or "blanketed" by stations in hostile states. Press attacks on the heads of foreign governments frequently lead to diplomatic protest and set off campaigns of hate, as instanced recently in the protests of Germany against statements by Secretary of the Interior Ickes regarding German policies, and Japanese diplomatic protests against uncomplimentary representations of Emperor Hirohito in the *Condé Nast* publications.

Another device for combating propaganda is counter-attack. Propaganda hostile to the national state will be answered by propaganda hostile to the nation that has offended. In the dictatorships, subterranean propaganda systems often attempt to combat the official propaganda. Unfortunately, the effect of counter-propaganda is not so much to dilute and neutralize propaganda as it is to aggravate it. Counter-propaganda generally provokes an enlargement of the initial or dominant propaganda effort, with an accompanying pandemonium which augments friction and tension.

The rise of propaganda has brought into existence a large number of experts who make a profession of detecting and exposing propaganda. Excluding official propaganda hunters, who are employed by governments for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of the national propaganda, these experts are generally associated with academic professions or liberal-reform movements. Although their work is often interesting, and perhaps worthy of attention for sentimental reasons if for no other, they exist only in the few nations in which vestiges of civil liberty still remain, and are usually without dynamic influence on political life. Propaganda as practiced today is an inseparable part of the power politics of national states. It is not only a symbol of the state of anarchy which exists in international relations, but also is itself a positive influence for increasing that anarchy. Nationalistic propaganda augments frictions and tensions.

It is unlikely, at the present stage of the world's political organization, that propaganda tensions can be released by any other means than war.

NOTES

1. A number of detailed studies have been made of the ideological content and methods of propaganda in individual countries. See HARWOOD CHILDS, *Propaganda and Dictatorship*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1936, for descriptions of state propaganda in Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia, and the Danubian dictatorships. Also see the following: for England—JOHN M. GAUSS, *Great Britain, A Study of Civic Loyalty*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929; for France—C. J. H. HAYES, *France, A Nation of Patriots*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1930; for Germany—HENRI LICHTENBERGER, *The Third Reich*, New York, Greystone Press, 1937, and S. H. ROBERTS, *The House That Hitler Built*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1937, ERIKA MANN, *School for Barbarians*, New York, Modern Age Publishers, 1938; for Italy—H. W. SCHNEIDER, and S. E. CLOUGH, *Making Fascists*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929, and G. A. BORGHESE, *Goliath*, New York, The Viking Press, 1937; for U. S. S. R.—SAMUEL N. HARPER, *Making Bolsheviks*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929; for Japan—"Science of Thought Control," in special number of *Fortune* on the Japanese Empire, September, 1936, Vol. XIV, No. 3, pp. 95 ff.

2. See FRANK CLEARLY HANIGHEN, "Foreign Political Movements in the United States," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1937, Vol. 16, pp. 1-20.

3. CÉSAR SAERCHINGER, "Radio as a Political Instrument," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1938, Vol. 16, pp. 244-259.

4. "President Moves to Combat Radio That Carries Foreign Propaganda," *New York Times*, February 27, 1938; "U. S. Initiates Radio Campaign for South American Good Will," *New York Herald Tribune*, March 5, 1938; "Station Aimed at Pan America Is Favored as Trade Weapon," *Broadcasting*, March 15, 1938, p. 19.

5. O. W. RIEGEL, "Propaganda and the Press," in *Annals*, May, 1935, No. 179, pp. 201-210.

6. In 1938 the British Government had under consideration the subsidization of English news services to meet the competition of cheap news abroad. See *World's Press News* (London), February 24, 1938, "Plans for Cheaper News Transmission," p. 1; "M. P.'s Discuss Subsidies for British Agencies," p. 3.

7. In February a committee was named, with Sir Robert Vansittart as chairman, to co-ordinate British publicity in foreign countries. Also, a special sub-committee headed by Sir Kingsley Wood, Minister of Health, was created to supervise domestic propaganda. See "Government Plans Extension of British Publicity Abroad," *World's Press News* (London), February 10, 1938, p. 24; Reich Press Twits Britain on New Propaganda," *New York Herald Tribune*, February 10, 1938.

8. ARTHUR KROCK, "Press vs. Government—A Warning," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, April, 1937, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 45-49.
9. BEN M. CHERRINGTON, "The Division of Cultural Relations," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, January, 1939, Vol. III, pp. 136-138.
10. R. R. BARLOW, "Journalistic Education under the Third Reich," *Journalism Quarterly*, December, 1935, Vol. XII, pp. 357-366.
11. CEDRIC LARSON, "The German Press Chamber," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, October, 1937, Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 53-70.
12. FRED S. SIEBERT, "The Press and the British Constitutional Crisis," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, October, 1937, Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 120-125.
13. *Cooperation of the Press in the Organization of Peace*, Geneva, League of Nations, A. 31, 1932.
14. O. W. RIEGEL, *Mobilizing for Chaos*, pp. 173-177. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1934.
15. "Reich Asks Pacts to Control Press," *New York Times*, March 13, 1938.

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CHAPTER 26

MORAL DISARMAMENT

Will Irwin

Doctors Riegel and Desmond, in their chapters of this book, have diagnosed expertly the disease of propaganda. Before discussing remedies, it may be well to state the problem in its simplest terms.

DEFINITION OF PROPAGANDA

Let us first determine what we mean by propaganda. Unfortunately for the process of clear thought, the word has in these days a double meaning. In its original form it meant—whatever the dictionaries may say—the means by which one strives to persuade others to embrace his own opinions. Every sermon, every “inspirational talk” in a business conference, and almost every newspaper editorial are in that sense propaganda. Ever since men began to discuss public affairs, the human race has known unfair propaganda based upon deliberate lies or perversion of facts. Only since 1914, however, have governments, political parties, and factions formulated the principles of unfair propaganda and reduced its application to a science infused with art. That is what we usually mean today when we say “propaganda,” and that is the sense of the word as used in this chapter.

No class can govern efficiently without accurate and speedy information on current events. Until printing was invented, democracy or even smoothly working representative government was possible only to small and close political units such as the early Roman Republic. In that place and period, the responsible citizens gathered at stated intervals in the Forum, which they used also as a resort between public assemblies. There, news pertinent to the business of government circulated by word of mouth. When the Romans extended citizenship to Italians living days and weeks away from the news center, they may have begun the disintegration of the Republic.

The rise of democratic institutions in the modern world runs closely parallel with the development of journalism.

The newspaper, as worked out through two centuries of unorganized experiment, performs two functions—reporting the news and expressing opinion. Gradually, social philosophers have begun to understand that the news function is by far the more important since one arrives at conclusions only on the basis of fact.

TECHNIQUES OF DICTATORSHIPS

The dictators and groups of dictators who, during the two decades following 1918, extinguished democracy in three fifths of the civilized world, learned their technique from the censorships and directors of propaganda in the World War. Although the processes have subtle refinements, the fundamental principles are very simple.

First, select from the news of the day those events whose description in print favors your own side; second, as subtly as the art of the writer permits, infuse all political news with your own set of opinions; third, when possible, lie discreetly (this third method must, of course, be used with great caution); fourth, "make" news. Arrange demonstrations, disturbances, celebrations and the like with a view not only to whipping up enthusiasm among the participants but to creating display in the newspapers both domestic and foreign.

These are the active measures, applied so far as possible while the group is struggling for power and absolutely when it takes over the government. They might fail of their purpose but for the final touch—the process of crystallizing public opinion, already half formed through reading biassed, unproportionate, tainted, and false news, and of transforming mere intellectual processes into active emotion. The orator is most useful at this point, especially since the radio has enabled a thrilling, "inspirational" speaker like Hitler or Mussolini to make a whole nation his audience.

When the embryo leader of the totalitarian state achieves power and hatches to a dictator, he applies the final touch—censorship. During the first two centuries of journalism, a censored press was the norm, not the exception. A brief period of comparative freedom; then the censors of the World War in 1914-1918 showed how to put down the screws on literate peoples in whom the press had created a hunger for news. A controlled press constantly perverting, inventing, or

suppressing facts cannot function perfectly so long as anyone remains free to publish untainted news. Clear facts, stated without bias, have their own aura of truth. When Jones finds on unimpeachable evidence that Smith has lied to him, he tends thereafter to disbelieve everything that Smith says. Often, one newspaper or even one writer, by publishing unimpeachable facts, has not only won a "campaign" but profoundly changed the direction of a government. Lord Northcliffe's "munitions exposé" of 1915 in the London *Daily Mail* and Émile Zola's "J'accuse" in *L'Aurore* are classic examples. Wherefore, the dictator begins by imposing on the internal press a censorship somewhat like that of the World War and goes on to the perfect form. Under this, only members of his supporting party, carefully trained in the doctrine, may publish, edit, or write for a newspaper. The government scrutinizes all important news and gives orders regarding its treatment. In periods of crisis, it issues specific orders not only as to the shade of opinion which the newspapers must adopt, but also as to the detailed news which they may or may not print and the point of view from which it must be written. From that time forth opposition becomes virtually impossible, because the public lacks the data to form a sound opinion.

So, in theory at least, the dictators and dictator groups have solved the problem of controlling thought among their own people. And the system has worked marvelously well in practice. The foreign problem is more difficult of solution. As a matter of course, the totalitarian governments are all making use of "export propaganda."

The daily news budgets of their official telegraph bureaus, carefully controlled, edited, and touched up by the government, go out to all lands whose policies the dictators wish to influence. In many regions, as in parts of South America, any editor who consents to use this matter may have it for nothing. So far, so good: but the foreign correspondent stationed in the dictator's capital cannot be handled so easily. Put him under the same absolute censorship and direction as the domestic reporters, and his government might object; might even take reprisals by imposing a corresponding censorship of its own. This last would be undesirable, since showing up the flaws of "old-fashioned democracy" is stock-in-trade with the controlled Russian, German, and Italian newspapers. So the totalitarian powers have fallen back upon an open censorship much milder than that

WITH THE MUNICH CRISIS,
NEWS BROADCASTING CAME
OF INTERNATIONAL AGE.

HOW AMERICA LISTENED IN THROUGH THE COLUMBIA
BROADCASTING SYSTEM'S TRANS-ATLANTIC HOOK-UP
TO THE STATESMEN THEMSELVES, OBSERVERS ON
THE SPOT, COMMENTATORS IN CAPITALS.

471 BROADCASTS

18 WORLD CENTERS

57 PRINCIPALS

LONDON	36	DIRECT
PRAGUE	22	DIRECT
PARIS	15	DIRECT
BERLIN	12	DIRECT



U. S. COVERAGE
115
STATIONS OF THE
COLUMBIA SYSTEM

A FACT PICTURE BY CHARLES HODGES

WITH THE WORLD LITERALLY LISTEN-
ING IN ON DIPLOMACY, A NEW TECH-
NIQUE OF MASS APPEAL ACROSS FRON-
TIERS DEVELOPS.

imposed upon their own journalists, and imposed an invisible censorship. First, they make it difficult for the correspondent to see any really vital fact except through the colored glasses of the official press bureau. When Hitler brewed his sensational "blood purge," when Stalin sprang his treason trials, no correspondent, foreign or domestic, could investigate for himself the verity of the official version. Any reporter getting at the whole truth depends largely upon private information. In the dictatorships, however, giving unofficial information to correspondents constitutes a grave offence. "It is a government policy, therefore, not to be discussed," the Italian censors repeat constantly in their instructions to the newspapers and the public. Last of all, the correspondent who shows himself too independent or too critical begins to find even the official sources of information closing against him. That last process is not entirely peculiar to the totalitarian governments. It operates, although more mildly, in the democratic capitals—even Washington. Occasionally, too, the dictatorships expel a correspondent whom they find too zealous in the search for facts or too unfriendly to the regime. This proceeding, however, usually gives a painful impression in the correspondent's home country, and the bureaus of propaganda and enlightenment apply it sparingly—just by way of cracking the whip over the others, it would appear.

RESULTS OF PROPAGANDA

The inevitable result is darkness and confusion in our foreign news. The New York *Herald Tribune* has remarked on the anomaly of news reporting on the Spanish Civil War. Americans are growing world conscious. Never before have readers demanded so much space on foreign events. As soon as the struggle in Spain grew dangerous to world peace, American reporters, both regular and free lance, flocked across the border. Some were out-and-out propagandists but the majority were intellectually honest men interested only in getting facts. They managed to give us a fairly accurate picture, probably, of the military movements. But as to the larger issues behind the affair, the result of millions of words was only confusion; so that Americans, in taking sides with Franco or the loyalists, have fallen back on preconceived opinions. The press seemed no longer a

light but a smokescreen. This is an extreme example; yet it stands typical of European reporting for the American press.

The reporter is there, however, to get copy. Finding the channels of information plugged, he falls back upon attempts at interpretation which amount, often, to mere guessing. The human mind lingers in a stage of development where violence makes much more attractive reading than the ways of peace. His developed journalistic instincts have taught him that. Further, he is obliged to absorb and to transmit a certain amount of nationalistic propaganda. The exaggerated nationalism of these days interprets patriotism almost solely in the terms of physical force. Here again, the propagandist deals with the atavistic in human nature and finds his material wax in his hands. We ourselves can work up more emotional rapture over Lee, Dewey, and Grant than over Franklin, Edison, and John Marshall; more glow of complaisant patriotism over Bunker Hill and Gettysburg than over the taming of the West and universal popular education. By the same rule, propagandists learned long ago that it is far easier to arouse hate than love. When Hitler and his militaristic fore-runners worked up their followers to white heat by denunciation and persecution of the Jews, they were applying one of the oldest formulas known to the art.

In sum, therefore, we Americans, with the freest press in the world, have found our own news subtly slanted toward creation of violence, dissension, and that mood of hate plus fear which leads toward war. So powerfully is propaganda serving its masters in this era that if we could demobilize the press we would take the longest step toward demobilizing the nations.

REMEDIES

To reform the journalism of the whole world would be a task beyond our powers, even if it were any of our business. But we can move to demobilize our own press and to clear away some of the clouds which obscure from our public the facts of contemporary life. And we need by no means confine our efforts to propaganda concerning foreign lands. The same processes, necessarily more imperfectly applied, are at work on our domestic affairs. Moreover, domestic and foreign propaganda often row in the same boat. An obvious

case in point is the struggle between the American communists on the one hand and the "anti-Red" element on the other.

There are no panaceas in politics any more than in medicine; and no social philosopher has ever so much as proposed a universal remedy for this flaw in our press. Moreover, the disease resembles one of those chronic ailments in the human body where the road to recovery is necessarily long and the physician must apply many remedies—including careful nursing. Let this doctor suggest a possible course of treatment.

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Fundamentally, we must adopt preventive measures. The field, there, is the schools. Fortunately both primary and secondary education has begun to take a vivid interest in contemporary history. In the past generation, teachers rather discouraged the habit of reading newspapers. The modern teacher encourages it. All progressive and semi-progressive schools have their classes in current events. Both professional ethics and professional technique demand that the competent teacher smother his own opinions; that he merely state the facts about this or that theory of government and let the pupils, by thought and discussion, find their own opinions. A few extremists among teachers have doubtlessly violated these rules; but they do not represent American education as a whole. Why not, in the same scientifically impersonal spirit, add education on propaganda to the courses in current events? Obviously the teachers themselves must first be taught. That is the job for the technical schools in which they receive their training. Obviously, in many public-school districts politics stand at present as an insurmountable obstacle. During epidemics of Red-baiting, many an efficient teacher with conservative opinions has lost her job, not because she advocated communism, but because she taught its principles impersonally as she did those of other political sects. And Chicago remembers a period when its mayor permitted no favorable mention of the British Government, past or present, in any textbook. To such authorities, any plan of education such as I have proposed would seem an assault on their own propaganda, which they regard as the heaven-revealed truth. Yet the quality of school boards and school executives is constantly improving. Most of them, probably, have enough scholarly toler-

ance and scientific spirit to welcome such an innovation, once they themselves become educated to its necessity. So we may raise up a generation which is not distrustful of the newspaper press—that would be going to the other extreme—but wary enough to be stampede proof.

The universities, speaking broadly, are less susceptible to political control than the public schools. Already in many universities, the instructors in such courses as politics and modern history have taken notice of propaganda as a force in modern life, although the teaching, judging from my contact with it, seems to deal with large principles rather than with the specific instances of modern life. This, too, is all rudimentary. We are just passing out of the era when scholarship regarded journalism with utter contempt—as a king of public nuisance, not a social force. Our literature on journalism is still very scant, and although a few writers, including this one, have treated aspects of the subject between book covers, we still lack even an authoritative textbook on the subject. The universities, which, by and large, educate our leaders of the next generation, could help mightily; especially if their schools of journalism gave more emphasis to education on the propaganda in current news.

PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

Our study clubs and public forums, and especially the women's organizations among them, are perhaps our strongest crystallizers of public opinion. They have all the more force in that, by a process of selection, they draw upon enquiring minds. The League of Women Voters, with its "study programs," specialized on foreign affairs in the period just after the World War; and from this organization, more than from any other collective entity, grew the sentiment for peace and international conciliation which marked American thought for a decade. It is probable, too, that the trend toward isolation, so notable in the decade that followed, rose mainly from study clubs of this kind. They are waiting open minded to be instructed as to the probable truth or untruth behind the news.

MORAL DISARMAMENT

But whom have we to give instruction and how shall the instructors themselves know the truth? Therein lies the kernel of the

problem. American liberals have proposed a government-owned newspaper published for the sole purpose of weighing factional propaganda and getting at facts. The flaw in this plan is apparent to any journalist who has worked at Washington. Since the World War, the government has itself been in the business of domestic propaganda; since 1933, very decidedly so. The administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt had not been in power a year before every important government agency employed a publicity agent to praise, to advertise, and to conceal. In this, it merely follows a tendency of the age. Doubtless the republicans, had they retained power, would have followed the same method. Such a newspaper, no matter how carefully guarded by the laws which established it, would become in the end a government organ, deepening that cloud of partisan statement and interpretation which it was created to dissipate. One cannot imagine a state-controlled newspaper taking a news release from the Department of Agriculture, the State Department, or the White House, analyzing it, and showing wherein it is false or partisan.

Nevertheless, the nucleus of this idea is sound. Nowhere in the world have we a newspaper or periodical entirely free of political bias, entirely independent of a business office, and entirely divorced from the necessity of creating an artificial interest in order to swell its circulation. The largest world agencies for gathering and transmitting unbiased and uncolored facts are our two great bureaus, the Associated Press and the United Press. They stand, in the opinion of this writer, as the greatest triumphs of free journalism. But as dissipators of propaganda, and especially as regards foreign affairs, they work under the limitations already described. Finally the newspaper reader never sees the whole Associated Press or United Press report. The editor of the newspaper selects from it—sometimes on his honest beliefs as to the news value of this item or that, but sometimes solely with a view to presenting only such news as supports his political or social opinions. And by the prominent display which he gives to the selected items and the semi-editorial headlines which he puts above them, he emphasizes still further what he wants his readers to believe.

What the distressed and fearful world needs at this moment—what it has needed ever since the blundering political settlements of 1919—are a few doses of cold truth. To this end, I propose an

institution, privately and liberally endowed in such manner as wholly to be isolated from the will and wishes of its financial supporters, which shall study and expose propaganda of all sorts and shall promptly give out its findings in the form, say, of a weekly periodical or, if that be impossible, a bulletin. It should work under the supervision of one or several departments of politics at our most independent universities. It should be staffed, largely, by journalists of long experience, instructed to get at the facts no matter whom they affect. And its bulletins or periodicals should go, by choice, to those people of good intention who are chiefly instrumental in forming our public opinion.¹

Laymen may object that this is a very large order. To go, first hand, to the source of every bit of tainted, slanted, or imaginative news would take an organization like that of the Associated Press, which spends \$10,000,000 a year. True, the job cannot be done perfectly—at least in the beginning. But the enterprise would have one thing in its favor—the toughness of truth. Every old newspaper man, especially if he has international experience, can smell propaganda a mile away. He knows the reputation of this or that important journal or journalist; knows his connections and his fetters. To take a relatively simple example, between 1936 and 1938 advocates of both factions in the Spanish Civil War filled the newspapers with atrocity stories. Journalists experienced in such matters, taking into account the sources and inherent probability of these dispatches, were able to mark certain of them as probably true and others as undoubtedly false, and to reach the conclusion that both sides had committed atrocities—although not so many nor such flagrant ones as their enemies alleged.

Such a periodical or bulletin, distributing at first perhaps only a few thousand copies a week, would seem to the layman a barrier of reeds against a mighty flood. Most experienced journalists know better. They could all cite instances where a relatively brief statement of facts, often in an obscure publication, has rendered ineffective hundreds of columns of insincere propaganda. As such an enterprise gathered force and prestige, it could serve as a nucleus of truth in a world now living on lies or half truths. And—because facts have an odd way of seeping through the tightest censorships—it might

even have some effect on the totalitarian countries. This is not set forth as a fantasy. It is worth trying.

NOTES

1. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (132 Morningside Drive, New York City) is a significant venture in this direction. However, there are two inherent weaknesses in its present organization: it is not adequately endowed; its monthly publication *Propaganda Analysis* is sent largely only to those who pay the annual membership fee.

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SUMMARY

In the making of world opinion two divergent trends are evident: the rapid development of a complete network of interlocking instruments and agencies for the dissemination of world news; and the ever more successful efforts of individual nations both to maintain national isolation for their own people and to control the news that is transmitted to the rest of the world.

These two trends are inevitably in conflict. Cables, the wireless telegraph and telephone, and the radio have made possible the almost instant transmission of news and even pictures to every corner of the world. Foreign and local correspondents and the organization of international agencies have provided the local newspaper in Four Corners, Montana, with vivid accounts of the guerilla tactics of Arab bands in the Holy Land. The world hookup of radio brought the voices of Beneš and of Hitler into every home and programs were interrupted twenty-four hours' a day to describe the fast-moving drama in central Europe during the world crisis of September, 1938. Their influence upon world opinion has never been so forcefully demonstrated. The emotionally toned accounts of London digging bomb-proof shelters in Hyde Park, Parisians carrying gas masks as they hurried through streets littered with sand-bags, women tearfully saying goodbye to husbands and sons, the fleeing of hundreds of thousands from their homes in potential war and air raid areas, and the ceaseless marching of troops brought to every individual the awful reality of war. It was a vital, if not the most important,

single factor in the rapid change of front and the complete capitulation of the democracies to the dictates of Hitler.

On the other hand, the almost air-tight censorship of news has prevented the world from knowing what has happened in Austria since the *Anschluss* or the possible anti-war strikes in Germany. Likewise the German people did not hear Beneš nor the accounts of world mobilization. They heard only Hitler and of the "horrible atrocities" in Sudetenland.

With every passing month, the second trend—controlled propaganda—is gaining the upper hand over impartial education through world communication. The agencies of communication, hailed in their origin and still potentially the greatest instrument for world understanding, have been diverted from achieving this high ideal and have become the tool of nationalistic states.

The right of government or of individuals to exercise control over the instruments for molding public opinion can be seriously debated. The fact remains that the masses of today are swayed by many irrational factors which are cleverly exploited by leaders in the game of world politics. To prevent such exploitation it is essential to seek earnestly to distinguish between injurious propaganda and education. It is the only way that the thinking citizen can guard against the propaganda onslaughts which, with ever greater subtlety and effectiveness, mold his thoughts and shape his attitudes into a common dictated pattern.

It must be emphasized, however, that the word "propaganda" is not simply a euphemism for "bad." Unfortunately, it is defined largely on the basis of personal preference. From another standpoint, we are equally disinclined to accept as worthy everything which is labeled "education," since much undesirable propaganda is hiding under the cover of the term "education." What is important is the need of knowing the

facts pertaining to public opinion and the techniques of "propaganda" and "education." Only with such an equipment can the citizen make an unbiased judgment regarding the problems of world affairs. Every citizen believing in the democratic process must retain, in the final analysis, the right to decide vital issues, even the issue of war or peace.

A clear understanding of the many agencies for the dissemination of news, a knowledge of their relative reliability in the light of the original source of the news item, and the ability to distinguish between truth and fiction are imperative. Such an agency as that described in the above chapter would render invaluable service, especially if the ability and the desire to seek truth had been first developed through our public schools.

PART VI

ROADS TO WORLD PEACE

INTRODUCTION

The world wants peace. Even the dictators claim that they seek peace and that their warlike measures are wholly in the interests of peace. Yet armament expenditures have mounted to all-time highs. The headline of a metropolitan daily newspaper reporting Chamberlain's address to Parliament on the Four-Power Pact is indicative of the desire for peace and the fear of war: "Urges Ratification of Permanent Peace Pact; Rallies Nation to Arms."

There are many causes of war. There are as many proposals for the elimination of wars. The drive of men to create what seems to them a better and a peaceful world centers about the successive ideals that have been set forth as social goals for humanity. These pictures of the "way out" may be entirely speculative flights of the imagination or carefully projected inquiries into the past and present which appear to give us a scientific conception of our social direction. The first may be characterized as utopian, the second, as "ideological." Utopias remain essentially dreams of the future society but the ideologies become vital social forces motivating mankind. An ideology may be defined as a theory of social life which approaches social realities from the point of view of an ideal and interprets them consciously or unconsciously to prove the correctness of the analysis and to justify that ideal. The starting point of such reasoning is essentially an unscientific element of thinking—the ideal.

The struggles of the world have been conflicts of ideologies, at times because of religious differences, at other times for the extension of civilization (always on the assumption that

the aggressor's civilization is superior to that of the conquered), and still again because of differences of government. Defense against unprovoked aggression, the right of self-determination, or the protection of vested interests may be the immediate instruments for fanning flames of antagonism. The real motives of war may be aggression and imperialistic ambitions. But whatever the real motives or the immediate propaganda instruments, the soldier who dies on the battlefield and the villager who sacrifices to sustain the army in the field does so as a crusader in the interest of some great and challenging ideal—an ideology.

The most dominant quality of every ideology is its irrational character. Logic, cool reasoning, and sane judgment have little place in their acceptance or rejection. Rationalization replaces logic, and conviction precludes reasoned judgment. Even international attitudes, in the last analysis, are based on faith.

The significance of the three basic ideologies of state is clearly shown in the analysis of each as a way of peace. Two facts stand out above all others in the three chapters (28-30): each possesses internal consistency, and each is in sharp variance with the other two. Their differences are impartially summarized in the common problem of all—the relation of the individual and the state. As this relationship has been a factor in war, so it may also be an instrument for peace.

Parenthetically, a word of explanation is necessary regarding the deliberate omission of socialism as a "Road to Peace." It was not due to the failure of the editors to recognize its potential importance, but rather to two facts: there is wide divergence of the concepts labeled with equal ardor by their proponents as socialism; no nation today can be ideologically termed a socialist state.

"Religion, morality, and education being necessary for good government and the happiness of mankind . . ." was more

than a statement of policy for the government of the Northwest Territory. It was an expression of the high confidence placed in religion and in education as instruments of social control. No analysis of roads to peace would be complete that did not present the contributions of the church and the other agencies of education. Limitations of space have prevented inclusion of more than the Catholic and Protestant points of view. Also it has been necessary to include the work of the public school under the larger field of education. However, the general direction is clearly shown. The church, to the degree that it is independent, is earnestly and courageously seeking to counterbalance the growing forces of nationalistic gods and to find the way to peace. Education, to the extent and in such countries as it is free from external control, resting its faith in wider knowledge, deeper understanding, and more genuine appreciation of world affairs, is encouraging young and old alike to face the present realistically, to see beneath the smoke screen of propaganda, to place reason above prejudice, and to give rational direction to irrational ideologies.

CHAPTER 27

IRRATIONAL FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Howard Becker

Most of us labor under the fond delusion that we are rational beings. True, we may scoff at "the rational man" when we encounter him in the writings of those misguided economists who take their working fiction of "the economic man" as a direct reflection of reality, but at the same time we tacitly presuppose our own rationality. Not only this: we have a definite conception—although perhaps tucked away in an obscure cranny of our minds—of what rational conduct is like under a wide range of circumstances. How else can we pass judgments as to irrationality? "If the salt have lost its savor, wherewith shall it be salted?" The normal, or what is believed to be normal, is always the standard by which the abnormal is judged.

Of course, what is regarded as normal differs widely from place to place and from time to time. The historical record shows that religious devotees, to choose an obvious example, often engaged in conduct that would have led to their confinement in an insane asylum if it had occurred almost anywhere in western Europe or America during the twentieth century, but in their day and generation, they were taken quite as a matter of course—in short, they were believed to be "normal," and even rational. True, a Hindu mystic suddenly transplanted to a center of Catholicism would not be regarded as in any way rational; the standards of the contrasting civilizations are too far apart. None the less, it is clear that, within any given civilization, the scope of rationality is always well defined and is taken for granted in social judgments of every description. We have, as it were, a sort of secret yardstick with which we measure conduct, sometimes without any clear idea of what we are doing. Indeed, we sometimes boast that we are able to analyze behavior

without making use of *a priori* "theories." All too often, however, we overlook the fact that our own civilization has imparted to us a host of preconceived notions that we never stop to examine. Among the most common of these is the prevailing standard of rationality.

The primary difficulty in analyzing "Irrational Factors in International Relations," therefore, is the fact that in one way or another we tend to impose our own estimates of rationality in situations where they may be out of place.

PHASES OF IRRATIONALITY

But leaving this aside for the moment, let us attempt to set forth some of the phases of irrationality frequently encountered. We may classify them thus: (1) traditionally sacred; (2) personally emotional; and (3) value-irrationality. On these three heads we may, by anticipation, assume that there will be general agreement when we have made our meaning clear. We shall add, however, a fourth category concerning which it is too much to hope for general approval; namely (4) the irrationality of *all* final ends, regardless of the rationality of the means used in their attainment.

Traditionally Sacred. We may say that the essence of the sacred, in our sense of the term, *is* tradition. This dark saying may be interpreted thus: Many, if not most, long-continued habits generate their own propulsive force. The familiar "bad habit" is an example. Although we may rationally regard it as unworthy of us, the strongest resistances must be overcome if we are to break its bonds, and in the process emotional difficulties may arise that, although often-times impossible to name in so many words, are none the less persistently troubling.

Anyone who has tried to break the cigarette habit can easily see what is meant. One becomes vaguely irritable and in some instances blames the irritability on others. Instead of saying to oneself, "What a nasty temper *I* have this morning," one may remark to a friend, "What a nasty temper *you* have this morning." This is one of the reasons for the intense resistance to change that peoples enmeshed in strong traditions frequently manifest. They are not inherently conservative or blind to the rational values of whatever new procedure is recommended to them; they simply become "upset" when the sacred ways, and by the same token, their own firmly rooted habits,

are disarranged. It is notorious that men frequently act first and then find "good" reasons for their conduct afterwards. Modern psychologists call this the process of "rationalization," by which they mean that an effort is made to disguise irrational life in a cloak of rationality. We have been so brought up that we do not wish to admit either to ourselves or to others that we do things simply because we have an emotional set one way or the other. We want to go through the motions of being "reasonable."

The phenomena of "sacredness" yield ample evidence on this point. Deep grooves of custom are ground into the members of a group through daily routine and the transmission of lore from one generation to the next, and when some new practice or device comes jolting across the ruts, a sense of outrage arises. This oftentimes is then projected on some god or other supernatural entity, and the guardians of the status quo proclaim, "The heretic must atone for his sin as the Great Mumbo-Jumbo ordains."

Contemporary nationalism provides numerous examples of this widespread form of irrationality. The German cannot help but feel that American table manners are not only inefficient but in some vague way improper, not to say immoral; why should the knife play so insignificant a role? Is it not clear that thoroughly rational persons will use the knife, not merely to cut meats and the like for which the fork is too dull a tool, but also as a sort of miniature shovel by means of which a larger shovel is loaded? That is to say, the knife pushes dabs of potato, beet, and like substances around the plate and then piles them on the waiting fork which, when freighted to capacity, is guided to the mouth. The American is not so sensible; he uses the fork only, and makes two or three times as many trips to the upper end of his alimentary canal as the German finds necessary. This seemingly farfetched and playful illustration shows, on a very simple level, what often enters into the sacred as an essential ingredient; namely, the obscure, irrational disapproval that conduct differing strikingly from our own often evokes. Multiply such instances by the whole routine of daily life—discipline of children, attitudes toward women, treatment of servants, greeting of acquaintances, and modes of amusement, and one can readily see what barriers are automatically placed in the path of rational analysis in international affairs.

Even when the strange and unfamiliar exercise a peculiar fascination, there is always a possibility of violent rejection when the charm of novelty has worn off, and, in any case, the spell of the exotic never affects a large proportion of the populace. The members of a woman's club may be "all of a dither" about the foreign lecturer with the "simply delicious" accent and the glossy whiskers, but the rank and file of solid citizens cannot get over the feeling that anyone who looks and talks like that may indeed be charming but certainly is not trustworthy. In other words, internationalism is rarely, if ever, the path of least resistance; we have to make a definite effort to rid ourselves of the suspicion that manners and customs differing from our own engender within us. We all have our "sacred cows," and among them there are certain to be a few which the most inoffensive foreigner unwittingly maltreats. We then become upset, and begin to be definitely aware of all that the violation of the sacred routine means to us.

Personally Emotional. It may seem difficult to draw a line between emotional upheavals that bring with them conceptions of the sacred, as we have defined it, and more definitely personal emotional biases. Perhaps it is, but a working distinction can be made at the point where inferiority feelings appear. Not only may "outlandish" conduct arouse righteous indignation, but it may also lead to a certain uneasiness. The stranger is morally beneath us, to be sure, but he does sometimes make us feel inferior. If he has seen "many places, many men, many ships," his worldly wisdom may be reprehensible but at the same time disquieting.

Undeniably, one of the reasons for the belief in the necessity of isolation, of "keeping out of Europe's mess," current among large sections of the American people roots here; rugged American honesty and simplicity are presumably no match for the furtive wiles of European diplomats. Now our State Department "career boys" are certainly naive at times, but they are not quite such babes in the woods as the Idaho farmer, upholder of Borah, habitually assumes. Many other sources of what we have termed personal emotion might be similarly analyzed, but space forbids. Enough has been said to give some idea of the drift of such analysis.

Value-Irrationality. Our third classification, value-irrationality, calls for more extended discussion. It might be termed "value-rationality,"

for in either case the terms point to the same thing. A supreme value is posited, and any conduct that aids in the realization of that value is consistently carried through. From the standpoint of the complete systematization of conduct that oftentimes results, the term "rationality" may seem applicable. And yet it is plain that the supreme value itself may be of such irrational character that the more perfectly systematized the conduct, the more thoroughly irrational it becomes.

Moreover, perfect systematization may help in the defeat of the supreme value. Rigid adherence to a definite series of steps or phases of conduct, with no allowance for variations in personality or circumstances, may indeed attest the subject's devotion to the ideal, but it may also lead to neglect of secondary effects, and thus hinder or even permanently block the advance toward the goal. The doctrines of Japanese *Bushido* provide an instance. They state that supreme loyalty to the emperor and the feudal code means that the warrior should gladly yield his life on the battlefield or commit harakiri when occasion demands, for only in and through such self-effacement can the ultimate values of *Bushido* hold their exalted place. This has sometimes led to situations where vitally important advisers, generals, and like officials have wiped themselves out just when they were most needed; loyalty to *Bushido* helped to make it less rather than more effective in the everyday world.

So extreme an example is obviously not essential; ordinary Western patriotism, sectarian devotion, and many kinds of class loyalty are relevant. Given the final end, one can rigorously deduce the means necessary to achieve it, and these means then take on a superficially rational character—but the end itself is irrational! And the systematization of the means may eliminate or counteract whatever functional rationality they initially possessed?

From what has just been said, it is clear that political thought of many types falls in this third category. Marxism, fascism, nazism, and mystic democracy are all tarred with the same stick; they are all fundamentally irrational.

Such doctrines are called "ideologies" by contemporary students of these matters. An ideology is simply a system of ideas that has been developed for the justification and furtherance of an irrational purpose of some kind. For instance: Men may believe that a classless

society is possible, and in this faith proceed to work out an elaborate set of doctrines that are supposed to aid in bringing such a society into being. Again, the conception of a "pure" race may grip the mind of some fanatic, and he and his followers may then develop a fantastic collection of rationalizations—mixed, perhaps, with shrewd plans for seizing power—that center around this mystical belief. Ideologies, in the strict sense, are rationalizations of the status quo of social conduct already present in some degree. That is to say, an ideology is a defensive measure; changes sought are in the nature of a return to an earlier state of affairs, real or imagined. Without praise or blame, then, we may say that ideologies are always reactionary.


There are other kinds of political thought, however, to which the word "utopia" should be applied. A utopia is irrational, but it is directed toward the new rather than the old; it is "the substance of things hoped for, the realization of things not seen." A utopia is in some sense "a pacemaker of history." It projects a new social order in advance of itself, and therefore aids in its own realization if the struggle for the new is successful. It is impossible to tell with certainty whether a given political theory is an ideology or a utopia; only victory in the struggle of ideas and programs determines which label is to be applied. To one thinker, nazism may be a mere ideology, for he is certain that it is reactionary and will ultimately collapse; to another it is a utopia, for he is sure that it is a new departure and will continue to grow and flourish. The pragmatic test is the only one that is applicable here: that which "works" is "true."

This theory of political irrationality is identified with the name of Karl Mannheim, and may be regarded as valid, although in a strictly limited way. Obviously only victory can decide questions of "worth" when two political irrationalities collide. In this sense, and in this sense only, a set of ideas that "aid in their own realization" may be regarded as a utopia, i.e., as politically serviceable. Mannheim falls into the error of believing that political serviceability is equivalent to scientific truth, but this untenable argument need not detain us. Here as elsewhere Pareto's words apply: "Much is held to be true that seems to be useful, and much is thought to be useful because it is believed to be true."

It may well be that the liberal faith in the ultimate victory of

THE POLITICAL FRONT - 1920

The republican and monarchic governments of North-Western Europe give a democratic predominance to Old World politics - both national and international.



THE FEAR OF BOLSHEVISM DOMINATED POST-WAR EUROPE TO A DEGREE THAT BLINDED THE VICTORS' STATESMEN TO THE GREATER DANGER—THE WEAKNESS OF DEMOCRACY ITSELF IN THE NEW STATES OF CENTRAL EUROPE. THE FAILURE TO BUILD STRONG LIBERAL REGIMES PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR FASCISM.



THUS THE SWEEP OF DICTATORSHIP
CAME FROM REVOLUTION ON THE
RIGHT AND IT HAS BROUGHT THE
BATTLE OF "ISMS" TO ITS TRIANGULAR
AND IMPERIAL CLIMAX TODAY. THREE
EUROPES APPEAR ON THE MAP WITH
THE CAPITALISTIC DEMOCRACIES ON
THE DEFENSIVE. FASCISM, NOT COM-
MUNISM, EMERGES AS THE LIQUIDATOR
OF LIBERALISM

truth is partially responsible for this grotesquely erroneous identification of political utility and truth. Following Milton, we sonorously chant, "Let truth and error grapple, for whoever knew truth to be worsted in a free and open encounter?" Any candid examination of the historical record shows that the encounter is rarely if ever free and open, and, in addition, that the enticements of error are often preferred to the austerities of truth. The liberal optimist may croon "Truth forever on the scaffold, Wrong forever on the throne, yet that scaffold sways the future"—but how do we know that it sways the *future*? Any assertion that sheer truth automatically gains the day is possible only on the basis of an irrational faith, clearly expressed in the succeeding lines of Lowell's poem: "And behind the dim unknown, standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above his own." Martyrdom is not necessarily the most effective way to bring a better social world into being. The reason for the liberal tendency to regard the martyr—*any* martyr—as socially useful is perhaps the result of the Christian belief in vicarious sacrifice and atonement. That is, the martyr is identified with Christ, and Christ's crucifixion presumably saved the world. *Ergo*, all martyrs save the world. This is an erroneous deduction, but logic does not always have the upper hand.

To the writer, at least, it is clear that liberal optimism frequently aids in its own defeat. Irrationality can often be dealt with only by force, itself irrational, rather than by rational demonstrations of the good life for all men.

Turning more directly to our theme, it may be said that we have no international law. We have international customs that are observed as long as the stress of conflict is not too great; when it is, the needs of the moment decide. Similarly, peace palaces at the Hague or at Geneva mean very little unless the rational arguments for their creed enlist the backbone, the belly, and the biceps.

The leaders of modern totalitarian states know this well, and they are quite right in despising liberalism that is based only on "moral suasion." Only when the liberal ceases to uphold a mere ethic of sentiment and champions an ethic of responsibility can the marching of the dictators' cohorts be stopped. Those who are socially responsible are not willing to do the "right thing" as decreed by sentiment, and then leave the outcome to God or some other inscrutable

power; they think in terms of flesh-and-blood men and women whose wrongs cannot be righted by any future bliss, however heavenly. In summary, the real liberal dares not be tolerant of intolerance; the threat of force must be met by force.

Irrationality of Ends. It will be recalled that the fourth section of our classification of irrationalities is much more open to question than those just surveyed. Very few persons will be found to agree with the contention that all final ends whatsoever are irrational. None the less, this is the writer's firm conviction, and he must state his case as best he can.

There have been many efforts to show that certain values, such as love in the Christian sense, equality, or even naked survival, are rational imperatives in human conduct. One should, therefore, be able to prove the error of his ways to the man who cries out, "Your Christianity is a faith for women and slaves; men must live hard and dangerously." Similarly, there should be a Q.E.D. refuting the aristocrat who proclaims the natural inequality of all men. Likewise, there should be a scheme of syllogistic argument that would convince the man contemplating suicide that he ought to survive for the sake of surviving. Thus badly put, it seems evident that the values chosen by men are basically the expression of their physiological traits and the situations in which they have developed.

A complete anarchy of values prevails if the only criterion of validity is rational demonstration. There are no rational demonstrations. The patriot who jealously limits his affection to those born under his flag is rationally on ground quite as firm as that of the internationalist who takes the Golden Rule as his text. The struggle between values must be decided on an irrational basis. Only in life as it is lived, only in and through the willingness to stake everything, including life itself, on the outcome of the struggle of wills can we say anything about the issues involved. There is no escape, in other words, from the task of *living* the ethical code to which one adheres, for only as it is successfully lived—and that means the transmission of that code to posterity—can its ultimate acceptance be assured. Mere faith in the victory of truth means nothing unless that faith is accompanied by the power and the readiness to act in its behalf.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE

What do these considerations mean, concretely, in international affairs? They boil down to this: There is no escape from irrationality. The beginning of political action is shrouded in obscurity, and so too is the end. In the middle ground the light of rationality may fitfully shine, but this middle ground is only the realm of means.

Here, in this realm of means, science has achieved its great victories. No one need despair of the knowledge now at our disposal concerning the means of attaining any social goals we set for ourselves. More, we know a great deal about the ease, difficulty, or impossibility of attaining this goal or that; here again science is no weak reed. The student of government, economics, or sociology need not feel that his effort is futile, for we know much more than we sometimes think. We can rationally evaluate the efficiency of various methods for the attainment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or the revivification of the Roman Empire, or the extension of "Aryan" supremacy over lesser breeds without the law, or the establishment of the perfect democracy where every man is to count as one and no man for more than one. We can calculate the chances for the success of this or that part of our program, we can foresee disturbances called forth by the very success of the contemplated action, we can modify our schemes so drastically that we are traveling toward the goal even when the path seems to lead away from it—in all these ways and many more we can be rational.

Finally, however, we are confronted by the black abyss of the future, and only by a leap in the dark can the irrational values that we cherish be brought within our grasp. *Political conduct, in the highest sense, is an act of faith; you stake your life on the creed to which you are sworn.* The values you uphold may be mere illusions, but they are *your* values.

And now, as a finale, let me state my own position, my own arbitrary choice among contending values. I stand for an ethic of responsibility toward those I know most intimately, whose way of life I can directly understand. I am an internationalist, yes, but on a basis of nationalism. The sentiments that cluster about the native land, the familiar language, and the accustomed way of life certainly represent nothing that is absolute, but the absolute can be

attained only in and through the relative. Men who do not respect themselves cannot respect others, and in the larger life of the nation the analogy seems to hold good: only through devotion to the values closest to us can we be genuinely loyal to the values that take in all mankind. There is a real place for patriotism, albeit a chastened and reticent patriotism. The poorest way to be an internationalist is to begin by apologizing for your nationality.

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CHAPTER 28

PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

Robert Gale Woolbert

In a world where there is little peace or democracy it is difficult to discuss the future of those ideals in any except a theoretical manner. One might be tempted to remark that this virtual disappearance of peace and democracy as living realities should make it easier for us to examine them with calmness and objectivity. Such a point of view would, I suppose, derive from the belief that one's emotions—one's hopes and one's fears—are less aroused by an autopsy than by a vivisection. For myself, I am frankly unable to subscribe to this point of view. As one who continues to hope for eventual world peace and to believe in democracy, I find it quite impossible to be objective about either of them. Were I, in fact, to try to be objective, I would be less than honest with myself and with my readers.

I said that I *hope for* peace and *believe in* democracy. That not entirely accidental choice of verbs reflects an important fact: that liberal-minded persons, judging peace and democracy by different sets of values, do not necessarily regard them as equally desirable things. Nor do they believe that the existence of the one is always dependent on the concomitant existence of the other. This observation is not as banal or self-evident as some might think. If one will examine the great mass of inspirational literature that has come from the pens of liberals and pacifists during the last twenty years, one will readily discover that many publicists have assumed that without peace there is no democracy and that without democracy there is no peace.

The statement that peace is a necessary condition to democracy cannot be accepted as entirely valid, though there is considerable truth in it. We in the United States have learned by bitter experience that a democratic nation cannot wage a war without surrendering most of its democratic institutions to a virtual dictatorship. We

learned that in 1861-1865 and again in 1917-1919. Even though these dictatorships may have been quite constitutional, their existence nevertheless put an end to democratic processes, not only for the duration of the wars but during the confused periods immediately following them. It is naturally to be expected that those who exercise supreme power during a war will be loath to surrender it when the war is over. And, given the political and social disorder that inevitably follows a large-scale war, it is easy for them to pretend that the public good demands that they be continued in power. In this respect, peace is obviously a far better medium for the development and preservation of democracy than is war.

THE STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY

At the same time, it must not be forgotten that all three of the great liberal nations—England, France, and the United States—passed through civil wars or revolutions, or both, in their progress towards democracy. The assault upon a nation's democratic institutions usually comes from within rather than from abroad, but not always. The democratic government of Spain has had to bear the combined attack of its own reactionary elements and of international fascism in the shape of Italy and Germany. Hitler's animosity towards Czechoslovakia arose as much from his hatred for Czech democracy as from any other motive. The support which he gave the nazi movement of Henlein will undoubtedly become one of the classic examples of how¹ an authoritarian state undermines a democratic state from within.

In France the Cagoullards and other fascist, anti-patriotic elements have received considerable aid (including arms) from Germany and Italy. The adepts of these subversive organizations, as well as many of their lay sympathizers, openly vaunt their preference for a France ruled by Mussolini or Hitler rather than the socialists, especially "that Jew Blum." In other words, the national security of France is being undermined by Frenchmen who are willing to sell out their own country to foreign totalitarian powers in order to keep French institutions—political, economic, and social—from being further democratized. They have placed the interests of their class above those of their country. They have, of course, rationalized this anomalous position with all sorts of specious arguments and emotional appeals.

They claim to be the only real patriots, the only true nationalists, in France because they alone have the true interests of the country at heart.

France is by no means the sole country in which domestic insurrection is encouraged by the conspiracies of the totalitarian states. There is hardly a country in the world where the nazis are not suspected of seeking to create, or take over, a subversive movement which they can use as a weapon against the government of that country. The Italian fascists are engaged in the same practices, but on a smaller scale. The activities of both nazis and fascists in Latin America admirably illustrate this insidious mode of attack, one to which democratic states, because of the wide latitude they allow all political movements, are particularly vulnerable.

By employing these tactics Germany and Italy are imitating the old technique of the Third International, only with greater thoroughness and success. The communists, in fact, have officially abandoned "boring from within" in favor of co-operation with democratically inclined parties and governments. This is the "Popular Front" policy. In some countries, such as France, the communists are far better patriots than the "nationalists." In the United States, the communists bend every effort to demonstrate their loyalty to American democracy and to prove the essentially indigenous nature of American communist ideals and leadership. Communist sympathizers are prominent in such liberal and pacifist bodies as the American League for Peace and Democracy.

For the time being, then, international communism is not the menace to the internal peace of the "bourgeois" countries it once was. Since the soviet regime in Russia needs long years of peace to create its socialist society, the Third International is not likely to endanger peace by wrecking the democratic countries from within. This hands-off policy obviously cannot be applied to the totalitarian states composing the anti-Comintern: Germany, Italy, and Japan. We can take it as axiomatic that international communism will continue to do everything within its power to weaken those three states, and any others that go fascist, by internal pressure. Whether such tactics are conducive to the maintenance of international peace is a matter for speculation. It might be held that any decrease in the solidity of the power of the fascist dictators would make them more

hesitant to risk the complete loss of that power in a general war. On the other hand, there is support for the belief that a deteriorating situation at home might have the opposite effect of driving them into foreign adventures in a desperate effort to recapture the imagination and loyalty of their peoples.

It is unwise to overemphasize the role of war in the creation and preservation of democratic regimes, for it can rightly be pointed out that in some of the smaller European states—notably in the Scandinavian countries where democracy is strongest because it is social and economic as well as political—democratic institutions evolved peacefully without recourse to large-scale violence. I shall also be reminded that there have existed democratic regimes which owe their origins to civil or international war but which were unable to survive for any length of time, even in a period of general peace. The governments of many Latin American republics and of several of the small Succession States in central and eastern Europe admirably exemplify this inability of peace to preserve what war has created.

PEACE AT ANY PRICE

We cannot, therefore, say that peace is an indispensable condition to democracy. We can, however, say that in recent years the so-called democratic powers have thought it to their interest to try to preserve peace at almost any price, especially a price that could be paid by other nations. When Chamberlain and Daladier, acting in what they believed to be accord with the profoundly pacifist sentiment of their peoples, forced Czechoslovakia, the sole remaining democratic nation east of the Rhine, to surrender to Hitler not only a considerable portion of its territory but the very substance of its economic and political liberty, they did so in the desperate hope that they could thereby preserve peace. And, in the attempt to preserve peace by such methods they nearly made an end to democracy in Europe by the discredit they brought upon it.

It might with some justice be maintained that Chamberlain and Daladier behaved as authoritarian rulers and not as the responsible heads of two great democratic states, and that their sins should therefore not be charged against democracy. It will be recalled that in acceding to Hitler's Berchtesgaden demands they acted without

any parliamentary check (neither the British nor the French parliament was sitting) and without giving the French and British publics time to be apprised of the facts, to form an intelligent opinion on them, and then to make that opinion manifest. If it had not been for the courageous action of Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak minister in London, the British and French peoples would probably not have known about the details of the Chamberlain-Hitler conversations until after the deal had been consummated. By making public the terms of the original Anglo-French offer to let Germany have the Sudeten area and of Hitler's more exigent counter-memorandum, Masaryk gave British and French public opinion at least a belated opportunity to know what was being done by their prime ministers—an opportunity which it used to show its disapproval of truckling to nazi intimidation. Unfortunately, their will to peace was greater than their interest in the preservation of democracy. In any event, Chamberlain and Daladier believed that this was the essence of the desires of their peoples, and acted accordingly. The clearly undemocratic character of their procedure was due in no small part to the necessity of meeting Hitler on his political level. That is one of the great sacrifices which democracies must be prepared to make if they wish to see peace, even a precarious peace, maintained in a world half slave and half free.

By offering to hold Czechoslovakia's body while Hitler dismembered it, Chamberlain and Daladier were only following the policy that Britain and France had consistently pursued through the Manchurian, Ethiopian, Spanish, and Sino-Japanese "incidents," each of which embodied a totalitarian attack upon a weaker nation. The great democratic powers have been renting peace—for themselves—by sacrificing the independence of weak, and in some cases, democratic countries. And these sacrifices have entailed loss not only to democracy's international prestige, but also to its vitality in those countries who put peace before liberty.

PRESERVATION OF STATUS QUO

How are we to explain such behavior, such cringing, by supposedly democratic governments towards fascist bluffing and bullying? In the first place, we must remember that Britain and France are "satisfied" powers, powers which stand to lose some of their far-

flung colonial territories—and therefore some of their political and economic pre-eminence—in a general war. It is only natural that the policy they pursue should be the one which they believe to be most effective in preserving the status quo, if not everywhere, at least within their own empires. They have surrendered the property and liberty of other peoples in the hope of deflecting the aggressive attention of the dictators away from the French and British empires. But should it not have been obvious to them that this course only postponed the evil day when Hitler and Mussolini, having consolidated their strength in central Europe and the Mediterranean, would press their colonial claims against France and Britain, and that these countries, having given away all the desirable possessions of other peoples, would then have to surrender some of their own? There has certainly been no dearth of Jeremiahs who foresaw that this was the path events would take.

Such a policy is not exactly what one would call a courageous one; it is certainly a nationally selfish one, but it is at least understandable in a world where the fear of war's horrible destructiveness has inevitably come to color the decisions of every responsible statesman possessed of a modicum of humanity.

The other colonial powers—the United States, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal—are similarly fearful of anything that will disturb the status quo. Except for Portugal, these countries enjoy what we still describe as democratic institutions. One of the chief bases for their democracy is their wealth and prosperity associated with their status as imperialist powers. Democracy is, in fact, a luxury to be enjoyed only by countries whose economy is expanding or whose accumulated wealth is sufficient to give moderate well-being to a large part of the population. In the United States two thirds of the people are generally believed to enjoy what might be considered a decent standard of living. In the other democratically governed home countries of colonial empires the ratio of well-being is likewise large enough to preclude the immediate rise of a disinherited, desperate class that might be organized by fanatical or unscrupulous demagogues into movements sufficiently militant to threaten the foundations of the state. Portugal is the only exception, for she alone among the colonial powers has an outright authoritarian government. But Portugal, unlike the other possessors of colonial empires,

is poor, too poor—in both resources and vitality—to give her people a high standard of living.

Similar logic can be applied to the more prosperous but colony-less nations like Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and perhaps even Argentina, though one hesitates to include any Latin American state, no matter how richly endowed with natural wealth, in a list of countries that are both democratic and relatively stable. Before her dismemberment Czechoslovakia was also to be counted among these small, relatively prosperous, democratic nations. Her position might indeed have been compared to that of the colonial powers, since one third of her inhabitants, being neither Czech nor Slovak, did not belong ethnically to the Czechoslovak "nation."

The other two outstanding "satiated" countries are China and Soviet Russia. China wanted peace in which to develop her nascent republican institutions and to consolidate her poorly articulated empire. But Japan could not afford to let her consolidate this empire and therefore struck before China could prepare an invulnerable defense. In the end, however, it may well be that China will afford another example of a nation whose democratic institutions are forged on the anvil of war. The new China, no matter how large or how small, will have been created by the united efforts of a long disunited people and will therefore almost without fail be more democratic than ever before in her long history.

Since its birth twenty-one years ago the Soviet Union has been the object of more insults and provocations than any other major power. That she has consistently refused to let these incidents lead to war is evidence of her will to peace. This will derives primarily from Russia's fear that a general war would resolve itself into an attack on her vast empire on the part of the combined forces of the capitalist world. Such an attack, if successful, would spell not only territorial dismemberment for Russia, but the end of the communist experiment. Soviet Russia very definitely belongs among the "have" powers who want peace in order that they may continue to "have." And since these "have" powers are almost without exception democratic, Russia pursues a philo-democratic policy. In fact, she even outdoes France and Britain in her professed zeal to uphold the status quo by collective security.

But the fact that Russia consorts with the democratic countries in

pursuit of a common policy against fascist aggressors should not in itself convince us—as some are convinced—that Russia is a democratic country. The question whether the soviet regime is any more democratic and less authoritarian than the regimes of Germany or Italy need not be discussed here other than to remark that the communists—unlike Hitler and Mussolini who constantly boast of their anti-democratic ideals—still maintain the pretense that their dictatorship is only a transitional stage, a vestibule leading to a more perfect form of democracy than has ever existed anywhere in the world. This is a high ideal, and it remains to be seen whether the present governing class in Russia will ever relinquish its power without a stiff fight. It seems difficult to believe that Russia can make much progress towards democracy without one or more revolutions, palace or otherwise. Perhaps the Soviet Union is too large for democratic processes to operate successfully. (Perhaps, for that matter, any large empire, like Britain's or France's, is too big to be governed democratically.) And it has yet to be demonstrated that the various peoples in the Soviet Union have any real capacity for democratic government. There is no question that Russia possesses the natural resources that are the indispensable prerequisite for that widespread material well-being necessary for a healthy democracy. Has it also the spiritual and the intellectual resources necessary for successful democracy? That is what remains to be seen.

WOULD UNIVERSAL DEMOCRACY BRING WORLD PEACE?

Let us now examine the widely held belief that the greater the number of democratic countries in the world—and the fewer the authoritarian ones—the better will be the chances for universal peace. Such an examination must perforce rest partly on historical analogy and partly on pure speculation. The world has never enjoyed that halcyon state in which all, or even a majority, of the nations were governed democratically.

For the purposes of argument, however, let us suppose that such a state were to exist. Would its existence outlaw war by rendering it unnecessary? There are good reasons for thinking that such would not be the case.

What are the emotions which drive men to war? First and foremost is nationalism. Now, if we explore modern history, we dis-

cover that nationalism and democracy became almost simultaneously powerful political forces in England, France, and the United States. English nationalism had already become thoroughly a part of English life by the end of the seventeenth century at the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, whereas the nationalisms of France and of the United States were forged in the heat of the revolutions those peoples fought at the end of the eighteenth century. The French Revolutionists sought to export democracy to the rest of Europe, and failed. Napoleon in his turn strove to impose French military hegemony on Europe and succeeded only in fertilizing its soil for the rapid growth of nationalism. Thenceforward, nationalism far outstripped democracy in the number of its converts. After the World War, democracy began to decline as a world force, whereas nationalism continued to march triumphantly on, until today there remains hardly a people unconscious of its national destiny. Arabia, India, and China have been stirred to a new spirit of national solidarity and assertiveness that would have seemed unbelievable a generation ago. Even the Soviet Union, which for a while in the 1920's turned its back on the gospel of nationalism, now makes a virtue of patriotism to the Russian "fatherland."

There can be no question that nationalism is the most impelling loyalty in the world today. When the interests of nationalism and democracy run in the same direction—as they did in Czechoslovakia—the nation's solidarity and determination are just so much the stronger. But there seem to be very few peoples who will fight for democracy. The Spanish loyalists are the only people who are today ready to die in defense of their free institutions. Arabia is not fighting Briton and Jew to establish a democratic regime but to attain nationhood. The Chinese are repelling the Japanese invasion in order to preserve their national integrity—only the so-called Chinese communists are imbued with any real democratic fervor. Haile Selassie and his feudal *rasses* could by no stretch of the imagination be described as defenders of Ethiopian democracy, something which was utterly non-existent.

In a world of democratic states is there any reason to believe that the spirit of nationalism would atrophy and disappear, and that the peoples would cease to "rage so furiously together"? I do not think so. Dictators, it is true, can throw their nations into war at almost

a moment's notice. But democratically ruled peoples can also be stampeded by demagogues and press lords, though not as quickly or unanimously. The very nature of a liberal regime fosters and protects such individuals, whether they be sincere or mere adventurers. It also permits the organization of movements whose object is to destroy precisely those democratic institutions which allow it to carry on its agitation. Under these circumstances, it seems difficult to anticipate that war would be banished in a democratically governed world.

If we were to proceed still further in our speculation and hypothesize not only a world in which every nation was governed democratically but one in which an identical and high standard of living was enjoyed by the peoples of all nations, then, and only then, would there be some sound basis for believing that the causes of war had been removed. It is not enough that the principles of democracy—political, social, and economic—govern the relations of men *within each nation*; there must also be democracy among the nations. There must be some sort of rough equality in living standards between the nations. Otherwise there will be what Mussolini, borrowing a phrase from the pre-War nationalists, has called proletarian nations and plutocratic nations. A rich nation is always going to be the object of envy by poorer nations, and this envy may not inconceivably lead to wars, even between democracies.

For these reasons I do not think we can subscribe to the doctrine that by universalizing democracy we inevitably put an end to war.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In order not to close this discussion of the relationship between peace and democracy on a speculative note, let us for a moment turn back the pages of history. We must, of course, keep in mind that when we describe a certain period as one of peace and another as one of war, we are not speaking in terms susceptible of precise measurement. Peace and war, viewed historically and in the large, are relative things. The century from 1815 to 1914 was *relatively* peaceful because there were no long and general wars; whereas the previous century had been *relatively* warlike, with its succession of general conflicts waged not only in Europe but in America, Africa, and Asia. It is hardly necessary to point out that history presents several ex-

amples of long periods of peace in epochs when there were few, if any, countries whose governments rested on the consent, much less the active participation, of the governed.

We need not here enter the threadbare discussion as to whether the Greek "democracies" were really democratic. It is enough for our purposes to recall that the record of those city-states in the matter of keeping the peace left much to be desired. Certainly, one would never think of citing the classic period of Greek democracy in support of the doctrine that democracies breed peace.

Rome was never more than a very diluted democracy at best. Such popular institutions as were to be found in republican Rome seldom displayed enough vitality to endanger the power of the great families. Nevertheless, it was under the Republic that Rome fought her great wars. With the advent of the Imperial Age, there settled down upon the Western world the *Pax Romana*. Now the *Pax Romana* was an imposed peace, a peace maintained by the threat of overwhelming military might. There was nothing democratic or liberal about it. But it did keep the Western world relatively free from war for over three centuries.

Of a different sort was the *Pax Britannica* which prevailed during the century that followed Waterloo. Those hundred years marked the heyday of Britain's imperial power and prestige. During that time no general European war was fought. England's word was listened to with awe by all nations, and it was fiat on the seven seas. But this British peace, unlike that of Rome, did not rest on any territorial sovereignty over Europe—for England had no continental possessions except Gibraltar—but on her economic, political, and moral hegemony over the entire world. Britain's possession of a great colonial empire and her headstart in the Industrial Revolution enabled her to create a vast reservoir of national wealth. This wealth, in turn, permitted an increasingly larger part of her population to partake of that degree of well-being necessary for the development of modern democratic institutions. Britain's supremacy in the nineteenth century, unlike Rome's nearly two millenniums before, was not founded upon, or concomitant with, an eclipse of popular institutions, either in Britain itself or in the rest of the world. It was rather a period in which liberalism and democracy spread into more

countries. It was, in fact, the golden age of liberalism and democracy in Europe and America.

The years immediately following the World War saw the high-water mark of democratic institutions, a mark from which the tide began to ebb with the rise of fascism in Italy. During the sixteen years since the March on Rome the light of democracy has been extinguished in one country after another. Certain optimistic lovers of democracy will object that, of the countries which enjoyed democratic institutions before the World War, scarcely one has forsaken them. In large part they are right: the apostates from democracy have been among those states where democratic institutions were created *ex novo* after the war and imposed on peoples unfit by inexperience or temperament to make them work. Yet, however true this fact may be, it entirely ignores the further fact that the spiritual content and the militant vitality of democracy have greatly deteriorated, at the same time that the aggressiveness and the ruthlessness of the totalitarian states have been growing ever more terrifying.

Before the World War the non-democratic states were typified by Germany and Austria-Hungary, which were by no means absolute monarchies or personal despotisms. Today the typical non-democratic ("anti-democratic" would be more accurate) states are the aggressive dictatorships governed by such opportunistic adventurers as Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco. The milder dictatorships of Pilsudski, King Carol, Atatürk, and Salazar—to cite merely some of the more obvious examples—are regarded as being comparatively humane and benevolent, and therefore deserving of the good-will of liberal-minded men everywhere. This is the measure of the low estate to which democratic standards have fallen.

The stage has now been set for Hitler to impose a *Pax Germanica* on Europe. This is the logical outcome of the breakdown of the collective security system of the League of Nations. And the responsibility for this breakdown must in no small part rest on the democratic countries which in their zeal for peace at any price have put an end to the rule of law in Europe.

We may well ask whether a political philosophy which is thus bartered away by its custodians deserves to live. Is a belief worth much if in the end men will not die for it? We in the United States must also ask ourselves whether we care to embark on any more

wars "to make the world safe for democracy." When the British, and most likely with them the French, discover they can no longer stave off the aggressive, land-hungry powers and must *fight* to protect their empires, will we be prepared to come to their assistance? And if we do come to their assistance, will it be "to make the world safe for democracy" or to make the world safe for the British Empire? The government of the British Empire, as distinguished from that of the United Kingdom and the self-governing dominions, is not a democratic institution. Four fifths of Britain's five-hundred million subjects do not enjoy the blessings of democratic government. We should not speak of British democracy and the British Empire as if they were the same thing.

This does not necessarily suggest that the preservation of the British Empire might not be to the interest of the United States. However, if we do decide that it is to our interest to fight in defense of Britain's power, let us frankly admit from the start that that is our purpose and not pretend that it is to preserve democracy.

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CHAPTER 29

THE FASCIST AUTARCHY

Ugo V. d'Annunzio

The general causes and philosophy of fascist autarchy are, by reason of space limitations, all that can here be discussed. To enter into an exposition or defense of individual points of policy would require a complete volume rather than a brief chapter. For the same reason, the writer cannot undertake a delineation of the many and often conflicting ideas sustained by the various authoritarian regimes existing in the world today. An Italian point of view alone will be outlined in this chapter, and, although the writer will attempt to render this viewpoint with sympathetic understanding, he personally does not hold that it is applicable to all countries or to all historical periods, nor does he claim to be in any way representative of official Italian currents of thought.

ITALY'S ECONOMIC HANDICAPS

In pre-War days, Italy, blessed with incomparable natural beauties and an unparalleled historical and artistic background, suffered silently under serious economic drawbacks which rendered her position in the modern world ever more unstable.

Italy's subsoil lacks coal, iron, and oil, the three essential commodities of twentieth century industrial life. Her rocky, mountainous soil, worn out by centuries of intensive cultivation, is incapable of producing in sufficient abundance the foodstuffs which her population needs. In the nineteenth century race for colonial possessions, a great potential source of raw materials, Italy, which did not fully attain statehood until the latter part of the century, found herself hopelessly outstripped by her better-organized European neighbors. Add to this a population constantly increasing and fully conscious of its tradition of civilization, and you have a national and international problem.

For the reasons outlined above, Italy found herself more and more handicapped in the field of international trade. Despite her people's industriousness and willingness to work, making a living was an ever more pressing problem for most Italians, while for the Italian state as a whole the question of balancing increasing imports of foodstuffs and raw industrial materials against a stationary export trade of manufactured or semi-manufactured goods and of a few non-essential agricultural products loomed greater as the years rolled by.

Happily, in those days, there was a constant demand for willing workers in other more fortunate lands that had resources to develop and insufficient man power with which to develop them. The wholesale emigration of ten million Italians between 1880 and 1914 to other countries of Europe, to South America, and above all, to the United States, served to make up for the deficiency in Italy's trade balance, as well as to afford a livelihood to the emigrants and the relatives they left behind them. Emigration helped, on the one hand, to relieve population pressure at home, on the other to supply the country with the means of equalizing the trade balance through the remittances which the emigrants abroad sent back to their families. Tourists who came to visit Italy also left substantial sums which could be used in international payments for the excess of imports over exports. Lastly, Italy developed, on a modest scale, a merchant marine which, by transporting the goods and passengers of other countries, gained for the nation sums that also went to fill the gap.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The World War, which swallowed up three quarters of Italy's national wealth, also disrupted her shipping and tourist trade. Foreign purchases of raw materials increased tenfold during the War years, with the result that an imposing debt was piled up.

At the end of the War, Italy found herself impoverished. Territorial gains in Europe, although highly flattering to national pride, were economically liabilities rather than assets. As for colonial gains, it is a matter of historical record that England and France appropriated Germany's productive colonies and Turkey's mandated areas rewarding Italy with some thousands of square miles of desert land

added to Italy's semi-desert colony of Libya and other thousands of square miles of unproductive territory in East Africa.

To what degree the attitude of these nations was responsible for the growth of fascism is still a matter of controversy. What is not controversial is that post-War economic conditions brought about a vast measure of dissatisfaction among the Italian working masses—a dissatisfaction which might, as formerly, have an outlet in wholesale emigration but for the fact that the countries to which Italians had been wont to emigrate decided at that point to shut out the migratory tides by means of which they had multiplied their populations and developed their resources. This was particularly true of the United States, which, during the two decades between 1890 and 1910, had absorbed Italian immigrants at the rate of over 200,000 a year.

It is hardly worth while to enter here into a discussion of the rights and wrongs of measures which, like the immigration quota laws of 1921, 1924, and 1929, or the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, had vast international repercussions. In a world composed of sovereign nations, in which the law of national selfishness reigns supreme, each country is entitled to take those measures which it feels are for the good of its own nationals, regardless of the effects they may have on the populations of other countries. America had thrived and prospered on a policy of free immigration and semi-free trade. Pressure groups, inspired by racial and religious considerations, and labor groups, concerned with the hypothetical menace to the American standard of living constituted by cheap immigrant labor and cheap foreign goods, decided that the time had come to call a halt to the country's traditional policy. Whether they were right or wrong, from a purely American standpoint, may be left to the depression years to determine. It was perhaps forgotten that immigrants are not merely producers, but also consumers, and that the purchase of foreign goods enables inhabitants of other lands to buy our goods in return.

ITALIAN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

The effect on Italian economy of these and similar measures practiced by countries rich in territorial and material resources was disastrous. Many reasons have been advanced why Italian socialism,

which was particularly strong in the immediate post-War years, did not seize the helm and turn Italy into a socialistic soviet republic instead of permitting fascism to assume the power. One possible answer, which does not seem to have arisen in the minds of those who have devoted their study to that critical period of Italian history, is that socialism and communism are predicted upon the abolition of private property, the redistribution of wealth, and, above all, the elimination of international obstacles to trade and migratory movements. In Italy there was little private property to abolish or nationalize, practically no wealth to redistribute and, considering the international situation and the attitude of the wealthier nations, no guarantee of that removal of trade and migration barriers which alone could solve Italy's problems. It was difficult, under the circumstances, for socialism to present a convincing case to the masses, whereas a fascist movement based upon national discipline and directed toward a program of aggressive nationalism in line with that of the other great European powers appeared far more practical to the man in the street.

AUTARCHY

It is not our purpose to go here into a description of the fascist seizure of power or the early domestic policies of the fascist regime, which were based to a large extent upon expediency.

Throughout the early years of fascism, however, the idea of autarchy was slowly maturing in the minds of the fascist leaders. Autarchy, reduced to its simplest terms, means military, political, and, above all, economic independence for the nation, in peace as well as in war. Complete autarchy is easily achieved by nations rich in territory and raw materials, like the United States; it is less easily attained, particularly in times of war, by nations, like Britain, dependent upon overseas colonies and dominions for their essential imports; and, for nations like Italy, devoid both of natural resources and of productive colonies, autarchy appears at first glance as well-nigh unattainable. In peace times, such nations are condemned to a slow process of economic bleeding. Imports exceeding exports, and the trade balance having to be paid in gold, the nation that finds itself in this unfortunate predicament is like a man whose annual essential expenditures exceed his total annual income, so that he

must go deeper and deeper into debt, until bankruptcy climaxes his vain efforts. In the case of a nation, the gold reserve behind the country's monetary circulation is gradually exhausted, the nation's credit abroad disappears, and ultimately the day comes when no one will sell to it (if the word "sell" can rightly be used when there is no money to pay for a purchase) the imported materials it needs, whereupon the country is condemned to sink to a lower standard of living. This brings about suffering, dissatisfaction, revolution, and still no solution of a problem which must be solved from abroad.

Answer must be made at this point to an argument which is occasionally voiced by the press of democratic countries. "Raw materials," runs the argument, "are easily accessible in the world's markets. In fact, there is a vast unsalable surplus of such materials. They, or the colonies which produce them, do not have to be fought for." This is partly true, but, like all half truths, highly misleading. Individual producers of such raw materials are in the market for the sake of profits. They demand payment for their products, and no matter how low their prices are, international payments must be made in gold. Payments to producers in a country's own territorial possessions, on the other hand, are made in the national currency, and do not disturb the nation's economic balance or gold reserve. It is for this reason that colonial nations are, as a rule, prosperous, and non-colonial ones in perpetual economic straits, unless they are fortunate enough to have on their own national soil either all the raw materials they need, or an export surplus of something the world needs, in exchange for which they can import what they lack without a drain of gold. To talk to a nation like Italy of the abundance, cheapness, and availability of the world's raw materials is therefore as ironical as to talk to a man who is willing to work but unemployed, and who has no money at his disposal, of the cheapness of living costs and the overproduction of the nation's farms.

OVERPOPULATION

Another contention frequently heard is the following: "If the country is overpopulated, why don't they practice birth control? Why do they encourage population growth?"

On the one hand, Italians are generally Roman Catholics and fond of children, and do not care to practice birth control on re-


ligious and sentimental grounds. On the other hand, the Italian Government sees no reason why it should discourage this natural tendency on the part of the population. It points out, with considerable historical justification, that the races that practice birth control on a national scale doom themselves to extinction. "Why" says the Italian Government "should a nation as important to civilization as the Italian so doom itself? There will be time enough to think of birth control when all the earth's available territory is saturated and the world's resources are fully exploited; until then, there is no good reason why the selfish policies of others should impose mass race suicide upon a nation that does not care to practice it."

To bring the problem home, it might as reasonably be argued that our own proletarian masses on the nation's relief rolls should be subjected to mass sterilization. They have displayed their inability to make a place for themselves; they are useless appendages of society; they are a constant problem and a constant menace; let them therefore be eliminated by the painless process of enforced birth control. Our sense of humanity and civilization rebels at the thought. Yet this is precisely what is suggested for Italy, despite the fact that the Italians as a nation have given evidence of being more useful to society than our own unemployable groups. If the freedom of the individual means what liberals claim it means, then they are contradicting themselves in advocating for Italy a governmental policy that would violate one of the most sacred of human rights, the right to parenthood.

The fascist government, in rejecting birth control as a solution for the nation's problems, finds justification not merely on moral, religious, and historical, but also on purely practical, common-sense grounds. In the pre-War days, the liberal governments of Italy, which did not carry on any active population policy, found themselves faced with a population surplus of nearly half a million a year, but such surplus found its outlet in emigration.

The fascist government, facing the identical problem, with migratory outlets closed, chose the more difficult but ultimately more satisfactory solution of autarchy. The country was to be made self-sufficient, in peace as well as in war. To this end, national agricultural production, particularly of wheat, was stimulated; waste lands were improved and made productive; population was shifted and

F A S C I S T A U T A R C H Y A W A R L E A G U E S A N C T I O N S



A Fact Picture

redistributed where necessary; unessential imports were cut to a minimum; substitute products based on national materials replaced, wherever possible, imported products; the nation's hydroelectric resources were developed to cut down the importation of foreign coal; the nation's mineral resources, particularly iron, were explored and exploited to the utmost.

COLONIAL DEMANDS

But the demands of autarchy required more than this. They required a vast colonial empire, rich in productive lands and raw materials, which could serve at once as a settlement territory for Italy's surplus millions and a reservoir of foodstuffs and industrial and mineral raw products for the mother country. There seemed to be but one possible answer—Ethiopia. The realm of the Negus was the only African territory which, thanks to its inaccessibility and the fierceness of its tribesmen-warriors, had escaped the greed of nineteenth century Europe's empire builders. Italy undertook to build the empire she needed, by precisely the same means and methods that all colonial nations have adopted innumerable times—the process of armed aggression.

The outcome of Italy's struggle for empire is known. Despite all prophecies of disaster, despite the relentless opposition, on moral grounds, of the League of Nations led, ironically enough, by the greatest empire builder of modern times, Italy triumphed. The conquest of Ethiopia gave Italy a vast territorial empire, where millions of Italians may settle and where some of the raw materials needed for Italian industry and agriculture may be found. To the objection that Ethiopia has not yet proved its value to Italy in these capacities, the reply may be made that such developments take decades, not years.

Strangely enough, the Ethiopian conquest brought forth a measure of justification for the policy of autarchy which the fascist government could never have hoped to achieve by itself. The threat of sanctions and the economic siege to which Italy was subjected proved to the Italian people and to the world at large that any nation not economically self-sufficient definitely runs the risk of strangulation whenever its policies happen to clash with those of its more fortunate neighbors, and that the promise of free access to raw materi-

als made by the wealthier to the poorer nations is a snare and a delusion, politically as well as economically.

So long as the wealthier nations are left undisturbed to rule the world, there is no economic pressure on the poorer ones save the ordinary process of gold-bleeding; the rate of speed of national strangulation is slow, almost imperceptible, and spread over a period of years. Let one of the proletarian nations dare attempt what the plutocratic countries have practiced numberless times, and it is forthwith labeled an "aggressor," a "gangster nation," and threatened with a speeding up of the tempo of economic suffocation.

Even today, in many liberal circles, the theory is advanced that all that is really needed to halt the progress of the dictatorships is for the democratic countries to pool their resources and forbid their antagonists access to raw materials. Liberals who advocate these policies unwittingly supply the dictators with the most powerful of propaganda weapons. The dictator can safely and honestly say to his people: "Our rich opponents wish to strangle us by economic pressure. Self-sufficiency is the only means of defense at our disposal. We must seize sources of foodstuffs and raw materials, because only by having them in our grasp can we ward off the threat to our national existence." And the people enthusiastically respond. A campaign like the Ethiopian, which the people of Italy might have been disposed to question at the outset, became a holy crusade for self-sufficiency the minute sanctions were applied. Nor was the lesson lost after the campaign was over. Dictatorial regimes the world over are able to point today to the fact that there are other forms of aggression beside purely military ones; that campaigns of boycott, sanctions, blockade, or other forms of economic pressure are just as cruel and far more cowardly than the bombing of open cities, since they strike at the very core of the life of the masses, aim at intensifying the sufferings of the poorer classes and at reducing them to starvation and forcing them to demand that their leaders surrender unconditionally; that men, women, and children are all indiscriminately victimized. This, the dictators point out, was the method by which Britain won the World War. The dictators and the countries over which they rule are resolved that it shall not happen again.

AUTARCHY AND PEACE

Autarchy is the reply of the proletarian nations to threats of economic aggression from abroad. Autarchy is not a desirable thing per se, except in war times. Yet as the world's economy is constituted today, it is a necessity even in times of peace. If the world were one vast, untrammelled economic unit, in which men and goods could move about freely, autarchy for any nation would be sheer nonsense, like war itself. As matters stand, the poorer nations must practice it if they wish to survive.

Autarchy may therefore be defined as a necessary evil, whose underlying cause is human selfishness. It is significantly indicative of human inconsistency that the fiercest attacks against the autarchic policies of the dictatorships come from those who believe in a policy of economic liberalism and redistribution of wealth within their own borders, and who claim that the lot of the proletarian classes in America (or Britain, or France, as the case may be) should be improved, their standards of living raised, at the expense of "economic royalists," of the wealthier classes, of those who in the past have built up for themselves positions of affluence and ease, whether by honest enterprise or by obscure manipulations.

The analogy between the national and the international field does not seem to strike those who advocate a policy of surrender to proletarian demands at home and of stiffening resistance to the demands of "have-not" nations abroad. Blinded by their hatred of external forms, they forget that such forms are nothing but the outward expression of serious economic problems underneath. They would, if they could, destroy the symptoms of autarchy and dictatorship, while leaving untouched the roots of the disturbance. They want "peace" and "non-aggression," even if they must rearm and fight to attain these laudable ends. Yet it should be clear to these well-meaning people that the time is past when a naval demonstration by the plutocratic powers could quell any attempt at revolt on the part of the international proletarians. The game of armed force can be played even by poor nations, as Italy conclusively demonstrated in the Mediterranean when England attempted to keep her out of Ethiopia. Armament programs can be carried out by both sides, even if they are labeled "rearming for peace" when conducted

by Britain and "cannons instead of butter" when put into effect by Germany.

An honest question that the peoples of democratic countries might ask themselves, if they are sincere in their desire for peace and justice, is: "What are we disposed to sacrifice for the sake of preserving the peace and establishing a true reign of justice in the world?"

Is Britain willing to give up at least that portion of her vast colonial empire which she seized from Germany, and to admit that the Mediterranean, which is to her the life line of empire, is to Italy the life line of existence? Is France disposed to relinquish her dream of hegemony over the continent of Europe and the vast armaments which she retained in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, and which were the direct cause of other countries' rearmaments? Is America willing to let down, at least in part, the barriers she has set up against the free movement of goods and human beings, and to return, in some measure, to her traditional and highly successful policy of freedom of immigration and trade? Are all these nations disposed to give up their talk of economic strangulation and speak of economic co-operation instead? Are they willing to accept the great proletarian nations on a basis of perfect equality, forgiving them their China, Ethiopia, and Austria as they may wish to be forgiven their Transvaal, Morocco, and Texas? Above all, are they willing to undergo a process of spiritual and psychological disarmament, get rid of their prejudices concerning dictators and authoritarian regimes, and meet the dictatorial nations on the frank, truly liberal basis that people are entitled to the form of government that best suits them?

AUTARCHY AND INTERNATIONAL MORALS

The last point is the vaguest and most difficult of all to attain. It is also the most important.

No true understanding is possible, between individuals or nations, until we place ourselves in the other fellow's position. It is comparatively easy for one who all his life has been a decent, law-abiding citizen to pass condemnation and visit moral scorn on a lawbreaker. Modern criminology recognizes, however, that the lawbreaker's point of view ⁽¹⁾heredity ⁽²⁾environment, and ⁽³⁾the attendant circum-

stances of the crime must also be considered before the sentence is passed. Such consideration ought to be particularly easy for any member of the jury who himself happens to be a reformed law-breaker, and who is enjoying a position of affluence by reason of his past misdeeds.

In the international field, this does not seem to occur.^① England, which waged war upon China to force that unhappy country to accept India's opium exports, and which destroyed the freedom of a white race in South Africa, today stands aghast at the invasion of China by Japan and holds up the finger of moral condemnation to Italy for seizing a backward black empire.^② France, which lately put down the Rif rebellion in Morocco with an iron hand, criticizes the colonial policies of other nations.^③ America, which forcibly annexed territories belonging to Mexico and repeatedly intervened by force of arms in the internal affairs of Latin America, regards with horror Germany's annexation of a willing Austria and condemns fascist intervention in Spain. All this smacks of hypocrisy. By dint of constantly dinning propaganda against "aggressors" and "international gangsters," the democratic regimes may succeed in deluding their own populations into a sense of moral uprightness. But historical records are available to all, even in authoritarian countries, and the holier-than-thou attitude of the enriched former aggressors can have only the effect of stirring up the antagonism of those who at present follow in their footsteps. Would it not be more honest for the democracies to say: "You are doing what we have done. It was wrong on our part; it is wrong on yours. Nevertheless, it paid us dividends, and will probably do the same for you. But there may be a better way of getting what we all want: the way of co-operation instead of the way of armed force. Let us sit down and talk it over, with the understanding that we are no better, morally speaking, than you are."

At this point, however, many liberals will arise with what they consider ponderous objections. "There can be no compromises with dictatorships," they will say. "Democracies are essentially peaceful, dictatorships essentially warlike. Dictatorship and aggression are synonymous. Fascism is inextricably linked with war."

This is not quite true. Aside from the examples of democratic aggression cited above, we may even recall that a liberal, democratic

Italy found it expedient in 1911 to embark upon a war of aggression against Turkey which netted her the North African colony of Libya and the Greek Islands of the Dodecanese. As between the Libyan and the Ethiopian war, the latter had considerably greater moral justification. Previously, under the great Liberal leader Crispi, democratic Italy had engaged in another Ethiopian war which was far from successful.

Aggressive tendencies on the part of democracies and dictatorships historically appear to be equal. The difference lies in the fact that the dictatorship is usually more efficient in its aggression. But highly efficient democracies, like America, France, and particularly England, can also give an excellent account of themselves. If they have for the time being renounced war as an instrument of national policy, it is only because they have all they want, and possibly a little more. Still, it is interesting to note that Britain shows no disposition to relinquish Germany's former colonies, though she can hardly be said to need them.

"The dictators have killed liberty," the liberals will add. "The people are groaning under an iron oppression in dictatorially run countries. As liberals, we can have nothing to do with oppressors."

It is a common delusion in democracies that dictators rule against the will of their people. We shall get nowhere until we come to a realization that dictatorial governments have, for the most part, fully as broad a base of popular support as democratic ones, minus the fluctuations and waverings to which the latter are periodically subjected. To begin with, it is childish to assume that peoples like the Italian and the German could be kept in subjection, against their will, by force of arms. There may be petty dissatisfactions here and there; there are undoubtedly idealistic, recalcitrant elements who prefer exile to acquiescence. But, in the main, the average Italian or German is as proud of his governmental institutions as we are of ours. Striking proof of this popular support for the dictators was the Saarland plebiscite, carried out under the auspices of the League of Nations and policed by an international military force. Granted that the Saarlanders might not have wished, on nationalistic grounds, to join France, they were still free to vote to remain under League control, at least until such a time as the German dictatorship might fall. They voted, freely and overwhelmingly, to join that dictatorship.

THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY

As for liberty, the historian knows that it is a relative, not an absolute, concept, which changes and shifts in different times and different places. Liberty meant aristocratic oligarchy to the ancient Greek or Roman, plutocracy to the inhabitant of the medieval republics of Venice and Florence, a combination of the two to our own founding fathers, to whom liberty was compatible with slavery. The Old Guard concept of liberty is "rugged individualism," with freedom for the gifted individual to impose economically upon his less gifted fellow citizens; the New Deal concept of liberty is that of restraint upon the individual on behalf of the working masses. To revolutionary France, liberty meant, among other things, the extinction of the aristocrats; to soviet Russia it means the liquidation of all who differ with Stalin; to loyalist Spain, the wholesale destruction of churches.

The right to life is restricted in times of war, when we are drafted and sent to the front; the pursuit of happiness is contingent upon our respecting the happiness of others. Full liberty is complete anarchy, and a return to the law of the jungle. All civilized social orders are built up on systems of checks and balances, which are compromises between the liberty of the individual and the rights of society, with society invariably holding the whip hand. The groups that are most vociferous in their agitation for liberty are in reality agitating for more and more restrictions upon the liberty of the individual on behalf of the social body.

If by liberty we mean representative party government (a true democracy, wherein all the people are called to pass upon all the laws, exists nowhere), then we may say that liberty in this narrow definition is a matter of degree and organization rather than of principle. Our type of representative democracy appears to work fairly well in certain countries, usually wealthy ones, where wastefulness is not too disastrous; poorly in others, where waste is a major tragedy, as in Italy, or where economic pressure brings about violent clashes between social classes, as in Spain. America is able to survive, we hope, New Deal experimentation, labor agitations, C.I.O. sit-down strikes and the terrific economic waste caused by unemployment relief policies. Italy was unable to survive the strike

wave of 1919-1921 and the economic losses that it entailed. Restrictions upon individual liberty were imperative.

It is significant that all dictatorial regimes claim to possess true liberty and true democracy, and that both the fascist and the nazi anthems contain allusions to liberty. "In fascism is the salvation of our liberty," says the former. "The day for liberty and bread is dawning," says the latter. Is it possible that the authoritarian regimes may have in mind a different concept of liberty from our own; that the liberty of the people to earn a living, to go about their business undisturbed by labor disputes, to hold their heads high in the international world, is placed before freedom of speech, of the press, and of party organization?

FASCISM AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

The present foreign policies of the Italian fascist regime are clear and well defined. Civilized Europe, fascism holds, cannot be ruled by a puppet League of Nations dominated by the wealthy former aggressors and interested solely in preserving the status quo. Europe's peace and welfare can best be directed by an understanding among the four great powers, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Soviet Russia, which fascism regards as the disturber of the world's economic structure and the fosterer of a Comintern designed to lead to world revolution, cannot be accepted on an equal footing with other nations that respect one another's internal structures. The Loyalist Government of Spain, which, in the opinion of the fascist leaders, has proved to be nothing but an appendage to the Russian Soviets, must give way to a civilized and responsible regime.

Guarantees must be given by Britain and France, neither of which is an exclusively Mediterranean power, that the sea, which is Italy's sole lifeline of trade, will at all times remain open. Italian territorial claims are only to those areas of predominantly Italian population or vital to the essential development of her recently re-established empire. The Ethiopian conquest must, however, be recognized by the entire world, and particularly by Britain and France. Nothing would suit Italy better than a true policy of disarmament, which would lead to a reduction of military and naval budgets and a consequent strengthening of Italian economy; it must be understood, however, that such disarmament must be general, and not

based upon arbitrary ratios of military power, since at no time and under no circumstances is Italy disposed to place herself, as formerly, in a position of absolute inferiority to other nations.

A ROAD TO PEACE

The fascist plea is for greater mutual understanding, the abolition of blind prejudice, and a comprehension of the deep, underlying economic problems of the poorer nations. Italy's greatest desire is for friendly relations and economic co-operation with her great neighbors, England, France, and Germany. Such friendly relations and co-operation cannot even begin to exist while the Popular Front of France and the Edenites of England carry on their violent propaganda campaigns against the dictatorial regimes and inflame public opinion to a war frenzy. The problem of spiritual disarmament, however, is one that concerns the governments of the democratic countries. The difficulties connected with it are grave indeed, in view of democratic freedom of speech and of the press, which, in the field of international relations, frequently resolves itself into freedom of false and harmful propaganda on the part of highly organized minority groups. It is, nevertheless, a problem for the solution of which the dictatorial governments can offer no help or suggestions, but only trust in the ultimate good sense and spirit of fairness of the populations involved.

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CHAPTER 30

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL'S ROAD TO PEACE

Theodore Draper

The effort to preserve world peace must begin by taking account of the critical situation which confronts us. The danger of a second and more terrible world war has never been so near and so great since 1914. The danger has grown with an appalling regularity since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 to the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1938. In two countries, Spain and China, the problem is that of restoring rather than of preserving peace.

Yet, none of the conflicts in this period came exactly unheralded. A very fair survey of past and future war crises can be obtained from a reading of but one book, Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. The proceedings of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, held in 1935, would be equally fruitful. In a resolution dealing specifically with the menace of war, the following prophecy was made:

The adventurous plans of the German fascists are very far-reaching and count on a war of revenge against France, the partition of Czechoslovakia, the annexation of Austria, the destruction of the independence of the Baltic States, which they (the German fascists) are striving to convert into a base for an attack on the Soviet Union and the wresting of the Soviet Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.¹

Similarly pertinent predictions were made with respect to Japan's intentions against China and Italy's plans to dominate the Mediterranean.

On no account, then, can it be held that the war crises of the past several years have come as a surprise. Three powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, have initiated, each one, jointly or alone, one. The so-called Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, ostensibly formed against communism, has functioned as a more or less effective military alliance

in which the aggressions of one partner become the concern of all. Germany, in particular, has evolved a distinct pattern of aggression, which parallels the pattern of propaganda described in the introduction to Part IV. Internal conflict in a neighboring state is fomented through the German minority, if there is one, or through agents operating with camouflaged trade or cultural organizations. An attempt is then made to bring the intended victim into the greatest possible economic dependence, through loans, credits, or special trade arrangements. There follows a vast and persistent propaganda barrage. When the aggression is about to come to a head, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, influence is exerted within allied states for a repudiation of pledges so that the victim may be attacked in the proper state of diplomatic isolation. At last the ultimatum is delivered, neighboring states mobilize, and peace becomes a matter of moments. Continuous use of this pattern has left few illusions about the future when once the propaganda mill begins to grind out its tales of the mistreatment of the German minority and the like.

Every challenge to peace goes deeper, of course, than the immediate cause which seemingly brought it forth. The public issue, as is well known, may be little more than a convenient pretext for setting into motion long-standing plans.

In September, 1938, the nations of Europe were led to the very brink of war by the German Government's demands for the "self-determination" of the German minority within Czechoslovakia. Self-determination was first interpreted as regional autonomy within the framework of the then existing Czechoslovak state; later it came to mean complete annexation by Germany. Annexation, in turn, first involved only those areas which were overwhelmingly German in nationality with the rest decided by plebiscite; actually it came to mean regions with 51 per cent or more Germans according to the last statistics of Austria-Hungary—percentages notoriously untrustworthy for the purposes of 1938 since they dated back to 1910. When the so-called Sudeten area was finally ceded to Germany, a large Czechoslovak minority, provisionally estimated at 850,000, came under German rule. In addition, Germany inherited a considerable Czechoslovak minority when it annexed Austria in March, 1938 (the Czechoslovaks were the second largest minority group in post-War Austria).

Thus, in the name of self-determination for the German minority in Czechoslovakia, a travesty and a crime were committed against the legitimate self-determination of the Czechoslovaks themselves. Moreover, this principle, which the German Government considered so sacred that it would not permit its demands to be settled by arbitration, does not seem applicable to the German minority in Italy or France or Poland, at least for the present. And in Italy and Poland, the German minority suffers infinitely worse oppression and indignities than it ever did in democratic Czechoslovakia.

Self-determination, then, had little to do with the real purposes of the Third Reich. The German minority did have certain justified grievances, most of which, incidentally, were fast finding their solution within the Czechoslovak state. But the solution of these grievances was not desired by Germany, as Lord Runciman, the British investigator, had to admit in his memorandum of September 21, 1938.² These grievances were more valuable as a means of waging a propaganda war against the Czechoslovaks in preparation for physical invasion. Exactly the same perversion was made by the Third Reich of the unquestionably cruel injustices forced upon the German people by the Versailles Treaty. In order to perpetrate outrages upon other peoples, the fascist rulers have exploited the sense of outrage felt by the German people themselves.

By such means are wars of conquest and pillage waged. The cause of peace requires the utmost vigilance in distinguishing false pretexts from real problems. The use made of self-determination in the Czechoslovak crisis has its parallels in the insignificant border engagement which opened Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and the night raid near Peiping which the Japanese converted into a "grievance" for the subjugation of all China.

THE FASCIST TRIUMVIRATE

The fact is that we are in the midst of a gigantic conspiracy by the fascist triumvirate to dominate the entire world by war and the threat of war.

The chief hate in fascist dogma is the Soviet Union. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler advised Germany to "put an end to the continual flow of Germans to southern and western Europe and turn our eyes to the land in the East." Even more explicitly, he continued,

"if today we speak of new land in Europe we can, in the first instance, only consider Russia and its vassal frontier states."⁸ Since coming to power, Hitler has made at least one speech in which he publicly intimated that the soviet Ukraine was the choice morsel which the Third Reich hoped one day to swallow.

By their very nature, these war plans cannot threaten the Soviet Union alone, or even most immediately. The social unity and armed strength of the U.S.S.R. make it a dangerous opponent, and the fascist powers are content to test their strength against less difficult opposition. Their ultimate objective may be the Ukraine in one case and Siberia in the other, but both Germany and Japan find it advisable to fatten up on the conquest of smaller powers in preparation for a struggle with the larger ones.

In the Far East, the direct force of the Japanese offensive has been felt by China because the subjugation of China is the necessary precondition for any war farther north. Meanwhile, a nation of 450,000,000 is under attack by a foe holding the advantage of inestimably superior arms; and the interests of the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Far East have been recklessly and ruthlessly damaged or wiped out. In Europe, the first blows delivered by Germany have fallen on Austria and Czechoslovakia. None of these powers was remotely socialist in its social organization, though the chief grievance against three, Spain, China, and Czechoslovakia, has been that they were democratic.

As a matter of fact, the aggressions against Czechoslovakia and Spain have placed France and Great Britain at such a disadvantage that the next series of fascist attacks are likely to be directed against them, in one form or another. With the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, France sacrificed the entire system of security painfully and expensively built up after the last war. She is faced with an additional frontier that needs defense to the south, at least along the region held by the insurgents. Her only ally is Great Britain, and past performances by Britain do not warrant any confidence in the fulfillment of promises which have never gone beyond generalities. The British, in turn, are beginning to suffer from France's new weakness, for Italy is already dominating the Mediterranean and Germany is driving to the east on the road to Baghdad. When the Third Reich begins to present colonial demands to Britain, Britain

will face the concrete choice of surrender or resistance which France has faced in the past several years.

Nor is the Western Hemisphere excluded from this alternative. Practically the entire South American Continent is witnessing a rapid and ominous expansion of German, Italian, and Japanese influence. At least one state, Brazil, has had to deal with a nazi-inspired insurrection during which President Getulio Vargas barely escaped with his life. In several of the South American countries, the fascist axis is able to operate through their own, considerable national minorities. It is estimated that there are between 400,000 and 1,000,000 German residents, 1,000,000 Italian colonists, and 200,000 Japanese emigrants in Brazil alone. One third of the total population in Argentina is of Italian origin, in addition to which there are approximately 100,000 Germans. The same is true, in less degree, of the two leading countries, Chile and Peru. Fascist inroads, while primarily economic, have taken political forms not unlike those used by Germany and Italy in middle Europe.⁴

This state of affairs represents a colossal overturn in the balance of power, a reversal which cannot be understood without an appreciation of the differences between 1914 and today. How does it happen that Germany, defeated and powerless in 1918, is now the organizing center of a tremendous world offensive? In what way does this offensive differ from the expansionist ambitions which culminated in the last war?

1914-1918 AND TODAY²

The war of 1914-1918 was determined by the rivalry between one bloc of powers, dominated by Germany and Austria-Hungary, and another bloc, dominated by Great Britain, France, and old Russia. In the opinion of V. I. Lenin, the foremost communist leader of the time, Germany was waging a predatory war to plunder its richer competitors, France and Britain, and to subjugate its weaker neighbors, Serbia for example. The Entente was waging an equally predatory war to ruin Germany, which was threatening its own dominant international position owing to its more rapid economic development in the pre-War years.⁵

The war itself, he maintained, was neither an "accident" nor a "sin" but "an inevitable stage of capitalism, (it is) a form of capital-

THIRD INTERNATIONAL UNION OF SOCIALIST REPUBLICS IN WORLD POLITICS



GERMANY
Lost to Hitler
1932-1933
Now efforts to form Popular Fronts against fascism.

EUROPEAN & AMERICAN
TRADE UNION DISUNITY
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
AND A.F.-L. TREND:
INT'L FEDERATION OF
TRADE UNIONS, 1901.
COPENHAGEN

COMMUNIST-BACKED, 1920,
RED INTERNATIONAL OF
LABOR UNIONS (RILU).

Moscow fails in effort to use
Mexico in 1920s as propaganda
center; more active since 1934.

Costa Rica has
an active C.P.
allowed.

PAN AMERICAN LABOR ORGANIZATION
EFFORTS REFLECT LEFT AND RIGHT
WING DIVISION. AFL REVIVES ITS
(GOPEERS) PAN AMERICAN FEDER-
ATION OF LABOR OF 1920s TO MEET
CIO SUPPORT OF A "LATIN AMERICAN
FEDERATION" 1938.

1919
Beginnings of the
Comintern at
Zimmerwald Conf.
Switzerland.

ITALY
Lost to
FASCISM
1922

Propaganda
of C.P. in
ports,
mines

A-B-C GOVERNMENTS
AND PERU, 1930s.
MAINTAIN ANTI-RED
COLLABORATION

SOUTH AMERICAN BASE LOST:
ARGENTINA CLOSED TO REDS,
1931; URUGUAY BREAKS OFF
DIPLOMATIC AND TRADE CON-
TACTS LIKEWISE IN 1935.

"THE WORKERS
FATHERLAND"

3D INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
1st Cong., Mar., 1919
MOSCOW

TROTSKY BREAKS WITH
STALIN, 1926, AND
UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE
LEADS TO HIS EXILE.

MANCHUKUO

JAPANESE SET
BARRIER 1933
SATELLITE OF
ANTI-RED PACT

U.S. JAPAN
MILITARISTS SUPPRESSING
JAPANESE RADICALS,
1932-1936

COLONIAL
EAST

Indian Ocean
Sphere
HEART OF BRITISH
EMPIRE
Under pressure

ANGLO-DUTCH
COLONIAL COMBINE
Oil Rubber

Agitational Pressure
Associated with USSR
National revolutionary movement

A Fact Picture Chilean C.P. active

Frederic M.
Charles makes

ist life as natural as peace.”⁶ He was not interested solely or even especially in the diplomatic strategems which characterized the decades of preparation for the war. Proof of the true character of the war was to be found, he believed, “in an analysis of the objective *position* of the ruling *classes* in *all* belligerent countries.”⁷ Both sides, he explained in his famous pamphlet on imperialism written in the spring of 1916, were forced to wage war by the inexorable operation of their economic systems which had reached a stage in which monopolies dominated the entire capitalist economy. The principal monopolies were financial oligarchies to which the export of capital had become of the most vital importance. Each of the belligerents was striving for markets, raw materials, and places for the investment of capital in behalf of “their own” monopolies. The imperialist stage of capitalism brought with it war between conflicting imperialist blocs.

Lenin’s road to peace in 1914-1918 followed logically from his analysis of the war; those who differed with him differed with both.

The duty of the working class, which suffered most from the war, and the people at large, he said, was to overthrow the reactionary governments responsible for the war and to overthrow the economic systems responsible for those governments. “Whoever wishes for a durable and democratic peace,” he wrote, “must be for civil war against the governments and the bourgeoisie.”⁸ He advised the people of the warring powers to strive for the defeat of their own governments because “a revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot help wishing the defeat of its own government; it cannot fail to see the connection between the government’s military reverses and the increased opportunity for overthrowing it.”⁹

But the war did not leave the world unchanged. Those very changes helped lay the basis for the peace problem which confronts us now.

The Russian Empire and its monarchy, which Lenin called “the most reactionary and barbarous government oppressing the greatest number of nations and the greatest mass of the populations of Europe and Asia”¹⁰ was toppled over and replaced by an altogether new type of state. For the first time in history, the principles of socialism were carried into practice on a national scale for an enduring period. The new soviet state exported no capital for investment

abroad, sought no raw materials of any consequence beyond its borders, maintained no profit-making armament industry, renounced colonies and colonization, enforced complete equality between 185 different nationalities and tribes speaking 147 languages.¹¹

The peace treaties also brought into existence a number of new, small, relatively weak states in middle Europe, most of them carved out of Austria-Hungary and parts of old Russia. Originally, these states were intended as barriers against German and Austrian resurgence and as buffers between the Soviet Union and western Europe. But, very early in their careers, some of these states had to rebel against the larger powers which created them. In one of his first post-War speeches, Lenin remarked that the interventionists had failed to overthrow the bolsheviks because they had to use the troops of these buffer powers, like Finland, but were resisted because the very independence of these powers hung in the balance.●

When the Entente brought pressure to bear on the small countries, on each of these fourteen countries, it met with resistance. The Finnish bourgeoisie, which has stifled thousands of Finnish workers during the White terror and knows that it will never be forgiven for having done so, and that it is no longer backed by the German bayonets which enabled it to do so—this Finnish bourgeoisie hates the bolsheviks with all the vehemence with which a plunderer hates the workers who have thrown him off. Nevertheless, the Finnish bourgeoisie said to itself: "If we follow the instructions of the Entente it means losing absolutely all hope of independence." And this independence had been granted them by the bolsheviks in November (October) 1917, when there was a bourgeois government in Finland. And so, wide circles of the Finnish bourgeoisie wavered. We won the contest against the Entente because the latter counted upon the small nations and at the same time repelled them.¹²

A similar process is taking place today except that the former vanquished have replaced the former victors. Each of the smaller middle European powers has become the economic satellite of Germany or Italy and has seriously compromised its freedom of action in its relations to the fascist axis. But the attraction is a forced one and the examples of Austria *Anschluss* and Czechoslovak dismemberment haunt their future. Czechoslovakia could not be an ally

in the accomplishment of Germany's aggressive aims because she was one of the first and most important objectives of those aims. Hence, she resisted as long as resistance was possible. As the German drive to the East threatens the independent existence of other powers, especially Rumania and the Baltic states, the resistance of Czechoslovakia will be repeated. Under certain circumstances, these small powers may be obstacles in the road to war because a war would wipe them out.

As a third consequence of the World War, the victor powers fell out among themselves. France and Great Britain, despite profound differences, made common cause as long as Germany was the greater menace. Having defeated the common enemy, they parted ways over the division of the spoils from the peace conference onwards. The war left France unchallenged as the supreme military power on the continent. France's new position clashed with the old British policy against permitting any one power to rule Continental affairs. As long as Germany lived as an advanced democracy, Britain refrained from helping her too generously. But when national socialism came to power in 1933, the British ruling class abandoned its restraint. British money and diplomacy nursed Germany back to prestige and power as a counter-weight against France and as the spearhead of a new intervention against the Soviet Union.

The enfeeblement of France came as the necessary accompaniment of this pro-nazi policy. For a strong France could not be easily dominated from No. 10 Downing Street. Every one of the fascist aggressions in the past several years have been aimed at one or another of France's strategic national interests. Italy's occupation of Majorca in the Balearic Islands cut France's lines to its African possessions. The invasion of Spain, if successful, would give France a long, unfortified frontier. And the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia utterly destroyed the whole base of French security, predicated upon the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact of 1935 and the Little Entente. France's failure to resist these evident blows at her own security is at once the cause and the result of her growing weakness.

FROM AGGRESSION TO AGGRESSION

It is a matter of record that every aggression since 1931 has laid the ground for further, more ambitious aggressions. The conquest

of Manchuria started a process which inevitably led to the invasion of north China, thence to central China along the Yangtze, and latterly farther south towards Canton. The conquest of Ethiopia placed Italy in a position to command the Mediterranean at one end, and this, in turn, led to the effort to command the Mediterranean at the other end through control over Spain. The annexation of Austria was the strategic precondition for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia which, as a direct consequence, opens the whole of middle Europe to the German advance. The most crushing refutation of the theory that the way to avert aggressions is to let them pass unchallenged lies in the record of these years.

The soviet foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, has coined a phrase to describe this state of affairs: the indivisibility of peace. The idea is a double one. When peace in any part of the world is violated, the ensuing crisis sets in motion a train of circumstances which threatens to drag into the hostilities other nations, not directly concerned, until a general war looms as a concrete possibility and menace. In the interdependent world in which we live, the interest of a Spain may be so closely related to the interests of a France and to the continental balance of power in general that it is difficult to tell when an indirect stake in the war changes into a direct stake and direct intervention. In the second sense, peace is indivisible because one aggression fatally leads to others, and, the sphere of aggression widens until localization is impossible.

The indivisibility of peace is a condition and not a theory. It does not imply any instantaneous transformation of any conflict whatever into a world conflict. The phrase describes a process in which the widening circle of aggression develops gradually, though more and more quickly, from one crisis to another and greater one.

Aggressions by partners in the fascist axis have become increasingly more serious for the obvious reason that effective opposition has been lacking. Relative impunity has made the makers of war daring and callous. There would be no war in Spain had not the invasion of Ethiopia been permitted to gain its ends. There would have been no ultimatum delivered to Czechoslovakia had Austria been rescued from annexation. The League of Nations would not have been passive during the Austrian and Czechoslovak crises had it not been irresolute during the Manchurian and Ethiopian crises.

A great power like France would not have sunk to the ignominy of breaking a pledge to stand by Czechoslovakia had not France's premier in 1935, Pierre Laval, hatched a scheme to betray Ethiopia and another premier, Léon Blum, the following year initiated a policy of "non-intervention" towards Spain in violation of international law and mutually binding obligations. There are no limits to the use of force when once it begins to command the relationships of nations. One war leads to another; irresoluteness leads to complete passivity; dishonor leads to humiliation and shame.

And the overshadowing tragedy in the past several years is that the aggressors would never have undertaken their adventures had they not felt reasonably assured of this immunity. The democratic powers together are immeasurably stronger in economic resources and military potential than the fascist powers. It is, indeed, extremely doubtful whether the fascist regimes could last through any extended war. The remark, ascribed to a member of the German General Staff, has been made that "you can end a war with bread-cards but you cannot start one." The social tensions in each of the fascist countries are terrific. The labor movements could be persecuted and outlawed by brute violence only at the cost of storing up a vast reservoir of pent-up anger and opposition. The oppression of the Jews has developed into a systematic and sometimes violent repression of all religions, and both Catholic and Protestant churchmen have been sentenced to concentration camps or stoned by nazi gangs. The insatiable demands of the war machine have so dislocated industry, especially through skyrocketing taxation, that even a portion of the bourgeoisie views the future with distrust and alarm.

Nevertheless, the fascist powers have been able to threaten, to browbeat, and to obtain what they demand, except from Spain and China, where a virtually unarmed people wrathfully resisted and are still resisting. The reason for this lies not in the strength of the fascists but in the deplorable weakness of the democracies. Only the democracy of the single socialist country, the U.S.S.R., has manfully maintained its pledges and fulfilled its obligations. But the democracies of the larger capitalist countries, specifically Great Britain, France, and the United States, have been deceitful and shabby in their weak and submissive betrayal of both peace and democracy.

They have pursued a policy which, in the words of Litvinov, "recommends as the height of human wisdom under cover of imaginary pacifism that the aggressor be treated with consideration and his vanity be not wounded."¹³

This coddling of aggressors has been the dominating aim of the British Government under both Lord Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, but it reached its most sickening climax during the Czechoslovak crisis. A "peace with honor" was proclaimed by Chamberlain upon his return from Munich where peace had been made infinitely more difficult to preserve and honor had been bartered for selfish class position. The governments of France and Britain have made no serious opposition to the wars and the threats of war by the fascist bloc of aggressors because they have followed a narrow class policy. In every one of the capitalist democracies, the fascist powers have their allies and their agents. The most reactionary circles in every land gravitate towards the fascist bloc, and especially towards Hitler Germany, as an organizing center. As the chief economic exploiters of their own people, they recognize a community of interest with the chief exploiters of other peoples though these latter be the enemies of their own country. The Chamberlain circles in England and the Flandin-Laval group in France are the best examples of this influence.

These "fifth columns" within the democracies are faced with a conflict of interest. Serious opposition to fascist demands requires joint action with the Soviet Union and greater participation by the masses of people in the formation and execution of policy. Capitulation to Hitler, on the other hand, has reduced France to second-rate status in the European balance of power and has brought Great Britain face to face with future nazi demands for the surrender of vital imperial positions.

Twenty years ago, the biggest reactionaries posed as the foremost patriots. But the existence of fascism has made a fundamental difference to the capitalist world. The class interests of British and French reaction, as represented by the notorious "200 families" and the "Cliveden set," are identical with the class interests of the fascist axis. Nevertheless, this narrow class interest can be pursued only by sacrificing that very system of security, those very allies, which these same reactionaries built up before Hitler seized power. In order to

carry forward their alliance with their class colleagues in Germany, the pro-fascist capitalists dominating French policy had to deal France itself a crushing blow, for the partition of Czechoslovakia was a strategic loss of the first magnitude.

Serious opposition to the fascist world offensive would require the extension of democracy in the capitalist countries as the fitting reply to the fascist demand for the abolition of democracy. It would require the unity of the people, a unity impossible without giving the working class a voice in the determination of policy and better conditions of life and labor. But the allies of fascism in the democratic countries fear this even more than they fear the enemy of their country.

Ironically, the Chamberlains and Flandins fear the class consequences of a lasting defeat for the fascist powers. They remember how close Germany came to social revolution in 1919; it seems unlikely that German capitalism could withstand a second collapse. The repercussions upon French capitalism of such a possibility critically inhibit the patriotic zeal of the "200 families." They have to choose between their class positions and democratic national interest. To maintain that position, they betray their people and their democracy. These are some of the several respects in which 1938 differs from 1914. At bottom these differences have their roots in the significance of the Soviet Union and the opposite attraction of fascism—neither present in 1914.

With the honorable exception of the Soviet Union, the democratic powers have tried to pamper, entreat, and humble themselves before the fascist aggressors. That "road to peace" has failed miserably; it has inspired one war and the threat of future wars. The democratic powers have actually collaborated in the conquests of fascism under the disingenuous makeshifts of "non-intervention" and "neutrality." Continuation of this camouflaged collaboration is just what will ensure another world war.

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AND PEACE

The Communist International seeks the substitution of a diametrically opposite "road to peace."

To begin with, it is necessary, in the words of Georgi Dimitrov, the general secretary of the Communist International, "to realize

from where the danger is arising, who are responsible for it, and against which countries the attack is being directed."¹⁴ The answers have already been stated. Though the fundamental cause of predatory wars lies in capitalism itself, the specific instigator of war in the existing international situation is fascism. Fascism is the road to war and the struggle against fascism, in all forms, is the road to peace. Within the fascist powers, it is necessary to distinguish German fascism as the most dangerous, the strongest, the organizing center. The attack is directed against the entire democratic world and has already struck the democracies of Spain, China, and Czechoslovakia. In the long run, it is calculated to crush the socialist democracy of the Soviet Union and in its place to restore capitalism. But, in the process, even the large capitalist democracies must suffer. Basic to the world politics of our time is that fact, for every concession to fascism weakens France, Great Britain, and the United States, though the enfeeblement proceeds at a different rate in each case. This progressive weakness emboldens the fascist powers to demand further concessions and more costly retreats. As a result, those reactionary circles in the capitalist democracies which have assisted the fascist aggressors owing to a joint hatred for socialism in the U.S.S.R. have had to pay a heavy price of their own. And as their assistance has developed, the price has increased.

The first necessity, then, is recognition that the danger of war comes from fascism. This danger is the immediate concern of a number of powers and the growing concern of others. There is an unmistakable cleavage between those which have proved themselves to be aggressors and those which are marked as the present and future victims of aggression. The aggressors are united into a war front. The present and future victims of aggression represent a potential peace front. The road to peace requires that this front be organized in the shortest possible time. It would be a democratic front because the fascist offensive is aimed at the democracies.

Until now, the warmakers have enjoyed a freedom of action and even, in the case of the British ruling circles, direct assistance. As long as aggressions are profitable to them, they will make more aggressions. The problem confronting the democratic countries is that of making aggressions unprofitable and ultimately impossible of fulfillment. All assistance, direct and indirect, to the aggressors

must be withdrawn and, instead, all possible assistance given to the victims of aggression. In effect, this reverses the practice of so-called neutrality which, in fact, aids the aggressor and restrains the victim. In the Spanish conflict, for example, Germany and Italy, the invading powers, do not need to buy finished arms but desperately need the raw materials for those arms. The neutrality act of 1936 prohibits them from purchasing in the United States what they do *not* need, finished arms, but permits unhindered all trade in essential raw materials, precisely their greatest need. The Spanish Government, on the other hand, needs finished arms owing to lack of its own armament industry; and these arms are just what the act prohibits. This unneutral neutrality, favoring fascism, encourages aggression. The need is for a policy which would discourage aggression by withdrawing these favors to fascism.

The Communist International has supported this road to peace under the name of "collective security." It is really a simple proposition and, stated abstractly, as R. Palme Dutt remarks, "has the degree of conclusiveness of a mathematical proposition."¹⁵ He defines it as follows:

Given a world of independent sovereign States, the only conditions under which these could conceivably keep the peace themselves, short of accepting federation or any common sovereignty, would be by their uniting to maintain and carry out a pledge of combined action by the entire force of the remainder against any State having recourse to war, with the consequence that the certainty of such overwhelming opposition would in practice restrain any State from having recourse to war or, in the extreme event of the attempt being made, would speedily bring it to an end.¹⁶

But, as Dutt goes on to say, this is only the essence of the principle. In practice, only the Soviet Union has stood by its commitments. The capitalist democracies are inconsistent and irresolute, even when they take desirable action, and frequently they do nothing at all or even assist in the aggression. As already described, this failure on the part of the capitalist democracies is founded upon the narrow class interests of the ruling imperialist circles, for which interests a sacrifice is made not only of peace but of national interest as well.

The only reliable peace force within the capitalist democracies is the masses of common people, with the working class at the core.

They alone have nothing to gain by war and they alone have no ties whatever with the fascist aggressors. The absolute precondition for any effective struggle for peace is the organization and unity of the working class, farmers, professionals, intellectuals, the middle class in general and those of the bourgeoisie itself who can rise above their narrow class interests and support the cause of peace for whatever reason. It is tragically wrong to view the people, and especially the working class, as merely so many puppets in the control of double-dealing governments. "If these masses," wrote Dimitrov, "without whom war could not be carried on, were to act *resolutely and promptly* against the war plans of the governments, they could force these governments to renounce war and the abetting of the war plotters."¹⁷

There is a double need for an effective road to peace: a united peace front is required among the people, and a united peace front is required among the democratic nations, especially among those nations whose interests and very independence are threatened by the fascist offensive. The two needs are interrelated and the guarantee of the second lies in the achievement of the first.

Neither of these needs has been fulfilled in the past several years. Though there is almost unanimous desire among the people for peace, there is no corresponding struggle and organization for peace. The working class in the key countries is still divided over essential issues; it was tragically true that the French Socialist Party should have supported Premier Daladier's betrayal of Czechoslovakia in a public vote while only the French communists opposed it, that the leadership of the British Labor Party should still stifle the movement for a peace alliance, and that the labor movement in the United States should be organizationally split. Without unity in the working class, there can be no wider unity embracing the middle class. Nevertheless, this unity is growing, with or without the assistance of the leaders in one or another camp. It is bound to grow further as the continued encroachments of fascism vitally endanger the very existence of the labor movements in country after country.

The preservation of peace is the broadest platform on which the masses of people can unite. In the view of the Communist International, "the chief, fundamental and decisive thing in the maintenance of peace is the independent action of the masses in defense of

peace against the actual war incendiaries.”¹⁸ The international proletariat, if united on militant lines, can itself prevent every ship and every train from bringing supplies and arms to the aggressors for the prosecution of the war. It can set in motion an even wider unity among the people at large to prevent such betrayals as have been attempted against Spain and as were consummated against Czechoslovakia. Said Dimitrov:

By economic and political measures the war-mongers should be put absolutely in a state of siege. They should be cornered in such a way that they are incapable of carrying out their criminal plans. The globe should be encircled with such a net-work of organizations of the friends of peace, such a mighty movement of international solidarity and such effective measures of a united international policy of the proletariat for the maintenance of peace, as will effectively tie the dastardly hands of the war-mongers.”¹⁹

BASES OF A SOUND PEACE POLICY

Such an international policy would require the following four concrete bases:

1. The restoration and strengthening of real international proletarian solidarity to defend the interests of the widest masses of working people; the Social Democratic Parties must make a decisive break with the imperialist interests of their bourgeoisie.
2. Every possible support for the peace policy of the Soviet Union, the proletarian state that stands unswervingly in defense of peace among peoples. And this presupposes in the first place a determined struggle by the working class parties against the counter-revolutionary attempts to depict the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as identical with the policy of the imperialist states and to represent the Red Army, that bulwark of peace, as being the same as the armies of imperialist states—attempts which play into the hands of the fascist war-mongers.
3. The blow against the fascist aggressor must be directed with definite purpose and with concentrated force at every moment; the attitude taken toward the aggressor must be different from that taken toward the victims of his attack; any attempt to gloss over the difference between the fascist and non-fascist countries must be exposed.

4. An independent struggle by the proletariat for the maintenance of peace, independent of the capitalist governments and the League of Nations, making it impossible for the working class movement to be subordinated to the behind-the-scenes designs of the imperialist governments in the League of Nations.²⁰

By carrying out such a policy, it is still possible to preserve peace despite the inroads of the aggressor powers in the past. But every week of delay makes the task more difficult. World peace will not be able to live through several more Spains, Chinas, and Czechoslovakias. In order to prevent a repetition of these crises, a twofold struggle is necessary. The main foe is the aggressor proper. But his allies in the democratic countries, not infrequently in control of governments, are equally reprehensible. While fascism delivers the direct blow, these "fifth columns" disorganize the defense and confuse the possible opposition. Just as the chief aggressive force is German fascism, so is the British ruling class the chief of the democratic "fifth columns."

The need and desirability of collective security is sometimes confused with its practical possibilities. The unity and organization of the popular forces for peace are the necessary preconditions for the fulfillment of collective security. As this unity and this organization lag, the war offensive grows and collective security diminishes. But the need for such security is no less great. For the only alternative to collective security is collective chaos and war. For several years, we have had little of the former and much of the latter. If the democratic peoples and nations do not wake up to the necessity of achieving a collective security in which the peace of each is dependent upon the peace of all, a frightful, general war is inevitable. But this security can be achieved. In the final analysis, the answer still rests with the people.

NOTES

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2. The Runciman memorandum was included in the British White Paper, as published in the *New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1938.

3. *Mein Kampf*, p. 742.

4. These figures are given by CARLETON BEALS, "Totalitarian Inroads in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1938, Vol. XVII, No. 1, pp. 78-89.
5. V. I. LENIN, *Selected Works*, Vol. V, pp. 123-124, New York, International Publishers, 1937
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12. V. I. LENIN, *Selected Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 58.
13. Speech by MAXIM LITVINOV before the League Assembly on September 21, 1938.
14. GEORGI DIMITROV, *The United Front*, p. 172, New York, International Publishers, 1938.
15. R. PALME DUTT, *World Politics: 1918-1936*, p. 160, New York, International Publishers, 1936.
16. *Ibid.*
17. GEORGI DIMITROV, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.
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CHAPTER 31

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE

Hans Kohn

Throughout history we find two different fundamental attitudes in the relation between the individual and the state. One attitude puts the state above the individual: the individual depends for the full realization of his faculties upon the state before whose authority he bows and to whose ends he is subservient. The other attitude regards men not as the object, but as the subject of the authority of the state. The state is no end in itself, but a means to the self-realization of the individual to the transformation of the society of men into a really human society. The first attitude is represented by the authoritarian form of state, the second attitude by democratic forms of state. The difference between these two forms of social philosophy and political organization expresses itself in the form in which the will of the community is formed and proclaimed, as well as in its contents.

CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy is based upon two fundamental concepts, the liberty and the equality of individuals. They are the product of a long historical development, of the growth of civilization. Before man recognized the equality and liberty of his fellow men, he had to master his primitive instincts by ethics founded on religion and by rational thought. Buddhism, the teachings of the Hebrew prophets and of early Christianity, the Stoic philosophy in the Greco-Roman world, set against the existing forms of dominion and inequality the ideal of the essential equality and spiritual liberty of all human beings. According to Christianity, man, every man, has been created in the image of God, every human soul is invested with an inalienable dignity. United in a common descent from Adam and Noah, in a faith in God as a common father, all men formed a potential common

brotherhood. The religious foundations of democracy were secularized and rationalized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The "natural" rights of the individual were proclaimed, not rights granted by "nature," but inherent in the quality of man as a human being, which implied always more than being a "natural" being, whether this "more" be intrinsically rooted in religion or in reason. The Free State Movement in Great Britain in the seventeenth century grew out of the Free Church Movement with its insistence upon personal inquiry, free discussion, and common deliberation. Descartes and Hugo Grotius laid the rational foundations on which a century later the French Revolution proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.

In the nineteenth century democracy seemed destined to become the generally accepted form for the relations of the state and the individual in "civilized" countries. From its birthplace in western Europe its influence spread with the progress of civilization all over the world, penetrating slowly even into Turkey, India, and the Far East. Democracy implied liberty and equality. Liberty was twofold: in its negative sense it protected the rights of the individual against interference by the state in its positive sense, it gave the individual a share in the legislative process. Both ways built up the autonomy of the individual, or, as Kant called it, his dignity as an end in himself. Man was to be subject to the authority of the state only within strict limits, and he was to participate in the determination of the contents of this authority. Democracy did not express itself only in the form of its laws, but also in their contents: they were based upon the frequently tacit but always present assumption of the complete equality of all individuals within the state, irrespective of class or wealth, of race or creed. This attitude of recognition of equal rights of one's fellow men creates in democracies a spirit of mutual tolerance.

Democracy, being a late product of human civilization and its refinement, presupposes for its lasting success a sense of compromise and moderation, a maturity of mind and soul, having outgrown primitive fanaticism, an objective and just attitude in judging one's self, one's group and their interests. Therefore, democracy is the most "perfect" and human form of the relations between the individual and the state, but at the same time, the most difficult and

the least "natural." Democracy is fundamentally optimistic, believing in the "human" character of man and society, in their perfectability and educability, but it must be pessimistic and wise enough to recognize the inevitable shortcomings inherent in the character of men and every form of their organization. Democracy is, therefore, never a lasting final accomplishment, nor is it, however, a utopia. It is a permanent growth and struggle for the self-realization of men and humanity. In view of the relatively very short time that democracy has existed as a political form and a social philosophy, its success and its vitality are surprising. At the same time it is little wonder that, since its incipient triumph in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it has been subjected again and again to violent attacks by the non-democratic forms of the relation between the state and the individual.

These set against the principle of liberty the principle of authority, against the equality of democracy the fundamental inequality of aristocracy, whether based upon birth or wealth, race or creed. They proclaim generally the priority and superiority of the state over the individual. The state has its own aims, generally the preservation and expansion of the power of a dynasty or a class, a people, a race, or a religious group. The individual serves these aims. The autonomy of the individual is not recognized; he does not share in the process of making law. The American and the French revolutions established the first modern democracies. In America, a country without a past and with vast resources, very remote from Europe, democracy could develop without being attacked in its foundations by pre-democratic forces and traditions. In Europe these forces organized again and again in an attack upon the "dangerous thought" of the French Revolution and its consequences, the liberty and equality of all individuals.

The opposition to democracy took different forms in the first half of the nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth centuries. One hundred years ago the opposition appeared in what was popularly known as the Holy Alliance; at present it is generally termed fascism. In spite of far-reaching differences between these two movements, they are united in their repudiation of the basic principles of democracy—liberty and equality of all individuals. After the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, democracy made definite progress everywhere in Europe, first in western Europe and later on even in

Germany and Russia. The classes and the traditions, the power of which predated the eighteenth century, still kept their influence in a varying degree in central and eastern Europe, but they were on the defensive, and practically everywhere constitutions were introduced with guarantees for the liberties of the individual.

At the beginning of the twentieth century even Turkey, Persia, and China were on their way towards a modern constitutional regime. The outcome of the World War seemed to mark a great triumph for democracy. The Peace Congress of Paris realized most of the aspirations of nineteenth century democracy. The leading statesmen who met there were not any more members of the old aristocracy, as they had been not only at the Congress of Vienna, but also at the congresses of Paris in 1856 and of Berlin in 1878. They were members of the new middle classes and their progressive, even radical, wing. The conservative monarchies of the Holy Alliance were gone; republics took their place; democratic constitutions were everywhere introduced; members of socialist and labor parties occupied for the first time in many countries the seat of power; suffrage was made general, women received the vote, the welfare and social progress of the working classes were declared common concerns of humanity. Democracy seemed victorious beyond many daring dreams of the nineteenth century.

From the point of view of an historian the question could have arisen then whether this triumph of democracy had not come too fast. The relation of the individual and the state is determined by three factors: the prevailing morale and communal psychology, the social and economic structure of society, and the development of political technique. It is difficult to assign priority to any of these three factors; in reality they are always closely interlinked and interdependent. Democracy cannot be fulfilled and certainly cannot be preserved unless the intellectual, economic, and political development of a community has reached a maturity in which the individuals may be trusted to maintain a reasonable balance between individual liberty and social integration, and when this has been achieved by a spontaneous struggle and effort on the part of the people and by a long-lasting training and tradition. In 1918 only the peoples of western Europe and Scandinavia, besides the United States, had reached this stage of development, and these only after

a struggle and preparation of more than a century, and under favorable social and economic conditions. The populations of the empires of the Romanovs, the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs, and the Ottoman Sultans were still under the domination of an intellectual, political, and economic order which had yielded only partly to the influences emanating from the British, American, and French revolutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

THE INDIVIDUAL UNDER FASCISM AND COMMUNISM

In central and eastern Europe a twofold opposition arose against democracy, communism, and fascism. Both are fundamentally opposed in their aims, and practically identical in their methods. The aim of communism is not opposed to some conclusions to be derived from the principles of the three great western revolutions. The ultimate goal it professes is a society of free and equal individuals. But on the march to the supposed or proclaimed goal the individual, his dignity, and his liberty are entirely crushed by, and submerged in, the exigencies of the state. Thus with all lip-service recognition to a future "perfect" democracy, the foundation of democracy—the free individual—is annihilated. There is, however, one fundamental difference of aim between democracy and communism. Democracy believes in man as man; communism believes only in the working class. Thus communism does not deal with the concrete reality of the individual, but with the abstraction of the proletariat.

Fascism, which comprises national socialism resembles communism in its methods. Mussolini and Hitler have learned much in their technique from Lenin. Both fascism and communism have tried to reduce to a minimum the tension between individual liberty and social integration. They have tried to do it by practically abolishing individuality and extolling social integration to the utmost. Mussolini has expressed it in his *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism* in a characteristic way: "The individual in the Fascist state is not annulled but rather multiplied, just in the same way that the soldier in a regiment is not diminished but rather increased by the number of his comrades." Mussolini fails to understand that it is the meaning of democracy that an individual cannot be multiplied and regimented like a soldier. Therefore he goes on in the same characteristic manner: "The Fascist state organizes the

nation, but leaves a sufficient margin of liberty to the individual. The latter is deprived of all useless and possibly harmful freedom but retains what is essential; the deciding power in this question cannot be the individual, but the state alone." This "solution" makes the individual entirely dependent upon the state. The individual is not more than the state allows him to be. His autonomy and liberty are submerged in the all-powerful state.

The tension between individual liberty and social integration grows with the growing complexity of the modern world. With populations unaccustomed to individual liberty and autonomy or with a great dead weight of feudal or autocratic traditions or of illiterate and lethargic masses, communism and fascism seem to offer a relaxation of the tension, a short-cut out of the painful and difficult travail of democracy into an apparent security. Communism tries a shortcut to a glorified future, and sacrifices the happiness and rights of the present individuals to that future. Fascism escapes into a glorified past, the Roman Empire or the pre-Christian Germans, and tries to mold the present individuals according to a standard which predates not only the three Western revolutions, but even Christianity.

Communism and fascism are united in their contempt for "decaying" democracy, in the aggressive exuberance of their "youth," in the vehemence of their language, and in their dislike for compromise and toleration. But communism is a product of the social philosophy of nineteenth century Europe. It is not only a political technique, it is a rational system; an attempt at an understanding of the general process of history and society. Fascism is much more of a pure political technique, without a definite rational philosophy. It is based upon an emotional urge for group power. In communism even the proletariat has a general function for the whole of humanity. Fascism is concerned only with its own group, its interests and growth. This group is, in the case of Italian fascism, the state, in the case of German national socialism, the racial group, or folk. Fascism has no universal message, no generous appeal to humanity. In this respect it differs not only from communism and democracy, but also from the Holy Alliance. As Mussolini said: "Fascism repudiates any universal embrace." Fascism in all its forms is the first great movement in history which denies, on principle and in its

hods, the idea of universal justice, of charity, and of peace.¹ s, fascism runs counter not only to democracy but also to all the dished foundations of civilization. It is a return to primitive l society, but equipped with the weapons of the most modern nique and science. The fascist leaders and philosophers pro n openly and defiantly the unbridgeable gulf separating them i democracy and all forms of liberal and rational humanism or stian brotherhood, compassion and humility.

his return to a primitive or "natural" stage, to a biological malism as in German national socialism or to a glorification of er and strength as in all fascism, threatens not only peace, but that refinement of man's conscience, of his awareness of his w man's wants and ills which had grown up slowly and pain- r since the eighteenth century. But fascism may be a blessing in uise to democracy; it can reinvigorate democracy. Democracy, id of its successes at the beginning of the twentieth century, steeped in complacency. It took the constitutional liberties of individual for granted. It forgot that they were of very recent in and had been gained by a hard and enthusiastic fight. They led for their preservation, for their spread and growth, a cont alertness, a permanent revitalization.

iscism and communism claim sometimes to be also "demo- c," because they represent the will of the majority of a nation. democracy means infinitely more than simply the prevalence ie will of the majority. Democracy expresses itself not only in form of the laws, but even more in their content and spirit. iocracy protects the individual and minorities against the om- tent will of the state, whether this will emanates from an vidual, king or leader, or from a majority of the people. Democ- has developed a system of liberty to protect the rights of the vidual and of minorities. Freedom of thought and of the ex- sion of opinion, the guarantee of the due process of law, and equality of rights without exception are some of the funda- tal safeguards of democracy. These liberties, denied by com- ism and fascism with their ideal of regimentation, allow peace- adaptation to changing circumstances. Their great formal value e recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, when ef Justice Hughes said, speaking for a unanimous court:

The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional right of free speech, free press, and free assembly, in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsible to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.

These liberties have a material value in addition to their formal value. They are based upon the recognition that every human being is a fellow man, equal in his right to liberty and to the quest for happiness. Although democracy is convinced that reasoning is a better instrument for social justice and readjustment than force, it must be watchful, and never can tolerate the advocacy of intolerance which would destroy the freedom and equality of individuals.

Democracy, from its beginnings in the three great Western revolutions, had a universal appeal. Its message was never confined to one class or one nation or one racial group. It tried to determine not only the relation between the individual and the state, but also between individual and individual, between state and state, between man and humanity. There is nothing exclusive in democracy, although it may penetrate only slowly and after struggles to widening circles of classes and peoples. All the fighters for democracy identified their cause with that of humanity. In the birth hour of democracy, in the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, John Milton, in his *Second Defense of the Peoples of England*, exclaimed:

Surrounded by congregated multitudes, I now imagine that, from the columns of Hercules to the Indian Ocean, I behold the nations of the earth recovering that liberty which they so long had lost; and that the people of this island are transporting to other countries a plant of more beneficial qualities and more noble growth than that which Triptolemus is reported to have carried from region to region; that they are disseminating the blessings of civilization among cities, kingdoms, and nations.

Democracy did not always live up to its own promises. It tried to reserve its blessings to privileged classes or privileged races. It

has not yet fulfilled its promises by far. It is still young; democracy has had barely more than a century to grow. Its main task is still ahead: the enlargement of democracy and all that it implies, liberty and equality, dignity and happiness, to embrace all classes, to provide equal opportunity for every man in every walk and condition of life. Not less difficult and important will be its enlargement to embrace all peoples, even the most backward ones, in a co-operative federation of mankind. The founders of the Second French Republic, which established universal male suffrage for the first time in Europe, never again to disappear from France, saw in their republic only the beginning of a Universal Republic. The greatest artistic expression which democracy has found, the Fourth Movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, culminates in the universal embrace of Schiller's *Ode to Joy*: "Seid umschlungen, Millionen! Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt!"

The nineteenth century was concerned primarily with the relations between the individual and the state. In western Europe and in the United States, as well as to the generation of 1848, liberty meant primarily the autonomy of the individual and its protection against the state. The word liberty received an entirely different connotation in its use in central Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Then, especially since Bismarck, liberty meant not the autonomy of the individual within the state, but the liberty and power of the nation within the international community. National liberty threatened to absorb personal liberty. This new situation emphasized the necessity to democratize not only the life within a nation, but also that between nations.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND INTERNATIONALISM

The twentieth century became concerned with democracy in the international field. Under the impulse of the cosmopolitan rationalism of the eighteenth century and of the French Revolution Immanuel Kant proclaimed the philosophical necessity of eternal peace and of a cosmopolitan society. In his *Idee zu eine allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, he stipulates that the greatest problem for the human race is the creation of a world republic, and he recognizes that the solution of the problem of a good national constitution depends upon the solution of the international

problem of the relations between nations. During the World War Kant's proposal for a League of Nations was taken up by Woodrow Wilson.

Democracy means the equality of the individuals and the protection of the weaker by law within a nation. Theoretically democracy is closely connected with peace. It tries to maintain peace and peacefully change nationality. Its interests demand that it tries the same internationally. Democracy maintains a very delicate balance between the right of the individual and the needs of social integration. Under conditions of modern warfare with their total mobilization of all resources this balance cannot be maintained. War necessarily curtails the full exercise of democratic liberties. The principles of an army are fundamentally opposed to the principles of democracy: the latter is based on individual liberty, on discussion, on moderation and charity; the army, on authority, discipline and aggressiveness. Fascist countries model their life according to the example of the army and pride themselves upon the warrior spirit of their populations. Their whole civic life is based upon authority, discipline, and aggressiveness. Fascism is the mightiest organization for war ever conceived, politically, intellectually, and economically. Fascism can thrive only in an international atmosphere which gives room for the exercise of warlike virtues and of aggressiveness, and it presupposes such an atmosphere. Democracy withers or is endangered in a similar atmosphere. It presupposes an international order on the basis of the complete equality of all nations and races, and of the protection of the weaker by law binding upon the community of nations.

With the growing interdependence of all nations and the shrinking of the earth through technical progress, the establishment of international democracy by a league or federation of nations becomes imperative for the preservation and growth of democracy. An international world order, as first outlined in Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations, carries the idea of universal human solidarity to its logical conclusion. Under present circumstances no nation can remain indifferent to the fate of a fellow nation. An orderly progressive development is possible only when the obligations of law are recognized. The insistence on the right of the stronger, on privileges for the more powerful, better-armed or more "progressive"

racés, on national self-interest and honor as supreme arbiters must lead to an international chaos, which suggests the most primitive stage of social development. Nationally we have left this stage of development far behind us. Internationally we are still in its midst. Democracy could be safe in the nineteenth century within national boundaries. It cannot any more in the twentieth.

As Kant and Woodrow Wilson foresaw, the League of Nations must be built upon the acceptance of the principles of democracy. The establishment of international law would protect the weak as well as the strong, would create a new sense of security, would remove fear and suspicion. The establishment of national law at the beginning of modern time made civic disarmament possible; the establishment of international law will make national disarmament possible. Then it will be possible to proceed to political and economical readjustments, to a struggle for the rise of the standard of living on a world-wide scale. The ideas of the League of Nations, peace, equality, universalism, are the direct outcome of democracy. It would be a fundamental mistake, destroying the organization, if the League should include openly anti-democratic members, flaunting their opposition to its ideas. Democracy is nowhere realized in a perfect form; all existing democracies are in need of more democratization. But it is essential that the direction of the way be clearly recognized and sincerely acknowledged. The inclusion of members who heartily disapprove of the direction of the way and proclaim their readiness to do everything to block it can scarcely fail to destroy the League of Nations.

Without its system of collective security the twentieth century is doomed to have wars of growing scope and frightfulness. These wars and their threat will make it more and more difficult to maintain and spread democracy.² The economic problems of today demand as much of an international solution and an international order as the political problems. With the growing complexity of economic life and with its accomplished international interdependence, the maintenance of the balance between individual liberties and social integration depends more and more upon the solution of world-wide economic problems. This solution can be attempted only in an atmosphere of mutual good will and peaceful co-operation.

The main progress of modern society proceeded along two lines,

the re-statement of the relations between the individual and the state on the basis of individual autonomy and equality, and the growth of human solidarity. The foundations have been laid by the three great Western revolutions. In the twentieth century even the most distant peoples have been drawn into the Great Society. The awakening of dormant masses and races into the common consciousness renders the task of democracy infinitely more difficult, its failures and shortcomings infinitely graver, but at the same time its achievement and struggles infinitely more promising.

NOTES

1. In National Socialist Germany it is frequently claimed that the German "revolution" of today resembles the English Revolution of the seventeenth century. Ernest Barker has rightly shown how unfounded this claim is. (*Oliver Cromwell and the English People*, Cambridge University Press, 1937.) Cromwell and his Puritan contemporaries cherished a sort of nationalism, but the community for which they cherished this feeling was not decided by blood but by faith. It was a nation by adoption and grace, after the manner of the Old Testament, a new Israel. This nationalism runs easily and naturally into internationalism. Cromwell was profoundly an individualist, concerned with the direct relation between God and the individual, fundamentally opposed to uniformity. The interest of the nation was never with him an absolute or ultimate goal. It was subordinated to the interests of universal Christianity and to the liberty of individual faith.

2. The attempt to establish an international order of collective security through the League of Nations has failed, at present, because the British Government, then in the hands of the Conservative Party, did not take the democratic principles seriously in 1931 and in 1936. Arnold J. Toynbee in his *Survey of International Affairs 1935*, Vol. 2, *Abyssinia and Italy* (Oxford University Press, 1936) has put the problem squarely before us:

At a time when the parochialism of the latest age was rapidly being turned into an anachronism by the forced march of technical progress, it might confidently be assumed that the destiny of Western society was some form of social and political unification. . . . One way towards unification of the world would be for the British Commonwealth of Nations, in collaboration with France and with a number of other liberal-minded communities, to build itself into a League of Nations constituted on the democratic pattern and informed with a democratic spirit, and to lay stone on stone—never ceasing from mental strife nor letting the sword sleep in the hand—until this voluntary association should have become substantially secure and approximately world-wide. This was, indeed, the enterprise to which the United Kingdom and France, on emerging from the ordeal of 1914-18, had officially dedicated themselves in company with all their fellow states members of the then inaugurated League; and then once their intuition had thus prompted them to take the tide of Destiny at the flood, they had

started on their voyage with the fairest prospect of its leading on to Fortune. . . . Yet, in 1936, . . . it looked as though the strain of "making the World safe for Democracy" by force of arms had broken the nerve of the official victors in the last General War, and broken it so seriously that they were now finding themselves morally incapable of making the lesser efforts and taking the slighter risks that must still be faced if the true harvest of the victory of 1918 was to be triumphantly gathered in. . . . They were confronted with a choice between making the post-war system of law and order genuinely work or else seeing the frail structure relapse into the chaotic anarchy which had begotten not only the war of 1914-18 but one war behind another before that.

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CHAPTER 32

THE CATHOLIC VIEW OF PEACE

Marie J. Carroll

Since the solution of international problems on a sound and permanent basis can be reached only through the acceptance and application of moral principles embodied in agreements for the establishment and maintenance of order, the Catholic viewpoint on the questions of war and peace, based upon the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, warrants examination.

No other religious organization has such a solid and well-defined international moral code on peace and war as the Catholic Church. This system of ethical principles and rules applicable to the relations among states has been built up in the course of centuries by the papal encyclicals, notably that on the Re-establishment of Christian Peace (*Pacem Dei*, May 23, 1920) by Pope Benedict XV and that on The Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ (*Ubi Arcano*, December 23, 1922) by Pope Pius XI, and by the teachings of Catholic theologians. Catholics, furthermore, are being constantly urged by their ecclesiastical authorities to strive for peace by specific and practical methods and to follow the inspiring appeals made by the popes to make the teachings of Christ on peace better known. The pages in Catholic Church history devoted to the record of her efforts in the organization of international peace show clearly and unequivocally the influence wielded by the papacy in the field of international arbitration and in the development of international law.

EARLY STATEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS

The first systematic work in creating a system of international ethics, or international law, was performed by the theologians, Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo Soto and the jurist, Baltasar de Ayala. These were followed by the Jesuits, Molina and Suárez. Gentili published his *De Legationibus Libri Tres* in 1589. The great

work of Grotius, who often has been called "the father of international law," *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, did not make its appearance until 1625.

From the early days leading scholars and doctors of the Catholic Church interested themselves in definitions or descriptions of the principles of international conduct based upon the precepts of the natural law. Most of the underlying principles of international law may be found in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, who exerted a great influence upon the world of his day by the publication of his *Summa Totius Theologiae* in 1274. In this treatise he pointed out the sinfulness of war and the impropriety of bishops and clerics taking part in war, and this counsel was preached by the Dominican order. Many of the maxims which have become classics in dissertations of the law governing war can be traced back to this book. The ethical opinions of the Thomist school of philosophy undoubtedly influenced other writers toward the end of the fourteenth century.

One of the most eminent Spanish theologians, Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), who antedated Grotius, and who is specifically mentioned by him not only in his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, but also in his *De Jure Praedae*, was admitted to the Sorbonne in 1540 and, upon returning to Spain, delivered his famous dissertations in 1552 at the University of Salamanca on the ethics of Spanish dominion in the New World, which have been collected in *De Indis* and *De Jure Belli Hispanorum in Barbaros*. He held that the Church had the right to act independently in such a way as not to disregard the political power of princes; but only through the medium of her spiritual authority. Another Spaniard, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), a member of the Society of Jesus at Salamanca, expounded the ethical principles and underlying international law in his extensive works, which, together with those of Vitoria relating to law and international relations, have been translated into English and published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The addresses delivered at the Catholic University of America in commemoration of the fourth centenary of the lectures of Vitoria and also the contributions of Suárez to the foundations of international law throw additional light upon the extraordinary talents of these great philosophers. It should be borne in mind that the funda-

mental principles elaborated by Grotius in his work are fundamentally the same as those outlined by Suárez and Vitoria.

Two other outstanding Catholic scholars should be mentioned, Baltasar de Ayala, a Spanish jurist, whose fame has been preserved in his *De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari*, and Alberico Gentili, an Italian, who was forced to leave his native city and flee to England because of his opinions. He became a professor of civil law at Oxford University, where he published his treatise, *De Jure Belli Commentatio Prima*, in the fall of 1588. It was to this work that Grotius (who was indebted, as he says, to the Fathers of the Church "who often manifest great genius" in their writings) admitted he owed great assistance in the writing of his own famous compilation which was "to lift international law out of the slough of despond" into which it had fallen.

NATURAL LAW

The teachings set forth by these Catholic writers of the past have always stressed the natural as a more pervasive and fundamental element than have those of many modern authorities who regard international law as a purely positive collection of treaties, customs, and usages accepted by the nations. Since the precepts of the Law of Nations are based upon human nature, they are the same for all peoples. They constitute a common code of world law, even though all nations may not interpret or apply them in exactly the same way. The problem of creating an adequate international code is for the most part the problem of incorporating the principles and conclusions of the natural law in a form applicable to the actual conditions of civilized nations. An ideal code of international law would contain the pertinent principles and rules of the natural law plus all those positive enactments which are necessary for right relations among states.

Against all theories which either expressly or by implication assert that the state is independent of the moral law, the Catholic Church sets forth her position that states, like individuals, are subject to the moral precepts of both nature and revelation. Since the state is a community of human beings it is as truly subject to the moral law as any private society. Its acts are the acts of an organized group of human beings. Its international conduct affects other human

beings. While its end is primarily the welfare of its own members, it must attain that end with due regard to the welfare of persons who are outside its jurisdiction, just as the acts of a family must be consistent with the rights and claims of other families. Hence, the state is bound by the precepts of justice, charity, veracity, and all the other moral rules which govern human relations. Every international action of a state must be justified or condemned in the light of its effect upon the welfare of human beings. The moral claims of all state groups are of equal intrinsic worth. Injury done by one state to another is injury done to human beings. Therefore, just as no state has a right to harm its own members, neither is it justified in causing damage to the members of other states.

The essential purpose of the state is to promote the welfare of its members as a whole, as united in families, and as grouped in social classes. The principal rights of states relate to self-preservation and self-development. Under the former is included the right to continue as an independent state, moral immunity from forcible subjection to another state. Hence it implies the right of self-defense by all legitimate means. The state has a right to require its members to defend the common good against aggression. The right of self-preservation implies also the right of a state to prevent by proportionately just means other states from fostering seditious doctrines and movements within its territory. All the moral presumptions, however, are against the use of armed force in such situations.

The right of a state to self-development must, of course, be exercised with due regard to the rights of other states. It does not justify conquest, nor making the flag follow either migration or trade, nor forcible annexation of territory which had once been subject to the state that thus seeks expansion. The welfare and preferences of the present inhabitants of the territory, as well as the just interests of the state of which they now form a part, constitute much stronger ethical claims than any that can be derived from merely historical considerations.

One of the most important means of national self-development is regular international intercourse. The individual cannot live a normal life nor adequately develop his personality unless he exchanges goods, material, moral, and intellectual, with his fellows. He needs their co-operation and they need his. One of the most striking proofs

of this obligation is derived from the common right of all persons to use and enjoy the bounty of nature. Men cannot exercise this right equitably unless they hold constant intercourse with one another. Similarly, states cannot promote the welfare of their members adequately nor use the common bounty of nature equitably unless they hold intercourse with one another. Probably the most powerful interferences with international intercourse are customs tariffs, export taxes, and embargoes and restrictions upon immigration.

In the matter of treaty obligations, generally speaking, states have both the right and the duty to form agreements for the establishment of international intercourse. The moral obligation of international treaties is obviously based upon the natural law. Human welfare demands that just agreements should be observed whether among individuals or among those groups that we call states. The obligation of a state to observe a treaty which has been unjustly imposed upon it is a very difficult ethical question. According to the prevailing view of Catholic moralists, the menace to the common welfare, if individual states were left ethically free to decide whether an agreement was extortionate and whether it should be kept, would outweigh the burden inflicted upon particular states. The common good might also require the unjustly treated state to observe treaty provisions which the offending state has no right to exact. The provisions of treaties which terminate wars are universally binding unless they have been made under extreme duress and inflict an extreme amount of injustice.

Relations among states are governed by the precepts of justice and charity. Charity is as necessary for human welfare among states as among individuals. Two specific duties of international charity require particular emphasis in our time. The first is the duty of curbing nationalism and excessive patriotism. The obverse side of this duty is to develop and promote a reasonable and moderate internationalism. Justice requires a state to promote peace for the sake of its own members, whereas charity obliges it to pursue the same end for the welfare of both itself and other nations. These duties rest not only upon governments, but also upon peoples, particularly upon those persons and organizations which can exert influence upon public opinion and upon political rulers.

THE MORALITY OF WAR

On the question of the morality of war, the Catholic Church follows the natural law, which clearly authorizes the individual to defend himself by force against unjust aggression. All the arguments that justify force in the vindication of individual rights are fully applicable to the groups known as states. Moreover, the individual is morally free to refrain from violent self-defense when he is not definitely responsible for the welfare of others, as is a husband or a father, whereas the obligations of the state to its members forbid it to indulge in such self denial.

For a war to be just, however, certain conditions must be fulfilled. In general all possible means must be taken to avoid war. The five conditions necessary and sufficient to justify a state in entering upon war are: actual or certainly imminent violation of rights; moral certainty that this is the situation; a degree of evil in the injury proportionate to the evils involved in war; inefficiency of peaceful means; and a well-grounded hope of bringing about better conditions. The sovereign authority must also declare the war and it must possess the right intention. In few, if any, modern wars have all these conditions been observed by the nations which initiated hostilities. Indeed, an honest attempt to observe all these conditions would make war practically impossible.

The report *International Ethics*, of the Catholic Association for International Peace, from which the summary given above has been extracted, also states:

One of the greatest obstacles to peace has always been the lazy assumption that wars must come, that there will always be war while men are men. So long as this pessimism prevails, the majority of persons will not assert themselves in the cause of peace. World peace is largely, if not mainly, a matter of human faith. If the majority of people believe that peace can be established and secured, peace will be established and secured. We must persistently show that a reign of peace is feasible, until this idea and this faith become a dominating and effective element in the habitual thinking of an average man and woman.

Our great duty in fulfilling our obligation of promoting world peace is to consider fairly and to support, so far as our abilities

and conscience permit, practical proposals and arrangements for preventing war and making peace secure. In general terms these methods are pretty definitely formulated and pretty generally accepted. . . . The substitution of moral right for material force, general disarmament, compulsory arbitration of disputes among states, the codification of international law, an international tribunal of justice and an association of nations, such is a complete and coherent summary of the practical methods available for the prevention of war. In the present condition of international affairs they all seem to be not only in harmony with, but also demanded by the principles of morality, the principles of international right. World peace seems to be unattainable unless every one of these proposals and devices is somehow made to function. As sincere lovers of peace, it is our duty to consider them sympathetically and adequately, and, in the light of that examination, support any of them that wins our approval.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND INTERNATIONALISM

The translation of the works on peace and war of such eminent European scholars as de la Briere, Ragout, Josef Müller, and the distribution of John Eppstein's *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations* have greatly contributed to the literature now available in America for an intelligent understanding of the Catholic position on the international problems of our time. An elaborate report, *The Organization of a World Society*, sponsored by all the various committees of the Association, delineates the constituent elements necessary for such a universal Christian commonwealth of nations and the moral, social, economic, and political obligations of membership in such a world society.

In his encyclical on Pentecost Sunday, 1920, *International Conciliation* (Pacem), Pope Benedict XV laid particular stress upon the association of the states in an international organization:

All states should put aside mutual suspicion and unite in one sole society, or rather family, of peoples, both to guarantee their own independence and safeguard order in the civil concert of the peoples. A special reason, not to mention others, for forming this society among the nations is the need generally recognized of reducing, if it is not possible to abolish entirely, the enormous military expenditure which can no longer be borne by the state,

in order that in this way murderous and disastrous wars may be prevented and to each people may be assured, within just confines, the independence and integrity of its own territory.

The same pontiff in his letter to the belligerent governments, in August 1917, offering a plan of peace for the termination of the World War, recommended that the nations enter upon a just agreement for the simultaneous and reciprocal reduction of armaments, and that "in place of armed force should be substituted the noble and the peaceful institution of arbitration according to regulations to be made and penalties to be imposed upon any state which might refuse either to submit a national question to such a tribunal or to accept its decision." In his letter to the American people on the last day of the year, 1918, he reiterated his fervent desire for an international organization which, "by abolishing conscription will reduce armaments; by establishing international tribunals will eliminate or settle disputes; and by placing peace on a solid foundation will guarantee to all independence and equality of rights."

His successor, Pope Pius XI, has condemned in the strongest terms, in his encyclicals, *Peace, Reconstructing the Social Order*, and in his various addresses, Consistorial Allocutions, and other messages, "false patriotism" and "a hard and selfish nationalism" which destroys the Christian ideal "that all men are our brothers and members of the same great human family, and that other nations have an equal right with us both to life and prosperity. . . ."

Yet, says Carlton J. H. Hayes, in *Patriotism, Nationalism and the Brotherhood of Man*, a report of the Committee on National Attitudes of the Catholic Association for International Peace:

Despite the age-long preaching of the Christian gospel and the progressive expansion of Christendom, despite the newer industrial and commercial bases for a common material civilization throughout the world, the fact must be faced that the rise and spread of a popular and exaggerated nationalism has been a concurrent phenomenon of recent times and that it now constitutes a major obstacle to the realization of human brotherhood. This nationalism may be a "myth," but, if so, it is an extraordinarily potent myth, commanding the ardent allegiance of more and more peoples and inspiring widespread popular attitudes and activities quite at variance with the ideals of world unity.

The Catholic Church expects and counsels every Christian to be patriotic, in the proper sense, to the national state of which he is a citizen—to its land, to its people, to its tradition and culture. Pope Pius XI proclaimed in his encyclical, *Caritate Christi*, May 3, 1932:

Right order of Christian charity does not disapprove of lawful love of country and a sentiment of justifiable nationalism; on the contrary, it controls, sanctifies and enlivens them. If, however, egoism, abusing this love of country and exaggerating this sentiment of nationalism, insinuates itself into the relations between nationality and nationality, there is no excess that will not seem justified; and that which between individuals would be judged blameworthy by all, is then considered lawful and praiseworthy if it is done in the name of this exaggerated nationalism. Instead of the great law of love and human brotherhood, which embraces and holds in a single family all nations and peoples with one Father Who is in Heaven, there enters hatred, driving all to destruction.

The Catholic Church is primarily interested in the individual and his eternal salvation. Accordingly, the Church's doctrine does not require for its support that its followers adopt any definite type of political government. The Christian philosophy of peace, however, is based upon the conviction that true peace, like true law, must have a moral basis in justice, and not be based merely upon the physical foundation of force. The Church has, therefore, a basic international philosophy which transcends the limits of any state. She is opposed to the type of nationalism which makes the nation an end in itself, which elevates the functions of the state into a pseudo-religion, contradictory to the tenets of Christianity. The Catholic Church has consistently denied the absolute sovereignty of the state, and has placed herself on record as opposed to the needless conflict of nationalities within her communion. The claim of the national state to sovereign authority over religion and education, over families, and especially over the upbringing of children has been vigorously denounced by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical, *The Church in Germany*, March 14, 1937:

He who takes race or nationality or state or form of government out of its earthly valuation and makes it the ultimate norm of all, even of religious, values, and deifies it with an idolatrous wor-

ship, perverts and falsifies the order of things created and commanded by God. It is a heresy to speak of a national God, of a national religion. It is madness to try to confine within the boundaries of a single people, within the narrow blood stream of a single race, God, the Creator of the world, the King and Lawgiver of all peoples. It is a duty to defend the sovereign rights of God against aggressive neopaganism.

This tendency to raise racial origin to the plane of a deity before whom all other men should bend the knee in worship and reverence was attacked by Pope Pius XI for the third time in two weeks on July 29, 1938, when the Holy Father, speaking to a group of missionary students from the College of the Propagation (of the Faith) defended Catholic Action against the attacks made on it by fascist governments and deplored the new Italian racial theories sponsored by the Ministry of Popular Culture. A group of fascist professors issued a report on July 21 in which the Italian people were declared to be of "Aryan" origin and it also asserted "that Jews do not belong to the Italian race." Pope Pius XI said:

We ask ourselves why Italy, with unhappy imitation, felt it necessary to copy Germany. . . . Catholic life means activity, compounded of charity, of virtue and of God's law which, permeating such life makes it the life of God. There is no other way of thinking in the Catholic sense and such a way is neither racist, nor nationalist nor separatist. . . . No, not separatism! We do not wish to separate anything in the human family. We regard racism and exaggerated nationalism as barriers raised between man and man, between people and people, between nation and nation. . . . Catholic Action, like the Catholic Church is Catholic, in other words, universal. . . . It is forgotten that humankind, the whole of humankind, is a single great universal human race. All men are, above all, members of the same great kind. They all belong to the single great family of the living.

There is, on the other hand, an exaggerated and dangerous kind of internationalism, which in its purely economic and political aspect is commonly known as communism. The doctrines of Marxism go beyond the limits of race, language, or territory and extend their appeal to groups differing widely as regards geographical situation, and racial and linguistic affinity. By means of a social revolution of

the workers, communism hopes to bring about an international dictatorship of the "proletariat." The internationalism of materialism advocated by all communist writers was condemned by Pope Benedict in 1920, after the establishment of the Soviet Union. Communism is avowedly materialistic and atheistic, and as such has been pronounced by Pope Pius XI, in his encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris*, of March 19, 1937, as "the first, the greatest, and most widespread menace." Catholics are obligated to oppose the spread of communism, but they are precluded by numerous papal pronouncements from using the weapon of anti-Christian nationalism. A thoroughly Christian patriotism and internationalism should be employed to combat the evils of communism and racism.

Dr. Hayes, an outstanding authority on the definition of "nationalism," states in his study, quoted above:

But the internationalism which is compatible with Christian teaching and which the Catholic Church exemplifies and positively enjoins is simply an honest and reasoned respect for the rights of all nations and for a pacific world order. It involves an appreciation of the ties of blood, nature, interest, and culture which knit together individuals and nations, indeed the whole human race. It calls for recognition of the claims of humanity, as well as of one's own nationality or locality, and for the sympathetic regard for serious efforts at international co-operation. Particularly does it call for a lessening of economic nationalism, for a halt on nationalistic imperialism, for a reduction of national armaments, for an eradication of national and racial prejudices, and, in general, for the reversal of policies and attitudes which militate against justice and charity in the mutual relationship of peoples and in the advance of common civilization.

If the four hundred million and more Catholics in the world were to heed the call of Rome and further the will to international peace and friendship, the menace of war which now walks abroad would be immeasurably lessened. It is encouraging to know that active efforts are being made to give voice to this will to peace.

THE CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

In his little book, *A Primer of Peace and War*, the Reverend Charles Plater, S. J., states that the most effective method for attain-

ing peace is through the education of public opinion by means of study clubs, lectures, popular literature, instruction in the schools, and peace societies.

The initial step for the organization of a Catholic association in the United States, devoted particularly to international peace and good international relations, was taken at a meeting called by the Social Action Department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference immediately following the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, June, 1926, where representatives of a dozen nations met informally with Americans for discussion. A resolution was adopted calling upon all organizations of Catholics in the United States to work for peace. The Catholic Association for International Peace, which came into existence on April 20, 1927, with the sanction of the American hierarchy, maintains headquarters in Washington, D. C. Its purpose is to help American public opinion, and particularly Catholics, in the task of ascertaining more fully the facts of international life and of deciding more accurately what ought to be done to the end that the relations between nations may become just, charitable, and peaceful. Being an association of Americans, it directs itself in a special manner to the international relations of the United States. It works in a double tradition: in the American tradition of political democracy under which citizens have the right and the duty to join in the general formation of foreign policy; and in the Catholic tradition of justice, charity, and peace to all mankind. Its task is the fusion of these two traditions.

The constitution of the Association sets forth that:

the objects and purposes of this Association shall be to study, disseminate and apply the principles of natural law and Christian charity to international problems of the day; to consider the moral and legal aspects of any action which may be proposed or advocated in the international sphere; to examine and consider issues which bear upon international good will; to encourage the formation of conferences, lectures and study circles with the view of educating Catholic opinion upon the subjects relating to international morality and of acquainting, as far as possible, the general public with the Church's teachings upon these matters; to issue reports on questions of international importance; to consider and arrange for the publication in the Catholic and secular press of

selected articles by Catholic writers of different countries; and to further, in co-operation with similar Catholic organizations in other countries, in accord with the teachings of the Church, the object and purposes of world peace and happiness. The ultimate purpose shall be to promote, in conformity with the mind of the Church, the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ.

To carry out its aims, the Association enlists the aid of scholars in the fields of history, economics, social and political science, theology, philosophy, education, and international law and relations for the preparation of the research material of its committees' reports. Over twenty-five of these reports, in addition to a *Syllabus on International Relations and A Primer of Peace*, by Charles G. Fenwick, president of the Association, have already been published. Study outlines for use in the colleges and among lay groups have been prepared on practically every phase of the peace problem.

The Association has been particularly active in the initiation of discussion groups and clubs for the study of international relations. These groups and clubs have been established in seminaries, in Catholic high schools and colleges, and in lay societies. Catholic youth throughout the United States has responded to the appeal of Pope Pius XI, in his Christmas Allocution, December 24, 1930, to extend Catholic Action, when he said: "To Catholics of all the world and particularly those who study, labor and pray in Catholic Action, We turn today with this warm invitation and plea. May they all unite in the peace of Christ and for the peace of Christ in a full concord of thoughts and emotions, of desires and prayers, of deeds and words—the spoken word, the written word, the printed word—and then an atmosphere of genuine peace, warming and beneficent, will envelop the world."

This enthusiasm has resulted in the establishment of some ten regional Student Peace Federations, affiliated with the Catholic Association for International Peace, to co-ordinate and extend the peace activities of students in Catholic universities, colleges, and Newman Clubs in non-Catholic institutions. A yearly program of study decided upon by the students elected as delegates to the annual national convention is followed, and discussions on important issues confronting youth today are held in the various regions in semi-annual conferences.

EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR PEACE

In many countries of Europe, Catholic organization for peace has found expression both in the formation of national peace groups and in affiliation with international associations interested in the study of peace problems. Before the World War, the international organization of Catholics in the peace movement was not very extensive. However, in 1911, on the initiative of Alfred Vanderpol of France, *La Ligue Internationale Catholique pour la Paix* (The International Catholic League for Peace) was formed in Brussels for the purpose of studying the Church's doctrine on peace and war as exemplified in the writings of Vitoria and Suárez. This organization, which had national centers in many European countries, did not survive the war.

Peace activities in France were resumed after the war by the League of French Catholics for International Justice and Peace, founded in 1921, and sponsored by His Eminence Jean Cardinal Verdier. The editor of its monthly organ, *Justice et Paix*, is the Reverend Yves de la Briere, author of the volume on international organization and the Church, *L'organisation internationale du monde contemporain et la Papauté souveraine* (Paris, 1927-1930), recently translated by the Catholic Association for International Peace. The purpose of the League is to spread among French-speaking Catholics the Christian doctrine of international relations; to keep them informed of the activities of the League of Nations and other international associations; and to "show the harmony between international duty and national duty."

The People's Christian Peace Association, numbering in its membership workers and the agricultural population, has been particularly active in the task of Franco-German reconciliation and in stressing charity in all human relationships. A large number of Catholic periodicals expound the papal pronouncements on peace and publish the activities of other French groups, which also include Catholic Youth peace programs. Peace congresses have been held at intervals since 1921 by the interdenominational organization known as International Democratic Peace Action, directed by the Frenchman, Marc Sangnier, from headquarters in Paris. The majority of its members in 27 countries are Catholics.

Effective work among trade-union groups has been carried on through the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions and in women's groups by the international Union of Catholic Women's Leagues, comprising some 25,000,000 members in 30 countries.

The promotion of international amity based on the peace action of Pope Benedict XV received graphic treatment in the "International Peace and League of Nations Exhibit" prepared by the Roman Catholic Peace League of the Netherlands in 1930. The League staged a monster demonstration in Amsterdam and forwarded the signatures of 400,000 Dutch Catholics on a petition to the Disarmament Conference in the Year 1932.

The splendid work of the Peace League of German Catholics, a popular movement with a large membership formed in 1923, was approved and supported by the Catholic Bishops of Germany. However, with the advent of nazism, Father Franziskus Stratmann, whose book, *The Church and War*, has become a standard text on that subject, suffered imprisonment for his preaching of the doctrines of the Church and for his distribution of peace literature. Happily, he is now continuing his work for international understanding from Vatican City. All the efforts of the German Peace Cartel—an organization which federated all specific peace groups in Germany—have been dissipated by the abolition of the German peace movement by the Hitler regime. A similar fate has now overtaken the Peace League of Austrian Catholics, and caused the dissolution of the one remaining peace periodical published in the German language.

Belgian Catholics peace activities are conducted largely by the Youth Movement. In Switzerland and Poland, the peace work of Pro Pace, a Swiss group which co-operates with all like-minded associations, and of the Polish Catholic Peace Association has become affiliated with the Catholic Union of International Studies and with Pax Romana, which is the international secretariat of Catholic Student Associations.

In Great Britain, the Catholic Council for International Relations, which was constituted in 1924, enjoys the approbation of both the English and Scottish hierarchy, and works to enable Catholics to understand, appreciate, and criticize the international organizations and movements of the day from the standpoint of their religion.

Eighteen organizations, representing Catholic social, charitable, and professional groups, are included in its membership, as well as some of the most eminent English scholars, who contribute articles to its organ, *A Catholic Survey*.

All these national peace associations are members of the Catholic Union of International Studies, an international organization founded in 1917 by Baron Georges de Monténach at the Catholic University of Fribourg, Switzerland, with the help of Catholic intellectuals from thirteen countries. This union is a member of the Conference of National Committees on Intellectual Co-operation and functions as a constituent part of the League of Nations Organization for Intellectual Co-operation. The activities of the union, in addition to the holding of general international assemblies, includes a wide variety of publications on pertinent international questions.

The aim of all Catholic peace organizations is not only to work for material peace and to study the causes of war, but to bring about that internal order and peace without which there can be no true external peace. According to the Holy Father, the spirit of peace must "possess the intelligence and hearts [of men]—the intelligence so as to recognize and respect the claims of justice, the hearts so that charity may be joined to and even prevail over justice."

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CHAPTER 33

THE PROTESTANT VIEW OF PEACE

Walter W. Van Kirk

From the very nature of Protestantism, it is not possible for any one to put forward any one view as "the Protestant" one. Within the Protestant tradition there is greater room not only for individual opinions but also for organizations representing the different points of view than between religious groups. To give one example, Catholic doctrine states that some forms of war (war under certain conditions) is justifiable; whereas numbers of Protestants affirm that no war is justifiable. From this standpoint, Protestantism might be thought of as more pacifistic than Catholicism. But Protestantism is largely responsible for the existence of the state church in many countries, and the state church is looked upon in these times as a buttress of nationalism and imperialism. In Catholic tradition also, the international church, represented by the Pope, is a constant safeguard against the ambitions of princes and the protector of its membership in states where they are in a minority.

In the Protestant tradition the word of God (the Bible) and the conscience of the individual believer have been the only checks on the ambitions of rulers. With the Old Testament, for the most part, a book of battles, and with Paul's injunctions to Christians to obey them that are in authority, and with the possibility of interpreting some of the sayings of Jesus (particularly the one on "tribute to Caesar"), the Bible is seen to be a book of wars. The Christian conscience has been given a great deal of freedom as to what is believed, but much less in the way of objective action; so that there has been, and probably still is, very little difference between the Protestant attitude toward war and peace considered as a whole and the Catholic position.

There have always been some Protestant pacifists. Historically they have been those who separated themselves from the main stream of

the world's life—in communal villages or colonies. There have been Albigenses, Waldenses, Lollards, Moravians, Mennonites, Schwenkfelders, Bohemian Brethren, Quakers, Molokans, Dukhobors, Christadelphians, and International Bible Students.

RELATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Most Protestants have remained within society, taking part almost without exception in every war that has been fought, even though they may not have favored the war at the time it was declared. They have tried to mitigate the horrors of war; to care for the sick and wounded; to outlaw inhuman forms and secure immunity for non-combatants; to distinguish "just" wars from "unjust" and regard with disfavor nations which fought for plunder or to satisfy a private grudge of the ruler; to promote disarmament; and now to use the collective authority, moral and physical, of mankind, so as to stop wars before they have begun.

No one can look at this record without being moved by the sacrifice, courage, and intelligence of the Christian individuals and societies and churches. No one can deny that these efforts have been attended with a degree of success. They have made aggressive warfare something to be apologized for rather than glorified, made it necessary for every ruler, whatever his acts may be, to assert that he seeks only peace, or, at the worst, war as the means to peace. But war—destructive, civilization-destroying war—is the one eventuality still feared, and expected, in the Western world. Consequently a third attitude has come into the Protestant community, consisting in an assertion of the church and of the individual conscience over against the state. In a sense this attitude is an attempt to combine the other two: to preserve the rigid non-participation in war which has characterized the pacifist sects, and at the same time to remain within the arena of human affairs, living like others in every respect but this one.

Recognizing that the only excuse the church can justifiably use for withdrawing from the world is that it can better serve as a means to save civilization in a period of collapse, C. C. Morrison, editor of the influential *Christian Century*, states in a recent issue of *Christendom*¹ the Protestant view that has come to have wide acceptance.

The first thing the church must do to prepare itself for war is to establish in its own thought the fact of its complete independence in human society. This includes as its first and major emphasis the independence of the church from the state. . . . The claim of the church to an independent existence is the deepest issue in the world today. The rise of the totalitarian state has forced the issue. . . . Another war will force every state to claim totalitarian functions and the church will surely fall a victim to it unless it begins now to make explicit and clear to itself that its course of action must, under God, be independently determined.

In the second place, if the church is to prepare itself for the next war it must excommunicate war from its altars. . . . One thing is sure: The church will come out of the next war shorn of her moral power if she participates in it, if she sanctifies it, if she puts the stamp of God's approval upon it. The only way of hope for the church to survive the next war is to begin now completely to dissociate itself from war. This requires that the church face one simple fact, namely, that a war—any war—spells defeat for every purpose for which the church exists. . . . The church can repent, but it cannot glorify its failure. Yet that is what happens when it glorifies and blesses the banners of war, when it recruits soldiers for battle, when it sends its ministers as chaplains to "buck up" the fighting morale of the troops, when it erects memorials to its sons who fell in war, and when its pulpits flame with patriotic hatred against the enemy.

The Christian is expected, even by outsiders, to live a life apart from "worldly things." But he is expected to be different in matters of morality, in relations with other persons—not in relation to the state and its laws. Sometimes the state makes exceptions, as when the United States Draft Act of 1917 provided for exemption from combatant service to members of the traditional pacifist churches. But the exemption was the granting of a favor, and not the recognition of a right, as some have discovered when they attempted to secure naturalization with conscientious reservations about serving in future wars or exemption from compulsory military training on the grounds of the higher religious obligation.

The degree of separation between church and state varies in the Protestant countries. Where the church is established by the government, is supported in whole or in part by it, and the government

has a voice in the appointment of the prelates, the church would seem to put itself under obligations to the form of government which makes possible its services. Under such conditions, the church can with good conscience call upon its members to come to the aid of the government in time of danger. In a situation of this character, the pacifist justifies himself by claiming that he, in his unwillingness to assist his government in conducting an unjust war, really is aiding his government more than the one who supports it and asks no questions.

CONFLICTING VIEWPOINTS

The clearest exposition of the differences of Protestants in America on the question of war was given at the World Conference on Church, Community, and State, which was held at Oxford, England, in the summer of 1937. This conference was participated in largely by representative American churchmen. Its report, *The Church and War*, was influenced by their participation.

After acknowledging the poignancy and urgency of the problem of war to Christians, the Oxford Conference first affirmed the fact that all Christians must give their first loyalty to one Lord "whose claim upon them is such as to transcend all other loyalties." This supreme and undivided allegiance unites Christians together within the church, "a society with a unity so deep as to be indestructible by earthly divisions of race or nation or class."

The Oxford Conference then proceeded to define war in terms which leave little comfort for the militarist:

Wars, the occasions of war, and all situations which conceal the fact of conflict under the guise of outward peace, are incidents in a world to which the Church is charged to proclaim the Gospel of redemption. War involves compulsory enmity, diabolical outrage against human personality, and a wanton distortion of the truth. War is a particular demonstration of the power of sin in this world, and a defiance of the righteousness of God as revealed in Jesus Christ and Him crucified. No justification of war must be allowed to conceal or minimize this fact.

But because a man is a sinner, said the Conference, his action, even though he is attempting to love his neighbor as himself, may be but a poor expression of perfect love. Although his obligation "to

do what appears as relatively best is an absolute duty before God," yet his sinfulness obscures his vision and therefore there is difference. Some Christians believe that war can be eliminated by a process of religious and moral enlightenment and by the exercise of free will; others believe that man is so bound by the necessities of a sinful world that war can never be eliminated until Christ returns in glory.

This division of opinion produces three main positions. The first of these positions the Conference described as follows:

Some believe that war, especially in its modern form, is always sin, being a denial of the nature of God as love, of the redemptive way of the Cross, and of the community of the Holy Spirit; that war is always ultimately destructive in its effects, and ends in futility by corrupting even the noblest purpose for which it is waged; and that the Church will become a creative, regenerative, and reconciling instrument for the healing of the nations only as it renounces war absolutely. They are therefore constrained to refuse to take part in war themselves, to plead among their fellows for a similar repudiation of war in favour of a better way, and to replace military force by methods of active peace-making.

The next position is that of Christians who can obtain the consent of their consciences to participate only "in just wars." One group of those who hold this opinion believes that Christians should participate only in wars which are justified by international law. "They believe that in a sinful world the State has the duty, under God, to use force when law and order are threatened. Wars against transgressors of international agreements and pacts are comparable with police measures and Christians are obliged to participate in them." These Christians would not support nationalistic wars which cannot be thus justified.

The second kind of war which some Protestants accept as justifiable is that waged to defend an essential Christian principle, such as to succor the victims of aggression or to secure freedom for the oppressed. In these circumstances they maintain that it is a Christian duty to take up arms when every other recourse has failed. They would still maintain that the verdict of conscience is their ultimate sanction, in the defense of which martyrdom is justified, but that they have no right to inflict martyrdom on others against their will by refusing to fight for them.

A third general view is that Christians are obliged to work for international good will but that man is inherently so sinful that no such effort can bring peace in this world. This view was described at Oxford as including those who believe that although political authority is frequently corrupt and immoral the state is a divinely appointed agency for the restraint of anarchic and criminal elements and is an instrument for defense against aggression. "It is therefore a Christian's duty to obey the political authority as far as possible, and to refrain from everything that is apt to weaken it." This means that normally a Christian must take up arms for his country. Only when he is absolutely certain that his country is fighting for a wrong cause (e.g., in case of an unjustifiable war of aggression) has the ordinary citizen a right to refuse military service. "Of those who hold this view, some would admit that individuals may be called directly by God to refuse categorically to take part in any war, and so to draw attention to the perverted nature of a world in which wars are possible."

Having defined these positions, which accurately represent the principal divisions of opinion within American Protestantism, the Oxford Conference continues to represent the major opinion in this country by its insistence that the church shall maintain fellowship with people who hold any of these opinions. It should help all its members to discover God's will and then should honor their conscientious decisions, "whether they are led to participate in, or to abstain from, war, and to maintain with both alike the full fellowship of the body of Christ."

Recognizing that this will not be easy, the Conference called upon the church for a penitent recognition of its own failures in removing the causes of war and in contributing to the spirit of contention, and called upon them all to make this basic spiritual contribution to peace, beginning with themselves.

It then gathered together the widespread feelings of distrust and dismay at the growth of the totalitarian state and reminded church members "that the principle of the unconditional supremacy of the state or nation, advanced either in time of peace or of war, is incompatible with the church's faith in Jesus Christ as its only Lord, and is therefore unacceptable as the final norm of judgment or action." The report ended with the statement: "The Church should

witness in word, in sacramental life and in action, to the reality of the kingdom of God which transcends the world of nations. It should proclaim and obey the commandment of the Lord, 'Love your enemies.' "

RENUNCIATION OF WAR

In the United States the strength of the first position has been a matter of rapid growth since the World War. C. C. Morrison says:

During the past twenty years there has been a vast development of nonresistant pacifism. Thousands of clergymen and no one knows how many of the laity, especially of our more intelligent youth, have committed themselves to a policy of non-participation. They will refuse to fight. They will defy conscription. And they will take the consequences. These men and women are the flower of our Christian community. They are organized; they are aggressive in the propagation of the conviction which they hold.

This development has occurred in part as an expression of penitence for what many regard as a betrayal of the churches into becoming an instrument of the national state in the World War. The extent of this apostasy is revealed in *Preachers Present Arms*, by Ray H. Abrams, who a few years after the war collected in book form statements of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, who went to what seems in saner years extraordinary lengths in their blessing of war practices and their identification of the church with them.

The extent of the shift within the next fifteen years has been documented by the writer in his book, *Religion Renounces War*. This documentation shows that not only are thousands of Christian preachers and laymen grounding their arms, but they are saying also that resort to war is contrary to the teaching of Jesus and that Christians should refuse to render unto Caesar the things that belong to God. Not only that, but the churches in their official bodies have attempted explicitly to dissociate themselves from war and the war system. Typical of these statements is one by the World Peace Commission of the Methodist Episcopal Church, which is: "We believe that war is unnecessary and that, under modern conditions, it is futile and suicidal. Our fundamental conviction is that war is sin. This is the logical conclusion which follows the pronouncement of the General Conference, but its full importance has not yet possessed

the mind of the church at large. We believe that war is sin because it involves (a) the slaughter of human beings, (b) the violation of personality, (c) lying propaganda, (d) deliberate breeding of the spirit of hate, (e) vast destruction of property, (f) it puts in place of moral law the doctrine of military necessity, (g) it distorts the religion of Jesus into the religion of a war god."

The Northern Baptist Convention of 1926 declared, "We once more express our conviction that war is contrary to the spirit and teaching of Jesus; we are opposed to war as a method for the settlement of international disputes."

The 1928 General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church proclaimed, "We assert our solemn judgment that warfare as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling disputes between nations, should be renounced. Such warfare, undertaken to further national policy, and without recourse to judicial arbitration or other peaceable means of settlement, is a crime on the part of the nation, and so to be held by followers of Christ, who has commanded us to make disciples, not enemies, of the peoples of the world."

The National Council of the Congregational Churches in the United States, meeting in 1925, stated, "We regret our conviction that war is contrary to the mind of the Christ; that the continuance of civilization demands its entire elimination; that it is the duty of all Christians and all churches to find a Christian way to meet international situations which threaten war."

The International Convention of the Disciples of Christ in 1931 asserted, "War as a method of settling international disputes is incompatible with the teaching and example of our Lord, Jesus Christ."

In 1934, the Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America endorsed the following statement: "In view of the prevailing dangerous war psychology among the nations, their spirit of self-seeking nationalism and war-provoking programs of armament expansion, in the name of Christ and country, the Assembly declares anew its break with the entire war system. We proclaim our adherence to the following principles of faith and policy, calling upon the churches to make unmistakably clear to their constituencies and the world at large: (a) that God in Christ has broken down the middle wall of partition that separated the races and nations and

that it is incumbent upon all who profess the name of Christ to frown upon and disavow all that is a barrier to free and friendly intercourse between the races and nations of mankind; (b) that Christians owe an allegiance to the kingdom of God that is superior to loyalty to their country and that in any matter in which the laws of their country conflict with the commands of God, they must assert their duty and right 'to obey God rather than man'; (c) that Christians cannot give their support to war as a method of carrying on international conflict."

This Assembly went further and authorized its board of education to make available, to pastors and others, blank pledges for circulation and signature among Presbyterians, the pledges to contain the following words: "I will not cross the borders of any nation except in friendship, nor will I support my country in such actions." The Northern Baptist convention has recommended to its people a similar pledge.

These statements by some of the principal Protestant denominations are typical. The Federal Council of Churches, because of this widespread conviction, has been able to say in its officially adopted *Social Ideals of the Churches*, as revised in 1932, "The war system is inconsistent with all Christian ideals. In war, mercy, righteousness, justice, truthfulness, self-control, cooperation are abandoned or practised only toward friends. Religion should no longer sanction war. While works of spiritual ministry and relief of human sufferings are at all times the duty of the church, the institutions of religion should never again be used as agencies of warfare."

IF WORLD WAR COMES

It would seem therefore that the government, in the event of another war, will have to get along without the moral support of a considerable number of the Protestant churches. So far as they are concerned, it will have to get its propaganda before the public in other ways than through the pulpits which were so eagerly co-operative the last time. Its regimentation of the public conscience for the purposes of totalitarian warfare will have to be without the undivided help of the agency to which the public has a right to look for guidance in forming its moral and religious judgments. The churches, in the main, have clearly stated that they are no

longer to be regarded as allies in the business of killing and maiming their brothers. The preachers are grounding their arms. They are washing their hands of the blood of their fellows. They are parting company with Caesar.

What may this mean in the event of another war? There will undoubtedly be more temptation for the Protestant churches to split on the pacifist issue than on anything since slavery, which produced so much schism two generations ago. C. C. Morrison says, "We have here the making of an issue which, when the next war comes, may rock the church to its foundations and result in further tragic divisions in the already divided body of Christ."

The depth of the church's concern with the problem of war is shown by the number of subsidiary issues which have accompanied its attempt to divide the religion of Jesus from the religion of nationalism. One of the most bitterly contested of these questions is that of the military chaplaincy. If religion renounces war, does it have any right to permit its ministers to become an officially recognized part of the military machine? The chaplain must take an oath of allegiance just as any other officer, wear a military uniform, accept the pay, and take the orders of the state instead of the church. Some churches, notably the Disciples of Christ and the pacifist churches, have therefore withdrawn from the Chaplaincy Commission of the Federal Council and urged that body to find ways of developing a non-military chaplaincy. At its 1936 meeting it formed a commission to study this proposal and make a report in 1938.

The problem of war also affects very deeply the missionary strategy of the church. Churches are greatly affected by the rise of nationalism in non-Christian lands and with the contradictions to brotherhood involved in the growing tension between Christian and non-Christian countries such as the United States and Japan.

In conclusion, therefore, it will be seen that, although there is no one view which can be put forth as the sole representative of Protestantism on this question, the trend is toward decreasing the church's entanglements with nationalism and an increasing tendency for Protestant churches to question the right of the state to the absolute loyalty required in modern totalitarian war. Fortunately, the future of this controversy is shrouded behind the veil of things

to come, but many people begin to see that no issue contains vaster possibilities of suffering or a greater threat of making the cross of Christ once again a contemporary reality. There is a faith, however, that if this issue drives the church once again into the catacombs and produces a new crop of martyrs, their blood may yet prove to be the seed of a peaceful world society.

Everywhere throughout the world, Protestant groups of every denomination are meeting in study clubs and discussion groups to face frankly the problem of Christianity and peace. They are studying international issues and analyzing the forces that make for peace and war. One hope for peace lies in their firm conviction in the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God.

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CHAPTER 34

RE-EDUCATING CITIZENS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

K. C. Leebrick

It is the purpose of this chapter to set forth some of the methods, devices, and practices which are being used to give our young people, especially in our schools and colleges, an opportunity to study world affairs so that they and our American democracy may take their proper place in the international activities of our time. The assumption that it is possible to educate for world-wide thinking and action to the end that citizens of free countries will influence government policy is perhaps open to discussion. This is not the proper place to consider that question. American educational practice is based upon the theory that education does have an important relation to citizenship in a democracy.

EDUCATION AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

"In the proverbial race between education and chaos, America continues to stake her bet on education," writes our United States Commissioner of Education, Dr. John W. Studebaker.¹ He points out that there are about 1,300,000 students attending our colleges and universities. "Such faith in education," he writes, "as is represented by these numbers, has never been manifested in any other country in the world. America is taking seriously the classic pronouncement of George Washington with respect to the place of education in a democratic form of government; he said, 'Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion be enlightened.'"

The colleges and universities of this country have made real efforts to meet the challenge of the times and have done much

to give students opportunities to become acquainted with world affairs.

COURSES ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

Prior to the World War period, 1914-1918, the courses of study in most of our institutions of higher learning gave much attention to history; ancient, medieval, modern, and specialized courses in Greek, Roman, English, and French History, as well as several courses in periods of United States history. Some attention was given to Latin-American history, and in a few institutions courses were given on the Far Eastern countries. Political science had been developed so that our own government was studied in its general and special phases. There were courses in comparative government, the government of Europe, modern democracies, international law, and a number of more specific courses in these general fields.

With the beginning of the World War, more attention was given to international affairs. Courses in "War Issues" and then "Peace Issues" were taught to fill needs which were evident during the war and at its termination. The part the United States had taken in the World War, in the peace negotiations, and in the Versailles Treaty and other treaties, including the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Constitution of the International Labor Organization, as well as the political discussion in relation to our adhering to these new international instruments, created a field in which students in our colleges and universities were vitally interested. Textbooks followed at once. Among the first widely used in this field were *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization*, by Putnam B. Potter (1922), and *International Relations*, by Raymond Leslie Buell (1925). Other texts and books which made studying world affairs easier appeared rapidly. Courses were added to our college and university curriculums so that within a short time many students were receiving instruction.

As a result of this new development, the offerings in the earlier standard courses in history were reduced to some extent. The fields of economics and political science were broadened by this movement. It is fair to say that international affairs were more prominent in almost all the university departments. This interest was equally reflected in the high schools under current affairs and, to a lesser

extent, in the higher elementary grades. American students were given greater opportunities than ever before to study international institutions and to broaden their intellectual acquaintance with other peoples, their institutions, ideals, and problems.

This movement has grown rather than diminished. Many institutions now have departments of international relations or politics. The number of courses offered have steadily increased, as have the number of students enrolled in these fields. "Schools of Public Affairs" have been set up in several of our larger institutions which have deepened as well as broadened these fields of teaching and study. The publication of texts and books by scholars and authors of all types has continued so that there is a wealth of material for the scholar and for the layman.

It is well worth mentioning here that the newspapers and magazines of our country reflect this increased interest in international problems. They not only print more, but the information is more reliable and more up-to-date.

FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR DEVICES

Several foundations have aided and even encouraged this education in world affairs. The World Peace Society of Boston, by its publications, lectures, and personal contacts with the schools, has made a significant contribution. The same can be said of the League of Nations Association of New York, of the Institute of Pacific Affairs, and of many others, but most of all, perhaps, of the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace. The contribution and stimulation these organizations have given to this field have been great and are difficult to overestimate. The International Mind Library, which the Carnegie Foundation has placed in most of our colleges and universities, has made many of the most significant books on international affairs available to most of the university students of our country.

The students themselves have proved their interest in international affairs by using international topics for their debates. They have formed discussion groups and have attended lectures given by visitors from other countries who were "experts" in many things. They have taken a real interest in the political discussions which have become perennial about American membership in the League of Nations,

the International Labor Organization, and the Permanent Court of International Justice. They have led their elders in interest in the Locarno Understandings and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris.

Various devices have been developed to aid students to understand the new international institutions. Student, or model, League of Nations assemblies have been enacted. This idea is a by-product of the First Institute of Pacific Relations held in Honolulu in 1925. Dr. H. Duncan Hall, then a delegate to the Institute from Australia, now with the League of Nations at Geneva, and the writer discussed and planned a student "model assembly." Dr. Hall returned to Australia and organized a student model assembly there. The writer did likewise at the University of Hawaii. A year later Dr. Hall was called to the School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York. He organized a similar model assembly among the colleges of New York. The idea took hold at once. At the present time, there are six or eight such intercollegiate student model assemblies held each year. These are locally managed by students with faculty assistance.

The preparation for these meetings and the more or less faithful following of League forms and the discussion of topics on the current agenda of the League of Nations have done much to acquaint students with the possibilities of international agreement through the League organizations. Many of these model assemblies have been of a high order, and, in their seriousness of purpose, would compare favorably with the Assembly at Geneva. Frequently the interest and performance of the students have produced a realism which has actually brought the atmosphere of Geneva to our colleges.

VARIOUS TECHNIQUES IN PROMOTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

The success of this movement has led to the establishment, again, under the leadership of Syracuse University, of an intercollegiate Model Council of the League of Nations, held twice each year by nine or ten upper New York colleges and universities—one meeting at Syracuse and the other at one of the participating colleges. This plan has certain advantages over a "model assembly." The gathering is smaller and more students from each institution can participate. The problems of expense and entertainment are not so difficult. The

meetings are more faithful to fact because council meetings are generally short. Topics on the agenda are discussed in character as they would be at Geneva, and frequently reference of an issue is made to the assembly or to a committee for report back to the second meeting of the student council in the spring or fall, as the case may be. Frequently the same officers preside for the two meetings held in the academic year. The experience thus gained and demonstrated is stimulating and encouraging to any teacher or observer. The affairs of the student council are managed so that some of the delegates, or observers, are sophomores or juniors, in order that the experience gained may be passed on from year to year.

The remarks of the distinguished guests, who generally give a criticism or an evaluation and an address at the evening banquets, have testified again and again to the value and faithful reproduction of these student "model councils" and "assemblies." Many of these guest speakers have represented governments at Geneva or have been observers or experts at League of Nations gatherings.

Two New York universities, Syracuse and Colgate, have also instituted a student Permanent Court of International Justice session. A case is agreed upon and a set-up made for its submission to the Court for decision or for an advisory opinion. The students prepare their briefs under the guidance of their university instructors and submit them in writing to a recognized international lawyer, who is invited to preside at the session of the Court. He prepares a written decision on the briefs in advance of the meeting of the Court, which takes place at one of the universities. When the Court meets, representative students and faculty are chosen to complete the bench of judges. The case is presented by the students. The rules and procedure of the Court are followed as faithfully as possible. When the briefs have been presented orally, the full bench of judges discuss the case in a brief session and the visiting judge makes whatever changes are necessary in his prepared decision. He then presents his decision and discusses the preparation and presentation of the case by the students. The skill and thoroughness with which these cases are prepared and presented bear testimony to the interest and ability of students to participate in this very technical field of international relationship. Frequently the expert has been most commendatory in his evaluation of the student Court.

These three examples of student portrayal are best known to the writer. He is aware that many universities engage in similar activities. Sometimes interuniversity meetings are held and, in many instances, the affair is an intrainstitutional, interdepartment, or college activity. These student portrayals of international organizations cover the entire field—the Assembly, the Council, World Court, International Labor Organization, Intervention Committee, Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, Pan-American and Pan-Pacific Congress, Commission for the Amendment of the Covenant, and many others. No attempt has been made to present an exhaustive list or to name institutions using these methods of instruction.

It would be difficult for anyone who has had the privilege of visiting, presiding over, or assisting in these affairs to be anything but enthusiastic about the interest of the students or about their ability to understand and to portray faithfully international gatherings. Students who have thus participated get a real feeling of the processes and difficulties of international conferences. The unanimity rule, the non-parliamentary method of procedure, and the need of diplomatic language and usage become very real to student participants and observers alike through these meetings.

Another movement which is much more general and continuous is the International Relations Club system, which is encouraged by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, under the able leadership of Amy Hemingway Jones. Clubs are organized in many of our educational institutions, large and small. Students organize and meet frequently throughout the academic year. A faculty advisor assists and, to some extent, guides the affairs of the club. Many different types of organizations exist and programs vary greatly. The student meetings discuss international affairs. They hear resident foreign students and returned students. Faculty travelers give their interpretations of international topics and of the peoples and policies of other countries. Frequently more formal gatherings are held where a distinguished speaker is invited to address a gathering sponsored by the International Relations Club which is open to the student body and sometimes to the public.

Once each year a district or regional International Relations Conference is arranged and conducted by the sponsor. Delegates from the clubs in the area meet at some institution for two days. They

form committees for discussion of topics previously announced and more or less carefully prepared. At one meeting, usually the evening banquet, an able speaker, generally a visitor from Europe or the Orient, gives an address. One session is given over to report of activities in the clubs represented, and to comment, question, and advice upon a program for the future. These "experience" meetings have been a continual source of wonder and inspiration to the writer. They prove to him that our students are interested in international affairs and that they are much better informed than many skeptical pronouncements and obvious surface superficialities would lead us to conclude.

The various peace organizations in this country have encouraged and sponsored student activities and organizations upon our college campuses. Interest has varied through the years. Much constructive work has been done and, as in other international activities, students have gained much information and experience and have taken a personal stand for or against something in the international field.

The Institute Movement has attracted students and adults alike. The Institute of Politics, which was held for more than a decade at Williamstown, Massachusetts, was perhaps the leader. It did much to demobilize the war hate and misinformation and to encourage thoughtful study and open discussions of international problems. The Institute of Pacific Relations, which held its first meeting in Honolulu in 1925, and is still functioning, is another good example. It attempts to throw light upon pertinent facts which are important for leaders in that area and to bring together those who can influence official action. Other organizations are the Institute of International Affairs of the Pacific Coast, 1926 to date; Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia; the institutes held by the Society of Friends, Rotary International, and many sponsored by universities and colleges and a host of others. These have brought competent speakers from many lands before American college and public audiences. Their broadening influence is beyond measure. The movement seems to be expanding rather than waning.

The radio has furnished another medium used by students, universities, and other organizations to carry information and discussion to youth and adults alike. The University of Chicago Round Table

and the Foreign Policy Association meetings in New York serve to illustrate the more formal, pretentious, and influential activities of his type. Many universities have their own program of round table, panel discussions, or more formal addresses broadcast by students, faculty, and visitors. The influence upon listeners is difficult to estimate. There is little doubt about the effect of this activity upon participants. It is most educational.

The discussion type of presentation, often by two speakers presenting divergent views, has been very popular throughout the past two decades in many cities and in our institutions of higher learning. Those who listen and those who read either the press reports of these affairs or the publications of these organizations are, to some extent at least, "re-educated" in international affairs. The "Headline" and "World Affairs" pamphlets are, perhaps, the best example of publications by this type of organization, although the number is great and varies widely as to type and objective.

A very important part in re-educating in world affairs has been the interchange of students and visitors between countries. There has been a constant stream of our students to many countries during the past few decades for purposes of serious study of conditions, situations, and ideas abroad. "Seminars" for old and young have been conducted in Latin America, Europe, and Asia. America has had what one of my friends characterized as an "invasion" of lecturers from Europe. Never in the history of the world have there been so many lectures, addresses, panels, open discussions, debates, radio addresses, and other forms of oral and written information disseminated by visitors abroad as have been presented to the people of this country during the past two decades.

Recently our national government has encouraged and supported public discussion groups, forums, panels, and institutes. Frequently our foreign policy and many phases of international affairs have been discussed. The concluding sentences of the official report of *A Study of America's Forums—Choosing Our Way*, by J. W. Studebaker, recently off the press, thus evaluates this movement:

The public forum is one important institution where the people may discuss and debate the affairs of the big family. In this record we have discussed ways of bringing that institution as close to the homes of the people as possible.

The influence of public discussion upon the life of the community are in terms of better government, reduction of graft and corruption, honest and more economical administration of the public business, more and better public services, more excellent provisions to meet the cultural and educational needs of the people, sustained and growing prosperity resulting from an understanding of economic forces, greater freedom of expression and respect for the rights of others, and world peace based upon a more intelligent approach to international relations.

Certainly from press and platform, through formal and informal education, a wealth of material has been presented to the people of this country, so that they have more information to influence their thinking than the people of any nation have had available at any former period in the history of the race.

OBJECTIVES

It may be asked to what end or objective has all this information been pointed. Individuals and groups have tried to influence people to think in agreement with their own ideas. Propaganda, good, bad and indifferent, has been plentiful and prevalent. Our safety and sanity have been preserved because of the amount of material presented and lack of compulsion to accept and act upon the implications of the information or propaganda. We in this country have so far avoided some of the evils of the totalitarian governmental educational programs. Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace may write *America Must Choose*, but it is a free choice and his objective was to influence us to make a deliberate, thoughtful choice. In the language of the street, "He was asking us, not telling us."

The objective of many leaders and educators, in attempting to influence individual and group thinking in international affairs and a better world order, has been perhaps best expressed by Nicholas Murray Butler in his lecture, *The International Mind*.²

We must learn to bring to the consideration of public business in its international aspects what I may call the international mind, and the international mind is still rarely to be found in high places. That the international mind is not inconsistent with sincere and devoted patriotism is clearly shown by the history of the

great Liberal statesmen of the nineteenth century who had to deal with the making of Europe as we know it.

In striving to gain the international mind, it is necessary first of all to learn to measure other peoples and other civilizations than ours from their own point of view and by their own standards rather than by our own. The really vital question is whether the time has yet come, and if not what can we do to hasten its coming, when races and nationalities are able to cease preying upon and oppressing one another, and to live together as fellow-sharers in a world's civilization?

It is this attempt to create an international mind, or to give the citizens of our country the information upon which to base sound opinions, which has characterized the period since the World War. How successful the movement has been, only the future will tell. We have proceeded upon the theory well stated by Franz Schneider.³

Our human progress will be faster and more steady as more of us become profoundly conscious of the power of creative thought and learn to see that every ideal which we now cherish has sprung as thought from some man's heart and mind. We likewise see that every social institution in any land reflects but some mind's thoughts which other minds espoused and thus brought to concreteness. The highest duty of education, then, is to make us conscious of this power of thought, to keep alive the urges, visions and ideal concepts of mankind's best. It must be our passion in our teaching to keep before us and our learners the truth that our social world is ever in the making, that our thinking is creating it, that nothing can exist in our social world unless it first be thought.

It is significant that in all the stress, strain, and emotion of the post-World-War period there has not been more interference by the officials of our government in this area of discussion and policy. It speaks well for our democratic institutions. International affairs have been political contentions through this period. Leaders have been for and against our joining the League of Nations, adhering to the World Court, becoming a member of the International Labor Organization. Public opinion has differed regarding disarmament, the "war debts," the Ethiopian conflict, the undeclared wars in the Far East. Our congressmen have reflected our opinion and produced

the "Neutrality Act" with the object of keeping this country out of foreign wars. About the only thing the people of America have agreed upon in the international field is that we wish to keep out of war. Perhaps this in itself is no mean educational achievement if it can be coupled with helpful official acts to aid, to establish, and to preserve world peace. Opinion differs as to what American foreign policy is and has been. It is significant that the people of this country have opinions and that they can and do express them. Freedom of speech, of press, and of teaching is a fact and not a fancy with us. The privilege of teaching, or for any individual or group to present peacefully its point of view, is seldom challenged.

As a democracy, our "task is to reconcile the problems of a new age with ancient and accepted principles. Here is the difficulty and also the test of statesmanship, as Burke said, to preserve the past with a capacity to improve. If there must be alterations, let them come with due regard to the processes of your democracy. For to preserve democracy we must preserve its processes."⁴

FREEDOM OF STUDY

The concluding chapter of this book, "The Study of World Affairs," is closely related to the field under discussion. Reference should be made to it for organizations engaged in international educational activities. Naturally, the objective and hope of these agencies is to spread information and to encourage people to think more clearly about international problems and our own relations to them. Chancellor C. W. Flint said in his baccalaureate address in 1935: "The only safe indoctrination is with truth—more and more truth. Repression, ignorance, and half-truths are always dangerous. . . . Explosive ideas, allowed expression, prove harmless even if spectacular, but repressed, work destruction."

The re-education of citizens in world affairs has been undertaken and encouraged by our national, state, and private school authorities and by many unofficial organizations interested in peace, disarmament, the League of Nations, the World Court, or other international ideals or activities. We have even been exposed to propaganda from abroad. Our citizens have been furnished information from the platform, from the press, from the printed page, and from the classroom on a scale that is new in the development of civilization.

It is approached only by the indoctrination which has been attempted by the authoritarian authorities. We have been free from many of the evils of those educational policies.

As long as freedom of speech, of assembly, and of the press are facts in this or any other country, education in any field can be encouraged by individuals, by groups, and by official organizations. Out of the mass of information presented a better-informed public opinion is bound to emerge. Thinking in terms of world problems has spread alongside a resurgence of nationalism and national isolation contradictory and conflicting as these policies are to each other. Even if the citizens of the nation intelligently choose a policy of peace at almost any cost, save loss of national existence, such a decision implies a choice based on some information about world affairs. The state of public opinion in this country is such that education should not be discouraged.

A study of the major objectives of education made in 1931 set down as one of these objectives:⁵ "To promote the development of an understanding and an appreciation of organized society. The problem of living together and of working together grows more complex as social contacts multiply. Growth in population, improvement in means of transportation, and the world-wide interrelationships of economics and finance have put an end to isolation. There is need for understanding and of good-will when only two people deal with each other. No one denies the need of understanding and of good-will under the conditions of our modern society."

This objective has been partially achieved as much progress has been made toward re-educating citizens in world affairs. It is a continuous task but it is being accomplished.

NOTES

1. JOHN W. STUDEBAKER, "The Future of Higher Education," *School and Society*, July 23, 1938, Vol. 48, pp. 93-98.

2. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, *The International Mind*, Boston, The American Peace Society, 1912.

3. FRANZ SCHNEIDER, *Teaching and Scholarship and the Res Publica*, Berkeley, Pestalozzi Press, 1938.

4. J. W. BAILEY, Senator from North Carolina, Commencement Address at Colby College, June 20, 1938.

5. *What Are the Major Objectives of Education?* Washington, National Council on Education, 1931.

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CHAPTER 35

THE STUDY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

John Eugene Harley

The preceding chapters have presented a comprehensive answer to the query, "Why study world affairs?" Although all the "doctors" have agreed that the patient is seriously ill, there has been little agreement on the remedial measures to be applied to this troubled old world. The day is past when an individual can shut out the outside world. The press, the newsreel, the radio bring the far corners of the earth within his daily horizon. Likewise, self-sufficiency is no longer possible, and significant events in Iran or South Africa affect the humble worker more or less directly. Finally, the thundering laughter of Mars echoes down the corridors of time and the mounting costs of new armaments stagger the taxpayer of almost every nation of the world beneath their crushing weight. The study of world affairs is as vital to the layman as to the diplomat.

It is true that there is a rapidly increasing field of professional service in world affairs, but the number of persons so engaged will remain small compared to the great group of average citizens who are ever more alert to the practical influences of world events upon their own lives. The business man knows that his business has been—or will be—affected by events in other countries. Members of every religious faith or racial group may readily see that their lot is related to that of their group as it exists in other countries. When war is no longer a matter of armies alone but involves non-combatants far removed from the war zone, it is apparent to every one that a war in any part of the world may be the spark to ignite a world conflagration that will bring destruction to his own home and family.

THE PEOPLE AND FOREIGN POLICY

- The introduction of the Ludlow Amendment to the Federal Constitution proposing that the people of the United States should vote

directly on the question of going to war, except under defined conditions, had the effect of dramatically fixing the attention of the American people on their own capacity to judge wisely on such a vital problem. The decisive rejection of the amendment, after it had been roundly criticized by the President and the Secretary of State, indicates that, at least for the present, the existing constitutional procedure is to be followed. But the fate of the Ludlow Amendment by no means signifies that in a democratic nation the people are not capable of voting on the vital question of war and peace; it does indicate, however, that in view of the disturbed and rapidly changing conditions now prevailing in the world the people are willing to trust the judgment of the duly elected representatives. In the long run, however, it is becoming increasingly evident that if democratic government and democratic educational institutions are to continue they must be sustained by a larger and larger number of people "back home" who really understand and appreciate the decisions that must be made by those officially charged with the formation and administration of our foreign policies.

THE CINEMA IN WORLD AFFAIRS

For those who would keep abreast of the recent developments of significance in the study of world affairs the international and educational aspects of the cinema should not be overlooked. The film is a powerful medium of education or propaganda. With the advent of sound and color the importance and effectiveness of the film is greatly increased. Steady progress is being made in providing the schools with projectors and equipment for the use of films, which are in a sense furnishing a new kind of textbook for the present generation.

Some countries are using the film very largely for propaganda purposes. In the United States the propaganda element is reduced to a minimum, but it may be said that because of the fact that some countries allow or compel a large measure of propaganda in their films such a state of affairs lessens the opportunities of international cultural exchanges by means of the cinema. Existing political conditions, quotas, tariffs, and other restrictions further bar the flow of films between nations. The international conventions signed at

INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

WILL "ISMS" DESTROY ALL WORLD INTELLECTUAL UNITY?

POPULARIZING WORLD AFFAIRS
Foreign Policy Association
League of Nations
World Peace Foundation

FOUNDATIONS
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the World Peace Foundation.

DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONALISM

MARXIST THOUGHT

EUROPEAN TRAVEL AND UNIVERSITY FELLOWSHIPS
STUDENT INTERCHANGES

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION a clearing-house for university interchange covering faculty and students.

SUMMER SEMINARS at Mexican National University, etc., for foreigners.

CULTURAL ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN OFFICES, such as U.S. State Department's new Division of Cultural Relations, to foster Cultural Relations, to foster CHILEAN GOVERNMENT FELLOWSHIPS Cover Latin American republics and the United States.

LATIN AMERICAN "HOLIDAY COURSES" for students, adults and specialists.
APPRAISING FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council on Foreign Relations
NEW YORK
Royal Institute of International Affairs
LONDON

LEAGUE OF NATIONS SUMMER INSTITUTES at Geneva, etc.

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES Periodic and special meetings of scientific, professional and social groups representing the federation of national bodies in all fields.

Fascistic Influences
Conflicting Trends

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Federating national councils coordinating research, plans for publications, etc., around Pacific.

A Fact Picture

Presented by CHARLES MOORE

Geneva and at Buenos Aires providing for duty-free circulation of educational films have not been widely ratified but one by one the various nations are seeing the advantage of opening up the channels for the interchange of this type of films.

The censor's knife is constantly at work barring films because of offense on racial, religious, political, moral, or ethical grounds. Indeed a detailed study of the list of films that have been censored by the national authorities and the reasons given for barring certain films produced in other countries will furnish both humor and pathos and cause one to wonder at the extreme provincialism and narrow-mindedness of some national censors.

In the United States the world picture is painted on the silver screen in current events releases by Fox-Movietone, Universal, Pathé, Paramount News, and the March of Time. Some of these releases are highly selective, and, at times, bias in the manner of selection clearly appears. Recently monthly releases of the March of Time, more elaborately than in the case of others, have attempted to give the audiences better impressions of nations and world events by giving more time and more footage to the subject presented. This point is well illustrated in the monthly releases dealing with China, Turkey, and Germany. The FitzPatrick travel series, for example, dealing with various cities and countries have proved entertaining and educational in the United States as well as in other parts of the world.

So far as the cinema is concerned there is a real need for the production and distribution of more and better films showing fairly the life and culture of the various peoples. At the same time there are still too many films in circulation that tend to arouse international hatred and distrust; these should be relegated to the wastebasket.

THE WORLD WAR AND WORLD AFFAIRS EDUCATION

The disastrous consequences of the World War have had the effect of making a considerable impression upon the educational program in the United States. The fact that this nation entered the war—despite its geographical aloofness and its traditional isolation from European squabbles—has served to show the leaders of the nation that we are a part of the world and should know what forces are at

work. Most of the people of the United States (President Roosevelt suggested 90 per cent)—and of the world—want peace. The problem is not one of “ends” but of “means” to achieve this all-desirable but elusive goal. The President and Mr. Everyman, congressman and farmer, diplomat and housewife, soldier and artisan, each has his own proposal for the prevention of war. Even the peace organizations, are neutralizing their effectiveness by their adherence to conflicting and actually opposing plans for peace. Amidst such confusion it seems quite plain that the people of the United States are compelled—to a degree never before approached—to study world affairs.

It may be said that a remarkable development in the number, and in the effectiveness, of agencies and efforts for the study of world affairs has occurred since the close of the World War. Many of these agencies either are centered in educational institutions, or are in some manner definitely related thereto. Some of the efforts are of special interest to colleges and universities; some are primarily suited to deal with the public schools; others are of a more general scope, not being related to schools directly but nevertheless having their influence upon them.

OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Although space does not permit any extensive reference to the part played by official international organizations in the study of world affairs in the United States, the reader should bear in mind the work of these organizations. As presented in earlier chapters of this symposium, the official membership of the United States in the International Labor Organization and the Pan American Union indicates the importance of having citizens know what these organizations are doing. The fact that the United States is officially co-operating with many of the efforts and conferences of the League of Nations makes it imperative that the people of the Nation follow the work of that organization. As to the Permanent Court of International Justice it may be said that distinguished Americans aided in its creation, and that a jurist from the United States has been a judge on the Court since its inception. Although the United States is not a member of the Court, many leading educators and interested citizens follow its work.

AGENCIES PROMOTING THE STUDY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Schools and Colleges. As an indication of the attention being given to world affairs, it may be pointed out that, in addition to formal classes and lectures, some of the leading institutions of higher learning attach special importance to a study of the problems of international relations. Such special emphasis on world problems is found in the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, the Conferences on Foreign Affairs at Louisiana State University, the Walter Hines Page School at Johns Hopkins University, the Institute of World Affairs held each December in Riverside, California, the Institute of International Relations at the University of Denver, the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation lectures at the University of Chicago, to name only a few institutions. Many of the larger universities like Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Georgetown, and the University of California offer comprehensive courses and lectures on world affairs. At the University of Southern California these courses are offered largely through the Los Angeles University of International Relations. An important Research in International Law and the Bureau of International Research are centered at Harvard. In connection with three of the larger institutions, viz., Columbia University, University of Chicago, and the University of California at Berkeley, there are spacious International Houses which serve to meet some of the needs of foreign students and to emphasize the importance of cultural exchanges. Special emphasis is given to international affairs at the Fletcher School of International Law and Diplomacy of Tufts College and at the International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University. International Relations Clubs, Cosmopolitan Clubs, and World Friendship Clubs dot the campuses of the nation.

The courses in the colleges and universities are of the widest range. International law is a popular course. Courses on international organization, "international relations," foreign affairs, or foreign policy are common. In many institutions there are courses bearing upon such regions as the Far East, Latin America, or Europe. Courses on foreign trade, world geography, and international economic policies indicate a further range. Courses on the psychology of international relations have invaded the curriculum. The foreign language courses

are, of course, indispensable, and are found in most institutions. A newer development is the introduction into the high-school curriculum of courses entitled "international relations" or some equivalent title. The National Education Association has recently expressed itself formally on the need for appropriate attention to world affairs.

Besides the educational work that is going on in the public schools and the colleges and universities of the United States, a number of unofficial organizations and agencies are carrying on programs of value in the dissemination of useful information on world affairs. The following pages present a brief descriptive note on several of these unofficial agencies. More detailed information may be obtained by addressing the offices of the various organizations as listed at the close of the present chapter.

It is evident that a vital link with public-school training is found in the fact that many public-school teachers are now availing themselves of the opportunities of enlarging their vision as to problems of international relations by active contacts with extramural agencies. The activities of only a few such organizations can be summarized here. A more complete directory is appended to the "Notes."

Foreign Policy Association. The Foreign Policy Association maintains a research department, headed by Dr. Raymond Leslie Buell, who is also president of the association. A weekly *Foreign Policy Bulletin* is devoted to brief comment by members of the research staff upon selected topics of timely interest in world affairs. *Special Headline Books* deal with timely questions as they arise. The *Foreign Policy Reports*, by individual members of the staff, are well-documented surveys of important issues or developments in contemporary international affairs. The Association holds luncheon and dinner meetings at which addresses on current problems of international interest are presented. Several branches have been organized throughout the nation.

Council on Foreign Relations. The Council on Foreign Relations of New York is "primarily a research organization for the scientific and impartial study of international relations"; it has a limited membership except as to academic members. The findings of many of its expert study groups and the views of outstanding authorities are reflected in important articles in its influential quarterly review,

Foreign Affairs. It also publishes an *Annual Survey of American Foreign Relations*, and a *Political Handbook of the World*.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This organization, founded in 1910 by Andrew Carnegie, is organized under three divisions: the Division of Intercourse and Education, under the direction of Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler; the Division of International Law, directed by Dr. James Brown Scott; and the Division of Economics and History, with Professor James T. Shotwell as director.

The Division of Intercourse and Education publishes *International Conciliation* pamphlets and assists International Relations Clubs in colleges and universities in the United States and in many countries of the world, especially by providing gratis selected books and pamphlets for students' international relations libraries and by donating important current books to "International Mind Alcoves" in the public libraries in smaller towns and cities throughout the country. This division has sponsored visits abroad of teachers and editors; it has from time to time sent special lecturers from educational institutions in the United States to those in other countries; and recently an Inter-American Section has also been established.

The Division of International Law has been active in promoting the advancement of international law by assisting international conferences; in co-operation with the University of Michigan it has maintained a summer course for teachers of international law and relations; it has collected and published data on the teaching of international law, and provided fellowships for students and teachers in this field. It has published *Classics of International Law*, and given subventions to journals on international law, and to international law societies for the publication of works on international law. The Division has taken an active interest in the codification of international law; it aided in the establishment of the Academy of International Law at the Hague and now assists in its maintenance.

The Division of Economics and History since 1920 has published the *Economic and Social History of the World War*. This series, which has been edited by the Division's director, includes several national series written by scholars of the countries that participated in the war. Taken together, the 155 volumes give a comprehensive view of modern war upon the normal life of civilized nations. At

present the endowment is sponsoring a series of research projects in Canadian-American relations.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace maintains a European center in Paris for the purpose of linking the work in the United States with similar projects that it sponsors in Europe. Professor Shotwell is also aiding the advancement of world affairs studies by virtue of his position as chairman of the American National Committee on Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations.

World Peace Foundation. Founded in Boston in 1910, the World Peace Foundation was organized as a non-profit educational agency devoted to the objective of world peace. As stated in the By-Laws of the Foundation, by Mr. Edwin Ginn of Ginn and Company, the donor, the purpose of the Foundation is to educate the people of all nations "to a full knowledge of the waste and destructiveness of war, its evil effects on present social conditions and on the well-being of future generations, and to promote international justice and the brotherhood of man; and, generally, by every practical means to promote peace and good will among all mankind." In a recent statement the Board of Trustees has declared that

... the Foundation operates upon the policy that the actual facts concerning international relations and official international cooperation constitute the best possible arguments for lasting peace and improved international understanding. Its activities are, therefore, focused upon the task of making these facts available in clear and undistorted form.

The useful work done by the Foundation in acting as distributing agent in the United States for the publications of the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the International Labor Organization, has recently been taken over by the Columbia University Press. The World Peace Foundation, however, continues its research and educational programs.

Rockefeller Foundation. The Rockefeller Foundation and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial were consolidated as The Rockefeller Foundation in January, 1929. The consolidated organization maintains an International Health Division that does effective health work in many parts of the world and co-operates actively with the health work of the League of Nations. The Foundation

also gives financial assistance to a number of efforts and agencies that are influencing international relations. Among these grants are those to the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Social Science Research Council (including fellowships in the social sciences), the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, the Geneva Research Center, the Geneva Post-Graduate Institute of International Studies, and the International Institute of Agriculture. The list of contributions made by this Foundation in the field of world affairs is indeed a long one.

Institute of International Education. The Institute began its services on February 1, 1919. It is supported by the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. Its object is to develop "international good will and education through such activities as the exchange of professors; the establishment of international fellowships; the holding of conferences on the problems of international education; and the publication of books and pamphlets on the systems of education of the different countries." The Administrative Board of the Institute is widely representative of organized educational groups in the United States. The Institute has offices and representatives in many countries of the world; it represents many foreign educational institutions and efforts for the purposes of student exchange, administers a large number of scholarships and fellowships of an international character, and assists exchange professors. It publishes a monthly News Bulletin that reports matters of interest in the field of international education. The Institute is one of the most important clearing houses in the United States for information on matters falling within the scope of its activities. It maintains a foreign lecturers' service bureau and a special Latin American Division. In a special report on March 1, 1936, describing the *Institute of International Education: Its Organization, Aims and Activities*, it was stated:

Under the various Exchanges there was, between 1922 and 1936, an interchange of 2555 students in the United States representing 1192 American Students abroad and 1363 foreign students in the United States; in addition, 453 Americans were sent to Europe on the additional special grants (offered by other organizations), making a total of 3008. A conservative cash estimate of the value of the exchange fellowships may be given as one and a half million* dollars, and adding to that \$304,800, the actual cash value of the

fellowships other than those under the exchanges, it will be seen that the value of the fellowships administered by the Institute over a period of fourteen years approaches the two million mark.

The Institute maintains and administers the Paris and London offices of the American University Union, which serves as a bond between the universities in the countries concerned.

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. This foundation, organized in 1925, permits advanced students to carry on researches and to publish works dealing with world affairs. The foundation does not deal exclusively with international affairs, but some of the fellows have elected to study in this field. In 1929 the Foundation began a policy of allowing exchange fellowships between the United States, Mexico, and certain countries of South America.

The National Peace Conference. This co-operative agency endeavors to co-ordinate the peace efforts of over two score peace organizations in the United States. It serves as a sort of clearing house, arranges radio programs, publishes books and pamphlets on world affairs, and is sponsoring a program of world economic co-operation. It stresses practical contacts with officials of the government.

The League of Nations Association. The Association embraces in its membership those who are interested in advancing the usefulness of the League of Nations. It carries on essay contests, assists in arranging "model assemblies," publishes and distributes literature concerning the League and related topics, and aids in placing speakers. It also sponsors motion pictures dealing with the creation and work of the League.

The Institute of Pacific Relations. This organization embraces representatives of nations bordering upon the Pacific Ocean. It stresses research work concerning problems bearing upon the countries of the area affected. It publishes a quarterly entitled *Pacific Affairs* and useful bulletins and reports, as well as more comprehensive volumes. It maintains offices in some twelve countries. Important conferences are held periodically in various countries of the Pacific area.

International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation at Paris has sponsored several conferences on the study and teaching of international rela-

tions.¹ The writer had the privilege of attending such a conference on the University Teaching of International Relations, at Prague, May 23-27, 1938. This was the Eleventh Session of the Permanent Conference on Higher International Studies, the first being held in Berlin in 1928. Under the same auspices, experts from various nations continued discussion of a most important research study on Economic Policies in Relation to World Peace. It is the plan of the directors of this research to assemble the reports of the various national groups into a final "master" report bringing together the findings of the experts in all parts of the world. This vital research study is well advanced; it is a splendid example of the possibilities of international cultural co-operation.

The Institute has published a number of useful volumes and special studies in the field of international cultural relations.

NOTES

1. Full information concerning these conferences and the publications of the organization may be obtained by addressing the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Palais Royal, 2, Rue de Montpensier, Paris, France.

ADDRESSES OF AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE IN THE STUDY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

American Association of University Women

1634 I Street, Washington, D. C. Maintains a department on international relations.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Division of Intercourse and Education, 405 West 117 Street, New York City; Division of International Law, 700 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.; Division of Economics and History, 405 West 117 Street, New York City; European Center, 173 Boulevard Saint Germain, Paris.

Council on Foreign Relations, 45 East 65 Street, New York City.

Department of Justice and Good-Will, *Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America*, 105 East 22 Street, New York City.

Fellowship of Reconciliation, 2929 Broadway, New York City.

Foreign Policy Association, 8 West 40 Street, New York City.

Institute of International Education, 2 West 45 Street, New York City.

Institute of Pacific Relations, American Office located at 129 East 52 Street, New York City. The secretariat is located at 1641 South Beretania Street, Honolulu, T. H.

International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Palais Royal, 2, Rue de Montpensier, Paris, France.

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, 551 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

- League of Nations Association*, 8 West 40 Street, New York City.
National Committee for the Cause and Cure of War, Grand Central Terminal,
 New York City.
National Council for Prevention of War, 532 Seventeenth Street, N. W., Wash-
 ington, D. C.
National League of Women Voters, 726 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.
 Maintains a department on international relations.
National Peace Conference, 8 West 40 Street, New York City.
Rockefeller Foundation, 49 West 49 Street, New York City.
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 532 Seventeenth Street,
 New York City.
World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, 70 Fifth
 Avenue, New York City.
World Peaceways, 103 Park Avenue, New York City.
World Peace Foundation, 40 Mount Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts.
Note. This list does not purport to be exhaustive; it does indicate, however,
 the widespread interest in world affairs in the United States.

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Report of the Commission on the Coordination of Efforts for Peace. Oberlin, Ohio: Oberlin College, 1933. Contains, among other things, a directory index of agencies in the United States promoting international understanding.
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SUMMARY

The "Roads to Peace" have been frequently projected and surveyed, but after many centuries, they remain only "blue-prints."

The major difficulty is not in the determination of the desired destination, for there is complete agreement; it is not in selecting the general direction, for such signposts as arbitration, trade agreements, and even disarmament are placed conspicuously on any proposed route to international understanding. The difficulty is, rather, the material with which such a road must be constructed. Human material is at the same time more variable and less plastic than steel girdles or concrete.

The high degree of variability has been continuously demonstrated throughout this volume and especially in this last section. The communist seeks peace through a world in which the "common man" assumes the reins of government and the economic motive is abolished from the earth. The fascist seeks the same goal by recognizing different classes but compelling them to co-operate for the common good. The fascists are strongly nationalistic, the communists international. Both systems impose a rigid discipline on the people, curtail personal liberty, maintain that the state as a living organism is superior and has prior rights to the individuals composing it. Both systems crush opposition ruthlessly and both reject parliamentary government and the theory of popular sovereignty. In international relations, communism has given up its former attempts to make the world communistic. This task has now been assumed by fascism and nazism, which hope to impose

their ideology by the show of force and under the guise of the right nationalistic self-determination. The advocate of democracy is convinced that through the eventual fulfillment of the ideals of liberty and equality and fraternity for nations as well as for individuals this world will become a place fit to live in after all. The agencies of education, including religion, seek peace through enlightenment and declarations of high idealism, believing that conviction is based upon knowledge. Such knowledge may be dogmatic and vested in authority or purely informational, leaving the individual free to formulate his own judgments.

Theoretically, the individual is the most plastic medium in the universe. For any one person this is true, for at birth he is little more than a bundle of potentialities. Realistically, however, the individual is not so plastic. He is born into a cultural environment rooted deep in the past. Before he is mature enough for critical evaluation this environment has fitted him to the common last of the community and the state. Its ideology has become his own.

Frankly facing these two facts, we have only one possible conclusion: there is not one road to peace, but many. It is but an ideal dream to envision a fusioning of the ideologies of communism, fascism, socialism, and democracy. Yet all are here—each insistent that the elusive peace will become a reality when its “system” will have been universalized.

Despite the failure of the political efforts for collective security, this is still the only means through which varying ideologies may be retained yet joint action be made possible. Unfortunately, within our generation, the degree to which this can be achieved is wholly dependent upon two other developments: the inculcation of the same firm conviction in the principles of democracy now held in their own ideologies by the adherents of other “political faiths,” and the strengthen-

ing of the position of democracies through increased strength of arms and through unity of action.

The need of, the first is forcefully emphasized by W. H. Shepardson and W. O. Scroggs in *The United States in World Affairs in 1937* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938, pp. 16-17):

One of the distinguishing things about democracy is that it *has* no ideology, *is* no ideology. It welcomes many opinions, tolerates many creeds, protects minority interests, gathers political parties like foxes under its tunic without squirming, governs best by governing least—and suffers fools gladly. It proceeds on the theory that the state exists for man, not man for the state; and it observes the principle that, however important the ends of organized society may be, it is even more important that these ends be attained only by democratic methods.

Thus democracy is not an “ideology” within the current meaning of that word. It lacks a complete and consistent set of interlocking dogmas. It is not a fighting creed. It bears no resemblance to politically organized passion such as directed the Spanish Inquisition, Cromwell’s Protectorate, the French Revolution, Trotsky’s Russia—and today, Hitler’s Germany. It is true that democracy, as such, once did put on shining armor to fight as Woodrow Wilson stated in his address to Congress, April 2, 1917, “for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.”

But that crusade did not pan out as advertised; and though there is available today another chance for democracy, as such, to get on horseback and ride off to make the world safe, that opportunity will probably not be seized.

The second development is equally essential. In a world girded in armaments, the nation weak in the power of self-defense has little voice in determining even her own destinies as abundantly evidenced in the Four Power Pact at Munich and its results during the succeeding months. The idealist may cry for universal disarmament, and it may be a goal for future generations; but the realist must recognize that respect in the council of nations is today in direct proportion to the force of arms.

The editors of this book are neither militarists nor alarmists. We earnestly seek the roads to peace. We have sought to present the problem in its entirety and in all its complexity, neither minimizing its difficulties nor overemphasizing the successes or failures of the many attempts at its solution. We have sought constantly to be realistic and earnestly believe that the weaknesses of democracy, as shown in the lack of conviction in its own system and in the unwillingness to use its military as well as moral strength, have been major factors in blocking all roads to peace. Non-democratic forms of government have been willing to fight for their beliefs and their rights; democracies often have been starry-eyed or on the defensive. In the future they must prove to themselves and to others that they will not be engulfed by their opponents. We do not advocate "riding off" on another crusade, but we are of the firm conviction that internal unity and united strength will do much to restore peace and security to a war-ridden world. Religion and education may be effective instruments in achieving some form of internationalism and may lay the basis of a permanent peace based upon co-operation rather than fear, when, very literally, tanks "may be beaten into plowshares and war will be no more."

Man wants the toil and the dangers of adventure, but at the end of the trail he wants peace.

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